GAMBETTA 


X.O<n^   ^^t^«-Z^<2^^J7^^" 


GAMBETTA 


PAUL^  bESCHANEL 

A  — 
President  of  the  hrench  Republic 


NEW    YORK 
DODD,    MEAD    AND    COMPANY 

1920 


Printed  in  Great  B'itain. 


FOREWORD 

When  M.  Louis  Battifol  asked  me  for  a  book  on 
Gambetta,  and  expressed  a  desire  that  its  publication  should 
coincide  with  the  signing  of  Peace,  I  felt  it  impossible  to 
decline  the  honour.  I  wrote  these  pages  during  the  rare 
moments  of  leisure  allowed  to  me  by  my  duties  in  the 
Chamber;  and  thus,  in  a  certain  sense,  I  lived  through  the 
two  wars  at  one  and  the  same  time.  I  disregarded  all  pane- 
gyrics, all  pamphlets,  all  legends,  whether  flattering  or  not : 
I  sought  the  truth  alone — and  no  homage  could  be  greater. 
I  have  ignored  the  enthusiasms  and  hot-headed  passions  of 
our  youth,  and  even  the  claims  of  gratitude — for  it  was 
Gambetta  who  launched  me  on  the  life  of  politics.  In  this 
book,  only  one  passion  is  to  be  found  :  the  passion  for  France. 
He  loved  her  ardently.  He  gave  his  whole  life  for  her.  He 
will  live  in  history  as  the  personification  of  the  nation's  resist- 
ance in  1870.  His  ideal  was  always  the  regeneration  of 
his  country.  His  memory  is  for  ever  associated  with  the 
restoration  of  justice.  P.  D. 


CONTENTS 

PART    I 
BEFORE  THE  WAR   (1838-1870) 

CHAPTER  I 

rACK 

HIS   CHILDHOOD   AND   EARLY  CAREER 3 

CHAPTER   II 

THE  BAUDIN  CASE  AND  GAMBETTA'S  ELECTION  AS  A  DEPUTY    .         21 

CHAPTER   III 

THE   QUARREL  WITH   PRUSSIA 34 

PART    II 

THE  WAR   (1870-1871) 

CHAPTER   IV 

JJATIONAL  DEFENCE 47 

CHAPTER   V 

GAMBETTA   AT  TOURS 66 

CHAPTER   VI 

THE  DELEGATION  OF  TOURS  AND  THE  MILITARY  OPERATIONS    .         78 

CHAPTER   VII 

THE   END  OF  THE   DELEGATION 99 

CHAPTER   VIII 

WAR  A  OUTRANGE Ill 


CONTENTS 

PART    III 

THE  NATIONAL  ASSEMBLY  AND  THE  ESTABLISHMENT 
OF  THE   REPUBLIC   (1871-1875) 

CHAPTER   IX 

THE   NATIONAL  ASSEMBLY 137 

CHAPTER   X 

THE   NEW   REPUBLIC I52 

CHAPTER   XI 

THE   FALL   OF  THIERS  '.     MARSHAL  MACMAHON       ....       169 

CHAPTER   XII 

GAMBETTA   AND  THE   CONSTITUTION 184 

CHAPTER   XIII 

THE   SPIRIT   OF  THE   1875   CONSTITUTION 200 

PART    IV 

THE    EARLY    STAGES    OF   PARLIAMENTARY    REPUBLIC 

(1876-1882) 

CHAPTER  XIV 

GAMBETTA's   IDEAS 211 

CHAPTER   XV 

THE   SIXTEENTH   OF   MAY 226 

CHAPTER  XVI 

GAMBETTA  AND  BISMARCK  :    THE  PRESIDENCY  OF  THE  CHAMBER      246 

CHAPTER  XVII 

"  THE  POWER  BEHIND  THE  THRONE  "  I    "  THE  DICTATORSHIP  "      27I 

CHAPTER   XVIII 

THE    GRAND    MINISTRY 297 

CHAPTER    XIX 

DEATH 312 

Bibliography 331 

Index 333 

viii 


PART   I 

BEFORE   THE   WAR 

(1838-1870) 


CHAPTER    I 

HIS    CHILDHOOD   AND    EARLY    CAREER 

Montfaucoii  and  Cahors — Student  Life  (Jan.,  i8s7-June,  l86i) — Intellectual 
Development — The  Young  Lawyer  (June,  1861) — The  Buelte  Case  (July,  1862) 
— The  \'()ung  Friend  of  the  Five — An  Unelected  Deputy  (1868). 

Among  the  glories  of  the  Gulf  of  Genoa,  on  the  lowest  slope 
of  the  Apennines,  between  Savona  and  Varazze,  a  little  town 
looks  out  upon  the  sea  from  the  shelter  of  two  headlands. 
It  is  Celle  in  Liguria,  the  cradle  of  the  Gambettas.  From 
Celle  Baptisle  Gambctta,  Leon's  grandfather,  sailed  to  the 
coast  of  France  with  the  produce  of  his  own  coast,  sweet  oil, 
macaroni,  vermicelli  and  pottery;  then,  from  Cette,  the 
Languedoc  Canal  took  him  to  Toulouse,  and  he  explored  the 
tributaries  of  the  Garonne  in  search  of  fresh  markets.  In 
1 818  he  arrived  at  Cahors,  and,  liking  the  place,  he  settled 
dow^n  there  with  his  three  sons,  Paul,  Michel  and  Joseph,  and 
started  a  crockery  and  grocery  business  in  the  Place  du 
Marche,  In  1824  the  statesman's  father,  Joseph,  in  accord- 
ance with  the  custom  in  such  families,  made  a  voyage  to  Chili 
as  a  ten-year-old  cabin-boy,  in  a  sailing-vessel  from  the 
Genoese  Riviera  :  a  vessel  that  carried  as  passengers — so  it  is 
said — Garibaldi  and  the  priest  Mastai,  afterwards  Pope 
Pius  IX.  In  his  old  age  Baptiste  returned  to  Celle  to  die, 
taking  with  him  his  eldest  son  and  leaving  the  two  others 
at  Cahors.  When  their  success  in  business  was  assured  they 
began  to  trade  independently.  Joseph  opened  the  Genoese 
Bazaar  in  the  Place  de  la  Cathedrale,  and  on  July  25,  1837, 
at  the  age  of  twenty-three,  married  a  girl  of  twenty-two 
named  Marie  Magdeleine  Massabie,  the  daughter  of  a  chemist 

3  B  ;1 


GAMBETTA 

at  Molieres,  in  Tarn-et-Garonne.  Of  this  marriage  was  born, 
on  April  2,  1838,  on  the  second  storey  of  a  house  in  the  Rue 
du  Lycec,  the  future  Minister  of  National  Defence. 

(icnoese,  Gascon  and  Cahorsin — such  was  Gambetta. 
Genoa  gave  him  adaptability,  charm  and  talent;  Gascony 
gave  him  dash,  daring  and  natural  eloquence ;  Cahors  gave 
him  his  tenacious  will.  The  Genoese  Riviera  evokes  visions 
of  stormy  achievement,  of  great  lives  of  adventure,  of 
Columbus,  Sixtus  IV.,  Julius  II.,  Mazzini,  Garibaldi;  Cahors 
recalls  scenes  of  bitter  struggle  and  fierce,  tenacious  resis- 
tance to  besieging  foes;  thus  the  orator's  eloquence  at  times 
was  like  Bessieres  or  Murat  charging  the  enemy.  There  was 
in  him  something  akin  to  those  practical  doges  who  succeeded 
in  founding  the  firmest  of  governments  amid  the  distractions 
of  civil  strife.  The  people  of  the  Ligurian  coast  have  deeper 
emotions,  more  violent  and  unbridled  desires,  and  more  im- 
perious wills  than  ours.  It  was  natural  that  he  should  dare 
greatly,  that  he  should  seize  Fate  as  she  passed  and  force  her 
to  follow  him. 

When  he  was  four  years  old  his  father  placed  him  in  the 
Petits-Carmes,  at  Cahors.  When  he  was  eight  his  life  was 
endangered  by  an  internal  complaint  that  made  him  ill  for  a 
month.  He  was  believed  to  be  dying  :  the  same  malady 
troubled  him  all  his  life,  and  finally  killed  him  at  the  height 
of  his  powers,  both  mental  and  physical.  His  next  school 
was  the  little  college  at  Montfaucon.  At  the  age  of  ten  he 
was  a  republican,  writing  to  his  father  :  "  Vive  Cavaignac  !  " 
(sic),  "  Down  with  Bonaparte!  "  A  year  later  an  accident 
cost  him  his  right  eye.  During  the  holidays  he  was  in  the 
habit  of  visiting  one  of  his  father's  neighbours,  a  cutler  by 
trade.  One  day  a  workman  was  drilling  a  hole  in  a  knife- 
handle  of  horn.  The  child,  in  his  anxiety  to  watch  the  work 
at  close  quarters,  hid  beneath  the  bench,  then  suddenly  sprang 
out  from  his  hiding-place.  At  the  same  instant  the  drill 
passed  beyond  the  edge  of  the  bench  and  struck  the  eye  of 
the  boy,  who  fainted  away,  and  was  drenched  with  blood. 

When  he  was  fourteen  he  entered  the  Lycee  at  Cahors. 
His  professor  of  rhetoric,  M.  Arnault,  a  man  well  versed  in 

4 


HIS  CHILDHOOD  AND  EARLY  CAREER 

the  humanities,  divined  his  abiHties.  A  speech  that  pur- 
ported to  be  addressed  by  fi'tienne  Marcel  to  the  States- 
General  of  1356,  but  was  sij:,med  L(!^on  Gambetta,  went  the 
round  of  the  l.yc6c.  He  already  loved  Rabelais.  He  knew 
the  Olynthiennes  by  heart,  and  never  forgot  them  ;  and  seven 
years  later,  when  in  the  country  with  Clement  Laurier,  the 
young  lawyer  one  evening-  recited  a  speech  of  Demosthenes 
with  an  imaginative  fervour  that  won  the  admiration  of 
Villemain. 

At  the  age  of  eighteen  he  was  admitted  to  the  degree  of 
Bachelor.  The  boy  had  long  been  dreaming  of  Italy,  of 
Celle  in  Liguria;  and  his  father  took  him  there  as  a  reward. 
His  beautiful  letters  to  his  mother  during  these  first  travels 
were  full  of  enthusiasm.  He  wrote  of  Montpellier,  Lunel, 
Aigues-Mortes  :  "At  Aigues-Mortes  I  saw  the  sea  for  the 
first  time;  it  is  much  the  most  magnificent  sight  among  the 
finest  that  Nature  gives  us";  of  Nimes  and  its  arenas;  of 
Marseilles — "  Marseilles  is  at  our  feet,  and  in  the  distance  is 
Corsica,  an  enchanting  and  intoxicating  picture  that  gives 
one  a  glimpse  of  the  wonders  of  Italy";  of  Italy  itself;  of 
Nice,  where  he  was  fated  to  lie  in  his  last  sleep,  in  ground 
that  was  no  longer  Italian,  but  French ;  and  of  the  splendour 
of  the  Genoese  Riviera,  where  every  turn  of  the  Corniche 
reveals  new  beauties.  In  every  drop  of  his  blood  was  a 
passionate  love  for  that  Latin  sea,  whose  son  indeed  he  w-as. 

At  last  he  came  to  Celle  and  its  pretty  late-Renaissance 
church,  with  the  rare  marbles,  and  the  pictures  by  Raphael's 
beloved  pupil,  Perino  del  Vaga,  and  the  rich  embroideries 
given  by  the  Queen  of  Naples.  Here  he  found  his  grand- 
father, with  "the  most  adorable  old  head  anyone  ever  saw, 
and  magnificent  hair,  soft  as  that  of  a  boy  but  whiter  than 
snow,  and  a  skin  whiter  than  his  hair,  and  a  smile  on  his  little 
pink  lips,  and  his  whole  face  lit  up  by  a  pair  of  still  brilliant 
little  black  eyes";  and  here,  too,  were  friends,  sailors  and 
fishermen,  honest,  serious  folk,  inured  to  hard  work,  "  with 
something  in  them  still  of  the  rocks  and  mountains,"  as  Dante 
said.  Here,  in  a  narrow,  climbing  street,  a  commemorative 
tablet  shows  the  simple  house  with  a  two-windowed  frontage, 

5 


GAMBETTA 

where  Joseph  was  born  when  imperial  France  encroached  on 
Lombardy.  There  I  once  saw  Gambetta's  cousin,  AngeHna 
Ghersi,  a  net-maker,  whose  mother  was  Joseph's  sister  :  a  true 
Gambctta,  with  the  same  profile,  the  same  colouring,  the 
same  vivid,  alert,  magnetic  glance,  the  same  fire  in  eye  and 
speech,  despite  her  seventy-seven  years.  She  told  me  secrets. 
"  When  L6on  was  here,"  she  said,  "  he  lived  on  the  shore. 
He  wanted  to  marry  my  sister,  who  was  better-looking  than 
I,  but  his  father  was  against  it  because  she  had  no  dowry." 

The  Saracen  origin  of  these  people  is  evident.  All  along 
this  coast  the  Phoenician  type,  dark  colouring  with  the  nose 
arched,  can  be  distinguished  from  the  Ligurian  type,  chestnut 
hair  and  light  eyes.  Gambetta  has  been  called  a  Jew.  The 
Gambettas  have  been  Catholics  for  generations,  and  strict 
Catholics,  moreover;  several  of  Leon's  uncles  were  priests. 

After  Celle  the  travellers  visited  the  battlefield  of  Monte- 
notte  :  "  It  was  there  that  Bonaparte  performed  his  wonders, 
and  won  glory  and  Italy.  Before  seeing  this  country  one 
regards  Bonaparte  as  a  great  tactician,  but  when  once  one  has 
seen  his  battle-grounds  one  begins  to  say  '  He  was  the  God 
of  War!'" 

Next  came  Genoa  the  Superb,  and  her  palaces.  He  who  in 
later  years  could  discourse  so  understandingly  of  Memling, 
Van  Eyck  and  Reynolds,  of  Turners,  Corots  and  Millets  (he 
never  liked  music  :  it  actually  repelled  him),  would  no  doubt 
have  described  to  his  mother  the  incomparable  Titians  of  the 
Palazzo  Rosso,  and  the  alluring  woman  whom  the  painter 
loved,  if  the  galleries  of  these  great  houses  had  at  that  time 
been  open  to  such  humble  visitors. 

They  returned  by  way  of  Turin,  the  Alps,  Savoy,  Grenoble 
and  Lvons.  He  came  back  to  his  home  dazzled  and 
enchanted,  with  a  heart  eager  for  further  adventures,  other 
delights  and  other  dreams. 

His  father,  who  had  worked  long  and  hard,  and  knew  the 
value  of  money,  feared  the  unknown  for  his  son  ;  he  wished 
to  make  a  sound  merchant  of  him  and  keep  him  in  the 
counting-house.  But  the  women — his  mother,  sister  and 
aunt — foresaw  a  different  sort  of  future  for  him.     The  mayor 

6 


HIS  CHILDHOOD  AND  EARLY  CAREER 

of  the  town,  M.  Acliille  Bessieres,  wIkj  had  his  eye  on  the 
boy,  came  to  their  aid.  The  father  yielded  at  last,  and  sent 
him  to  Paris  to  study  law.  He  \Nas  then  nineteen.  His 
wings  were  spread  and  his  star  was  in  sight  :  in  ten  years' 
time  he  was  to  conquer  Paris — and  fame. 

Then  followed  the  life  of  a  poor  student  in  the  Quartier 
Latin.  He  slept  under  the  roof  in  biting  cold,  "  feasted  on 
eighteen  sous  a  day,"  and  wrote  by  the  light  of  a  street-lamp. 
He  hoped,  with  the  help  of  one  of  his  former  masters  at  Mont- 
faucon,  to  fmd  some  pupils,  but  *'  Fortune  is  so  full  of  caprice, 
especially  in  her  dealings  with  young  men,  as  Charles  V. 
said!  "  In  order  to  buy  some  winter  clothes  he  arranged  to 
correct  Greek  proof-sheets  for  a  printer  during  the  vacation. 

His  father  was  at  first  disturbed  and  irritated,  but  said 
nothing.  To  reassure  him  and  win  him  over,  the  boy  made 
a  joke  of  his  hardships,  showing  not  only  deep  respect  but 
also  considerable  skill  in  his  dealings  with  a  parent  who  loved 
him  truly,  but  seemed  harsh  because  he  knew  the  cruelty  of  a 
struggle  with  poverty,  and  because  he  feared  Paris.  It 
required  constant  diplomacy  on  the  boy's  part  to  secure  the 
modest  supplies  that  enabled  him  to  live  while  he  was  climb- 
ing the  ladder.  When  once  his  studies  were  finished,  he 
felt,  he  could  decide  whether  to  follow  his  father's  trade  or  to 
attempt  a  legal  career.  His  letters,  which  overflow  with 
gratitude  and  tender  feeling,  give  evidence  of  a  heart  of  gold 
and  an  immense  craving  for  love.  They  reflect  perfectly  the 
virtues  of  the  French  family  :  hard  work,  economy,  mutual 
devotion,  and — though  these  sons  of  the  people  must  count 
every  franc  and  even  every  copper — the  greatest  delicacy  of 
feeling,  the  greatest  moral  refinement.  Every  word  in  them 
is  innocent,  refreshing  and  wholesome. 

In  his  cold  lodging  he  sees,  mentally,  the  "  red  and  green  " 
waters  of  the  Lot,  the  narrow  valleys  with  their  rough  yellow 
soil  and  dark  grass,  "  the  rugged  landscape  where,  between 
two  mf)untain  sides,  is  hidden  the  house  which  shelters  certain 
heads  that  are  dearer  than  the  daylight";  and  he  breathes 
the  scent  of  the  orange-blossoms  and  verbenas  that  make  that 
southern    landscape   sweet.       And   these   fragrant  scenes  are 

7 


GAMBETTA 

illuminated  here  and  there  by  the  great  hope  that  is  dawning 
on  the  horizon  and  gilds  the  mountain-tops:  "France  is 
awakening.  The  time  is  near.  You  will  smile,  perhaps;  it 
is  true  that  I  am  too  impetuous;  but  the  people's  sufferings 
are  so  great  that  a  moment  of  enthusiasm  may  well  be  for- 
given !  "     (June  9,  1857.) 

In  his  twentieth  year  he  was  present  at  the  trial  of  Orsini. 
On  the  one  side  was  Chaix  d'Est-Ange,  and  on  the  other  were 
Jules  Favre,  Cremieux  and  Liouville.  "  I  have  been  pre- 
paring my  heart,  my  ears,  and  my  memory  for  a  week. 
O  Fate!  when  shall  I  be  preparing  my  words?  "  He  prac- 
tised on  a  funeral  oration  by  Bossuet,  and  speeches  by 
Mirabeau,  Vergniaud  and  Danton,  trying  to  imitate  the 
different  orators  by  varying  the  intonation,  inflexions  and 
rhythm. 

On  October  29,  1859,  during  the  vacation,  he  made  at  the 
inairie  at  Cahors  the  declaration  imposed  by  law  upon  all 
children  born  in  France  to  foreign  fathers.  Thenceforward 
he  was  French. 

At  the  age  of  twenty-two  he  passed  all  his  examinations 
with  brilliant  success.  "The  high  road  lies  open  before  us; 
we  must  take  it  resolutely,  head  in  air,  and  fight  well.  I  am 
quite  ready.  .  .  .  Oh,  how  I  am  longing  to  speak.  My 
tongue  is  on  fire.  /  am  afraid  of  being  afraid,  as  Alontaigne 
said.  When  will  that  grand  day  come?  I  read  and  re-read 
the  masters  of  speech ;  I  learn  all  I  can  by  going  to  the 
theatre  and  the  courts;  I  look  everywhere  for  lessons  and 
models.  Why  should  I  hide  it  from  you,  dear  father?  I  am 
devoured  by  ambition.  But,  after  all,  ambition  is  not  a 
crime  !  Pride  is  a  force,  and,  with  work  for  a  lever  and 
necessity  to  spur  him  on,  what  cannot  be  achieved  by  an 
enthusiastic  and  honest  youth,  who  has  his  father's  whole 
life  for  an  example?  "     (February  27,  i860.) 

His  instructors  urged  him  to  try  for  a  fellowship  and  a 
professor's  career,  but  this  time  it  was  his  fate  to  fail.  He 
was  called  to  the  Bar,  and  took  the  oath  on  June  8,  1861. 

His  father  wished  him  to  practise  at  Cahors,  but  the  women 
of  the  family  insisted  on  his  being  left  in  Paris.     His  father 

8 


HIS  CHILDHOOD  AND  EARLY  CAREER 

consented  on  one  condition  :  that  the  young  lawyer's  aunt, 
Jenny  Massabie,  should  join  him  there  and  preside  over  his 
modest  establishment.  To  the  last  Gambetta  gave  a  son's 
love  to  this  aunt,  who  devoted  herself  to  him  with  single- 
hearted  adoration  :  "  I  shall  always  be  deeply  grateful  to  her 
for  her  striking  proof  of  affection  in  sacrificing  her  whole 
future  to  my  happiness;  for  I  know  very  well  that  her  presence 
will  change  me  completely,  and  that  study  will  become  my 
daily  bread,  instead  of  being,  as  hitherto,  carried  on  by  fits 
and  starts." 

For  his  contemporaries  he  became  a  centre,  a  rallying-point, 
a  leader  :  he  attracted  them  in  Paris  as  he  had  attracted  them 
at  Cahors.  And  he  talked,  and  talked,  and  talked  !  Everv 
chair  was  his  rostrum.  This  group  of  ardent  youths  met  of 
an  evening  at  the  Caf6  Procope,  in  the  Rue  de  I'Ancienne- 
Com^die,  as  once  Piron,  Voltaire,  Jean-Jacques,  Diderot, 
d'Alembert  and  d'Holbach  had  been  wont  to  meet,  and 
Danton  and  his  friends,  and  as  Verlaine  and  Mor^as  met 
afterwards.  There  he  practised  his  art,  attacking,  retorting, 
improvising  on  every  kind  of  subject  w-ith  magnificent  assur- 
ance and  the  fury  of  one  possessed — but  the  sort  of  fury  that 
knows  what  it  is  aiming  at  and  stops  when  it  chooses — in  a 
voice  of  thunder  and  a  strong  provincial  accent,  overflowing 
with  life,  bursting  with  energy,  all  fire  and  keenness,  all 
impetuosity  and  magnetism. 

Soon  the  left  bank  of  the  Seine  no  longer  satisfied  him,  and 
he  crossed  the  bridges.  In  the  caf^s  of  the  boulevards  he 
met  and  became  intimate  with  Spuller,  H(^brard,  and  the 
editors  of  the  leading  journals  of  the  opposition  :  L'Avenir 
national,  he  Journal  de  Paris,  L' Opinion,  he  Reveil,  he 
Siecle,  he  Temps,  ha  Tribune,  etc.  Meanwhile  he  worked  in 
the  chambers  of  M.  de  Jouy,  a  nephew  of  the  dramatist. 

On  the  death  of  Cavour  he  w^rote  "  An  Address  to  Young 
Italy,"  which  was  published  in  all  the  papers  :  "  Cavour  has 
died  of  patriotism,  a  glorious  and  devouring  disease  that 
attacks  none  but  the  great-hearted.  Nations  that  aspire  to 
greatness  must,  like  heroes,  be  educated  in  the  school  of 
misfortune." 


GAMBETTA 

Mis  self-t'onfidence  and  enthusiasm  increased  day  by  day. 
On  August  15,  1S61,  he  wrote  :  "  My  dear  father,  I  am  taking 
advantage  of  this  fete-day,  when  all  the  people  are  in  the 
streets  and  ail  the  lawyers  in  the  country,  to  chat  with  you 
for  a  moment.  The  town  is  full  of  noises,  and  they  all  go  on 
under  my  windows.  I  am  thankful  to  escape  for  an  instant 
from  this  tumultuous  life,  and  to  fly  in  thought  to  the  calm- 
ness of  the  family  circle,  where  happiness  seems  to  consist  in 
silence  fraught  with  emotion.  Yet  it  is  of  my  emotions  that 
1  am  going  to  talk  to  you.  I  am  going  to  make  my  debut  on 
Thursday;  my  heart  is  beating  fast,  but  it  is  with  courage. 
I  am  longing  to  experience  the  baptism  of  the  Bar ;  I  shall 
never  be  so  happy  again ;  the  first  steps  of  a  career  have  the 
glamour  of  mystery.  During  the  past  three  months  I  have 
Ijeen  listening  to  all  the  lawyers  in  the  Courts,  and,  I  say  it 
without  pride,  my  hopes  are  twice  as  high  as  before.  Six- 
months  ago  I  trembled  to  think  of  opposing  the  great  men 
at  the  top  of  the  tree ;  now,  I  am  full  of  a  feeling  that  has  a 
strong  resemblance  to  audacity ;  but  it  is  an  appropriate 
moment  to  quote  Danton's  version  of  the  words  of  Christ : 
'  The  audacious  and  the  violent  shall  inherit  the  earth  !  '  " 

He  was  successful,  and  afterwards  spoke  every  week. 
La  Gazette  des  Trihunaux  reports  his  first  speech  in  the  assize- 
courts,  in  a  case  concerned  with  false  coin. 

The  dossiers  filled  him  with  delight  :  "  From  all  these  ivory- 
yellow  papers  there  emanates,  like  an  acrid  scent,  a  troubled 
sort  of  consciousness  that  mounts  to  my  brain  and  gives  me  a 
fever  for  work.  It  is  almost  grasping  the  palm  with  one's 
hand,  to  desire  it  so  intensely!  "     (October  31,  1861.) 

He  was  introduced  to  Ernest  Picard,  £mile  Ollivier  and 
Jules  Favre ;  and  in  December  was  admitted  to  the  Conference 
Mole,  over  w-hich  he  was  soon  to  preside.  The  junior  Bar 
entrusted  him  with  the  composition  of  an  address  to  Berryer, 
to  celebrate  the  latter's  fiftieth  year  of  legal  practice. 

On  December  30,  1861,  he  wrote  :  "  Thanks  to  you  and  all 
your  efforts  and  sacrifices,  dear  father,  I  am  at  the  dawn  of  a 
beautiful  day  !  When  noontide  comes  1  shall  go  to  you,  and 
with  my  arms  round  your  neck  I  shall  say  :  Father,  you  made 

10 


HIS  CHILDHOOD  AND  EARLY  CAREER 

my  happiness,  and  1  can  best  show  my  j^ratilude  by  bringing 
it  to  be  shared  with  you." 

When  he  lost  a  certain  case  in  which  Nicolet  was  his  oppo- 
nent, he  avenged  himself  so  thoroughly  in  the  lawyers'  con- 
ference that  he  was  congratulated  by  Jules  Favre  and 
Cremieux.  "  Crt^mieux  came  up  and  pressed  my  hand  and 
embraced  me ;  he  wanted  to  know  my  name,  my  age  and 
whence  I  came.  lie  foretold  the  most  splendid  future  in  the 
world  for  me,  and  invited  me  to  go  and  see  him  regularly.  1 
had  tears  in  my  eyes,  I  was  drunk  with  joy."  (February  14, 
1862.) 

These  joyous  fireworks  on  the  part  of  ambitious  youth  were 
modified  by  a  steady  presentiment  that  a  crisis  was  approach- 
ing :  "  The  political  situation  grows  blacker  every  day.  One 
hears  ominous  cracking  sounds.  Who  knows  whether  the 
time  is  not  at  hand,  as  Christ  said?  The  minds  of  the  public 
are  greatly  disturbed :  the  debates  in  the  Chambers,  the 
industrial  crisis,  the  financial  crisis,  and  the  general  difficulties 
that  beset  the  country  have  darkened  the  horizon  profoundly. 
It  is  a  time  for  heaving  the  lead,  to  find  out  where  we  are  and 
whither  we  are  going.  Towards  a  change,  that  is  certain  ; 
God  grant  it  may  be  a  useful  change  and  a  good  one!  " 
(February  25,  1862.) 

"In  the  Conference  des  Avocats,"  he  writes  in  the  follow- 
ing month,  "  I  was  cheered,  and  almost  carried  aloft  in 
triumph.  So  many  mouths  congratulated  me  all  at  once,  so 
many  hands  were  held  out  to  mine  in  gratitude  for  the 
pleasure  I  had  given — so  their  owners  declared — that  I  was 
wild  with  delight,  and  so  I  am  still  as  I  write  to  you.  I  am 
in  a  state  of  rapture,  and  I  send  you  my  success  and  joy  as 
the  finest  bouquet  for  your  birthday  !  " 

He  was  just  twenty-one  when  he  wrote,  on  April  12  :  "  I  low- 
can  I  describe  my  successes  to  you  ?  They  fulfil  all  my 
wishes.  Yesterday  I  secured  a  favourable  verdict  that  gave 
me  great  pleasure.  A  poor  old  woman  was  prosecuted  for 
causing  the  death  of  a  little  child  who  had  been  placed  in  her 
(^are ;  her  advanced  age,  her  poverty  and  her  innocence,  in 
which  1  believed,  filled  me  with  the  keenest  sympathy  for  her. 

II 


GAMBETTA 

I  defended  her  with  all  the  ardour  at  my  command,  and  had 
the  happiness  of  procuring  her  acquittal.  Oh  I  as  you  will 
easily  believe,  there  is  no  amount  of  money  that  can  give  us 
such  delight  or  move  us  so  profoundly.  I  shall  have  one  of 
these  performances  ready  for  you  some  day,  when  I  have  you 
safe  in  Paris." 

At  Cl(f^ment  Laurier's  request  he  wrote  an  unsigned  sketch 
of  Lachaud  for  La  Cour  d  Assises  of  May  lo,  1862,  in  which 
his  description  of  the  "  grand  avocat  des  passions  "  was  vir- 
tually a  portrait  of  himself,  of  his  own  opinion  and  vision  of 
himself — himself  as  he  fain  would  be — untrammelled,  spon- 
taneous, natural,  the  impetuous  debater,  shattering  the 
armour  of  his  foe.  "  His  speech  is  sudden  as  the  lightning. 
When  carried  away  by  anger,  he  growls,  like  a  lion  tearing 
his  prey.  His  natural  vivacity  fascinates  and  dominates  his 
audience,  leading  them  whither  he  will.  He  sees  everything, 
grasps  everything,  guesses  everything,  and  all  in  the  space  of 
a  few  minutes.  He  looks  his  opponent  in  the  face,  and  it 
would  seem  as  though  that  opponent  was  forced  to  provide 
him,  on  the  instant,  with  the  means  of  his  own  undoing.  In 
a  moment  the  full  strength  of  his  greatest  gift  bursts  forth  : 
that  sovereign  gift  of  speech,  excited  by  the  heat  of  debate. 
For  it  is  on  the  spot,  in  the  court,  that  he  creates  and  con- 
ceives, moulds  and  gives  life  to  his  work.  .  .  .  There  is  no 
preparation,  no  arrangement  of  ideas:  note-books  are  not  for 
such  as  he  !  His  memory  is  not  a  mere  retention  of  phrases 
and  words,  but  rather  an  acutely  sensitive  consciousness  which 
retains  every  impression  it  receives,  and  in  a  moment  can  find 
all  the  ideas  that  have  struck  it,  reviving  them  more  than 
recollecting  them."  This  anonymous  portrait,  drawn  by  him 
at  the  age  of  twenty-four,  gives  us  an  accurate  sketch  of  him- 
self in  later  years. 

His  activities  were  many :  he  devoured  everything  that 
came  his  way.  His  delight  in  Rabelais  persisted,  and  he 
could  recite  Grandgousier's  letters  to  Gargantua  by  heart. 
He  loved  the  sense  of  reality,  the  sense  of  proportion,  the 
"expedient";  he  loved,  too,  the  excitements  of  the  vivid 
language  that,  in  the  burning  desire  to  prove  and  convince, 

12 


HIS  [CHILDHOOD  AND  EARLY  CAREER 

breaks  into  tongues  of  flame,  or,  in  a  positive  orgy  of  reason, 
rolls  on  and  on  like  the  rising  tide.  In  after  years  it  was  his 
boast  that  he  possessed  the  famous  copy  of  Pantagruel  that 
the  Regent  used  to  read  at  Mass.  He  recited  Hugo's  poems, 
too  :  La  Legende  des  Siecles,  and  Les  Clidtiments. 

He  was  an  admirer  of  Richelieu  and  Mirabeau,  having  the 
same  conception  of  government  and  the  same  taste  for  diplo- 
macy. The  notes  in  which  Mirabeau  points  out  to  the  Court 
the  necessity  for  reorganising  the  administration  and  re-estab- 
lishing a  strong  Government,  and  the  letters  to  the  Comte 
de  la  Marck,  especially  appealed  to  him.  He  liked  neither 
Rousseau  nor  Robespierre.  Danton,  on  the  other  hand, 
attracted  him;  but  in  Danton's  tragic  greatness  there  was 
always  a  hint  of  the  petty  bourgeois;  whereas  in  Gambetta 
there  was  a  plebeian  element,  mingled  with  his  artistic  in- 
stincts and  his  professional  tastes.  Proudhon  was  his  daily 
bread  :  "  There  is  no  more  virile  mind  in  our  day,  nor  one  to 
whom  I  owe  so  much  as  to  him."  Auguste  Comte  exercised 
a  great  and  ever-increasing  influence  over  him — Comte,  who 
would  have  sacrificed  progress  to  order,  and  hated  instability, 
and  desired  a  strong  central  authority ;  who  preached  the 
glorification  of  science  and  the  necessity  for  depending  upon 
reason,  and  took  as  one  of  his  formulae,  "  the  immanence  of 
justice." 

In  these  things  we  see  the  man's  growth.  We  see,  too,  the 
marked  difference  between  him  and  the  republicans  of  his  day. 
He  believed  that  the  nation's  sovereignty  should  be  exercised 
through  a  strong  Government.  He  had  a  taste  and  feeling 
for  authority,  combined  with  a  natural  tendency  towards 
argument  and  compromise. 

In  March,  1862,  the  police  invented  a  plot  against  the  safety 
of  Europe,  and  arrested  about  fifty  persons,  among  whom  was 
one  Louis  Buette,  a  mechanic.  Though  he  was  only  twenty- 
two,  his  employers  had  already  made  him  a  foreman.  He 
would  not  employ  a  counsel ;  he  had  no  wish  to  defend  him- 
self ;  his  only  desire  was  to  use  the  trial  as  a  means  of  express- 
ing his  ideas  and  influencing  public  opinion.  His  sister 
appealed  to  Jules  Favre,  at  that  time  Bdtonnier  [Treasurer  of 

13 


GAMBETTA 

the  Brncliers],  to  save  her  brother.  Jules  Favrc  sent  her  to 
M.  le  Chatelier,  who  referred  her  to  M.  de  Sal,  who  in  his 
turn  suggested  Gambetta.  "  1  will  defend  your  brother  as 
though  he  were  my  own  !  "  he  cried.  He  hurried  to  Mazas. 
Buette,  in  his  surprise,  at  first  refused  help,  but  his  extempore 
counsel  won  him  over,  and  a  friendship  was  begun  that  was 
only  ended  by  death.  Buette  revealed  to  him  the  working- 
man's  world  :  his  sufferings  and  aspirations,  his  thirst  for 
justice  and  his  large-hearted  idealism.  There,  in  the  little 
cell  at  Mazas,  Gambetta  for  the  first  time  came  in  contact  with 
the  proletariat;  it  was  there  that  he  learnt  to  know  and  love 
the  generous,  enthusiastic  hearts  of  the  people. 

Two  days  later  the  fifty-four  conspirators  were  brought  to 
trial.  The  counsel  for  the  defence  included  the  cream  of  the 
Republican  Bar  :  Cremieux,  Emmanuel  Arago,  Jules  Ferry, 
Charles  Floquet  and  the  younger  men  who  were  the  hope  of 
the  party,  Leon  Renault,  Spuller,  Cresson,  de  Sal,  Laurier, 
Cl^ry  and  Durier.  Gambetta  began  to  speak,  throwing  back 
his  long  black  hair,  and,  with  his  eyes  starting  from  his  head, 
described  in  his  resonant  voice  the  laborious  and  blameless 
life  led  by  Buette.  But  soon  he  passed  from  the  defensive  to 
the  attack  :  "  And  you  call  yourselves  a  strong  Government  ! 
You  are  only  a  Government  by  accident !  "  He  quoted  the 
trial  of  Jesus,  paraphrasing  the  words  of  the  Gospel,  "  thou 
art  not  Cajsar's  friend  "  ;  he  recalled  the  Passion,  and  pointing 
to  the  figure  of  Christ  that  hung  above  the  judges,  cried  : 
"  Insidiatores!  Spies!  Yes,  they  were  spies  who  nailed  Him 
to  the  Cross  !  ' ' 

Buette  w^as  condemned  only  to  three  months'  imprison- 
ment. Cremieux,  introducing  Gambetta  to  his  friends,  said  : 
"This  is  M.  Gambetta,  the  great  success  in  the  trial  of  the 
fifty-four."  He  made  him  his  secretary.  "  It  wall  be  a  great 
pleasure  to  me  to  see  your  ability  developing  under  my  eyes. 
We  shall  have  good  cause  to  be  very  proud  of  it  some  day,  if 
you  combine  persistent  work  with  your  natural  gifts." 
(October  i6,  1862.) 

He  owed  much  to  Laurier's  efforts.  It  was  Laurier  who 
introduced  him  to  Cremieux,  and  took  him  to  see  Villemain, 

'4 


HIS   CHILDHOOD   AND    EARLY    CAREER 

(he  pormancni  secretary  of  the  Acadi'mic  l^>an(;aise.  "  I  am 
in  the  seventh  heaven  !  "  he  declared. 

Since  fees  were  now  coming  in,  he  left  the  Rue  V'avin  for 
the  Rue  Bonaparte.  The  little  table  of  his  new  dwelling  was 
surrounded  on  Sundays  by  the  faithful  Pephau,  Fieuzal. 
Cendre  and  Spuller,  who  discussed  his  old  wine  from  Cahors 
and  tasted  the  excellent  dishes  of  his  own  country-  "  If  for- 
tune continues  to  smile  on  me,"  he  says,  "  I  shall  S(jon  be  able 
to  leave  off  burdening  my  family ;  indeed,  who  knows  whether 
I  might  not  be  useful  io  them  ?  I  long  for  nothing  so  much 
as  the  day  when  I  can  show  my  gratitude  for  the  sacrifices 
ihey  have  made  for  me." 

On  January  i,  1863,  ^^^  writes  to  his  mother  :  "  How  can  I 
express  to  you,  my  sweet  mother,  all  that  I  feel  deep  down  in 
my  heart  ?  What  words  can  make  you  understand  my  grati- 
tude and  love?  Are  you  not  the  bravest  of  mothers  and  most 
devoted  of  wives?  Ought  I  not  to  be  the  most  loving,  the 
most  dutiful  and  the  proudest  of  sons  ?  I  will  see  to  it  that 
the  rest  you  have  so  well  deserved  shall  some  dav  be  a  glorious 
rest,  happy  and  undisturbed.  Courage!  the  goal  is 
near.   .  ." 

To  his  father  he  says:  "1  am  getting  into  my  stride! 
People  are  beginning  to  take  note  of  me,  and  I  greatly  hope 
that  before  many  years  are  gone  I  shall  be  able  to  say,  as  I 
kiss  the  two  persons  to  whom  I  owe  everything  :  '  This  is 
what  I  am,  this  is  what  I  am  worth  :  it  is  your  work,  and  it  is 
my  joy  to  bring  it  to  you  !  '  .  .  ."  Then,  alluding  to  a 
"little  disagreement"  on  a  question  of  philosophy,  he  goes 
on  :  "  Our  little  quarrel  only  arose  from  a  misunderstanding. 
It  is  not  possible  that  you  could  have  doubted  my  heart  or  mv 
intelligence,  or  could  have  believed  any  casual  rumour  that 
was  going  about,  with  regard  to  my  opinions  and  philosophi- 
cal ideas.  As  for  religious  ideas,  and  the  great  idea  of  God, 
I  am  too  rational,  both  in  politics  and  ethics,  to  give  it  up. 
Moreover,  as  you  very  justly  said,  it  is  one  of  the  most  valu- 
able resources  of  eloquence.  So  you  may  make  your  mind 
easy;  to  that  I  am  still  faithful."     (March  9.) 

From  (hit  time  forward  he  was  associated  with  all  the  most 

J  5 


GAMBETTA 

influential  men  of  the  Republican  party.  He  was  a  member 
of  the  committees  formed  to  draw  up  the  lists  of  candidates 
for  the  legislative  elections  of  1863.  In  the  Quartier  Latin, 
Adolphe  Gueroult,  editor  of  L'Opinion  Nationale,  one  of  the 
principal  organs  of  the  Democratic  party,  was  opposed  by 
Pr^vost-Paradol,  the  brilliant  product  of  the  £coles  Normales, 
the  champion  of  constitutional  monarchy  and  parliamentary 
liberties,  and  the  favourite  of  Orleanist  salons.  Gambetta 
believed  that  the  Empire  could  receive  no  harder  blow  than 
the  election  of  the  young  and  mordant  controversialist  of  the 
Journal  des  Debuts-^  he  alone,  of  the  Republicans,  entered  the 
lists  on  behalf  of  Prevost-Paradol.  This  first  act  of  his  public 
life  is  the  key  to  many  others.  He  was  exuberant,  enthusias- 
tic and  vehement,  it  is  true,  but  political  expediency  had  the 
last  word  with  him.  He  weighed,  he  measured,  he  calculated. 
Was  it  not  he  who  said:  "  What  is  needed  for  governing 
France  is  violence  in  speech  and  moderation  in  action"? 
From  the  very  beginning,  as  we  have  seen,  the  complexity  of 
his  temperament  was  apparent. 

But  there  was  another  and  a  more  profound  reason  that  led 
him  to  support  Prevost-Paradol  against  Gueroult :  his  views 
on  the  progress  of  European  affairs  coincided,  from  this  time 
forward,  w'ith  those  of  the  former,  and  were  opposed  to  those 
of  the  latter.  Like  the  whole  democratic  school  since  181 5, 
Gueroult  had,  in  the  name  of  the  principle  of  nationalities, 
embraced  the  cause  of  "  Protestant  and  Liberal  "  Prussia,  in 
opposition  to  "  ultramontane  and  despotic  "  Austria.  Three 
years  later  Gueroult's  paper,  L'Opinion  Nationale,  wuthall  the 
organs  of  the  Left,  rejoiced  over  Austria's  defeat  at  Sadowa. 
Paradol  and  his  friends,  on  the  contrary,  considered  that  two 
nations  were  defeated  in  that  battle,  Austria  and  France. 
Gambetta  was  of  that  opinion,  and  was  in  this  respect  far 
more  in  sympathy  with  Thiers  and  the  Orleanists  than  he  was 
with  the  Republicans.  His  letters  and  intimate  conversations 
leave  no  doubt  on  that  subject.  But  in  this  year  1863  he  was 
still  obscure  and  unknown ;  his  opinion  was  of  no  account. 

This  year  was  marked  by  a  serious  crisis  in  the  history  of 
the  Second   Empire.       The  party  of  the  Opposition,   which 

16 


HIS  CHILDHOOD  AND  KAKLY  (  AREEU 

since  1857  had  i>(>asied  oi  unly  li^e  members,  Jule.s  Favre, 
Ivrnest  l^icard,  llmile  Ollivier,  H(^non  and  Darimon,  was 
increased  to  thirt)-live,  am(jn^  whom  were  Thiers  and 
lierryer. 

Durinfj  this  summer  Gambetta  appeared  in  a  variety  oi 
cases:  in  Lorraine,  Belgium,  Alsace,  Burgundy  and  Berry. 
"Ovations,"  he  reports.  "The  future  is  at  last  growing- 
bright.  It  is  going  to  be  radiant."  In  the  autumn  he  was 
made  much  of  at  L'Rpineau,  Laurier's  home. 

On  his  return  to  Paris  he  constantly  visited  the  Chamber. 
Though  not  yet  a  Deputy  himself,  he  knew  all  the  Deputies, 
and  followed  public  affairs  closely.  One  dav,  when  the  hall 
was  full  and  there  was  not  a  seat  left,  a  Deputy  approached 
the  President,  the  Due  de  Morny,  and  begged  for  a  corner 
for  the  young  friend  of  the  Five.  "  ^L  Gambetta  shall  be  put 
into  my  tribune,"  answered  Morny.  "  1  have  heard  a  great 
deal  of  him,  and  shall  not  be  sorry  to  see  him."  And,  raising 
his  glasses,  the  President  proceeded  to  insf>ect  the  young 
barrister. 

Thiers  said  of  him  :  "  If  he  does  not  warp  his  judgment  in 
private  discussions,  his  qualities  will  soon  become  conspicu- 
ous." "  An  atmosphere  of  political  genius  surrounds  him," 
said  another. 

He  appeared  in  some  literary  lawsuits,  which  brought  his 
name  before  the  world  of  writers.  "  The  audience,"  he  writes 
on  November  8,  1863,  "  was  adorned  by  some  of  the  most 
eloquent  tongues  in  Paris,  from  the  editors  of  the  Figaro  and 
the  Nain  Jaime  to  the  solemn  secretaries  of  two  Academies. 
I  enjoyed  a  good  hour  of  vivacity  and  inspiration.  This  little 
success  went  the  round  of  Paris." 

In  February  of  the  next  year  he  says:  "  F^ortune  smiles 
upon  me.  I  agree  with  Mazarin  :  I  believe  in  Fate  !  One 
always  worships  the  gods  that  favour  one.  I  have  been 
successful  everywhere  beyond  my  hopes  !  "  And  in  August  : 
"  Forward!  That  is  my  battle-cry  !  " 

He  was  retained,  with  Jules  F'erry,  in  the  trial  of  the 
Thirteen,  and  played  a  brilliant  part  in  several  cases  connected 
with  the  Press.     In   his  defence  of  the    Rcviie  du   Progres, 

17  C 


GAMBETTA 

which  had  been  denounced  in  a  charge  by  the  i3isliop  of 
Orleans,  Mgr.  Dupanloup,  he  attacked  the  Solicitor-General. 
The  editor  of  the  review,  Xavier  de  Ricard,  who  was  present, 
describes  the  scene  thus:  "All  the  enthusiasm  of  the  audi- 
ence, which  was  numerous,  was  directed  upon  Gambetta,  who, 
as  he  beat  the  bar  furiously  till  its  destruction  seemed  immi- 
nent, and  withered  the  judges  with  his  terrible  one-eyed  stare, 
took  the  Empire — so  to  speak — by  the  scruff  of  the  neck  and 
hauled  it  over  the  coals  for  all  to  see.  The  Empire  had  found 
its  prosecutor."  In  this  is  foreshadowed  the  Baudin  case, 
four  years  before  it  took  place. 

"  Something  must  happen  soon,"  he  writes  on  March  30, 
1865,  "  the  present  regime  has  now  been  in  existence  for 
thirteen  years,  and  its  Constitution  and  origin  are  still  being 
discussed  as  though  it  dated  from  yesterday.  This  is  a  grave 
symptom  of  approaching  death." 

About  this  time  he  visited  La  Gironde  and  the  Landes,  to 
sound  the  feelings  of  certain  constituencies;  and  in  June  of 
the  same  year  he  went  with  Laurier  to  Twickenham,  to  see 
the  Comte  de  Paris.  His  enemies  afterwards  took  him  to  task 
for  this  visit ;  but  no  doubt  his  motive  in  making  it  was  the 
same  that  led  him  to  support  Prevost-Paradol.  On  both  occa- 
sions his  first  words  were,  "  I  am  a  Republican";  but  he 
knew  that  the  Empire  could  only  be  overthrown  by  the  union 
of  the  Legitimists,  Orleanists  and  Republicans. 

In  the  following  spring  he  writes  :  "  The  political  situation 
grows  more  acute ;  the  Government  is  losing  ground  every 
day;  its  adherents  are  falling  away  on  all  sides;  everyone 
believes  that  its  imminent, ruin  is  inevitable,  and  1869  will  be 
a  decisive  date  for  the  Empire,  as  1852  once  was  for  the 
Repuolic.  Meanwhile  I  am  redoubling  my  efforts  and  my 
studies,  that  I  may  be  prepared  to  take  an  active  and  worthy 
part  in  the  coming  events.  I  am  keeping  myself  well 
informed  in  all  affairs.  .  .  ."  In  the  summer  he  travelled 
with  Laurier  in  Italy  and  Greece. 

On  May  26,  1867,  he  says  :  "  I  have  been  suffering  a  great 
deal  with  both  my  eyes.  My  injured  eye  had  become  decom- 
posed, and  was  having  a  very  bad  effect  upon  the  good  one. 


HIS  CHILDHOOD  AND  EARLY  CAREER 

After  much  serious  thought,  thanks  to  my  excellent  friend 
Dr.  Fieuzal,  I  was  introduced  to  an  eminent  oculist, 
Dr.  Vecker,  who  has  removed  my  right  eye  and  will  replace  it 
with  a  false  one,  which  I  have  already  tried,  and  which  suits 
me  so  well  that  anyone  would  think  it  was  real.  So  for  the 
future  I  shall  be  safe  from  all  ills,  and  my  left  eye  will  lose 
none  of  its  strength." 

By  June  ii  he  had  recovered,  and  wrote  :  "  During  the  last 
few  days  we  have  had  a  delightful  meeting  with  Favre  and 
Berryer.  I  was  publicly  embraced  by  my  chief,  Jules  Favre, 
before  everyone,  as  the  representative  of  the  younger  men." 

With  Jules  Favre  he  was  briefed  in  a  case  at  Cahors,  and 
the  famous  counsel  arrived  at  the  Law  Courts  with  Gambetta's 
sister  on  his  arm.  The  grocer's  son  was  unknown  in  his 
native  town;  but  it  learnt  to  know  him  now. 

In  June,  1868,  Challemel-Lacour  founded  the  Revue  poli- 
tique et  litteraire,  which  continued  to  appear  until  February, 
1869.  For  three  months  Gambetta  contributed  to  it,  his  first 
article  being  on  the  subject  of  political  economy.  "  The  theory 
of  free  trade  between  all  the  markets  of  the  world,"  he  said,  "  is 
not  an  inflexible  dogma,  to  be  applied  rigorously  and  instantly 
to  all  communities,  whatever  their  social  conditions  or  their 
form  of  government."  Next,  he  produced  some  masterly 
pages  on  General  Grant,  whom  he  presented  in  a  new  guise, 
foreseeing  both  the  military  leader  in  him  and  the  future  guide 
of  a  free  democracy.  "  By  democratic  institutions  genius  is 
inevitably  doomed  to  be  virtuous.  Grant  is  not  yet  forty-six, 
and  he  has  for  ever  associated  his  name  with  the  sublimest 
form  of  glory  :  he  has  saved  his  country.  General  Grant,  for 
all  his  halo  of  glory,  is  but  the  servant  of  Congress,  the  sub- 
ordinate of  the  law."  This  was  followed  by  other  articles  on 
various  topics  :  the  administration  of  Haussmann,  Pr^fet  of 
the  Seine,  the  budget,  and  the  session  of  1 867-1 868. 

In  August  of  the  same  year  he  set  out  with  Laurier  to 
Rumania,  with  an  introduction  from  Thiers  to  Prince  Nicolas 
Bibesco  :  "  Saint-Germain,  August  4,  1868. — M.  Gambetta,  to 
whom  I  am  giving  this  letter  for  you,  is  what  we  call  in  France 
a  Republican.     But  he  has  more  intellect  and  sound  sense  and 

19  c  2 


GAMBETTA 

true  wisdom  than  many  of  the  most  enlightened  Conserva- 
tives, and  I  only  wish  that  most  of  the  party  leaders  had  as 
much.  No  one  knows  the  inside  of  Paris  better  than  he,  or 
could  give  you  fresher  and  more  accurate  news  of  it.  He  is  a 
very  distinguished  member  of  the  junior  Bar,  and  is  using 
the  vacation  to  educate  himself  by  travel.  Pray  help  him  to 
bring  home  correct  ideas  of  your  country.  In  return,  he  will 
refresh  the  ideas  that  you  took  away  about  ours." 

On  his  return  the  young  barrister  was  more  assiduous  than 
ever  in  visiting  the  Legislative  Assembly,  and  seemed  almost 
to  belong  to  it  by  right.  The  Deputies  of  the  Left  treated 
him  as  a  colleague.  He  had  a  gift,  a  real  genius,  for  politics 
— all  that  was  needed  was  a  spark  to  set  it  alight.  It  was  the 
Baudin  case  that  set  fire  to  his  fame — and  to  the  Empire. 


ao 


CHAPTER    II 

THE   BAb'DIN   CASE  AND  GAMBETTA'S   ELECTION   AS  A    DEPUTY 

The  Baudin  Case  (14th  Nov.,  1868) — Gambetta  is  elected  to  ihe  Legislative 
Assembly  (23rd  May,  1869) — His  Maiden  Speech — His  Speech  on  the  Plebiscite 
(April  5th,  1870) — The  Students'  Banquet  (April  19th). 

Eugene  Ti^not,  in  his  book  Paris  en  decembre  1851,  had 
recently  reminded  his  readers  how,  on  December  3, 
certain  members  of  the  Assembly  had  gone  unarmed  to  the 
barricades  to  prevent  the  violation  of  the  law.  The  youngest 
of  them,  Baudin,  Deputy  for  the  Ain,  had  been  struck  by  a 
bullet  and  killed.  When  the  story  was  told  seventeen  years 
later  his  grave  was  sought  out,  and  found  in  a  corner  of  the 
cemetery  at  Montmartre,  neglected  and  smothered  in  grass. 
On  All  Souls'  Day — the  Day  of  the  Dead — a  number  of  men 
who  had  suffered  for  their  opinions,  and  a  few  students, 
brought  some  flowers  to  this  grave,  and  after  making  a  few 
speeches  in  subdued  tones,  visited  the  tomb  of  Cavaignac. 

Challemel-Lacour's  Revue  politique,  the  Reveil  of  Deles- 
cluze  and  Peyrat's  Avenir  national  opened  a  subscription  list 
with  the  object  of  raising  a  monument  to  Baudin.  The  list 
was  headed  by  Berryer,  who  on  December  2,  in  the  Mairie  of 
the  tenth  Arrondissement,  had  drawn  up  a  decree  deposing- 
Louis  Bonaparte,  which  was  signed  by  220  Deputies. 
Prevost-Paradol's  name  figured  there,  with  Victor  Hugo's, 
Edgar  Quinet's  and  Louis  Blanc's. 

On  November  14  Delescluze  was  lialed  before  the  Tribunal 
Correctionnel  on  a  charge  of  "  exciting  hatred  and  contempt  of 
the  Government."  Within  these  walls  that  were  still  vibrat- 
ing with  the  echoes  of  Berryer 's  voice  Gambetta  approached 

21 


GAMBETTA 

the  bar,  straightened  his  massive  frame,  and  fixed  the  Bench 
with  his  strange  stare.  It  was  no  defence  that  followed  :  it 
was  an  indictment — nay,  it  was  an  assault.  The  Empire,  far 
from  being  the  prosecutor,  was  placed  in  the  dock.  It  was 
Baudin  who  was  the  prosecutor.  The  Solicitor-General  tried 
to  interrupt,  but  Gambetta  silenced  him  with  an  unanswerable 
appeal  to  the  judges:  "You  who  are  our  judges,  you 
who  are  entrusted  with  the  enforcing  of  the  law,  you  owe 
protection  to  us  who  defend  it !  " 

"  Has  a  case  such  as  this,"  he  asked,  "  ever  been  argued 
at  any  period  of  the  world's  history?  No — never!  Not  in 
the  days  of  Athens,  nor  in  the  days  of  Rome,  was  there  ever 
to  my  knowledge  such  a  duel  as  this,  between  justice  and 
despotism,  between  law  and  force.  ...  It  seems  to  me  that  a 
court  of  law  is  the  last  place  in  which  such  outrages  should  be 
encouraged,  for  here  the  law,  and  nothing  but  the  law,  should 
speak  and  gain  a  hearing." 

He  attacked  not  merely  the  flaws  in  the  Empire,  but  its  very 
source.  "  On  December  2,  I  say,  there  were  gathered  round 
a  pretender  a  group  of  men  of  whom  France  until  that  moment 
had  never  heard — men  of  no  talent,  or  honour,  or  rank,  or 
position,  the  kind  of  men  who  in  all  ages  have  been  the  accom- 
plices of  despotic  acts  of  violence,  men  to  whom  one  might 
apply  Sallust's  description  of  the  rabble  that  surrounded  Cata- 
lina,  or  Caesar's  own  portrait  of  his  accomplices,  the  ever- 
present  scum  of  orderly  communities, 

JEre  alieno  obruti  et  vitiis  onusti, 
or,  as  Corneille  translates  it, 

Un  tas  d'hommes  perdns  de  dcttes  et  de  crhnes. 

"  It  is  with  the  help  of  such  characters  as  these  that  institu- 
tions and  laws  have  been  overthrown  through  all  the 
centuries,  while  the  conscience  of  humanity  is  helpless,  despite 
the  long  line  of  great  thinkers  and  martyrs — Socrates, 
Thraseas,  Cicero,  Cato— who  have  raised  their  protests  in  the 
name  of  the  religion  that  has  been  overthrown,  the  morality 
that  has  been  injured,  the  justice  that  has  been  crushed  beneath 
a  soldier's  boot !  "     The  orator  calls  them  to  his  aid ;  he  bids 

22 


BAUDIN   CASE   AND   GAMBETTA'S    ELECTION 

them  add  tlieir  voices  to  his,  as  he  cries  upon  conscience  and 
morality  to  revolt. 

France,  it  was  boasted,  had  been  saved.  "There  is  an 
unfailing-  test  of  the  truth  or  falsity  of  such  a  statement. 
When  a  country  is  really  passing  through  an  acute  crisis,  and 
I  he  very  foundations  of  society  are  felt  to  be  rocking,  do  you 
know  what  happens?  Those  whom  the  nation  is  accustomed 
lo  regard  as  its  leaders,  because  they  are  distinguished  by 
their  powers  of  mind  and  character,  come  forward  to  save  it. 
Xow,  when  1  appraise  and  analyse  the  worth  of  the  men  who 
profess  to  have  saved  the  country  on  December  2,  I  cannot 
tind  among  them  one  single  man  of  mark ;  whereas,  on  the 
other  side,  I  see,  coming  to  the  country's  aid,  such  men  as 
Michel  de  Bourges  and  Charras,  both  now  dead — Ledru  was 
already  in  exile — and  many  others  of  the  very  flower  of  ai' 
parties;  such  as,  for  example,  our  Berryer,  the  great  man  who 
lies  dying,  and  only  yesterday  sent  us  a  letter  dictated  by  a 
noble  heart,  a  last  bequest  of  indignation,  a  proof  that  all 
parties  are  eager  to  support  the  claims  of  morality. 

"  Where  were  Cavaignac,  Lamoriciere,  Changarnier,  I^e 
Flo,  Bedeau,  and  all  the  leaders,  all  the  honour  and  pride  of 
our  army?  Where  were  M.  Thiers  and  M.  de  Remusat,  and 
the  authorised  representatives  of  the  Orleanist,  Legitimist  and 
Republican  parties?  They  were  at  Mazas  and  Vincennes, 
these  men  who  defended  the  law  !  They  were  on  the  way 
to  Cayenne,  or  starting  for  Lambessa,  these  despoiled  victims 
of  an  ambitious  frenzy  !  That,  gentlemen,  is  how  France  was 
saved  !  After  that,  do  you  think  those  who  boast  of  saving 
society  have  any  right  on  their  side,  when  all  they  have  done 
is  to  aim  a  blow  at  the  country  ?  On  which  side  were  genius, 
and  morality  and  virtue?     All  crushed  by  violence!  " 

The  president  of  the  tribunal,  Vivien,  a  converted  Orleanist, 
thought  he  had  allowed  things  to  go  far  enough  and  it  was 
his  duty  to  intervene.  But  Gambetta  spoke  on.  "Listen! 
For  seventeen  years  now  you  have  been  the  absolute,  *  dis- 
cretionary '  masters  of  France — it  is  your  own  word.  We  will 
say  nothing  of  the  use  you  have  made  of  her  resources,  of 
her  blood,  of  her  honour  and  her  renown  ;    but  there  is  one 

33 


GAMBETTA 

fact  that  is  your  most  complete  condemnation,  because  it  is 
the  measure  of  your  own  remorse  :  you  have  never  dared  to 
say,  '  We  will  celebrate  December  2  as  one  of  the  solemn 
festivals  of  France,  we  will  make  it  a  national  anniversary.' 
And  yet  all  the  successive  forms  of  government  in  this  country 
have  honoured  themselves  by  honouring  the  day  of  their 
nativity.  July  14  and  August  10  were  made  festivals;  the 
fateful  days  of  July,  1830,  were  also  celebrated,  as  well 
as  February  24.  Only  two  anniversaries,  the  i8th  of 
Brumaire  and  December  2,  have  never  been  raised  to 
the  rank  of  solemn  commemorations,  for  you  know 
that  if  you  tried  to  place  them  there  they  would  be 
rejected  by  the  conscience  of  the  nation  !  Well,  that  anni- 
versary that  you  have  disregarded  is  claimed  by  us ;  we  take 
it  for  our  own,  and  we  shall  celebrate  it  always,  unceasingly, 
every  year;  it  shall  be  the  festival  of  our  dead,  until  the  day 
when  the  country  shall  once  more  be  master,  and  shall  subject 
vou  to  a  great  national  expiation  in  the  name  of  liberty, 
equality  and  fraternity." 

Then,  addressing  the  Solicitor-General,  he  said  :  "Ah,  you 
shrug  your  shoulders  !  " 

"Well,  this  is  not  argument  !  " 

"Do  not  imagine,"  retorted  Gambetta,  "that  I  am  afraid 
either  of  your  scorn  or  your  threats.  Yesterday,  at  the  close 
of  your  address,  you  said :  '  We  shall  take  precautions.' 
What !  do  you — Solicitor-General,  an  officer  of  the  Crown,  a 
man  of  law — dare  to  say  you  will  take  measures?  W^hat 
measures  will  you  take  ?  Is  that  not  a  threat  ?  Well  then, 
listen  !  this  is  my  last  word  :  You  can  strike  us,  but  you  can 
never  dishonour  us  nor  beat  us  down  !  " 

And  the  orator,  breathless  like  his  audience,  with  streaming- 
forehead,  dishevelled  hair  and  rumpled  gown,  fell  exhausted 
into  his  seat.  Then  the  hall  shook  w^ith  an  outburst  of  cheers. 
The  president  tried  to  suppress  them,  but  they  only  increased 
to  the  point  of  frenzy,  and  the  crowd,  who  had  not  been 
admitted  to  the  building,  added  their  applause  from  without. 

After  three  hours  of  discussion  the  tribunal  sentenced 
Delescluze  to  six  months'  imprisonment,  a  fine  of  six  thousand 

24 


BAUDIN  CASE  AND    GAMBETTA'S   ELECTION 

francs,  and  the  suspension  of  his  civic  rights  for  the  term  of 
his  confinement.  But  the  Empire  liad  also  received  its 
sentence.  Baudin,  brouj^^ht  to  life  again,  had  rallied  round 
him  all  the  enemies  of  the  Government,  from  Berryer  to 
Delescluze.  Gambetta  suddenly  found  himself  famous.  The 
whole  generation  that  the  Empire  had  mown  down  arose  again 
in  his  person.  The  dream  that  he  had  cherished  so  long  was 
fulfilled  in  an' instant.  He  burst  headlong  into  history — the 
history  that  for  fourteen  years  was  to  resound  with  his  name. 
Thenceforward,  like  a  soldier  in  battle,  he  would  clutch  at 
every  bush,  every  stone,  every  wrinkle  in  the  soil  that  could 
help  him  to  advance,  and  fight,  and  win.  "The  opportunity 
is  there,"  says  Goethe;    "it  is  your  part,  Faust,  to  seize  it  !  " 

Delescluze  appealed,  and  on  December  12  Gambetta  again 
defended  him. 

In  March  of  the  next  year  he  defended  the  journal 
L'Emuncipaiion  at  Toulouse.  "He  is  not  merely  a  man," 
exclaims  one  who  heard  him  on  this  occasion  ;  "one  is  face  to 
face  with  a  force.  We  listened  half  stupefied;  our  hearts 
stood  still.  The  audience  w-as  beside  itself.  We  lost  all 
consciousness  of  our  surroundings." 

After  a  visit  to  Italy  with  Laurier,  Gambetta  stood  for 
Belleville  against  Hippolyte  Carnot ;  and,  Berryer's  seat  being 
vacant  owing  to  his  recent  death,  he  also  opposed  Thiers  and 
Lesseps  at  Marseilles,  under  the  auspices  of  Barb^s,  as  the 
candidate  of  the  "irreconcilable  Opposition."  He  accepted 
the  Radical  programme,  which  included  the  "  separation  of  the 
Churches  and  the  State  "  and  the  "suppression  of  standing 
armies."  Before  taking  'his  seat  it  was  as  obligatory  upon 
him  to  accept  this  programme  as  to  take  the  oath  :  a  formality 
to  which  certain  very  sensitive  consciences  were  never  able 
lo  submit.  Later  on,  when  he  was  reproached  for  having 
demanded  the  suppression  of  standing  armies  on  the  eve  of 
1870,  he  explained  that  he  had  intended  them  to  be  "re- 
placed by  national  armies."  It  is  certainly  better  to  avoid 
the  necessity  for  explanations  of  this  kind  :  such  ambiguities 
may  cost  the  country  very  dear  :  but  everyone  at  this  tim.- 
was  in  a  false  position.     The  standing  army  was  considered 

25 


GAMBETTA 

to  be  propping  up  the  Empire,  and  every  Republican  believed 
that  the  Empire  was  incompatible  with  the  sovereignty  of 
tlip  nation. 

I   have  before  me  an   unpublished  speech   that   Gambetta 
delivered  in  the  Theatre  Mussetat  Marseilles;    the  first  rough 
sketch  of  his  more  finished  discourses,  a  year  later,  in  the 
Legislative  Assembly  and  at  the  students'  banquet,  on  the 
subject  of  the  plebiscite.     "Universal  suffrage,"  he  says,  "can 
do  everything  except  commit  suicide.  ...  It  was  not  possible, 
in  one  day,  to  dispose  of  the  country's  future.  ...  As  the 
generations  succeed  one   another  they  come   to   claim   their 
rights,  they  come  forward  to  protest  against  a  decision   in 
which   they  had  no  voice.       It  is  in   the  name  of   national 
sovereignty  that  they  claim  their  share  of  authority,  for  the 
true  authority  is  the  democracy."     And  here  is  an  idea  that  was 
to  become  one  of  his  favourite  themes.     Having  expressed  his 
respect  for  those  w  ho  came  before  him,  he  goes  on  :    "  The 
democracy  of  to-day  has  entered  upon  a  better  and  stronger 
phase.    The  benefit  of  the  personal  government  beneath  which 
our  necks  have  been  bowed,  wounded  and  bleeding,  is  that  it 
forces  the  democracy  to  ask  itself  frankly  why  it  has  failed 
where  it  ought  to  have  triumphed,  and  why  its  cause,  which 
is  the  cause  of  all,  should  once  have  been  betrayed  by  the 
people.   .  .  ."     "The  scientific  spirit,"  he  says,  "should  be 
introduced  into  the  conduct  of  affairs."     "  Instead  of  vague 
propositions"   we   need    "a   definite    method   and    system." 
Gradually  his  abstract  Republicanism  became  more  and  more 
practical. 

He  was  elected  both  in  Paris  and  at  Marseilles  (May  23 
and  June  6,  1869),  and  decided  in  favour  of  the  latter. 
Edgar  Quinet  wrote  to  him  from  Geneva:  "The  awalcening 
of  conscience  in  the  soul  of  a  great  people — that  is  what  your 
election  demonstrates.  This  event  makes  the  name  of 
Gambetta  one  of  the  most  powerful  symbols  of  justice." 

He  was  suffering  from  an  internal  malady  as  well  as  from 
his  throat,  and  in  July  he  visited  Ems.  In  September  he 
went  to  Montreux,  but  on  October  12  he  wrote  to  Laurier  : 
"I  can  stay  here  no  longer.     I  want  to  attend  the  meetings 

26 


BAUDIN   CASE    AND   GAMBETTA'S    ELECTION 

announced  by  Jules  Ferry  in  the  Siecle.  It  will  be  high  time 
to  force  that  Left  into  governing  public  opinion.  That  is 
the  serious  complaint  that  is  brought  against  us  (for  I  do 
not  dissociate  myself  from  these  just  reproaches).  We  have 
never  yet  succeeded  in  leading,  in  dominating  the  public. 
That  is  the  secret  and  well-deserved  reproach  that  everyone 
aims  at  us,  though  they  may  not  express  it  openly.  The 
official  authority  being  in  its  death-agony,  the  country  is 
looking  for  a  guide,  and  finds  none.  The  third  party,  the 
Left  Centre,  and  the  Left,  seem  equally  incapable  of  govern- 
ing and  of  obeying.  We  shall  be  running  the  most  serious 
risks  unless  this  state  of  anarchy  can  be  ended.  The  Left 
must  decide  to  take  the  helm ;  it  must  apf)ear  as  the  visible 
successor — reassuring,  prepared  for  anything— of  the  existing 
state  of  things  which  will  so  soon  be  in  the  past."  He 
returned  to  Paris  and  installed  himself  at  No.  12,  Rue 
Montaigne,  in  November,  1869. 

On  January  i,  1870,  he  wrote:  "My  dear  father,  there  is 
hardly  any  need  to  wish  you  a  happy  New  Year,  for  vou  have 
already  achieved  the  fulfilment  of  all  your  wishes:  a  pleasant 
retreat  in  charming  surroundings  on  the  borders  of  your  native 
land,  the  most  robust  health,  and  the  certainty  of  enjoying  for 
many  a  year  all  the  advantages  that  your  merits  and  labours 
have  earned  for  you.  For  my  part,  my  hopes  also  run  high  ; 
if  I  continue  to  regain  mv  strength  I  shall  soon  make  up  for 
the  time  I  have  lost.  However,  I  am  beginning  to  be  im- 
patient of  my  long  inactivity,  and  I  feel  I  must  shortly  break 
silence.  I  am  preparing  to  do  so."  Joseph  Gambetta  and 
his  wife  had  recently  retired  to  Nice,  where  they  had  a  little 
house  on  the  Villefranche  road. 

The  elections  had  more  than  doubled  the  Republican 
minority  in  the  Legislative  Assembly.  Cr^mieux,  Gr^vv  and 
Jules  Ferry  had  been  elected,  and  the  "third  party"  was 
increased  by  fifty  members.  The  Rouher  Ministry  had  fallen, 
and  the  Empire  was  aspiring  to  transform  itself  into  a  Con- 
stitutional Monarchy  with  the  help  of  the  Cabinet  formed  by 
£mile  Ollivier  on  January  2,  1870. 

Gambetta    ascended    the    rostrum    for    the    first    time    on 

27 


GAMBETTA 

January  lo  to  ask  a  question  of  General  Le  Boeuf,  Minister  of 
War,  with  regard  to  two  soldiers  who  had  been  sent  to  Africa 
for  taking  part  in  an  electioneering  meeting.  The  General 
returned  a  biting  answer;  and  £mile  Ollivier,  with  a  view  to 
smoothing  matters,  said  that  the  legal  opposition  and  the  new 
Government  must  confine  their  discussions  to  questions  "  con- 
cerned with  measures."  Gambetta  replied  that  the  question 
between  the  Government  and  the  Opposition  was  one,  not  of 
measures,  but  of  principle.  "What  we  are  demanding,"  he 
said,  "  is  that  the  Monarchy  should  be  replaced  by  a  series  of 
organised  institutions  consistent  with  universal  suffrage  and 
the  sovereignty  of  the  nation ;  that  we  should  be  given,  peace- 
ably and  without  a  revolution,  the  form  of  government  whose 
name  vou  all  know  :  a  Republic." 

He  repudiated  any  desire  to  employ  force ;  his  ideal  was  to 
be  realised  by  legal  and  persuasive  means.  "  In  the  light 
thrown  from  this  rostrum  the  conscience  of  the  country  will 
become  more  and  more  confident  and  convinced,  and  the 
moment  will  come,  nor  is  it  far  distant,  when  the  majority 
that  will  supplant  you  without  any  disturbance  or  disorder, 
shall  be  borne  along  by  the  irresistible  force  of  logic  to  another 
order  of  things.  You  are  but  a  bridge  between  the  Republic 
of  1848  and  the  Republic  of  the  future,  and  over  that  bridge 
we  shall  pass  !  " 

He  spoke  again  on  several  occasions,  notably  in  connection 
with  an  application  for  a  warrant  against  Henri  Rochefort 
after  the  murder  of  Victor  Noir,  on  the  subject  of  the  strikes 
at  Le  Creusot  and  on  the  freedom  of  the  Press.  But 
it  was  on  April  5,  1870,  that  he  really  began  his  career  in 
the  Assembly,  with  a  speech  that  placed  him  by  universal 
consent  in  the  first  rank. 

The  Emperor,  in  the  difficulties  that  beset  him,  had  resolved 
to  appeal  to  the  country.  After  Grevy,  Thiers,  Ernest  Picard 
and  Jules  Favre  had  addressed  the  Assembly  on  ihis  subject, 
Gambetta  rose.  Repeating  the  ideas  he  had  so  often  ex- 
pressed in  conversation,  intimate  letters,  and  electioneering- 
speeches,  and  drawing  inspiration  from  a  recently  published 
pamphlet  called  L' Empire  parte mentaire  est-il  possible?  by 

28 


BAUDIN  CASE  AND   GAMBKTTA'S    ELECTION 

Gustave  Chaudey  (afterwards  a  victim  of  the  Commune),  he 
spoke  for  two  hours.  For  the  space  of  two  hours,  before  a 
majority  who  shuddered  at  the  very  name  of  a  Republic,  he 
expounded  with  the  utmost  moderation  the  entire  Republican 
doctrine. 

After  pointing  out  the  failure  of  the  Constitution  of  1852, 
he  showed  that  a  plebiscite,  as  the  word  implies,  is  "  the  ex- 
pression of  a  people's  knowledge  and  beliefs  with  regard  to  a 
political  fact";  that  the  people,  therefore,  should  only  inter- 
vene after  discussion  by  their  representatives,  and  public 
debates;  that  without  these  tests  the  country  is  in  no  condition 
to  pass  judgment,  and  the  plebiscite  is  but  a  snare  and  a  delu- 
sion. He  seemed  to  be  defining  an  appeal  to  the  country 
similar  to  that  which  is  practised  in  England  after  a  dissolu- 
tion— though  the  likeness  was  unacknowledged  and  indeed 
involuntary,  since  at  that  time  he  was  dominated,  like  the 
whole  Republican  party,  by  memories  of  the  Revolution  and 
of  1848,  and  was  still  in  favour  of  a  single  Chamber.  He 
pointed  out  to  the  Monarchists  who  supported  the  Empire  the 
danger  to  monarchical  doctrines  of  putting  the  hereditary 
principle  to  the  vote  every  time  that  the  fundamental  compact 
was  threatened.  He  skilfully  provoked  interruptions  by  the 
Bonapartists,  making  them  say  that  for  them  the  doctrine  of 
divine  right  meant  the  sovereignty  of  the  people,  and  that 
the  moment  the  people  declared  a  Republic  to  be  necessary 
they  would  bow  to  the  decision.  "  I  ask  nothing  better  !  "  he 
said. 

He  carried  his  argument  to  its  logical  end  :  "  Experience 
will  show  us  that  a  parliamentary  Monarchy  is  incompatible 
with  universal  suffrage.  National  sovereignty  can  only  exist 
when  the  Parliament,  having  been  elected  by  all  the  citizens 
of  the  nation,  holds  the  command  and  has  the  last  word  in 
the  treatment  of  political  affairs.  If  a  power  exists  that  can 
keep  Parliament  in  check,  the  principle  of  sovereignty  is 
violated." 

Then,  as  though  foreseeing  and  prophesying  the  terrible 
events  of  a  few-  months  later,  he  went  on  :  "I  will  suppose  that 
the  country  desires  peace  and  the  executive  power  desires  war. 

29 


GAMBETTA 

It  ilir  Constitution  is  to  n'spect  the  sovereignty  of  the  nation 
ilu'  last  word  must  lie  with  the  electors ;  otherwise  the  national 
\sill  is  thwarted,  the  iiati(jnal  sovereignty  is  violated,  and  the 
nation  is  defeated."  Thus,  step  by  step,  he  forced  the 
Mtnpir(,*  to  observe  the  consecjuenees  of  the  method  of  election 
on  which  it  was  founded  and  fr(jin  which  it  professed  to  draw 
its  strength;  he  took  from  it,  one  by  one,  all  its  titles  to  exis- 
tence. A  Monarchy  must,  un  pain  of  death,  surround  itself 
with  monarchical  institutions;  uni\ersal  sulTiage  contains  the 
germ  of  a  Republic,  and  will  sooner  or  later  bring  it  forth  by 
a  natural  {process  of  development. 

lo  the  politics  founded  on  Holy  Writ,  "the  code  of  the 
ancient  Monarchy  "  so  magnificently  expounded  by  Bossuet, 
he  opi)osed  the  new  political  code:  *'  the  politics  founded  on 
universal  sulTrage." 

Finally  he  showed  that  the  so-called  responsibility  of  the 
Hmp<'ror  had  no  existence  in  fact.  "  If  you  do  not  organise 
res|)(jnsibility,  there  is  someone  who,  in  fateful  moments,  will 
not  hesitate  to  appropriate  it  without  any  previous  organisa- 
tion :   that  someone  is  called  Revolution." 

War  and  revolution  !  The  success  of  the  speech,  however, 
was  considerable.  The  Kmpire  seemed  so  solid  !  This 
academical  discourse  was  of  no  consequence;  there  was  no 
danger  in  enjoying  this  masterly  eloquence,  seasoned  as  it  was 
with  a  hint  of  quite  unreal  catastrophe.  And  besides,  at  the 
heart  of  things,  there  was  another  point  :  the  imperialist 
Right,  without  perhaps  admitting  it  to  itself,  was  the  orator's 
confederate,  and  was  not  sorry  that  the  new  Ministry  should 
be  told  :  ''  You  .see  whither  your  concessions  lead  !  "  There 
is  nt)thing  so  u.seful  for  an  orator  as  to  win  the  approbation, 
whether  secret  or  avowed,  of  his  habitual  opponents;  they 
can  do  more  for  him  than  his  own  party,  which  contains  his 
true  rivals.  The  s|x>aker's  youth,  his  fatigue — Tor  he  had 
hardly  recovered  from  his  illness,  which  affected  his  powerful, 
earnest  voice — his  mingled  strength  and  charm,  the  curious 
blending  in  his  delivery  of  persuasiveness  and  vehemence,  the 
maturity  of  his  thought  and  language,  his  daring  and  his 
prudence,  the  motleration   that  tempered  his  ruthless  logic — 

30 


BAUDIN   CASE   AND    GAMBKTTA'S   ELECTION 

all  these  qualities  ajmbinetl  to  produce,  within  the  Chamber 
and  witiiout,  a  unanimous  outburst  of  admiration  for  this 
master  of  eloquence,  this  member  of  the  most  advanced 
opposition  who  none  the  less  preached  the  need  lor  govern- 
ment. The  Baudin  case  had  won  him  recognition  as  a 
lawyer;  it  was  his  sf)eech  on  the  plebiscite  that  made  him 
recognised  as  a  political  orator. 

It  is  said  that  Guizot,  after  reading  this  speech,  solemnly 
declaimed  an  answer  to  Gambetta's  arguments,  with  no 
audience  but  his  own  son.  , 

A  few  days  later  the  students  of   the  Schools  entertained 
him    at    a    banquet,    the    organisers    being    fitienne    Lamy, 
Camille    Pelletan    and  M.    Jules   Cambon.       To    understand 
aright  the  originality  of  his  speech  and  the  effect  produced 
by  it,   we   must   recall   the  history  of   the   Republican   jxirty 
between   the  years   1814  and    1848.     Under  the   Restoration, 
with  all  the  memories  of  the  Terror  on  its  shoulders,  it  had 
existed  only   in   the  obscurity  of  secret  societies;   under  the 
Monarchy  of  July  it  had  lived  through  insurrections,  revolts, 
riots,  imprisonment  and  exile;  then,  in   1848,  came  the  inva- 
sion of  the  Assembly  on  May  15,  followed  by  the  insurrection 
of  June;  and  in   185 1   a  fresh  series  of  death-sentences,  im- 
prisonments   and    banishments    to   Brussels,    London,    Lau- 
sanne, Lambessa  or  Cayenne.     The  Republicans  had  behind 
them  half  a  centurv  of  persecution  and  suffering.     And  now, 
here  was  this  young  man,  face  to  face  with  other  young  men, 
saying  openly  to  them  :   "The  heroic  age  of  the  Republican 
party  is  at  hand."     He  would  have  nothing  to  do  with  vio- 
lence,  nor  force,   nor  with  any  of  the  old  methods  of  con- 
spiracy, riots  and  plots.     The  convulsions  of  childhood  were 
over,  he  announced,  and  the  maturity  of  Republicanism  was 
at  hand.     Every  man,  he  said,  must  devote  himself  to  a  life- 
long apostleship;  a  new  method  must  be  adopted — the  educa- 
tion of  the  people  to  acquire  authority  by  regular  means,  to 
discuss  affairs  soberly,  to  persuade   public  opinion,  and  so 
deserve  to  govern  the  nation.     In  these  days,  when  the  very 
word    Republic  was    still    associated    in    many    minds   with 
memories  of   the  Terror  and   of  the  June   insurrection,  and 

31 


GAMBETTA 

when  Orsini's  attempt  was  still  recent,  the  interest  and  sur- 
prise aroused  by  sucli  unexpected  words  can  easily  be 
imagined. 

And,  after  all,  had  he  not  in  his  veins  the  blood  of  Italy, 
the  blood  of  brilliant,  splendid  Genoa?  Was  he  not  the 
child  of  the  sunshine  and  the  blue  sea?  He  had  done  witii 
sterile,  grey-toned  theories.  He  was  essentially  a  politician 
and  a  diplomatist :  he  was  also  a  lawyer  and  a  constructive 
citizen;  can  one  picture  him  within  the  mildewed  walls  of  a 
prison,  or  in  the  mefanchoiy  loneliness  of  exile?  Me  was  an 
artist,  born  to  enjoy  all  the  pleasures  of  earth,  and  flinging 
from  him  the  dust  of  the  past,  he  determined  to  eat  freely  of 
the  golden  fruit  that  hangs  on  the  evergreen  tree  of  life. 

The  Republicans,  because  they  wished  to  put  an  end  to 
monarchical  authority,  were  opposed  to  all  authority;  and 
were  opposed  to  the  army,  because  the  army  supported  autho- 
rity. This  was  how  Gambetta  unravelled  their  sophistry  : 
"  I  protest  against  those  who  attack  the  institutions  of  our 
Government  because  they  are  in  the  hands  of  a  man  who 
makes  a  bad  use  of  them,  and  forget  that  in  a  democratic  com- 
munity the  Government  would  consist  of  ourselves.  Not  that 
the  Government  should  overstep  its  proper  limitations.  No, 
no  !  I  have  too  much  respect  for  the  individual,  too  much  con- 
fidence in  the  mutual  development  of  the  liberated  powers  and 
united  energies  of  our  citizens  to  require  of  the  State  anything 
resembling  constraint.  .  .  .  But  neither  do  I  wash  to  over- 
throw this  organisation  that  keeps  society  in  a  state  of  equili- 
brium. We  need  a  Government.  We  need  our  Govern- 
ment !  "  Here  we  may  recognise  the  views  of  Auguste 
Comte.  For  the  first  time  the  mind  of  a  politician  was  guid- 
ing universal  suffrage  towards  an  organised  democracy.  And 
he  boldly  hazarded  this  profound  phrase,  which  led  him  far 
and  was  always — perhaps  wilfully — misunderstood  :  "  To  be 
right  is  to  cease  to  be  a  party." 

The  electoral  committees  were  convoked  for  May  8. 
Gambetta  signed  the  Manifesto  of  the  Opposition  :  "  The 
people  of  France  intend  to  replace  personal  government  by 
the  government  of  the  country  by  the  country.       The  new 

32 


BAUDIN   CASE   AND   GAMBETTA'S   P:LECTI0X 

Constituiion  on  which  you  are  summoned  lo  give  an  opinion 
does  not  establish  the  government  of  the  country  by  the 
country,  but  merely  ar;  imitation  of  it.  The  personal  govern- 
ment preserves  intact  its  most  dangerous  prerogatives,  the 
right  of  making  treaties  and  of  declaring  war,  rights  which, 
during  fifteen  \'ears,  it  has  exercised  with  such  disastrous 
results  to  the  country.  Finally,  the  new  Constitution  leaves 
to  the  individual  initiative  of  the  head  of  the  State  a  right 
that  essentially  belongs  to  every  free  nation,  the  right  of 
reforming,  when  it  considers  it  necessary,  its  fundamental 
institutions." 

The  result  of  the  appeal  to  the  country  was  7,350,142  ayes, 
1,538,825  noes  and  112,975  blank  voting-papers.  Less  than 
three  months  later  war  broke  out. 


n 


CHAPTER  III 

THF-:    Ql  ARRliL   WITH    I'lU  SSIA 

The  Causes   of  the  War — The    Growing  Menace    of  Prussia — Napoleon    III.    and 
Bismarck  (1862- 1870) —The  Ems  Telegram. 

The  mother  of  history  is  geography.  The  policy  of  a 
State  is  the  result  of  its  physical  conditions.  France  has 
three  strong  frontiers — the  sea,  the  Pyrenees  and  the  Alps — 
and  one  that  is  weak,  on  the  north-east.  Hence  her  struggles 
with  her  eastern  neighbours,  formerly  with  Austria  and  to-day 
with  Germany.  The  eternal  task  of  her  diplomacy  has  been 
to  guard  against  the  dangers  threatening  her  on  that  side. 

In  1862  the  frontier  of  France,  from  Switzerland  to  the 
Palatinate,  was  the  Rhine.  She  was  separated  from  the  rest 
of  Germany  by  Luxemburg,  the  Palatinate  and  the  Grand 
Duchy  of  Baden,  and  touched  Prussia  only  at  one  point,  near 
Sarrelouis.  Prussia  was  cut  in  two  by  Hanover,  Hesse  and 
Nassau. 

On  September  23,  1862,  Bismarck  became  head  of  the 
Ministry.  His  ambition  was  to  unite  the  whole  of  Germany 
under  the  dominion  of  Prussia;  and  by  one  of  the  most  extra- 
ordinary paradoxes  in  history  he  set  out  to  accomplish  his 
design  by  seeking  the  support  of  the  very  man  who  should 
have  opposed  it,  the  Emperor  of  the  French. 

This  surprising  circumstance  needs  explanation. 

Napoleon    I.  said  at   St.    Helena:    "One  of   my   greatest 

dreams  was  the  agglomeration,  the  concentration  of  peoples 

who  are  geographically  united,  but  have  been  disintegrated 

and  torn  asunder  by  revolutions  and  political  events.     Thus, 

in  different  parts  of  Europe  there  are  more  than  thirty  millions 

34 


/ 


THE   QUARREL   WITH   PRUSSIA 

of  French  people,  fifteen  millions  of  Spaniards,  fifteen  million 
Italians  and  thirty  million  (Germans:  1  should  like  to  have 
made  each  of  these  peoples  into  a  single,  united  national  body. 
The  agglomeration  of  the  thirty  millions  of  French  was 
already  accomplished.  As  for  the  fifteen  million  Italians, 
their  agglomeration  was  in  a  fair  way  to  be  achieved.  The 
agglomeration  of  the  Germans  would  have  been  a  slower 
matter.  How  is  it  that  no  German  ruler  has  ever  perceived 
the  natural  conditions  of  his  nation,  or  at  least  has  never 
profited  by  them  ?  This  agglomeration  w  ill  take  place 
sooner  or  later  through  the  force  of  circumstances;  the  initial 
impetus  has  been  given,  and  now  that  I  have  fallen  1  do  not 
think  there  is  any  balance  of  power  possible  in  Europe  apart 
from  the  agglomeration  and  confederation  of  the  great 
peoples."     {Memorial,  November  ii,   1816.) 

Napoleon  III.  came  into  power  with  his  head  full  of  his 
own  youthful  dream  and  his  uncle's  views,  which  he  had 
already  expounded  in  1839  in  Lcs  Idees  napoleoniennes. 
Here  we  may  find  both  the  opinion  expressed  at  St.  Helena 
and  the  whole  programme  of  his  future  reign. 

On  becoming  President  of  the  Republic  in  1850  he  con- 
fided his  scheme  for  the  aggrandizement  of  Prussia  by  an 
alliance  with  France  to  his  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs, 
Tocqueville,  and  to  the  Prussian  Minister,  Hatzfeld.  "  Have 
not  France  and  Prussia,"  he  said  to  the  Prussian  diplomatist, 
"  the  same  kind  of  culture,  the  same  ideal  of  enlightened 
liberalism,  the  same  interest  in  emancipating  and  unifying 
nations  and  races?"  And  when,  in  October,  1850,  the  duel 
between  Austria  and  Prussia — which  was  only  to  be  fought 
out  in  1866 — seemed  on  the  point  of  beginning,  Louis 
Napoleon,  who  was  awaiting  the  conflict  as  a  good  oppor- 
tunity to  intervene  in  Germany,  called  40,000  men  to  arms 
and  despatched  them  to  the  fortresses  of  the  North  and  East, 
to  be  ready  for  events.  The  submission  of  Prussia  at  Olmiitz 
made  these  preparations  labour  lost. 

During  the  Crimean  War  he  confided  to  Palmerston  and 
Prince  Albert  his  design  to  weaken  Austria  by  emancipating 
the  Germans,  Italians  and  Poles. 

35  Da 


GAMBETTA 

Austria,  at  the  moment,  was  seeking  an  alliance  with 
France.  Drouyn  de  Lhuys,  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs, 
said  to  the  Emperor:  "  Any  policy  except  the  Austrian  alli- 
ance would  be  fatal."  To  stand  aloof  from  Austria  was  to 
take  the  side  of  Prussia,  whose  credit  in  Germany  was  fed  by 
the  weakness  of  her  rival.  On  May  5,  1855,  the  Emperor — 
without  consulting  his  Minister,  who  immediately  resigned — 
rejected  the  Austrian  proposals. 

At  the  conclusion  of  the  Crimean  War  the  Emperor,  in 
spite  of  Walewski — for  he,  too,  desired  to  keep  in  Austria's 
good  graces — insisted  that  Cavour  should  be  admitted  to  the 
Congress  "  on  a  footing  of  perfect  equality."  In  July,  1858, 
he  received  him  at  Plombieres,  and  this  interview  resulted  in 
the  Italian  War. 

It  was  foreseen  by  all  intelligent  people  that  the  course  of 
events  beyond  the  Alps  would  lead  to  a  fresh  conflict  between 
Austria  and  the  growing  power  of  Piedmont,  while  to  humble 
Austria  was  to  play  Prussia's  game.  And  it  is  certainly  a 
fact  that  the  Italian  affair  produced,  or  rather  revived,  the 
Danish  affair.  Napoleon,  in  order  to  serve  Italy's  designs 
against  Austria,  secured  the  connivance  of  Prussia  by  allow- 
ing her  to  take  the  Duchies.  Profiting  by  the  difficulties  in 
which  France  had  involved  Austria,  the  potentate  of  the 
Mark  of  Brandenburg  began  the  series  of  acts  of  violence  by 
which,  in  the  course  of  seven  years,  he  defeated  Denmark, 
Austria  and  France,  established  the  dominion  of  Prussia  over 
the  rest  of  Germany,  and  made  Germany  the  strongest  Power 
in  Europe. 

Drouyn  de  Lhuys,  now  once  more  in  office,  pressed 
Napoleon  III.  to  accept  England's  offer  of  support,  to  honour 
the  signature  that  he  had  himself  affixed  to  the  Treaty  of 
London  in  1852  as  a  guarantee  of  the  integrity  of  Denmark 
and  to  help  the  Brave  nation  that  had  so  loyally  defended 
France  during  the  wars  of  the  First  Empire.  The  integrity 
of  Denmark  was  bound  up  with  the  rights  of  all  European 
nations  and  the  general  interests  of  civilisation.  How  could 
the  great  highways  of  commerce,  and  the  keys  and  gateways 
of  the  seas  be  allowed  to  pass  into  the  hands  of  a  State  power- 

36 


THE   QUARREL   WITH   PRUSSIA 

ful  cnouj^h  to  close  them  at  will  ?  Was  Prussia,  as  mistress 
of  the  port  of  Kiel,  thenceforward  to  command  the  North  Sea 
and  the  Baltic? 

France,  most  disastrously,  did  not  interfere,  and  this  act  of 
violence  paved  the  way  for  the  others  :  1864  '^'S.s,  so  to  speak, 
the  first  roug^h  sketch  of  the  fatal  year  1866,  and  of  that  most 
terrible  year,  1870. 

After  eng-a^ing  in  a  war  with  Austria  as  an  allv,  Bismarck 
next  stirred  up  a  war  against  her.  In  dragging  her  into  his 
unscrupulous  adventure  he  created  the  circumstances  that 
made  it  possible  to  turn  and  rend  her.  He  was  employing 
the  tactics  that  he  affected  all  his  life — making  the  tool  of  one 
dav  the  victim  of  the  next. 

In  October,  1865,  he  went  to  Biarritz,  to  sound  the 
Emperor.  He  saw  that  Napoleon's  mind  was  obsessed  with 
one  idea  :  to  give  Venetia  to  the  Italians.  He  said  to  Nigra 
on  his  way  through  Paris  :  "  If  Italy  did  not  exist  we  should 
have  to  invent  it."  Armed  with  Napoleon's  approval,  he  set 
to  work  without  delay,  and  negotiated  an  alliance  with  Italy. 
Prussia  promised  Italy  to  give  her  Venice  :  Italy  guaranteed 
to  Prussia  an  equivalent  gain  in  Germany. 

A  certain  misguided  section  of  the  French  nation  continued 
to  support  Prussia,  but  all  politicians  of  anv  insight  under- 
stood that  danger  had  changed  sides,  and  that  opposition  to 
Austria  had  become  an  anachronism.  They  made  ceaseless 
efforts  to  persuade  the  Emperor  of  his  fatal  misapprehension, 
and  of  the  danger  of  trying  to  restrain  Austria  bv  nourishing 
a  Power  whose  only  object  in  subduing  her  was  to  take  her 
place. 

Their  warnings,  however,  were  thrown  awav ;  and  when, 
on  May  3,  1866,  Thiers  delivered  in  the  Legislative  Assemblv 
the  finest  speech  of  his  whole  pnrliamentarv  career,  prophesy- 
ing German  unity  under  the  rule  of  the  Hohenzollerns,  it  was 
already  too  late.  On  April  8  Piedmont  had  signed  a  secret 
treaty  with  Prussia,  under  the  Emperor's  auspices.  The 
Austrians,  surprised  between  two  fires,  were  defeated  at 
Sadowa,  and  the  newspapers  of  the  Opposition  vied  with 
I  hose  of  the  Government  in  rejoicing  over  Prussia's  victory. 

37 


GAMBETTA 

"  The  Revolution,"  said  one  of  them,  "  has  defeated  Feudal- 
ism." Alas!  France,  without  entering  the  field,  had  suffered 
the  most  serious  blow  that  she  had  received  since  Waterloo. 

William  I.  said:  "Napoleon  could  and  should  have 
attacked  the  Prussian  Army  in  the  rear."  And  Bismarck 
pointed  out  what  Napoleon  should  have  done  to  prevent 
Prussia  from  completing  the  conquest  of  North  Germany. 
"  A  small  contingent  of  French  troops  on  the  Rhine,  com- 
bined with  the  numerous  forces  of  South  Germany,  would 
have  obliged  us  to  cover  ITerlin."  It  is  true  :  a  mere  demon- 
stration on  the  Rhine  at  that  supreme  moment  might  yet  have 
made  the  Emperor  of  the  French  master  of  the  situation. 

On  July  5,  1866,  a  Grand  Council  was  held  at  Saint-Cloud. 
"  This  was  the  most  decisive  day  of  the  whole  reign,"  says 
M.  Pierre  de  la  Gorce,  in  his  Histoire  du  Second  Empire. 
The  Ministers,  and  especially  Drouyn  de  Lhuys,  implored 
the  Emperor  not  to  miss  this  last  chance  of  intervening. 
They  succeeded  at  first  in  obtaining  an  order  to  mobilise  : 
Marshal  Randon,  Minister  of  War,  promised  80,000  men  at 
once  and  250,000  in  twenty  days'  time.  But  the  arguments 
of  the  Minister  of  the  Interior,  La  Valette,  changed  the 
Emperor's  mind,  and  made  him  fear  so  great  an  undertaking 
immediately  after  the  Mexican  expedition.  The  Italian  party, 
and  Napoleon  III.'s  own  weakness  for  Germany,  dissuaded 
him  from  hindering  the  triumphs  of  Prussia. 

The  Queen  of  Holland,  a  woman  of  considerable  intellect, 
who  was  devoted  to  the  Emperor  and  his  family,  wrote  to 
him  on  July  18,  1866  :  "  You  are  deluding  yourself  strangely  ! 
Your  prestige  has  suffered  more  during  this  last  fortnight 
than  in  all  the  rest  of  your  reign.  You  are  allowing  the  weak 
to  be  trodden  down  and  permitting  the  insolence  and  brutality 
of  your  nearest  neighbour  to  pass  all  bounds.  I  am  sorry 
that  you  fail  to  see  the  danger  of  a  powerful  Germany.  ..." 
Magne,  Persigny  and  many  other  faithful  servants  of  the 
Empire  shared  her  opinion. 

William  I.  and  his  generals,  as  the  price  of  their  victory 
at  Sadowa,  claimed  a  portion  of  Austria's  territory.  But 
Bismarck    foresaw    that    he    would    need    the    neutrality   of 


THE   QUARREL    WITH    PRUSSIA 

Austria  in  a  struggle  w  ith  France.  He  said  to  Karl  Schurz, 
formerly  American  Ambassador  in  Spain  :  "  Now  it  is 
France's  turn.  We  shall  have  war,  and  it  will  be  the  Em- 
peror himself  who  will  bring  it  about.  Mis  hand  will  be 
forced  by  the  necessity  of  maintaining  his  prestige.  The  war 
will  break  out  in  two  years' time.  We  shall  win.  Germany  will 
be  united,  to  the  exclusion  of  Austria,  and  Napoleon  will  fall." 

Bi.smarck,  to  spare  Austria,  withstood  his  sovereign  and 
the  military  party  with  desperate  energy.  He  even  sugge.sted 
resigning.  F"inally  the  King  yielded;  and  Prussia,  being 
now  certain  of  her  ascendency  in  Germany,  left  Austria  intact 
as  a  precaution  for  the  future. 

While  Bismarck  thus  avoided  wounding  Austria  too 
grievously  and  throwing  her  into  the  arms  of  France,  with 
a  view  to  a  possible  renewal  of  friendly  relations  with  her, 
the  Prussian  Minister  in  Paris,  Goltz,  sought  an  interview 
with  Drouyn  de  Lhuys,  and  asked  him  in  Bismarck's  name 
for  some  fragments  of  Saxony,  Hesse  and  Hanover — that  is 
to  say,  300,000  .souls.  Drouyn  de  Lhuys  refused  the  request. 
Goltz  hastened  forthwith  to  Saint-Cloud,  and  persuaded  the 
Emperor  to  give  him  Hanover,  Hesse,  Nassau  and  Frankfort 
— 4,500,000  souls.  He  then  returned  to  the  Quai  d'Orsay 
and  informed  the  amazed  and  horrified  Drouyn  de  Lhuys  of 
the  Emperor's  decision.  "  There  is  nothing  left  for  us  to  do 
now,"  said  Drouyn  de  Lhuys  to  his  private  secretary, 
Chaudordy,  "except  to  weep." 

This  is  a  striking  example  of  the  essential  weakness  in  the 
diplomacy  of  the  Second  Empire.  Napoleon  himself  nego- 
tiated directly  with  foreign  Ministers  and  ambassadors,  a 
practice  which  Louis  XIV.  had  been  very  careful  to  avoid, 
in  order  always  to  leave  liis  agents  a  line  of  retreat,  and  which 
even  Napoleon  I.  had  considered  unwise.  It  is  true  that 
William  L's  policy,  too,  was  one  of  personal  authority;  but 
at  least  the  Prussian  Monarch  never  negotiated  behind  his 
Minister's  back  and  in  opposition  to  his  opinions.  When 
Bismarck  disagreed  with  his  King,  his  fir.st  care  was  to 
convert  William  to  his  point  of  view,  either  bv  persuasion  or 
bv  threatening  to  resign. 

39 


GAMBETTA 

Immediately  after  this  crisis  Napoleon  made  the  situation 
public  in  a  circular  signed  by  La  Valette,  who  was  tem- 
porarily acting  as  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs.  "The 
growth  of  Prussia  insures  the  independence  of  Germany. 
France  should  take  no  umbrage  at  it.  When  once  Germany's 
national  sentiment  is  satisfied,  her  various  hostilities  will 
cease.  A  more  accurate  demarcation  of  frontiers,  by  render- 
ing Europe  more  homogeneous,  will  guarantee  the  peace  of 
the  Continent.  An  irresistible  Power — need  we  regret  it? — 
is  forcing  peoples  to  unite  together  in  great  agglomerations 
and  causing  secondary  States  to  disappear.  Perhaps  it  is 
inspired  by  a  sort  of  providential  prevision  of  the  world's 
future  destiny.  .  .  .■"  It  was  thus  that  this  monarch  trans- 
formed the  principle  of  nationalities  into  the  theory  of  "  great 
agglomerations."  All  the  efforts  of  the  Monarchy  had  been 
directed  towards  the  disintegration  of  Germany :  all  the 
efforts  of  the  Empire  tended  to  unify  her.  Some  time  after- 
wards, in  his  speech  from  the  throne.  Napoleon  III.  quoted 
the  very  words  used  by  his  uncle  at  St.  Helena.  Napoleon  III. 
has  often  been  called  a  dreamer.  A  dreamer  he  may  have 
been,  but  he  was  one  with  an  idee  fixe. 

After  playing  Bismarck's  game  in  the  name  of  the  principle 
of  nationalities,  he  continued  to  do  so  by  violating  that  prin- 
ciple himself.  In  trying  to  redeem  his  faults  he  made  them 
worse.  To  compensate  for  the  Prussian  annexations  he 
asked  for  the  left  bank  of  the  Rhine,  as  far  as  Mainz.  It  was 
too  late :  Bismarck  refused  to  comply.  Then  Napoleon, 
since  he  could  obtain  no  German  territory,  fell  back  upon 
Belgium  and  Luxemburg.  Bismarck,  with  the  example  of 
Frederick  in  his  mind,  begged  the  French  Ambassador,  Bene- 
detti,  to  make  his  request  in  writing;  and  the  document  was 
useful  to  him  later  on  in  securing  the  neutrality  of  England, 
who  was  disturbed  by  our  covetous  designs  on  the  shores  of 
the  North  Sea.  Finally,  after  passing  from  one  concession 
to  another,  the  Emperor  ended  by  confining  his  ambitions  to 
Luxemburg— and  even  here  he  was  outwitted  by  his  terrible 
adversary. 

During  these  sad  years  the  death  of  the  Emperor  Maxi- 

40 


THE   QUARREL   WITH   PRUSSIA 

milian  put  a  tragic  end  to  the  Mexican  expedition.  Marshal 
Niel,  the  Minister  of  War,  was  obstinately  opposed  in  his 
schemes  of  military  organisation,  both  by  the  Legislative 
Assembly  and  the  public  at  large.  Various  men  of  light  and 
leading  said  :  "  Put  an  end  to  the  army,  and  you  put  an  end 
to  war."  In  all  ages  there  have  been  those  who  thought  that 
war  could  be  avoided  by  making  no  preparations  for  it,  and 
extended  to  the  army,  the  instrument  of  war,  the  hatred  they 
felt  for  war  itself.  In  spite  of  the  warnings  of  Rothan, 
Stoffel  and  Ducrot ;  in  spite,  too,  of  the  fact  that  King 
William  and  his  Minister,  disregarding  the  Chamber,  were 
considerably  enlarging  the  Prussian  Army,  the  Imperial 
Government  proposed  to  reduce  our  forces. 

As  regards  the  rest  of  Europe,  England  professed  to  be 
indifferent  to  Continental  matters,  and  Russia  was  alienated 
from  us  by  the  Crimean  War  and  the  affairs  of  Poland.  The 
only  tw^o  alliances  that  remained  open  to  us  were  with  Austria 
and  Italy.  Since  1867  there  had  been  conversations  and  cor- 
respondences with  Vienna  and  Florence,  but  no  precise  agree- 
ment or  definite  compact  had  resulted.  Between  France 
and  Italy  was  Rome,  which  Victor  Emmanuel  coveted,  but 
which  Napoleon,  false  to  his  favourite  principle,  would  not 
give  up.  Austria,  before  committing  herself,  wished  to 
finish  her  military  preparations  and  watch  the  course  of 
events. 

On  July  3,  1870,  Paris  received  the  news  that  Prince 
Leopold  of  Hohenzollern  had  ascended  the  throne  of  Spain. 
This  was  a  re-constitution  of  the  Empire  of  Charles  V.  for 
the  benefit  of  Prussia.  In  the  case  of  a  European  war  France 
would  have  no  security  on  her  Pyrenean  frontier.  The 
French  Government  protested.  On  July  12,  on  the  advice 
of  the  Czar,  Alexander  II.,  the  candidate  retired.  The  inci- 
dent was  apparently  closed,  to  the  benefit  of  France  and  of 
the  cause  of  peace,  when  a  secret  meeting  was  held  at  Saint- 
Cloud,  with  neither  £mile  Ollivier  nor  any  other  Minister 
present,  except  the  Due  de  Gramont,  Minister  for  Foreign 
Affairs.  As  the  result  of  this  meeting  Gramont  addressed  a 
despatch   to  the   French    Ambassador  in    Prussia,   Benedetti, 

41 


GAMBETTA 

demanding  an  assurance  from  the  King  of  Prussia  that  he 
would  not  again  authorise  Leopold's  candidature.     (July  12.) 

On  the  following  day,  at  Ems,  an  aide-de-camp  came  from 
the  King  to  inform  Benedetti  that  Prince  Leopold  had 
renounced  the  throne  of  Spain,  and  that  His  Majesty  regarded 
the  incident  as  completely  closed.  The  Ambassador 
demanded  another  audience.  The  aide-de-camp  returned 
with  the  King's  assurance  that  he  approved  of  Prince  Leo- 
pold's renunciation  ;  as  for  promises  regarding  the  future, 
His  Majesty  could  only  repeat  his  previous  statements. 
Benedetti  still  insisted.  The  answer  came  :  it  was  a  refusal — 
not  discourteous,  but  quite  definite.  The  King  had  said  his 
last  word  in  the  morning,  and  regretted  that  he  could  add 
nothing. 

At  this  moment  Bismarck  appears  upon  the  scene.  The 
telegram  relating  these  facts  reached  him  in  Berlin.  Moltke 
and  Roon  were  dining  with  him.  The  tragic  scene  is  familiar 
to  us  :  those  who  took  part  in  it  never  forgot  its  overwhelming 
effect.  They  deciphered  the  message,  which  indicated 
strained,  but  not  ruptured  relations,  and  left  a  loophole  for 
peace.  Even  the  chance  of  such  a  prospect  filled  the  Minister 
and  generals  with  consternation.  "  My  guests,"  wrote 
Bismarck  afterwards,  "  were  so  crushed  that  they  forgot  to 
eat  and  drink." 

And  then,  according  to  his  own  confession,  he  committed 
the  action  that  will  blacken  his  memorv  more  and  more  as  the 
world  advances  in  wisdom  and  morality.  By  a  flagrant  sup- 
pression of  facts  he  gave,  to  a  telegram  that  was  merely  a 
diplomatic  announcement,  the  character  of  a  call  to  arms. 
"  I  neither  added  nor  expunged  anything,"  he  wrote  cyni- 
cally, "  but  I  suppressed  a  few  things."  He  sent  this 
sipurious  document  to  the  Press,  representing  the  King's 
answer,  by  which  no  slight  was  intended,  as  an  insult  to  the 
French  Ambassador.  He  sent  telegrams  to  the  same  effect 
to  all  our  embassies.  "  It  will  act  down  there  on  the  Gallic 
bull,"  he  said  to  his  guests,  "  like  a  red  rag."  The  three 
men  returned  to  the  dinner-table.  They  suddenly  recovered 
their  zest  for  food  and  drink,  and  the  conversation  was  quite 

42 


THE   QUARREL    WITH   PRUSSIA 

gay,  even  Moltke,  usually  so  self-contained,  becoming  expan- 
sive and  garrulous.  "  If  it  be  granted  me,"  he  cried,  "  to 
live  to  command  our  army  in  such  a  war  as  that,  my  old 
carcass  may  go  to  the  devil  as  soon  as  it's  over  !  " 

Meanwhile  Benedetti,  after  paying  his  court  to  the  King  at 
the  station  at  Ems,  and  telegraphing  the  story  to  his  own 
Minister,  arrived  in  Paris.  The  Government  therefore  heard 
the  truth  from  him,  as  he  told  it  afterwards  in  his  hook  on  his 
mission  in  Prussia,  and  as  the  Due  de  Gramont  confirmed  it 
in  187 1  before  the  Committee  of  Inquiry  appointed  by  the 
National  Assembly. 

On  the  13th  England  had  pointed  out  to  the  Imperial 
Government  that  it  was  assuming  a  heavy  responsibility 
in  failing  to  declare  itself  satisfied  by  Prince  Leopold's 
renunciation. 

Such  was  the  state  of  alTairs  when  the  matter  came  before 
the  Corps  L^gislatif. 


43 


PART    II 

THE    WAR 
(1870-1871) 


4S 


CHAPTER  IV 

NATIONAL   DEFENCE 

The  Declaralioii  of  War — (lambetta  believes  in  Victory  for  France — First  Defeats — 
The  4th  September — The  Goveninient  of  National  Defence — Canibetta  becomes 
.Minister  of  the  Interior — The  Tours  Delegation  (September  8th-October  9th). 

On  July  15  the  sitting  of  the  Legislative  Assembly  opened 
at  one  o'clock.  The  Government  briefly  described  the  recent 
negotiations,  and  announced  that,  having  made  every  effort 
to  avoid  war,  it  would  now  prepare  for  it,  leaving  the  respon- 
sibility to  Prussia.  Thiers,  amid  tumult  and  invective,  made 
his  protest:  "Remember  May  6,  1866.  You  silenced 
me  when  I  pointed  out  to  you  the  dangers  that  were  immi- 
nent. That  memory,  if  nothing  else,  should  make  you  listen 
to  me  now."  Gambetta  intervened.  "  You  are  making  the 
whole  of  this  grave,  this  terrible  question  hang  upon  a 
telegram  sent  without  your  knowledge  to  all  the  Cabinets  of 
Europe.  I  maintain  that  you  should  lay  before  the  Chamber 
no  mere  extracts  or  allusions,  but  some  direct  and  authentic 
communication.  It  is  a  question  of  honour,  you  say;  well, 
we  must  know  in  what  terms  they  have  dared  to  speak  of 
France."  Jules  Favre  demanded  the  publication  of  the 
despatches,  and  especially  of  the  one  in  which  the  Prussian 
Government  informed  the  foreign  Governments  of  its  resolve. 
Bufifet  supported  the  motion,  but  it  was  defeated  by  153  votes 
to  84. 

The  sitting  was  resumed  at  half-past  nine  that  evening. 
Talhouet,  Recorder  of  the  Committee  that  examined  the  legis- 
lative measures  proposed  by  the  Government,  read  his  state- 
ment.    Later  on,  he  .sadly  acknowledged  its  mistakes. 

47 


GAMBETTA 

Gambetta   entered    the    tribune.       His    speech    shows    his 
peculiar  position  in  the  party  of  the  Left.     On  the  one  hand 
— with  the  majority — he  supported  the  vote  of  credit  for  the 
army,  from   motives  of  patriotism,   though  ten  members  of 
the  Left,  including  Favre  and  Grevy,  voted  against  it,  and 
seven  abstained  from  voting.     On  the  other,  he  maintained 
that  the  Imperial  Government  was  false  to  its  policy  of  1864 
and  1866;  he  demanded  reasons  for  so  great  a  change,  and 
asserted  that  even  if  the  progress  of  Prussia  had  made  this 
necessary  there  was  no  need  to  resort  to  "  wretched  make- 
shifts."    "  For  my  part  I  was  expecting  that,  when  eighty- 
four  members  of  this  Assembly  had  demanded  the  produc- 
tion of  the  document  on  which  you  ground  the  whole  casus 
belli,   you  would  communicate  it  directly,   fully,  and  in   its 
integrity  to  the  Committee.     You  call  upon  France  to  give 
you  men  and  money,  you  plunge  her  into  a  war  which  will 
mean,   perhaps,  that  the  end  of  the  nineteenth  century  will 
be  devoted  to  settling  the  question  of  supremacy  between  the 
German  and  French  races,  yet  you  will  not  make  an  authen- 
tic,  definite  statement  of  the  origin  of  this  immense  enter- 
prise, so  that  France  and  all  Europe  may  know  which  side 
perpetrated  the  unjust  outrage  and  which  side  is  making  a 
legitimate  defence.    In  this  discussion  I  am  concerned  with 
one  thing  only,  which  should  be  as  interesting  to  you  as  it 
is  absorbing  to  me  :    to  find  out  whether  the  decisions  that 
you  are  trying  to  make  final  will  win  the  assent  of  Europe, 
and  more  especially  of  France.     Well,  when  you  have  drawn 
the  sword  it  will  only  be  on  one  condition  that  you  can  count 
on    the    needful    sympathy,    the    indispensable    support    of 
Europe  :  your  explanations  must  prove  that  you  have  suffered 
a  profound  and  real  outrage.    Now,  I  am  as  sensitive  as  any 
man,  and  speaking  for  myself,  if  the  choice  had  been  left  to 
me  by  the  Government  of  my  own  party,  I  beg  you  to  believe 
that  I  should  not  have  resorted  to  such  wretched  makeshifts 
to  find  decisive  reasons  for  such  conduct.     I  am  not  suspect, 
therefore,  and  I  beg  you  to  listen  to  me  when  I  say  that  you 
have   given    no   adequate   satisfaction   to  the   public  in   the 
quotations  and  documents  that  you  have  produced."     Finally 

48 


N  ATIONAL  ^  DEFENC E 

he  stated  that  the  Ems  telegram,  which  in  the  eyes  of  the 
Government  was  the  cause  of  the  quarrel,  had  been  sent  with 
Benedetti's  knowledge  and  had  given  him  no  uneasiness,  and 
that  the  French  Ambassador  had  not  uttered  a  word  of  protest 
against  the  altitude  of  the  Prussian  Government. 

It  is  plain  that  what  he  condemns  is  not  so  much  the 
rupture  with  the  policy  of  1864  and  1866,  as  the  manner  of  its 
accomplishment.  He  was,  at  heart,  quite  convinced  that  the 
policy  of  1866  could  not  be  maintained,  that  it  was  high  time 
to  put  a  stop  to  the  encroachments  of  Prussia,  and  indeed 
that  this  should  have  been  done  sooner.  In  a  letter  to  his 
father  from  Ems,  dated  July  25,  i86g,  he  spoke  of  "  the  hatred 
he  had  vowed  to  the  victors  of  Sadowa."  He  knew  that 
sooner  or  later  the  struggle  must  come,  but  he  wished  the 
motive  to  be  irreproachable,  the  outrage  undeniable,  and  the 
action  of  France  clearly  proved  to  be  just,  in  the  eyes  of  the 
world. 

A  Bonapartist  Deputy  congratulated  him  publicly  on  voting 
for  the  Army  supplies.  "There  is  no  need  to  congratulate 
me,"  answered  Gambetta  (and  his  words  were  published  at 
once);  "  I  could  not  hesitate.  It  will  be  all  the  better  for  your 
Emperor  if  he  can  wash  away  December  2  in  the  waters  of  the 
Rhine,  and  can  profit  by  his  victory,  which  I  desire  with  all 
my  heart.     The  Republic  will  profit  by  it  later  on." 

j£mile  Ollivier.  in  his  book  on  the  Liberal  Empire,  which 
abounds  in  interesting  remarks,  says  that  at  a  meeting  in  the 
Rue  de  la  Sourdi^re  Gambetta  used  very  "bellicose"  lan- 
guage. We  have  seen  what  this  amounted  to.  The  truth  is 
that  Buette — at  that  time  a  member  of  his  comite — and  others 
of  his  friends  thought  that  he  was  going  too  far.  Gambetta 
was  much  nearer  to  the  Republicans  of  the  Restoration  and 
the  July  Monarchy,  who  dreamt  of  restoring  the  military 
greatness  of  France  and  the  frontiers  of  the  First  Republic, 
than  to  his  own  party  in  the  Legislative  Assembly,  who 
thought  the  profession  of  arms  incompatible  with  democracy, 
and  feared  that  in  strengthening  the  army  they  would 
strengthen  the  Empire.  They  did  not  believe  in  the  German 
menace.     It  was  of  this  that  Jules  Ferry  was  thinking,  when 

49  E 


GAMBETTA 

examining   his  conscience   later  on,   as  he  spoke  of   "those 
dangerous     and     deceptive     Utopias";     and    we    know    of 
Michelet's  noble  remorse  after  the  disaster.     Always,  genera- 
tion after  generation,  we  see  the  same  eternal  mistake.     The 
humanitarians  and  cosmopolitans  of  1790  became,  the  moment 
their  country  was  invaded,  the  ferocious  patriots  of  1792  and 
1793.     But  the  mistake  was  less  excusable  in  1868  and  1869; 
in  the  first  place  because  the  past  should  have  served  as  an 
object-les.son,    and    also    because    the    foreign    policy  of  the 
Republican    Democracy    was    founded    on    the    principle   of 
Nationalities  and  was  therefore  inconsistent  with  its  military 
policy.    To  aim  at  the  remodelling  of  Europe  and  then  oppose 
the  first  steps  necessary  to  the  scheme  was  too  glaring  a  con- 
tradiction.    Gambetta  was  keenly  alive  to  this  situation.     In 
the  preceding  year,  when  Marshal  Niel's  projects  were  under 
discussion,   Lavertujon   had  published  in  the  Gironde  some 
rather  trenchant  articles  criticising  the  attitude  of  the  Left, 
and  Jules  Simon  had  "been  stung  into  complaining  "  I  have 
just  read  your  article  on  military  law  :    I  think  you  sacrifice 
us  a  little  to  your  own  reputation  as  a  politician.    As  for  me, 
I  am  not  afraid  of  being  called  a  Utopian.    You  know  there  is 
one  of  our  reasons  that  we  shall  not  give  :    namely,  that  a 
standing  army  is  an  instrument  of  Csesarism."    Jules  Favre 
spoke  in   the  same  sense:    "A  concern   for  military  affairs 
points  to  schemes  hatched  in  the  interests  of  the  dynasty." 
Now  it  was  these  very  articles  that  led  Gambetta  to  pay  a 
visit  of  congratulation  to  Lavertujon,  to  make  a  friend  of  him, 
and  support  him  in  the  election  of  1869. 

We  see,  then,  that  there  were  many  points  of  difference 
between  Gambetta  and  the  Left  party  as  a  whole.  He  did  not 
share  the  opinions  of  his  Republican  colleagues  with  regard 
to  Prussia,  or  Sadowa,  or  the  Army.  Nor  did  he  share  their 
views  on  the  organisation  of  the  State.  In  their  wish  to 
abolish  the  Empire,  they  would  also  have  destroyed  the  State 
on  which  the  Empire  was  founded.  The  State,  like  the  Army, 
was  confused  in  their  thoughts  with  the  Imperial  regime 
whose  downfall  they  desired.  He,  on  the  contrary,  whose 
mind  was  saturated  with  Miraheau  and  Comte.  identified  the 

50 


NATIONAL   DEFENCE 

Staff*  with  the  Dfinocracy.  Tlip  Slat«',  li«*  saiti,  is  ourselves; 
universal  suffrage  means  ourselves;  authority  means  our- 
selves, in  virtue  of  the  nation's  sovereignty.  Authority  must 
be  strong,  then,  since  it  speaks  in  the  name  of  the  nation  ; 
the  State  must  be  powerful  and  active,  since  it  is  the  main- 
spring of  the  people's  progress.  This  idea  never  left  him, 
and  later  on,  long  after  the  fall  of  the  Empire,  it  created 
serious  trouble  between  him  and  a  section  of  the  Republican 
party.  So  we  see,  even  when  he  first  entered  the  Chamber 
at  the  age  of  thirty-one,  how  independent  was  his  character. 
how  original  his  mind. 

On  July  19  came  the  declaration  of  war.  On  the  24th  the 
session  of  the  Chambers  closed,  and  Gambetta  set  out  for 
Switzerland  with  Lavertujon.  The  final  goal  of  their  journev 
was  the  Chateau  des  Cretes,  near  Clarens,  but  they  first 
travelled  about  Switzerland  in  easy  stages.  Not  for  one 
moment  did  he  doubt  of  victory.  Whenever  his  companion 
allowed  any  feelings  of  uneasiness  to  become  apparent  he 
would  cry,  gaily  and  confidently  :  "  We  shall  beat  them  !  " 
The  despatch  from  Wissembourg  on  August  5  left  him  calm. 
Then  news  of  Reichshoffen  and  Forbach  reached  them. 
"We  must  pack,"  said  he,  and  returned  to  Paris;  but  he 
gave  no  sign  of  anxiety. 

On  August  8  the  Chambers  were  convoked.  The  Legis- 
lative Assembly  met  on  the  9th.  In  the  name  of  the  Left 
Jules  Favre  proposed  that  a  committee  of  fifteen  members 
should  be  appointed,  with  full  powers  to  save  the  country  from 
invasion.  Clement  Duvernois  moved  the  following  order  of 
the  day :  "  The  Chamber,  having  resolved  to  support  a 
Cabinet  that  is  capable  of  organising  the  country's  defences, 
passed  to  the  order  of  the  day."  £mile  Ollivier  announced 
that  the  Cabinet  did  not  accept  it.  The  members  of  the 
Chamber  passed  it  without  leaving  their  places,  and  the 
Cabinet  at  once  resigned.  Then  the  Chamber  rejected,  by  190 
votes  to  53,  the  appointment  of  a  Defence  Committee.  "  You 
will  come  to  it  yet !  "  cried  Gambetta.  And  Jules  Favre 
added  :  "  By  the  time  you  come  to  it,  it  will  be  too  late  !  " 
The  question  was  raised  again  on  the   13th.     "We  must 

51  E   2 


GAMBETTA 

know/'  said  Gambetta,  "whether  we  have  made  our  final 
choice  between  saving  our  country  and  saving  a  dynasty." 
In  a  secret  Committee  of  the  whole  Chamber  the  new  Presi- 
dent of  the  Council,  General  de  Palikao,  opposed  Jules 
Favre's  motion,  which  was  rejected.  If,  at  that  time,  the 
Corps  Legislalif  had  appointed  the  Defence  Committee 
demanded  by  Jules  Favre,  Thiers  and  Gambetta,  that 
"  most  imprudent  and  least  strategical  "  march  which,  as 
Napoleon  111.  himself  admitted  in  his  letter  of  October  29, 
1S70,  to  Sir  John  Burgoyne,  was  prompted  by  "  political  con- 
siderations " — namely,  the  march  on  Sedan  from  Chalons — 
would  certainly  never  have  taken  place. 

The  next  day  Gambetta  appeared  in  the  tribune  with  a 
newspaper  from  Nancy  called  L'Esperance  du  Peuple,  which 
contained  the  news  that,  on  the  12th,  four  Prussian  soldiers 
had  taken  possession  of  that  town.  Sorrow  wrung  from  him 
the  cry:  "Our  protectors  are  useless!  "  A  few  days  later 
he  read  aloud  an  article  from  the  Progres  de  la  Marne 
announcing  that  live  Prussian  horsemen  had  occupied 
Chalons. 

13y  August  22  the  Empire  had  practically  ceased  to  exist. 
Lord  Lyons  wrote  to  his  Government :  "  I  do  not  know  if  the 
news  of  a  victory  would  save  the  dynasty."  The  members 
of  the  Left  believed  that  the  Empire  was  lost,  but  were  in  no 
mind  to  see  the  Republic  inheriting  its  troubles.  They  hoped 
that  the  Chamber  would  avoid  revolution  by  taking  the  reins 
into  its  own  hands  and  forming  a  Government  for  the  dura- 
tion of  the  war,  even  if  they  themselves  should  have  no  place 
in  it.  Thiers  and  General  Trochu  were  regarded  as  probable 
leaders ;  and  later,  when  the  war  was  over,  a  Constituent 
Assembly  could  institute  a  Republic.  It  was  the  most  ardent 
wish  of  the  Republicans  that  there  should  be  no  disorder, 
that  the  law  should  be  respected.  When,  on  August  9,  some 
rioters  scaled  the  garden-wall  of  the  Corps  Legislatif  at  the 
corner  of  the  Rue  de  Bourgogne,  Jules  Ferry's  determined 
attitude  made  them  retire  :  and  when,  on  the  14th,  some  of 
Bianqui's  followers  tried  to  seize  the  firemen's  barracks  at 
La   Villette  and  to  steal   their  muskets,  with   the   result  that 

52 


NATIONAL   DEFENCE 

several  men  were  killed,  Gambetta  from  the  rostrum  scourged 
those  who  made  civil  war  in  the  face  of  the  enemy,  and 
demanded  an  inquiry.  There  was  nothing  that  the  Left 
dreaded  so  much  as  riots  in  the  streets,  which,  while  aj^fjsfra- 
vatinp;-  the  troubles  of  the  country  before  the  eves  of  thr 
world,  would  have  further  compromised  the  Republican 
cause  in  the  future.  But  the  official  majority  and  Palikao's 
Ministry  dared  not  subscribe  to  the  election  of  a  Governmf^nt 
by  the  Chamber,  which  would  have  meant  the  recognition  of 
the  Empire's  collapse.  Their  evasions  and  delavs  brouj^^ht 
about  what  they  most  feared  :  a  revolution. 

Meanwhile  Gambetta  and  his  friends  were  vainlv  clamour- 
ing to  be  told  something-  of  the  military  situation,  and  of  the 
defences  of  Paris.  It  was  known  that  the  Metz  Army  was 
engaged;  the  battles  of  Gravelotte,  Rezonville  and  Mars-la- 
Tour  had  been  fought  in  the  middle  of  August ;  but  the  Minis- 
ter of  War  did  not  dare  to  give  definite  information.  It  was 
known,  too,  that  MacMahon's  Army  was  marching  away 
from  Paris,  but  its  movements  were  not  published,  and  the 
sense  of  torture  grew  day  by  day,  since  every  day's  delay 
was  a  fresh  chance  of  disaster. 

At  last,  on  September  3,  came  the  news  of  the  catastrophe 
at  Sedan.  At  four  o'clock  a  telegram  from  the  Emperor  to 
the  Empress  confirmed  the  fact  of  the  capitulation.  The 
Council  of  Ministers  published  a  proclamation  ;  numbers  of 
Deputies  hastened  to  the  Palais  Bourbon  to  demand  a  night 
sitting.  Opposite  the  Pont  de  la  Concorde  Gambetta 
addressed  the  crowd,  begging  them  to  retire  and  leave  the 
Assembly  to  discuss  the  situation  undisturbed.  The  sitting 
opened  at  one  o'clock  in  the  morning.  General  de  Palikao, 
amid  profound  silence,  announced  that  the  Armv  had 
capitulated  and  that  the  Emperor  was  a  prisoner.  Jules  Favre, 
representing  the  Left,  proposed  a  motion  to  the  effect  that 
Louis  Napoleon  Bonaparte  and  his  dynasty  were  deposed  an  ' 
that  a  Defence  Committee  should  be  nominated.  Instead  of 
settling  the  question  at  once  the  Chamber  adjourned  at  noon. 

When  the  sitting  opened  on  the  4th,  General  de  Palikao 
brought    forward    a    measure    appointing    a    Committee    of 

53 


GAMBETTA 

Regency  and  National  Defence,  and  Thiers  moved  a  resolu- 
tion signed  by  forty-seven  Deputies  of  all  parties:  "The 
Ciiamber  appoints  a  Committee  of  Government  and  of 
National  Defence.  A  Constituent  Assembly  will  be  elected 
as  soon  as  circumstances  permit."  The  three  motions  were 
sent  to  the  bureaux,  and  the  sitting  was  suspended,  only  to  be 
resumed  at  two  o'clock. 

Meanwhile  the  crowd  that  had  been  gathering  in  the 
approaches  to  the  building  since  noon  was  swelling  minute 
by  minute.  At  last  the  grille  yielded  to  the  pressure,  and  the 
Strangers'  Gallery  was  invaded. 

Most  of  the  Deputies  of  the  Left  took  their  seats,  and 
Gambetta,  urged  by  several  of  his  colleagues,  entered  the 
tribune  and  spoke  to  the  public  in  the  Strangers'  Gallery: 
"The  first  condition  of  the  people's  emancipation,"  he  said, 
"  is  order;  and  I  know  you  are  resolved  to  respect  it.  You 
desire  to  give  an  energetic  expression  of  your  wishes ;  your 
w  ish  is  in  the  depths  of  every  Frenchman's  heart,  it  is  on  the 
lips  of  your  representatives,  it  is  the  subject  of  their  dis- 
cussion :  to  depose " 

"Yes!  "  cried  many  voices  from  the  Strangers'  Gallery; 
and  several  added  : 

"  Deposition,  and  the  Republic!  " 

"  What  I  am  asking  of  you,"  continued  Gambetta,  "  is 
that  you  should  feel,  as  I  do,  the  intense  gravity  of  the  situa- 
tion, and  should  forbear  to  disturb  us  with  your  cries,  even 
if  they  be  cries  of  applause " 

He  was  interrupted  by  prolonged  shouting.  "  We  want 
a  Republic!      Vive  la  Republique!  " 

"  Pray  be  calm  !  "  said  Gambetta.  "  Order  must  be  ob- 
served. We  are  the  representatives  of  the  nation's  sove- 
reignty. I  beg  you  to  respect  that  title,  which  we  hold  from 
the  people.  It  is  incumbent  on  the  men  who  occupy  these 
benches  to  recognise  that  the  power  which  has  brought  upon 
the  country  all  these  deplorable  evils  has  fallen;  but  it  is 
equally  incumbent  upon  you  to  see  that  the  declaration  which 
will  shortly  be  made  should  not  appear  to  be  made  under  the 
pressure  of  violence.     We  have  two  things  to  do  :    first,  to 

54 


NATIONAL   DEFENCE 

resume  our  silting  and  act  in  accordance  witli  the  authorised 
forms;  and  secondly  to  give  the  country  an  example  of  real 
union.  In  the  name  of  our  country  and  of  political  liberty — 
two  things  which  will  never  be  separated  in  my  mind — I  call 
upon  you  to  remain  calm  while  your  representatives  return 
to  their  seats." 

The  calm,  however,  was  short-lived.  At  half-past  two 
President  Schneider  entered  and  took  the  chair.  The 
Strangers'  Gallery  was  packed  with  a  constantly  increasing 
crowd,  and  the  tumult  became  greater  than  ever.  The  butt- 
ends  of  muskets  battered  loudly  on  the  entrance-door  of  the 
Pas-Perdus;  panels  burst  in  noisily,  and  there  were  crashes 
of  broken  glass.  Crt^mieux  tried  to  speak,  but  his  voice  was 
drowned  in  the  uproar.  Gambetta  again  appealed  for  order 
and  silence  :  "  There  is  a  solemn  pledge  that  you  must  give 
us  :  you  must  allow  the  deliberations  that  are  about  to  take 
place  to  proceed  in  perfect  freedom." 

President  Schneider  then  added  his  entreaties:  "  M. 
Gambetta,"  he  said,  "  whom  none  of  you  can  suspect,  and 
whom  I  for  my  part  regard  as  one  of  the  most  patriotic 
men  in  the  country,  has  just  appealed  to  you  in  the  name 
of  that  country's  interests.  Believe  me,  at  this  moment 
the  Chamber  is  called  upon  to  discuss  a  situation  of  the 
greatest  gravity.  It  can  only  be  done  in  a  spirit  appropriate 
to  the  needs  of  that  situation;  if  it  were  otherwise  M. 
Gambetta  would  not  have  begged  you  to  give  us  support  by 
your  conduct." 

Sounds  of  approbation  mingled  with  complaints  came  from 
the  gallery. 

"  And  I  count  upon  it,  citizens  !  "  cried  Gambetta. 

President  Schneider  continued  :  "  Like  M.  Gambetta,  I 
cannot  express  to  you  too  strongly  that  there  is  no  true  liberty 
that  is  not  accompanied  by  order " 

Still  the  excitement  grew.  Gambetta  made  a  last  effort  to 
preserve  legal  forms  :  "  It  is  necessary  that  all  the  Deputies 
now  in  the  lobbies,  or  in  the  committee-rooms  where  they 
have  been  discussing  the  Emperor's  deposition,  should  return 
to  their  benches  and  take  their  places  before  the  measure  can 

55 


GAMBETTA 

■be  passed.  And  you  also,  citizens,  must  wait  in  seemly  and 
dignified  calmness  while  your  representatives  enter  the  hall 
and  take  their  seats.  They  are  being  summoned.  I  beg  you 
to  preserve  a  solemn  silence  till  they  return " 

At  that  moment— it  was  three  o'clock — the  door  above  the 
semi-circle,  opposite  to  the  tribune,  was  burst  open  and  the 
crowd  swarmed  into  the  Deputies'  benches. 

"  Since  discussion  is  impossible  under  these  conditions," 
said  the  President,  "  I  close  the  sitting." 

An  uproarious  and  excited  crowd  invaded  the  semi-circle, 
the  steps  of  the  tribune,  and  the  President's  chair.  Gambetta 
forced  his  way  through  it,  and  cried  from  the  tribune : 
"  Come,  come,  citizens,  the  precincts  must  be  treated  with 
respect !  Be  calm  !  In  less  than  a  quarter  of  an  hour  the 
Act  of  Deposition  will  be  parsed  and  made  public.  Come — 
leave  us  !     Have  you  no  confidence  in  your  representatives?  " 

"Yes,   yes,    we   have  confidence   in    you!" "Well, 

then,  leave  us  when  I  ask  you,  and  rest  assured  that  we  are 
going  to  pass  the  Act  of  Deposition  !  " 

"  And  what  about  the  Republic?  " 

A  scene  of  wild  confusion  followed,  during  which  he  left 
the  tribune  and  spoke  to  some  of  his  colleagues  of  the  Left. 
Then,  again  entering  the  tribune,  he  said  : 

"  Listen,  citizens!  Since  the  country  is  in  danger,  since 
sufficient  time  has  been  given  to  the  representatives  of  the 
nation  to  pass  an  Act  of  Deposition,  since  we  constitute 
to-day  the  authority  sanctioned  by  universal  suffrage,  we 
declare  that  Louis  Napoleon  Bonaparte  and  his  dynasty  have 
for  ever  ceased  to  reign  over  France." 

This  announcement  was  greeted  with  prolonged  cheers; 
but  demands  for  a  Republic  continued  none  the  less. 

"Do  you  or  do  you  not,"  cried  Jules  Favre,  "wish  for 
civil  war?  " 

"  No,  no  !  Not  civil  war,  but  war  against  the  Prussians  !  " 

"Then,"  said  Favre,  "  we  must  immediately  form  a  Pro- 
visional Government.  ...  I  entreat  you,  do  not  let  us  have 
any  bloodshed  :  do  not  force  brave  French  soldiers  to  turn 
their  arms  against  you  !     Their  arms  should  only  be  used 

56 


NATIONAL    DEFENCE 

against  the  foreigner.  Let  us  all  be  united  in  a  single 
thought,  the  thought  of  patriotism  and  democracy  !  " 

"  Vive  la  Republique!  "  cried  the  people. 

"  This  is  not  the  right  place  for  proclaiming  a  Republic  !  " 

"Yes,  yes!   Vive  la  Republique! '' 

"Yes!"  agreed  Gambetta.  "Vive  la  Republique! 
Citizens,  let  us  go  and  proclaim  it  at  the  Hotel  de  Ville  !  " 

Surrounded  by  countless  hordes  they  set  out  to  the  Hotel 
de  Ville  :  Jules  Favre  and  Jules  Ferry  by  the  right  bank  of 
the  river,  and  Gambetta,  Ernest  Picard,  Pelletan  and  Glais- 
Bizoin  by  the  left  bank.  In  the  radiant  sunshine  the  town 
wore  a  festal  air.  It  seemed  to  the  people  that  since  they 
were  saved  from  the  Empire  they  were  also  saved  from  the 
Prussians.  They  hoped  that  the  country  would  soon  find 
new  troops,  and  new  opportunities  for  saving  everything. 
No  weapons  were  to  be  seen,  no  blood  was  shed,  no  resistance 
was  made.  The  movement  was  the  work  of  circumstances 
rather  than  of  men.  A  tidal  wave,  it  seemed,  had  swept  away 
the  remnants  of  the  Empire;  and  the  Republic  appeared  like 
an  impersonal  Government  that  commanded  the  support  of  all 
because  all  had  but  one  task.  The  Empire,  as  it  fell,  handed 
France  over  to  the  Republic. 

In  a  letter  that  has  often  been  quoted  Gambetta  described 
this  famous  day,  four  years  later,  to  Mme.  Adam  :  "  The 
memories  of  this  tragic  anniversary  always  clothe  my  soul  in 
mourning.  In  spite  of  the  deliverance  that  marked  the  day, 
I  cannot  chase  away  the  cruel  thought  that  we  did  not  over- 
throw the  Empire  with  our  own  hands,  but  watched  it  sinking 
under  the  blows  of  a  foreign  foe.  I  can  remember,  with  all 
the  bitterness  of  that  first  day,  that  as  I  walked  to  the  Hotel 
de  Ville  along  the  quays  of  the  Seine,  with  the  people  of 
Paris  shouting  and  cheering  round  me,  I  said  to  the  man  who 
was  beside  me  :  *  The  cheers  and  raptures  of  these  people 
make  me  so  sad  that  I  could  die  !  The  poor  souls  do  not  hear 
the  tramp  of  the  German  armies  in  the  distance  !  '  I  hated 
the  glorious  sunshine,  which  seemed  to  be  illuminating,  as 
though  for  a  last  holiday,  the  fall  of  a  great  people.  France 
was  rushing  towards  the  abyss  in  perfect  unconsciousness." 

57 


GAMBETTA 

These  were  words  written  after  the  event,  under  the  burden 
of  defeat.  At  the  time,  his  imperturbable  optimism  had  by 
no  means  forsaken  liim.  When,  on  hearing  of  the  defeat 
at  Sedan,  Lavertujon  had  cried  :  "This  time  we  have  reached 
the  bottom  of  the  abyss  !  "  Gambetta  broke  in  with  :  "  Don't 
talk  such  nonsense  !  " 

They  reached  the  Hotel  de  Ville  at  about  four  o'clock,  and 
found  that  Milli^re,  a  leader  of  the  Revolutionary  party,  who 
had  hastily  returned  from  the  Legislative  Assembly,  was 
already  there  with  his  followers.  He  had  quickly  drawn  up 
lists  of  members  for  a  Provisional  Government,  and  was 
throwing  them  to  the  people  from  the  windows  :  they  bore 
the  names  of  Blanqui,  Delescluze,  Flourens,  Felix  Pyat  and 
Rochefort,  with  those  of  Jules  Favre  and  Gambetta.  A  voice 
cried:  "The  Deputies  for  Paris  must  be  members  of  the 
Government  !  "  Upon  this  such  an  outburst  of  acclamation 
followed  that  all  competition  was  impossible.  The  Govern- 
ment therefore  included  all  the  Deputies  for  Paris  except 
Thiers,  who  had  refused  office  beforehand.  Gambetta, 
Ernest  Picard  and  Jules  Simon  were  regarded  as  Deputies  for 
Paris,  though  they  had  chosen  to  represent  the  Bouches-du- 
Rhone,  L'H^rault  and  the  Gironde. 

But  the  revolutionaries  were  on  the  alert.  They  must  win 
the  army,  and  to  win  the  army  they  must  have  the  support 
of  the  Governor  of  Paris,  General  Trochu.  Civil  war  was  on 
the  horizon,  and  this  danger  decided  him  to  accept  the 
presidency  of  the  Provisional  Government. 

Jules  Favre  was  made  Vice-President,  and  Minister  for 
Foreign  Affairs;  Gambetta  received  the  portfolio  of  the  In- 
terior, being  elected  to  the  post  in  opposition  to  Ernest  Picard, 
who  went  to  the  Ministry  of  Finance.  Cr^mieux  became 
Minister  of  Justice,  Le  Flo  Minister  of  War,  Fourichon 
Minister  of  Marine,  Jules  Simon  Minister  of  Public  Instruc- 
tion and  Ecclesiastical  Affairs,  Dorian  received  the  portfolio 
of  Public  Works,  and  Magnin  that  of  Commerce. 

On  September  5  the  Government  thus  addressed  the  army  : 
"  We  are  not  the  Government  of  a  party  :  we  are  a  Govern- 
ment of  National  Defence.     We  have  but  one  aim  and  one 

58 


NATIONAL    DEFENCE 

desire  :  the  salvation  ol  our  country  by  the  arni}'  and  the 
nation,  rallied  round  that  glorious  symbol  before  which 
Europe  fled  eighty  years  ago.  To-day,  as  then,  the  Republic 
stands  for  the  close  union  of  army  and  people,  in  the  defcnre 
of  our  country." 

Three  days  later  the  Government  of  the  Defence  prepared 
to  appeal  to  the  country.  "It  must  be  irrefutably  prr»ved 
before  the  eyes  of  Europe  that  the  whole  country  is  with  us. 
The  invader  must  find  his  advance  checked,  not  only  by  an 
immense  city  that  is  determined  to  perish  rather  than  yield, 
but  also  by  an  entire  people — alert,  organised  and  governing 
through  their  representatives — by  an  Assembly,  in  short,  that 
can  keep  the  country's  heart  alive  everywhere  and  despite  all 
disasters."  The  Government  then  convoked  the  electoral 
assemblies  for  October  i6,  to  elect  au  scrutin  de  liste^  a 
"  Constituent  Assembly"  of  750  members. 

At  this  moment  MacMahon's  Army  was  imprisoned  in  Ger- 
many, while  Bazaine's  was  surrounded  in  Metz,  and  General 
Vinoy  was  returning  to  Paris  with  fifteen  or  twenty  thousand 
men.  To  oppose  700,000  Germans  we  had  94,000  regular 
troops,  49,000  sailors,  13,000  marine  infantry  and  artillery, 
and  34,000  gendarmes,  custom-house  officials  and  foresters. 
The  Corps  Legislatif  had,  as  a  matter  of  fact,  ordered  a  general 
mobilisation  ;  but  the  cadres  were  incomplete,  there  was  a  lack 
of  generals,  and  arms  were  very  scarce.  Our  most  important 
supplies  were  in  Strasburg  and  Metz.  The  Prussians  were 
marching  on  Paris ;  and  it  was  believed  that  the  capital  con- 
tained only  enough  food  for  forty-five  days.  The  enemy  was 
counting  on  a  riot. 

It  was  to  the  interest  of  the  Government  to  hasten  the  elec- 
tion, for  the  sooner  it  took  place  the  more  Republican  would 
its  result  be;  and  moreover  it  gave  the  Ministry  an  oppor- 
tunity of  escaping  the  dangers  into  which  the  necessity  of 
saving  the  country  had  plunged  them. 

On  September  15  they  decreed  the  number  of  deputies  to 
be  elected  by  each   department,   and   on   the   following  day 

^  That  is,  a  ballot  in  which  the  elector  votes  for  all  the  deputies  or  senators  of  a 
department. — Translator's  note. 

59 


GAMBETTA 

fixed  the  elections  of  the  municipal  councils  for  September  25 
and  changed  the  date  of  the  legislative  elections  to  October  2. 

In  the  meantime  they  were  seeking  to  establish  a  delegation 
in  the  provinces,  to  represent  them  and  act  for  them  during 
the  siege.  On  September  9  they  all  agreed  that  the  town 
should  be  Tours;  but  the  selecting  of  the  men  was  a  harder 
matter,  since  not  one  would  consent  to  go. 

It  has  often  been  repeated  that  at  this  time  Gambetta 
insisted  on  the  danger  of  keeping  the  Government  in  Paris. 
Later  on  he  himself,  when  giving  evidence  before  the  Com- 
mittee of  Inquiry  of  the  National  Assembly,  on  November  13, 
1872,  referred  to  the  subject  in  these  words:  "  From  the  very 
beginning  1  declared  that  the  whole  Government  ought  to 
leave  Paris.  It  seemed  to  me  incomprehensible  that  a  town 
that  was  about  to  be  besieged  and  blockaded,  and  con- 
sequently reduced  to  a  purely  military  and  strategical  role, 
should  continue  to  be  the  seat  of  Government.  Among  all 
the  weaknesses  possible  in  the  circumstances,  that  was  the 
most  fatal ;  affairs  would  have  turned  out  quite  differently  if 
the  Government,  instead  of  being  blockaded,  had  been  out- 
side." It  was  indeed  a  mistake  of  the  first  importance  to 
leave  the  Government  in  Paris ;  but  that  this  was  not  so 
obvious  at  first  can  easily  be  deduced  from  the  notes  taken 
day  by  day  during  the  sittings  of  the  Council,  by  Dr^o, 
secretary  to  the  Government  of  National  Defence. 

On  September  7  and  9  the  Council  decided  that  "  the  head 
of  the  Government  "  should  remain  in  Paris,  but  should  send 
some  of  the  members  to  the  provinces  with  the  title  of  dele- 
gates; and  on  the  9th,  that  Cr^mieux  should  go  to  Tours  but 
that  the  Ministers  for  Foreign  Affairs  should  not.  On  the 
evening  of  the  same  day  Gambetta  described  the  gravity  of 
the  situation  in  Lyons,  and  the  theories  of  over-decentralisa- 
tion that  were  winning  their  way  in  several  of  the  large 
towns.  He  expressed  the  opinion  that,  if  dismemberment 
were  to  be  avoided,  an  energetic  Government  must  be  estab- 
lished outside  Paris.  There  was  some  discussion  on  the 
number  of  members  to  be  sent  as  delegates  to  Tours.  Favre, 
Rochefort  and  Glais-Bizoin  advised  that  two  members  should 

60 


NATIONAL    DEFENCE 

accompany  Cr^mieux,  but  in  the  end  he  was  sent  alone.  On 
the  13th  Gambetta  wrote  to  Magnin  :  "I  beseech  you  to 
render  an  inestimable  service  to  your  country  and  our  cause. 
J  cannot  myself  go  to  Tours;  my  presence  in  Paris  is  con- 
sidered indispensable,  and  1  think  that  view  is  not  without 
foundation.  Nothing  less  than  a  prevailing  belief  to  that 
effect  could  have  prevented  me  from  going;  but  you  will 
understand  how  indispensable  it  is  for  me,  therefore,  to  have 
at  the  head  of  my  department  a  man  who  is  safe,  well  known, 
popular  in  the  province,  and  absolutely  worthy  of  my  con- 
fidence. You  are  the  very  man.  Consent  to  go  to  Tours,  I 
implore  you," 

On  the  15th  he  again  referred  to  the  tendency  in  some  of 
the  departments  to  form  themselves  into  independent  groups, 
and  urged  that  a  "  real,"  strong  Government  should  be  set 
up  at  Tours.  Garnier-Pag^s  suggested  that  Cr^mieux 
should  be  supported  by  four  other  members ;  but  Jules  Simon, 
Jules  Favre,  Glais-Bizoin  and  Gambetta  thought  three  dele- 
gates would  be  enough,  provided  they  were  well-known  and 
influential.  The  same  evening  Jules  Favre's  insistence  on  the 
need  for  reinforcing  Cremieux  resulted  in  the  appointment 
of  Glais-Bizoin  and  Admiral  Fourichon,  who  was  Minister  of 
Marine  and  at  the  same  time  Minister  of  War  for  the  depart- 
ments. This  rough  sketch  of  a  Government — so  to  speak — 
seemed  sufficient,  because  the  convocation  of  the  Constituent 
Assembly  was  expected  at  an  early  date,  and  no  one  foresaw 
a  long  siege. 

In  the  middle  of  September,  then,  there  was  no  question  of 
transferring  the  seat  of  Government  to  the  provinces  :  the 
Council  was  chiefly  concerned  with  the  political  situation  in 
certain  departments,  and  the  friction  betw^een  the  civil  and 
military  authorities.  Gambetta  thought  it  was  his  duty  to 
remain  in  Paris.  It  was  only  when  he  was  at  Tours,  two 
months  later,  that  he  recognised  the  full  danger  of  this  situa- 
tion from  the  point  of  view  of  national  defence,  and  insisted 
upon  it  to  the  besieged  Government  in  his  despatch 
of  November  9.     But  by  that  time  it  was  too  late. 

Hardly  had  they  arrived  at  Tours  before  the  delegates  saw 

61 


GAMBETTA 

the  impraclicabilily  of  calling  an  election.  The  whole  of 
Eastern  France  was  occupied  by  the  Prussians,  while  in  the 
rest  of  the  country  most  of  the  electors  were  on  active  service. 
Moreover  it  would  involve  breaking,  in  the  face  of  the  enemy, 
the  truce  between  the  different  parties.  On  September  i8 
Cremieux  wrote  to  Gambetta  opposing  "  this  terrible  domes- 
tic conflict."  Gambetta  insisted,  however,  on  keeping  to  the 
whole  programme — first  the  municipal  elections,  and  then  the 
political  elections.  It  was  of  the  first  importance,  he  main- 
tained, to  legalise  the  revolution  of  September  4,  to  remove 
every  pretext  for  the  hostility  and  the  schemes  of  the  pro- 
vinces, "  to  have  no  appearance  of  forgetting  in  power  the 
principles  professed  in  opposition  " — this  was  written  on 
September  17 — "and  to  show  Europe  that  the  Republic  has 
the  sanction  of  the  nation."  The  delegates  were  obliged  to 
give  way,  and  convoked  the  electors. 

But  Bismarck  put  an  end  to  these  projects.  Already,  on 
September  13,  he  had  sent  a  circular  to  the  diplomatic  agents 
of  Prussia,  laying  down  as  a  condition  of  peace  "  the  push- 
ing back  of  the  German  frontier  so  as  to  give  Germany,  as 
defensive  ramparts,  the  fortresses  that  enabled  France  to 
menace  her."  On  September  20,  at  Ferri^res,  he  demanded 
Alsace  and  Lorraine  of  Jules  Favre,  and  also,  as  the  prelimi- 
nary condition  of  an  armistice  for  the  forming  of  a  Constituent 
Assembly,  the  surrender  of  Strasburg,  Pfalzburg  and 
Toul,  and  the  occupation  of  Mount  Valerien.  That  is  to  say, 
the  Assembly  was  to  carry  on  its  deliberations  at  the  cannon's 
mouth.  On  such  terms  as  these,  it  was  impossible  to  convoke 
the  Assembly.  Later  on,  when  General  Trochu  related  these 
facts  to  the  National  Assembly,  on  June  2,  1871,  he  ended 
with  these  words  :  *'  The  Government  of  the  Defence  made 
a  great  effort  to  give  the  country,  in  its  agony,  the  support  of 
an  Assembly.  Had  not  the  Prussian  Chancellor  introduced 
dishonour  between  us  and  that  Assembly,  it  would  have 
assumed  the  direction  of  the  country's  affairs." 

The  Government,  then,  was  forced  to  adjourn  the  elections. 

Dates  will  be  fixed  anew,"  it  said,  on  September  23,  "as 

soon  as  circumstances  allow."     And  Gambetta  telegraphed  to 

62 


NATIONAL   DEFENCE 

the  prefects:  "Publish,  in  all  the  communes  of  France,  a 
l)rief  report  of  Favre's  interview  with  Bismarck  .  .  .  Paris  is 
maddened,  and  swears  to  resist  a  outrance.  The  depart- 
ments must  be  roused  !  " 

The  whole  of  France,  indeed,  was  enraged  by  the  outrage. 
Never,  since   the   Treaty   of    Br^tigny,  had    she    heard   such 
insulting  language.     From  every  corner  of  the  country  came 
the  same  cry  of  protest.     All  parties,  the   "  blue  "  and  the 
"white"    alike,    had    flocked    to    the    tricolor    even    before 
Bismarck's     insolent    demands    were     published.       Already 
Cathelineau    had    raised    his    volunteers    in    the    West,    and 
Charette    had    hastened    from     Rome    with     his     Pontifical 
Zouaves.     Here  was  no  war  of  La  Vend(^e  !       There  was  no 
repetition,  now,  of  the  melancholy  scenes  of   1814!     At  the 
end  of  this  September  of  1870  France  sprang  to  arms  as  one 
man,  shaking  with  anger  :   not  a  man  in  the  whole  country 
would  have  dared  to  speak  of  peace,  not  one  !     The  Comte  de 
Chambord  wrote  :  "At  all  costs  the  honour  and  the  territory 
of  France  must  be  kept  intact."       Napoleon   III.,  from   his 
captivity    at    Wilhelmshohe,    wrote:     "What    Government 
could  demand  such  conditions,  and  then  hope  to  live  on  any 
kind   of   terms   with   a   nation    that    had   been   so  outraged? 
France  would   never  resign   herself  to  such  a  humiliation." 
Guizot  declared  for  war  a  outrance,  and  opposed  the  idea  of 
surrendering   Alsace   and    Lorraine  before   showing    France 
and  the  world  that  everything  possible  had  been  done  to  save 
them.     The  Prince  de  Joinville  sought  active  service,  and  the 
Due  de  Chartres  joined  the  forces  under  the  name  of  Robert 
Le  Fort.     Taine  spoke  in  no  uncertain  tones.     "  If  there  be 
men  who  are  French  in  heart  and  desire,"  he  wrote,  "they 
are  the  compatriots  of  Kleber  and  Uhrich.     To  demand  that 
they  should  be  torn  from  their  country,  should  be  made  the 
subjects  of  another,  and  should  enter  Prussian  regiments,  to 
fire  on  the   French,  perhaps,   later  on,   is  a  most  enormous 
injustice.   .  .  .  To  impose  such  a  sacrifice  upon  France  is  to 
demand  of  a  mother  the  surrender  of  one  of  her  children  :  it 
is  contrary  to  Nature  and  to  morality.     The  lips  that  should 
stammer  such  a  compact  under  the  constraint  of  force  would 

6.1 


GAMBETTA 

retract  it  in  a  whisper,  and  would  vow  that  such  a  criminal 
promise  should  never  be  sealed  with  a  still  more  criminal 
resignation.  .  .  .  On  this  subject  the  voice  of  history — in 
default  of  feeling — speaks  loudly  enough  :  our  enemies  have 
only  to  consult  their  memories  of  1807  and  1813  to  learn  that 
the  oppression  they  suffered  produced  their  retaliation,  and 
that  the  fruits  of  Wagram  and  Jena  were  Leipzig  and 
Waterloo." 

For  every  Frenchman,  then,  the  continuation  of  the  war  at 
that  time  was  a  matter  of  plain  duty.  There  was  not  a  man, 
whatever  his  past,  his  party,  or  his  beliefs,  who  hesitated.  It 
was  a  moment  of  magnificent  unanimity  on  a  point  of  honour. 

Meanwhile,  at  Tours,  there  was  no  real  leader.  The  dele- 
gates were  assisted  by  a  consulting  committee  composed  of 
representatives  of  each  of  the  Ministerial  departments.  The 
Ministry  of  the  Interior  was  represented  by  Clement  Laurier, 
with  Durangel  and  Jules  Cazot  under  him;  the  Ministry  of 
Finance  by  Roussy ;  Foreign  Affairs  by  the  Comte  de 
Chaudordy;  Public  Instruction  by  Silvy ;  Public  Works  by 
Franqueville,  and  Commerce  by  Dumoustier  de  Fr^dilly. 
The  delegates  often  sought  the  opinion,  also,  of  Steenackers, 
Director-General  of  Telegraphic  Communications,  and  of 
Jules  Lecesne,  President  of  the  Committee  of  Armament. 

It  would  be  unjust  to  ignore  the  good  work  achieved  by 
the  delegates  and  their  colleagues  before  Gambetta's  arrival. 
He  himself  fully  recognised  it.  Admiral  Fourichon  restored 
the  discipline  that  was  so  much  shaken.  Colonel  Thoumas 
began  the  reorganisation  of  the  artillery.  Through  the  dele- 
gates' efforts  a  fund  of  fifty  millions  was  placed  at  the  disposal 
of  the  Committee  of  Armament,  which  had  been  formed  in 
Paris  on  September  9  and  had  immediately  put  itself  into 
communication  with  all  parts  of  the  world  where  arms  were 
manufactured.  At  Tours  the  Delegation  had  found  General 
Lefort,  who,  in  the  capacity  of  Under-Secretary  in  the 
Ministry  of  War,  had  been  deputed  to  form  a  relieving  army 
on  the  Loire.  With  a  naval  brigade,  some  reserves  from 
Africa,  a  corps  of  militia,  and  the  remnant  of  Sedan,  the 
nucleus  of  an  army  was  created  in  a  few  days. 

64 


NATIONAL   DEFENCE 

On  October  2  Admiral  Fourichon,  owin^  to  a  disagreement 
with  his  two  colleagues,  resigned  his  post  as  delegate  of  the 
Ministry  of  War,  while  remaining  Minister  of  Marine. 
General  Lefort  was  selected  as  Admiral  Fourichon 's  suc- 
cessor, but  his  health  obliged  him  to  decline  the  post,  and 
the  Ministry  of  War  was  left  with  no  real  head.  A  variety 
of  substitutes  were  suggested,  among  them  a  managing 
committee  of  five  members;  but  this  was  never  actually 
formed. 

It  was  on  September  19  that  Paris  was  invested.  During 
the  two  preceding  days  the  Diplomatic  Corps  had  left  the 
capital  for  Tours.  On  the  21st  Gambetta  issued  a  proclama- 
tion that  breathed  something  of  the  spirit  of  Danton.  "  On 
this  day,  seventy-eight  years  ago,  our  fathers  founded  the 
Republic,  and — while  the  foreign  invader  was  profaning  the 
sacred  soil  of  their  country — vowed  to  live  free  or  to  die  fight- 
ing. They  kept  their  vow;  they  defeated  the  foreigner;  and 
the  Republic  of  1792  lives  in  the  memory  of  men  as  the  symbol 
of  heroism  and  national  greatness.  .  .  .  May  the  spirit  of 
power  that  inspired  our  forefathers  breathe  into  our  own  souls, 
and  we,  too,  shall  conquer!   .  .   ." 


CHAPTER    V 

GAMBETTA  AT  TOURS 

Gambetta  leaves  Paris  in  a  Balloon — How  he  became  Minister  of  War— Gambetta 
and  Freycinet  at  the  Ministry  of  War. 

During  the  night  of  September  27  the  Prussians  destroyed 
the  cable  that  passed  under  the  Seine,  with  the  result  that  com- 
munications were  cut  off  between  Paris  and  Tours.  And  hour 
by  hour  bad  news  was  arriving  from  other  quarters :  the 
fall  of  Toulon  on  the  23rd,  the  fall  of  Strasbourg  on  the  28th, 
the  invasion  of  Orleanais,  the  threat  of  danger  to  Tours  itself, 
trouble  in  the  Ligue  du  Midi,  increasing  friction  between  pre- 
fects and  generals.  These  things  gave  the  delegates  a  sense 
of  helplessness,  and  having,  only  a  fortnight  earlier,  declared 
an  election  to  be  impossible,  they  now  regarded  it  as  a  neces- 
sity. *'  We  must  have  some  kind  of  support,"  said  Cremieux, 
"and  nothing  but  an  Assembly  can  give  it  to  us."  Laurier 
was  of  the  same  opinion.  "  Remember,"  he  said  on  Octo- 
ber 3,  "  that  the  greatest  achievement  of  our  national  history 
was  the  work  of  the  Convention.  Give  us  some  similar 
support,  for  without  it  we  can  do  nothing,  either  at  home  or 
abroad."  The  Delegation  convoked  the  electoral  meetings  for 
October  16,  and  informed  the  Government  in  Paris  of  their 
action,  by  means  of  carrier  pigeons.  This  change  of  front, 
which  revealed  their  vacillating  and  uneasy  condition,  made 
a  bad  impression  in  Paris.  The  objections  previously  insisted 
on  by  the  delegates  themselves,  the  practical  impossibilities 
arising  from  the  invasion  of  the  country  and  the  demands  of 
the  war,  were  far  more  marked  than  before,  while  Bismarck's 
claims  at  Ferri^res  and  the  excitement  they  had  aroused,  left 

66 


GAMBETTA   AT   TOURS 

no  choice  but  to  continue  the  struggle  a  outrance.  On 
October  i  the  Government  in  Paris  passed  this  decree : 
"  Since  the  new  decision  of  the  Delegation  can  only  be  the 
result  of  a  misapprehension  .  .  .  since  it  is  physically  impos- 
sible that  it  should  be  carried  out  in  twenty-three  of  the  depart- 
ments, and  since  it  must  of  necessity  be  incompletely  enforced 
in  the  others,  it  is  decreed  that  the  adjournment  of  the  elec- 
tions should  remain  in  force  until  such  time  as  they  can  be 
held  in  all  parts  of  the  Republic." 

There  then  arose  a  question  of  sending  another  member  of 
the  Government  to  Tours,  and  Gambetta  was  suggested  by 
several  of  his  colleagues.  He  refused  to  go.  "  He  regarded 
Paris  as  the  post  of  the  greatest  danger  and  therefore  of  the 
greatest  honour,"  says  Jules  Simon  in  his  Souvenirs  du 
Quatre-Septcnibre ;  it  seemed  to  him  that,  being  young,  he 
ought  to  be  nearer  to  the  enemy.  For  a  long  time  he  resisted 
his  colleagues'  wishes."  The  whole  of  the  3rd  was  occupied 
in  discussions,  yet  nothing  definite  was  settled.  Jules  Favre 
and  Gambetta  persisted  in  their  refusal.  The  matter  was  then 
put  to  the  vote,  and  the  choice  falling  on  Gambetta,  he 
declared  himself  ready  to  submit.  After  a  long  discussion, 
his  powers  were  thus  defined:  "M.  Gambetta's  instructions 
are  to  express  and  carry  out  the  wishes  of  the  Government. 
He  will  strive  to  maintain  the  unity  of  action  that  is  essential 
to  success.  He  will  consult  with  his  colleagues,  and  will 
have  a  casting  vote.  In  concert  with  them  he  will  enforce  the 
execution  of  the  decree  by  which  the  elections  to  the  Con- 
stituent Assembly  are  adjourned  until  the  conditions  of  the 
war  shall  make  it  possible  to  consult  the  country.  As  Minis- 
ter of  the  Interior  he  is  invested  with  full  powers  to  recruit, 
assemble,  and  arm  all  the  national  forces  which  it  may  be 
necessary  to  raise  for  the  defence  of  the  country.  In  all 
matters  concerning  the  organisation  and  movements  of  the 
army,  the  decisions  of  the  Delegation  shall  be  executed  by  the 
Minister  of  War  and  Marine." 

Gambetta  had  no  illusions  with  regard  to  the  almost  insur- 
mountable difficulties  that  lay  before  him,  but  he  did  not 
despair  of  overcoming  them.     He  had  not  sought  the  power 

67  F  2 


GAMBETTA 

that  was  thrust  upon  him  ;  but  his  whole  soul  was  filled  with 
the  sacred  ambition  to  save  his  country,  and  in  the  intensity 
of  his  desire  he  believed  he  had  the  strength  to  fulfil  it.  "I 
shall  come  back  with  an  army,"  he  said  to  Jules  Favre,  "  and 
if  I  have  the  honour  of  saving  France  1  shall  ask  no  more  of 
fate." 

At  eleven  o'clock  in  the  morning  of  October  7  two  balloons, 
the  Armand  Barbes  and   the   George  Sand,   rose   from   the 
Place  Saint-Pierre  at  Montmartre.     In  the  first  was  Gambetta, 
and  with  him  the  intimate  friend  who  w£is  his  chief  confidant, 
Spuller — as  well  as  the  fortunes  of   France.     The  balloons, 
borne  by  a  very  gentle  south-easterly  breeze,  left  Saint-Denis 
on  their  right,  but  hardly  had  they  crossed  the  line  of  forts 
when  they  were  attacked,  not  only  by  a  fusillade  from  the 
Prussian  advanced-guard,    but  also  by  artillery  fire.       The 
balloons  were  at  a  height  of  less  than  two  thousand  feet,  and 
the  travellers  could  hear  the   whistle  of  the  bullets.     They 
therefore  rose  to  an  altitude  that  put  them  out  of  danger; 
but,  owing  to  some  accident  or  mismanagement,  the  balloon 
that   was    carrying   the    Minister    of    the    Interior    began   to 
descend  rapidly,  and  finally  alighted  in  a  field  that  had  been 
crossed  only  a  few  hours  earlier  by  some  of  the  enemy's  regi- 
ments, and  was  but  a  short  distance  from  a  German  post.     On 
some  ballast  being  thrown  out,   the  balloon  rose  and  went 
safely  on  its  way ;  but  it  had  barely  reached  a  height  of  600  ft. 
when,  near  Creil,  it  was  again  attacked,  this  time  by  some 
Wiirtemberger  troops,  and  Gambetta's  hand  was  grazed  by 
a  bullet.     Finally,  he  alighted  near  Montdidier,  and  reached 
Amiens  in  the  evening. 

He  wrote  to  Paris:  "The  country  is  rising  in  every 
direction.  The  Government  of  National  Defence  is  applauded 
everywhere."  At  Rouen  he  was  presented  with  an  address. 
"  There  is  abundance  of  enthusiasm,  but  a  lack  of  energy  and 
leadership.  Be  in  the  provinces,  as  you  have  been  in  Paris, 
energy  and  leadership  personified,  and  the  enemy  will  be 
beaten  back,  France  will  be  saved,  the  Republic  will  be  finally 
and  permanently  established  !  " 

"Let  us  sink  all  individual  interests,"  he  answered,  "and 

63 


GAMBETTA   AT   TOURS 

sacrifice  all  personal  sentiments  to  the  one  thought  of  the 
country's  salvation  !  "  On  reaching  Tours  he  hastened  to 
the  Council.  Thanking  the  crowd  for  their  welcome,  he  said  : 
"  Neither  you  nor  I  have  a  moment  to  lose  :  this  is  no  time 
for  demonstrations.  We  must  work  :  at  this  moment  to  work 
is  to  fight.  Every  man  should  be  at  his  post."  He  then 
informed  the  departments  of  his  arrival,  and  described  to  them 
the  magnificent  effort  that  was  being  made  by  Paris.  "  The 
situation  lays  great  duties  on  your  shoulders.  The  first  duty 
of  all  is  to  concern  yourselves  with  nothing  whatever  that  is 
not  the  war — war  a  outrance.  We  must  make  the  most  of  all 
our  resources,  and  they  are  immense.  The  Republic  calls 
up>on  every  individual  to  play  his  part.  It  is  a  tradition  with 
the  Republic  to  love  young  leaders  :  we  will  make  some  !  .  .  . 
No,  it  is  not  possible  that  the  genius  of  France  should  be  per- 
manently eclipsed,  or  that  this  great  nation  should  be  robbed 
of  her  place  in  the  world  by  an  invasion  of  five  hundred 
thousand  men  !" 

His  first  care  was  to  urge  General  Lefort  to  accept  the  port- 
folio for  War  (Actes  du  Gouvernement  de  la  Defense 
nationale,  deposition  du  general  Leforl,  vol.  VI.,  p.  ^6).  The 
general,  whose  health  was  still  very  bad,  was  firm  in  his 
refusal.  It  was  then  that  Gambetta — w-ho  saw  in  the  scheme 
a  means  of  putting  an  end  to  the  growing  friction  between 
the  prefects  and  generals — suggested  entrusting  the  two  port- 
folios to  the  same  hand.  Cr«^mieux  and  Glais-Bizoin  opposed 
the  idea,  but  Fourichon  voted  with  Gambetta,  whose  casting 
vote  settled  the  matter.  The  Minister  of  the  Interior,  there- 
fore, became  also  Minister  of  War,  to  the  great  surprise  of 
the  Government  of  Paris,  and  curiously  enough  Avithout  a 
Decree.  Later  on,  before  the  Commission  of  Inquiry,  he 
stated  the  fact,  but  laid  no  stress  on  it :  "  I  do  not  wish  to 
contradict  my  colleagues  on  questions  of  no  importance.  I 
gave  Admiral  Fourichon  the  opportunity  of  keeping  the  port- 
folio for  War,  but  he  declined  it;  he  said  he  had  had  enough 
of  it."^ 

*  November  I3lh,  1872.     Cf.  Trochu,  Commission  of  Inquiry  and  Le  Sie^e  de  Paris  ; 
Ernest  Picard,  Commission  of  Inquiry  ;  Olais-Hizoin,  Dictature  de  cinq  mois,  etc. 

69 


GAMBETTA 

General  Lefort  gave  an  account  of  the  situation  to  the  new 
Minister,  and  told  him  the  number  of  regiments  that  were 
ready  to  take  the  field.  "  General,"  said  Gambetta,  "  we 
will  put  the  state  of  affairs  in  writing,  so  that  there  may  be  no 
doubt  as  to  what  you  have  done  and  where  we  stand."  And 
he  sent  a  despatch  to  Jules  Favre.  "There  really  exists  an 
Army  of  the  Loire,  numbering  110,000  men,  all  well 
armed  and  well  equipped,"  he  said.  Here  he  was  certainly 
exaggerating,  but  none  the  less  much  had  been  achieved. 

The  central  administration  of  the  Ministry  of  War  was  in 
an  embryonic  state.  Only  a  quarter  of  the  Ministerial 
bureaux  had  been  sent  to  Tours.  There  were  no  archives, 
and  no  maps.  Gambetta  appointed  M.  Charles  de  Freycinet 
as  his  "  deputy  in  the  department  of  War,"  instructing  him 
to  "  direct  the  affairs  of  that  department  in  his  name  and 
place,  within  the  limits  that  would  be  laid  down  for  him  by 
the  Minister." 

M.  de  Freycinet,  once  a  pupil  at  the  Polytechnic  School, 
was  a  mining  engineer  who,  while  still  quite  young,  had  for 
four  years  directed  the  development  of  railways  in  the  South. 
He    had    carried    out    various    administrative    missions    and 
written  several  scientific  essays;  and  when,  on  September  6, 
he    was    made    prefect    of    his    native   department,   Tarn-et- 
Garonne,  he  sent  to  the  Delegation  a  memorandum  that  he 
and  Jules  Lecesne  had  written  together  on  the  best  means  of 
saving  France  from  her  perilous  position.     Having  read  this 
paper,  Gambetta  determined  to  make  him  his  colleague.     He 
was   then    forty-two,  an    indefatigable    worker,    clear-headed, 
quick,  shrewd,  imperturbable,  a  spring  always  stretched  to  its 
utmost   limit,   yet  of  fragile  appearance.     In   a  despatch  to 
Jules  Favre,   Gambetta,  after  describing  how   he   had  trans- 
formed the  Ministry  of  War,    "since  that  was  inevitable," 
added  :  "  I  have  had  the  good  fortune  to  find  colleagues  who 
are  both  enterprising  and  prudent;  and  I  cannot  pass  over  in 
silence  the  most  able  of  them  all,  my  Deputy  in  the  Ministry 
of  War,  M.  Charles  de  Freycinet,  whose  zeal  and  striking 
abilities  are  equal  to  the  solving  of   all   difficulties  and  the 
overcoming  of  all  obstacles." 

70 


GAMBETTA   AT   TOURS 

M.  de  Freycinet's  first  undertaking  was  the  organisation 
of  the  chief  administrative  departments  in  the  War  Ministry. 
It  has  been  complained  that  in  his  choice  of  officials  the  miU- 
tary  element  was  not  sufficiently  prominent.  But  there  was 
a  great  lack  of  officers,  and  those  that  were  left  were  needed 
for  the  army  :  he  was  forced  to  appoint  engineers  and  the 
higher  railway  officials.  "  There  were  many  who  eagerly 
offered  their  services,"  he  said,  "  but  often  their  patriotism 
was  greater  than  their  capacities." 

In  a  short  time,  thanks  to  the  efforts  of  a  distinguished 
officer  of  Marines  called  Jusselain,  the  generals  and  staffs  were 
provided  with  good  maps.  In  spite  of  great  difficulties,  the 
telegraphic  service  was  well  organised  under  Steenackers  :  an 
entirely  new  department  for  investigation  and  inquiry  was 
created  by  M.  Cuvinot ;  and  a  committee  for  studying  methods 
of  defence,  with  Colonel  Deshorties  as  chairman,  was 
employed  to  discriminate  between  useful  and  worthless 
inventions. 

The  Department  that  was  at  first  in  the  hands  of  General 
de  Loverdo  and  then  under  General  Haca  sent  600,000 
infantry  and  cavalry  mto  the  field  in  less  than  four  months — 
"  troops  that  were  too  raw,"  said  Gambetta,  but  fought  with 
great  courage.  The  Ordnance  Department  was  separated 
from  that  of  the  Engineers,  which  was  placed  under  General 
V^ronique,  and  in  the  same  space  of  time  Colonel  Thoumas — 
promoted  to  General  in  December  for  his  special  services — and 
his  admirable  coadjutors,  Colonel  de  Reffye  at  Nantes  and 
General  Demolon  at  Rennes,  sent  out  1,400  guns,  that  is  to 
say,  two  batteries  a  day,  fully  equipped  and  manned.  None 
of  the  armies  lacked  munitions;  indeed,  Chanzy  said  that  his 
gunners  enjoyed  a  positive  orgy  of  them.  Only  Bourbaki 
ran  short  of  them  at  the  end  of  the  campaign  in  the  east,  but 
that  was  owing  to  difficulties  of  transport. 

During  the  first  half  of  November  some  engineers  of  the 
Survey  Department  erected  some  fortifications  at  Orleans, 
which  gained  much  approval  from  the  generals,  especially 
General  d'Aurelle  de  Paladines.  M.  de  Freycinet,  therefore, 
created  a  corps  of  civil  engineers  which,  by  the  end  of  the 

71 


GAMBETTA 

war,  numbered  52,  with  the  addition  of  200  section 
commanders. 

At  the  time  of  Gambetta's  arrival  all  the  army  supplies 
were  supervised  by  one  Assistant-Commissary.  He  was 
replaced  by  M.  F^rot,  at  one  time  general  traffic  manager  of 
the  railways  of  the  west.  Between  October  15,  1870,  and 
January  31,  1871,  the  army  received  779,200  blankets,  677,400 
great-coats,  957,200  pairs  of  trousers,  714,500  tunics  and 
jerseys,  1,813,700  pairs  of  shoes,  697,000  haversacks, 
17,000,000  rations  of  biscuits,  40,000,000  rations  of  rice, 
11,000,000  of  lard,  35,000,000  of  salt,  and  35,000,000  of  sugar, 
coffee,  etc.  This  considerable  achievement  did  not  make 
itself  felt  at  once,  nor  in  every  place;  it  often  happened  that 
officers  in  command  had  to  complain  of  insufficient  supplies 
of  clothing  and  equipment.  In  the  middle  of  October,  for 
instance,  one  of  the  two  corps  composing  the  Army  of  the 
Loire  was  fairly  well  equipped,  but  the  other  was  still  in  want 
of  many  things;  and  in  January  there  were  certain  corps  of 
the  Army  of  the  East  that  had  not  enough  equipment  or 
clothing.  Committees  of  officers  and  expert  civilians  were 
formed  to  superintend  the  buying  of  food,  clothes,  equipment 
and  camp  furniture.  Sanitary  arrangements  were  amply 
provided  for. 

The  cadres  were  incomplete.  It  was  necessary  to  double 
the  strength  of  each  company,  at  the  risk  of  injuring  the 
quality  of  the  troops,  in  order  to  reduce  the  number  of 
captains  by  half.  Non-commissioned  officers  and  even 
private  soldiers  received  commissions.  The  Decree  of 
October  13  suspended  the  ordinary  rules  of  promotion  for  the 
duration  of  the  war,  which  enabled  officers  like  Billot, 
de  Sonis  and  Loysel,  lieutenant-colonels  in  October,  to  be  in 
command  of  army  corps  in  December.  The  Decree  of  Octo- 
ber 14,  following  the  example  of  the  United  States  during 
the  War  of  Secession,  created  an  Auxiliary  Army.  This 
decree  was  much  criticised  :  it  was  pointed  out  that  if  the 
21  millions  who  composed  the  Federation  of  the  North  took 
four  years  to  defeat  the  six  millions  of  the  Confederation  of 
the  South,  this  was  owing  to  the  inexperience  of  untrained 

72 


GAMBETTA   AT   TOURS 

officers.  M.  de  Freycinet  himself  recognised  that  some  of 
these  provisional  appointments  were  not  very  fortunate,  but 
it  was  thanks  to  this  decree  that  Generals  Bonnet, 
de  Polignac,  Pelissier,  Cremer,  Garibaldi,  Bossack  and 
Ochsenbein  were  in  command  of  divisions,  that  Lipowski, 
Cathelineau,  Keller,  Bouras  and  Carayon-Latour  distin- 
guished themselves  in  leading  the  volunteers,  and  that  our 
glorious  sailors,  Jaur^guil3erry,  Jaur^s,  Penhoat,  Payen, 
Bruat,  Gougeard  and  others,  won  renown  on  the  field  of  battle 
side  by  side  with  their  brothers  of  the  army.  "If  it  be 
thought,"  said  M.  de  Freycinet,  "  that  the  Auxiliary  Army, 
notwithstanding  its  immense  services,  did  not  shine  like  that 
of  the  United  States,  let  it  be  remembered  that  in  America 
the  war  lasted  for  several  years,  while  in  France  it  was  over 
in  four  months;  it  was  only  after  being  beaten  for  three  years 
by  the  regular  organisation  of  the  South  that  the  improvised 
generals  of  the  North  learnt  to  win  in  their  turn.   .  .   ." 

One  of  the  greatest  anxieties  of  the  new  Government  was 
the  scarcity  of  arms  and  munitions.  The  chassepots^  manu- 
factured under  the  Empire,  which  were  superior  to  the  German 
rifles,  had  been  captured  by  the  enemy  or  were  in  besieged 
towns.  The  State  factories  only  produced  between  15,000 
and  iS,ooo  a  month.  The  Armament  Committee,  which  was 
connected  with  the  Ministry  of  Public  Works,  had  exhausted 
the  rather  limited  English  market,  as  appears  from  a  despatch 
of  September  28  from  our  Consul  Tissot,  and  was  now  turn- 
ing to  America.  In  the  three  months  that  followed,  it  spent 
200  millions  in  arms  and  munitions.  In  February  the  number 
of  rifles  supplied  to  the  troops,  irrespective  of  about  300,000 
chassepots,  amounted  to  more  than  1,200,000.  As  thev  were 
of  very  varying  types,  the  question  of  cartridges  was  a  serious 
complication. 

By  a  decree  of  November  3  each  department  was  obliged 
to  supply,  at  its  own  expense,  w-ithin  a  period  of  two  months, 
one  completely  equipped  battery  for  every  100,000  inhabitants. 
The  time  allowed  was  too  short,  but  the  result  was  not  to  be 

'  The  French  breech-loading  rifle  of  1866-1S74,  called  after  its  inventor,  and  first 
used  in  action  at  the  Battle  of  Mentana  (1867). — Translator's  note. 

73 


GAMBETTA 

despised.  The  Committee  appointed  on  February  19,  187 1, 
to  estimate  the  military  resources  of  the  country  reported  to 
the  National  Assembly  that  there  were,  at  that  time,  57  com- 
pletely equipped  batteries,  with  their  full  complement  of  men 
and  horses,  and  41  batteries  complete  as  regards  materiel 
only. 

Finally,  on  November  25 — the  decree  of  November  2 
having  made  all  able-bodied  men  under  forty  eligible  for  the 
army — the  Minister  of  War  created  eleven  local  camps  to 
facilitate  their  training.  The  Government  intended  these  to 
be  permanent,  and  to  form  a  basis  for  future  military  reforms; 
but  here,  too,  time  failed,  and  the  measure  did  not  achieve  all 
that  was  expected  of  it. 

The  work  to  be  done,  however  great  the  inevitable  over- 
sights and  mistakes,  was  a  gigantic  undertaking.  In  1914 
an  unfavourable  critic  ^  of  the  Delegation  of  Tours  and  Bor- 
deaux maintained  that,  if  the  Government  of  National 
Defence  was  able  to  send  armies  into  the  field,  this  was 
thanks  to  the  measures  taken  between  August  10  and  Septem- 
ber 4  by  the  Comte  de  Palikao,  Minister  of  War.  Now 
Le  Bocuf  and  Palikao  themselves  have  shown  this  statement 
to  be  incorrect.  On  the  declaration  of  war  the  army  num- 
bered 250,000  men.  This  figure  should  have  been  increased 
to  340,000  by  the  calling-up  of  the  reserves  on  July  14; 
"but,"  said  Le  Boeuf  to  the  Committee  of  Inquiry,  "there 
was  a  very  considerable  deficiency  :  great  numbers  had  been 
granted  leave,  and  the  civil  hospitals  were  full."  He  esti- 
mated the  effective  forces  at  300,000,  of  whom  250,000  were 
in  the  armies  of  the  Rhine  and  of  Chalons.  The  law  of 
August  10  called  up  every  man  between  the  ages  of  twenty- 
five  and  thirty-five,  but  could  not  be  carried  out,  since  the 
depots  could  neither  hold,  clothe,  nor  train  so  many.  On 
vSeptember  4  the  Militia  comprised  120,000  at  the  most,  with 
the  addition  of  the  1869  class,  who  had  been  incorporated  with 
it  at  the  end  of  August  and  numbered  75,000;  but  they  were 
neither  clothed,  nor  equipped,  nor  formed  into  corps. 
The    1870   class   was  only   to   be   called    up   on   January    i, 

*  Dutrait-Crozon,  Gamlieita  el  la  Defense  Nationale. 

74 


GAMBETTA   AT   TOURS 

187 1.  As  for  the  artillery,  the  Due  d'Audiffret-Pasquier, 
President  of  the  Contracts  Committee,  informed  the  National 
Assembly  on  May  22,  1S72,  that  there  were,  when  war  was 
declared,  2,058  field-guns  fit  for  use.  But  the  loss  of  those 
captured  at  Sedan,  and  of  those  shut  up  in  Metz  and  Paris, 
left  the  Delegation  without  a  single  complete  battery  at  their 
disposal  :  they  had  nothing  but  the  equipment  necessary  to 
form  eighty.  And  in  his  book,  U71  ministcre  de  la  Guerre 
de  vingt-quatre  jours,  Palikao  declares  that  600,000  new  rifles 
were  required,  and  that  though  he  had  passed  contracts  for 
458,000,  no  more  than  38,432  were  delivered  by  the  end  of 
March,  1871.  This  shows  us  how  much  truth  there  is  in  the 
belief  that  the  Palikao  Ministry  created  the  defensive  forces 
of  France  in  1870. 

General  Borel,  referring  to  the  Delegation  of  Tours  and 
Bordeaux,  said  to  the  Committee  of  Inquiry  of  the  National 
Assembly  :  "  Everything  that  was  physically  possible  to  be 
done,  it  did."  Its  work  left  the  achievements  of  1792  far 
behind.  The  men  of  '92,  moreover,  had  much  more  time 
before  them.  The  labours  of  M.  Gambetta,  M.  de  Freycinet 
and  their  colleagues  earned  them  the  undying  gratitude  of 
their  country. 

Gambetta  restored  the  nation's  self-confidence.  The 
f)eople's  hearts  were  stirred  by  his  glowing,  forcible  eloquence 
and  his  enthusiastic  faith  ;  their  imagination  was  fired  by  the 
daring  novelty  of  his  perilous  journey  in  the  air.  His  pro- 
clamations thrilled  them.  France  felt  that  she  had  a  leader, 
and  took  heart  again.'  He  infected  her  with  the  energy  and 
sparkle  of  youth.  He  had  faith,  when  so  many  had  none. 
Everything  that  he  touched  reflected  the  flame  within  him. 
It  was  in  this — in  this  above  all — that  his  greatness  consisted. 
He  was,  and  will  always  be  in  the  eyes  of  posterity,  the  per- 
sonification of  that  national,  unanimous  outburst  of  hostility 
to  Germany  that  followed  on  the  insult  at  Ferri^res.  To 
France,  and  to  the  whole  world,  he  will  always  appear  as  the 
hero  of  the  country's  defence — of  her  resistance  to  the  attacks 
of  force  and  guile  combined,  and  to  the  barbarities  of  the 
conqueror.     The  more  hideous  Bismarck's  crime  of  falsifying 

75 


GAMBETTA 

tlie  Ems  teleg^ram  grows  in  the  eyes  of  civilised  humanity, 
the  finer  will  appear  the  figure  of  the  man  who  did  his  utmost 
to  repair  the  evil. 

But  at  the  moment  the  most  urgent  need  was  a  sword,  a 
military  leader.  Neither  the  lawyer  of  thirty-two  nor  the 
civil  engineer  of  forty-two  was  capable  of  commanding  an 
army  :  how  could  they  have  been  ?  No  art  can  be  practised 
without  training — and  that  art  least  of  all.  "What  would  I 
not  give  to  be  a  soldier  I  "  cried  Robespierre  in  1793  to  the 
Committee  of  Public  Safety,  when  he  heard  Carnot  speaking 
of  these  things  as  one  who  understood  the  subject.  And 
later  on,  when  Gambetta  sang  the  praises  of  Hoche,  it  was 
plain  that  he,  too,  had  suffered  from  this  longing.  Gambetta 
and  M.  de  Freycinet  have  been  accused,  not  without  reason, 
of  interfering  in  the  conduct  of  military  operations.  But 
they  had  first  done  everything  in  their  power  to  find  generals. 
Of  those  who  had  attained  to  distinction  under  the  Second 
Empire,  only  Trochu  and  Bourbaki  had  escaped  being  taken 
prisoner  at  Sedan  or  besieged  in  Metz.  Trochu,  who  was  held 
fast  in  Paris,  advised  Gambetta  to  employ  Bourbaki.  "  Keep 
Bourbaki  at  all  costs, *^  he  wrote  on  October  19.  "  He  will 
save  the  provinces  as  we  shall  save  Paris." 

Bourbaki  at  that  time  was  fifty-six  years  of  age.  His  career 
had  been  brilliant.  He  was  a  major  at  thirty,  a  colonel  at 
thirty-six,  and  a  general  only  a  few  days  later.  He  had 
covered  himself  with  glory  in  Africa  and  the  Crimea,  and 
finally  had  commanded  the  Imperial  Guard.  Having  been 
deceived  by  false  reports  in  Metz,  he  had  followed  the 
Empress  to  England,  much  to  her  surprise;  then,  instead  of 
returning  to  Metz,  he  arrived  at  Tours  on  October  14  to  put 
his  services  at  the  disposal  of  the  Delegation.  Gambetta  at 
once  offered  him  the  command  of  the  Army  of  the  Loire. 
"  Since  France  has  need  of  your  sword,  and  since  I  am  not  here 
to  meddle  with  politics,  I  shall  ask  you  no  questions  about 
your  secrets,  if  you  have  any."  And  he  used  every  effort 
to  persuade  him.  But  Bourbaki  answered  that  "  he  did  not 
feel  equal  to  fulfilling  all  that  the  public  expected  of  him," 
and  would  only  consent  to  organise  the  forces  of  the  north. 

76 


GAMBETTA    AT   TOURS 

He  had  always  been  in  command  of  picked  troops — the  Afri- 
can Light  Infantry,  the  Zouaves  and  the  Imperial  Guard. 
He  believed  only  in  seasoned  troops,  and  of  these  France  had 
no  more;  he  distrusted  the  "scratch  collection  of  men" 
that  were  being  turned  into  soldiers,  and  thought  it  would  ba 
wiser  to  conclude  peace. 

"  A  scratch  collection  of  men  !  "  And  yet  it  was  with 
such  "  scratch  collections  "  that  the  Convention  saved  France 
in  1793,  and  that  Prussia  defeated  Napoleon  in  1813.  And  we 
know  the  tone  that  Napoleon  took  in  18 14,  when  Angereau, 
whom  he  had  made  Duke  of  Castiglione,  complained  that  he 
could  do  nothing  with  "  conscripts  without  cartridge- 
pouches,"  and  "  miserable  National  Guards."  "  Really  this 
is  too  ridiculous  !  "  said  Napoleon.  "  You  are  to  set  out  within 
twelve  hours  of  receiving  these  orders,  to  enter  upon  the  cam- 
pagn.  If  you  are  still  Augereau  de  Castiglione,  keep  the 
command ;  if  your  sixty  years  weigh  too  heavily  on  you, 
hand  it  over  to  the  senior  general  officer  under  you.  The 
country  is  in  danger ;  it  can  only  be  saved  by  audacity  and 
goodwill,  and  not  by  foolish  dallying.  Be  the  first  in  the 
field!  On  with  your  boots  and  your  resolute  will  of  1793! 
When  our  men  see  your  plume  at  the  outposts,  and  see  you 
are  the  first  to  face  the  enemy's  fire,  you  will  be  able  to  do 
what  you  like  with  them." 

Gambetta,  however,  contented  himself  with  saying  to  the 
hero  of  Inkerman  :  "  You  will  change  your  opinion."  He 
was  too  optimistic. 


77 


CHAPTER   VI 

THE  DELEGATION  OF  TOURS  AND  THE  MILITARY  OPERATIONS 

The  Army   of  the    Loire— Couhiiiers—Beaune-la-Rolande—Loigny— Evacuation   of 
Orleans  (November  20-December  4)— Who  was  Responsible? 

Of  all  the  forces  organised  by  the  Government  of  National 
Defence,  the  Army  of  the  Loire  played  the  most  important 
part.  It  was,  as  Colmar  von  der  Goltz  said,  "the  Grand 
Army  of  the  Republic." 

The  15th  Army  Corps,  the  first  to  be  formed,  was  driven 
south  of  the  Loire  on  October  lo  and  ii,  and  the  Germans 
occupied  Orleans.  Gambetta,  who  reached  Tours  at  about  the 
same  time  as  the  news  of  this  repulse,  removed  General  de  la 
Motterouge,^  who  was  in  command,  and  replaced  him  by 
General  d'Aurelles  de  Paladines. 

General  d'Aurelle,  who  was  sixty-six  and  had  been  in  the 
Reserve  since  1869,  had  fought  in  Africa  and  the  Crimea  as 
a  colonel  of  Zouaves.  He  was  a  good  soldier  and  one  of  un- 
doubted courage,  with  an  aptitude  for  training  and  disposing 
troops,  but  he  had  never  commanded  more  than  10,000  men. 
Ver}'  wisely  he  declined  the  full  powers  that  Gambetta  offered 
him;  he  only  accepted  the  command  of  the  15th  and  i6th 
Army  Corps,  and  retired  to  Salbris — whence  he  covered 
Vierzon  and  Bourges — with  a  view  to  organising  his  forces 
there.  Several  days  passed,  during  which — save  for  the 
splendid  defence  of  Chateaudun,  where  a  handful  of  heroes 
gave  a  noble  example  to  the  open  towns — the  20,000 
Bavarians  of  Von  der  Tann  and  100,000  Frenchmen  faced  one 
another  without  engaging. 

*  Etienne   Lamy  explained  the   reasons    for   the   removal    of   Motlerouge   in    the 
CorrespondanI  of  June  25,  1903. 

78 


DELEGATION   OF   TOURS 

There  then  arrived  some  urgent  despatches  from  the  Govern- 
ment in  Paris,  with  the  news  that  a  sortie  by  way  of  the  lower 
Seine  had  been  organised  by  Generals  Trochu  and  Ducrot.  It 
seemed  to  Gambetta  and  Bourbaki  that,  since  there  was  then 
no  organised  force  in  Normandy,  the  project  of  ihese  generals 
could  only  be  seconded  by  moving  the  troops  beyond  the  Loire 
from  Bourges  towards  Rouen.  A  flanking  movement  of  this 
kind,  carried  out  on  so  long  a  line  by  young,  untried  troops, 
under  the  eyes  of  the  hostile  forces  that  were  now  being  massed 
in  the  neighbourhood  of  Chartres,  must  be  fraught  with  the 
greatest  danger.  Gambetta  therefore  desired,  while  the 
German  forces  were  concentrated  round  Paris  and  Metz,  to 
take  the  offensive  against  Von  der  Tann  while  he  was  twenty 
leagues  from  his  base,  and  drive  him  back,  thus  raising  the 
blockade  of  Paris.  But  to  do  this,  it  was  first  necessary  to 
retake  Orleans.  On  October  24  a  conference  was  held  at 
Salbris  between  M.  de  Freycinet  and  Generals  d'Aurelle, 
Martin  des  Palli^res,  Pourcet,  and  Borel ;  and  the  next  day 
they  met  again  at  Tours,  with  Gambetta  presiding,  to  arrange 
the  details  of  the  enterprise.  At  the  last  moment,  on  the 
evening  of  the  2Sth,  the  Delegation  learnt  that  the  expedition 
would  not  take  place.  They  were  informed  by  General 
d'Aurelle  that  the  weather  was  bad,  the  roads  out  of  order,  the 
equipment  of  a  section  of  the  militia  defective,  and  that  it 
would  not  be  prudent  in  the  circumstances  to  venture  on  so 
bold  a  movement.  In  the  face  of  this  despatch  the  Minister 
of  War  felt  it  impossible  to  issue  to  the  general  in  command 
an  order  that  might  result  in  defeat.  He  simply  answered  : 
"  Your  hesitation,  and  the  fears  you  express  in  your  despatch 
force  me  to  renounce  a  plan  of  whose  value  my  opinion  has  not 
changed.  The  movement,  therefore,  must  be  stopped." 
On  the  following  day  came  the  terrible  news  :  Bazaine  has 
surrendered. 

The  cry  of  rage  and  despair  wrung  from  Gambetta  by  the 
fall  of  Metz  will  echo  down  the  centuries  : 

"  Men  of  France,  bestir  yourselves,  and  brace  your  spirit  to 
meet  the  appalling  perils  that  are  overwhelming  your  country  ! 
It  rests  with  us  still  to  wear  down  the  evil  fortune  that  pursues 

79 


GAMBETTA 

us,  and  show  the  world  the  greatness  of  a  nation  that  refuses  to 
be  crushed.  .  .  . 

"  Metz  has  surrendered. 

"  A  general  in  whom  France  trusted,  even  after  the  events 
in  Mexico,  has  robbed  our  country  in  her  danger  of  more  than 
a  hundred  thousand  of  her  defenders.  ..." 

"The  French  army,"  he  added,  "despite  the  heroism  of 
the  troops,  has  been  involved  in  the  country's  disasters  through 
the  treachery  of  its  leaders  !   .  .  ."     (October  30.) 

It  is  clear  that  these  words,  "  the  treachery  of  its  leaders," 
were  meant  to  apply  to  Bazaine  only.  Certain  officers,  how- 
ever, even  though  appointed  by  Gambetta  himself,  felt  them- 
selves insulted;  and  he  therefore  tried  to  reassure  them  in  a 
proclamation  addressed  to  the  army  on  the  following  day. 
"  You  have  been  betrayed,  but  not  dishonoured.  .  .  .  Now 
that  you  are  rid  of  leaders  unworthy  of  you  and  of  France, 
are  you  prepared,  binder  generals  who  deserve  your  confidence, 
to  wash  away  in  the  invaders'  blood  the  insult  that  has  been 
hurled  at  the  ancient  name  of  France  ?  "  This  time  the  mean- 
ing was  plain  enough ;  yet  some  of  the  generals  continued  to 
misinterpret  it,  and  it  was  only  a  new  proclamation  on 
November  12,  after  the  Battle  of  Coulmiers,  that  finally  cleared 
up  this  disastrous  misunderstanding. 

The  immediate  consequence  of  the  surrender  of  Metz  was 
that  the  180,000  men  under  Prince  Frederick-Charles  were  set 
free  to  serve  elsewhere.  They  might  be  expected  to  arrive 
about  November  16  or  18;  it  was  essential,  therefore,  at  all 
costs,  to  take  the  first  step. 

Gambetta  determined  to  employ  the  15th  and  i6th  Army 
Corps  in  the  recapture  of  Orleans.  General  Chanzy,  who  had 
distinguished  himself  at  the  head  of  a  division,  was  promoted 
to  the  command  of  the  i6th  Army  Corps.  General  d'Aurelle 
conducted  the  operation.  On  November  9  the  Army  of  the 
Loire  advanced  upon  the  plain  of  Coulmiers  in  perfect  order; 
and  Von  der  Tann,  who  had  only  20,000  men  and  no  guns, 
against  60,000  men  and  150  guns,  was  outflanked.  The 
French  generals,  Peytavin  and  Barry,  dashed  forward  at  the 
head  of  their  troops,  like  their  forerunners  of  the  Revolution, 

80 


DELEGATION   OF   TOURS 

inspiring  tlieir  men  to  follow.  Admiral  Jaur^guiberry,  said 
the  soldiers,  navigated  his  little  horse  as  skilfully  as  a  ship  in 
a  gale.  At  four  o'clock  Von  der  Tann  evacuated  Orleans  and 
fell  back  on  Artenay. 

The  French  army  fought  valiantly;  our  men,  each  and  all, 
showed  splendid  courage  and  dash;  our  artillery  fire  was  un- 
erring. But  unfortunately  General  Reyau,  who  should  have 
turned  the  enemy's  right  with  his  cavalry,  fell  back  when  he 
saw  Lipowski's  riflemen  in  the  distance,  taking  them  for 
Germans;  and  Martin  des  Palli^res,  who  was  coming  up  by 
the  right  bank  of  the  Loire  with  30,000  infantry,  44  guns  and 
800  horse,  did  not  arrive  in  time.  He  was  carrying  out  his 
orders,  be  it  said,  but  so  rapid  an  advance  was  unexpected. 

These  circumstances  detracted  considerably  from  the  effects 
of  the  victory  of  Coulmiers.  Yet  it  was  an  undeniable  victory 
which,  in  the  words  of  the  general  in  command,  "  strengthened 
the  morale  of  the  troops  tenfold  "  and  made  a  deep  impression 
both  in  France  and  abroad.  It  was  our  greatest  success  of  the 
whole  war,  and  seemed  to  promise  a  change  in  our  fortunes. 
The  Army  of  the  Loire  had  come  gloriously  through  its 
baptism  of  fire,  and  was  apparently  to  be  the  instrument  of 
our  approaching  revenge. 

The  surprise  of  the  Germans  was  extreme.  A  Bavarian 
officer  wrote  to  his  family  :  "  It  was  said  that  the  Army  of  the 
Loire  had  ceased  to  exist,  and  that  the  enemy's  forces  were 
worn  out,  and  now  suddenly  there  springs  up  a  well-organised 
corps,  with  formidable  artillery,  admirably  mounted  cavalry, 
and  infantry  that  have  shown  us  what  they  can  do.  The 
situation  has  changed,  and  in  a  most  disquieting  way  for  us." 
Gambetta  addressed  a  proclamation  to  the  army.  "  Your 
courage  and  exertions,"  he  said,  "  have  at  last  brought  us  the 
victory  that  has  been  denied  to  our  arms  for  three  months. 
France  in  her  mourning  owes  you  her  first  consolation,  her 
first  ray  of  hope.  .  .  .  Under  leaders  whose  vigilance  and 
devotion  are  worthy  of  you,  you  have  recovered  discipline  and 
strength.  You  have  restored,  Orleans  to  us,  and  overpowered 
veteran  troops  who  have  long  been  accustomed  to  victory. 
.  .  .  You  are  the  advanced-guard  of  the  entire  countrv,  and 

81  r. 


GAMBETTA 

to-day  your  feet  are  on  the  road  to  Paris.  .  .  .  Paris  awaits 
us  :  our  honour  is  at  stake  :  she  must  be  rescued  from  the 
barbarians'  clutches.  .  .  .  With  such  soldiers  as  you  the 
Republic  will  rise  triumphant  from  her  present  trials  :  having 
organised  her  defences  she  can  now  avenge  the  nation.   .  .  ." 

The  Germans  expected  that  the  French  army  would  at  once 
follow  up  the  victory  of  Coulmiers  by  marching  to  Paris. 
This  fear  can  be  detected  in  the  telegrams  sent  by  King 
William  on  November  9,  10,  and  even  11  to  Queen  Augusta, 
10  explain  the  defeat  and  reassure  her  with  regard  to  its 
consequences.  He  laid  great  stress  on  the  fact  that  the 
French,  instead  of  advancing  towards  the  capital,  were 
securing  the  positions  they  had  won.  Moltke  wrote  on  the  14th 
to  General  von  Stiehle,  Chief  of  Staff  to  Frederick-Charles  : 
"The  Army  of  the  Loire  has  failed  to  recognise  its  own 
capacity  to  push  on  to  Paris,  fighting  as  it  advances  :  yet  that 
is  its  only  hope  of  success.  Apparently  it  dares  not  make  an 
attack.  A  strong  offensive  by  the  enemy  would  be  no  less 
dangerous  for  us  from  the  West  than  from  the  South.  It  is 
possible  that  the  Army  of  the  Loire  will  confine  itself  to  a 
passive  defence  of  Orleans,  but  that  is  very  unlikely,  since 
Gambetta  knows  for  certain  that  Paris  cannot  hold  out  unless 
the  blockade  be  raised.  We  are  very  grateful  to  His  Royal 
Highness  (Prince  Frederick-Charles)  for  hastening  his  march  : 
it  helped  us  out  of  a  kind  of  crisis."  Then,  alluding  to  the 
"  movements  of  the  Army  of  the  Loire,  of  which  we  un- 
fortunately know  so  little,"  Moltke  adds  that  they  must  expect, 
on  the  15th,  a  sortie  of  the  Paris  garrison  "  on  a  larger  scale 
than  those  hitherto  attempted." 

Thus,  from  November  12  to  14,  the  situation  caused  real 
uneasiness  at  the  German  General  Headquarters.  Moltke 
faced  the  possibility  that  the  blockade  of  Paris  might  be  raised, 
and  recognised  on  the  14th  that  a  sort  of  strategical  crisis  had 
occurred. 

And  indeed,  according  to  the  statistics  in  the  archives  of  the 
Ministry  of  War,  the  French  troops  within  sixty  kilometres 
of  Toury  amounted  to  150,000  infantry  and  8,000  cavalry, 
against  whom  the  Germans  were  only  able  to  bring  .-^5,000 

82  ' 


DELEGATION   OF   TOURS 

infantry  and  ii,ooo  cavalry.  The  army  of  Frederick-Charles, 
which  had  reached  the  Troyes-Vandeuvre-Chaumont  line  on 
the  loth,  was  too  far  away  to  support  the  Grand  Duke  of 
Mecklenburg  with  an  army  corps  before  November  i6,  or 
with  his  entire  force  before  the  21st.  We  had  at  least  three 
days  at  our  disposal  after  the  13th  to  deal  with  the  Grand 
Duke  before  the  arrival  of  Frederick-Charles.  Moreover,  the 
German  General  Staff  could  not  draw  upon  the  troops 
investing  Paris,  since  a  sortie  on  a  large  scale  was  expected. 

vSuch  was  the  situation  when  Gambetta  and  M.  de  Freycinet 
went  to  Villeneuve-d'Ingr6  on  the  12th,  to  congratulate  the 
generals,  thank  the  troops,  and  bestow  rewards.  They  found 
there  Generals  d'Aurelle,  Borel,  and  des  Palli^res,  the  officers 
in  command  of  the  Artillery  and  Engineers,  and  the  Prefect 
of  the  Loire  with  his  secretary. 

With  regard  to  what  passed  at  Villeneuve-dTngre  on  this 
occasion,  neither  eye-witnesses  nor  historians  are  agreed.  I 
questioned  M.  de  Freycinet  on  the  subject,  and  this  was  his 
answer  :  "  It  was  not  a  Council  of  War,  in  the  proper  meaning 
of  the  term.  We  had  come,  Gambetta  and  I,  to  congratulate 
the  generals  and  ask  them  for  information.  In  the  course  of 
the  interview  I  put  this  question  to  D'Aurelle  :  '  What  do  you 
think  of  doing?  Do  you  think  you  can  march  on  Paris?' 
D'Aurelle  merely  uttered  an  exclamation.  Borel  said  :  '  We 
must  first  find  out  the  strength  and  positions  of  the  enemy.' 
D'Aurelle  declared  that  the  troops  were  tired  out,  and  the 
matter  was  dropped  as  far  as  that  meeting  was  concerned. 
There  was  no  definite  suggestion  made,  nor  was  there  any 
discussion.  It  was  understood  that  the  troops  would  remain 
at  Orleans  for  the  time  being,  aw-aiting  news  from  Paris." 

M.  de  Freycinet's  statements  agree  with  his  account  of  the 
occasion  in  the  Souvenirs  he  published  in  191 2.  He  says 
there:  "  General  d'Aurelle  opposed  the  idea  of  a  march  on 
Paris,  which  seemed  to  be  suggested  as  a  possibility  in 
General  Borel's  explanations." 

D'Aurelle,  in  his  book  La  Prcynicrc  arviee  de  la  Loire,  says 
that  a  march  on  Paris  would  have  been  "a  mad  attempt." 
He  thought  the  good  effects  of  the  Battle  of  Coulmiers  might 

83  G  2 


GAMBETTA 

be  undone  if  recently  formed  troops  of  little  training  and  little 
experience  were  sent  out  to  the  relief  of  Paris.  He  did  not 
know,  moreover,  the  exact  numbers  and  positions  of  the 
Germans,  and  he  considerably  exaggerated  their  strength. 
Being  a  person  of  discretion,  he  kept  his  counsel  (La  Premiere 
armee  de  la  Loire,  page  130),  but  he  had  firmly  decided  to 
entrench  his  troops  before  Orleans  in  carefully  chosen  and 
prepared  positions,  and  there  to  await  the  shock  of  the  com- 
bined German  forces — Prince  Frederick-Charles  from  Metz, 
the  Grand  Duke  of  Mecklenburg  from  D'Angerville,  and 
von  der  Tann,  who  joined  the  Grand  Duke  near  Loury,  seven 
or  eight  leagues  from  Coulmiers,  and  was  placed  under  his 
orders  on  the  loth. 

Before  the  Committee  of  Inquiry  of  the  National  Assembly, 
General  Borel  was  asked  by  a  member  if  the  Commander-in- 
Chief  had  had  serious  reasons  for  failing  to  pursue  the  enemy 
after  his  victory.  The  witness  unhesitatingly  answered, 
"Yes,  certainly";  and  explained  that,  since  the  Bavarians 
had  been  able,  to  retire  in  good  order,  the  pursuing  troops 
would  have  been  obliged  to  engage  in  a  second  battle,  and 
might  have  found  the  enemy  considerably  reinforced.  No 
doubt,  he  said,  a  pursuit  would  have  rendered  the  retreat  less 
orderly,  but  the  French  could  not  have  fought  their  way  to 
Paris  wath  the  means  at  their  disposal. 

General  Chanzy  added  his  evidence  in  La  Deuxieme  armee 
de  la  Loire  (p.  35)  :  "  If  the  Government  at  Tours  had  been 
less  preoccupied  with  the  position  at  Orleans,  which  it  wished 
to  make  the  base  of  future  operations,  and  ij  the  general  in 
command  had  thought  the  Army  of  the  Loire  sufficiently  com- 
plete and  equipped  to  continue  its  advance,  it  might  perhaps 
have  been  possible,  by  taking  advantage  of  the  enthusiasm 
roused  by  the  victory  of  the  9th,  to  reach  and  defeat  General 
von  der  Tann's  Army  before  it  was  reinforced  by  the  Grand 
Duke's,  and  then  to  attack  the  latter,  thus  dealing  with  the 
Germans  separately  before  the  arrival  of  Prince  Frederick- 
Charles." 

And,  in  trying  to  grasp  the  situation,  we  must  not  forget 
that,    while    the    Battle    of    Coulmiers    was    being    fought. 

84 


DELEGATION   OF   TOURS 

Trochu  and  Ducrot  were  making  llieir  final  preparations  for 
the  sortie  by  the  lower  Siene.  They  only  heard  of  the  victory 
at  Coulmiers  on  November  14,  and  were  obliged  to  change  all 
their  plans.  It  would  therefore  have  been  difficult  to  time 
their  movement  towards  Orleans  so  as  to  coincide  with  an 
advance  by  the  Army  of  the  Loire. 

One  thing  is  certain  :  the  Commander-in-Chief  received  no 
orders  at  Villeneuve-d'Ingre;  to  march  on  Paris.  It  is  also 
evident  that,  if  Gambetta  and  M.  de  Freycinet  had  firmly 
believed  at  that  time  in  the  possibility  of  an  immediate  pursuit, 
they  would  at  least  have  taken  the  precaution  of  leaving  some 
record  of  their  opinion,  since  a  decision  on  one  side  or  the 
other  was  likely  to  involve  very  serious  consequences.  Gam- 
betta thought  of  it :  that  is  proved  by  the  question  put  by 
Freycinet  to  D'Aurelle.  But  when  the  Commander-in-Chief 
rejected  the  idea  it  was  agreed  by  all,  on  that  occasion,  that 
the  army  should  remain  at  Orleans. 

There  was  this  difference,  however,  between  the  views  of 
the  Minister  of  War  and  those  of  the  general  in  command. 
The  former  regarded  Orleans  as  a  base  for  further  offensives, 
to  be  promptly  undertaken  ;  while  the  latter  proposed  to  wait 
there  for  the  enemy's  attacks.  Gambetta's  plans  were  depen- 
dent on  sorties  from  Paris,  which  could  not  be  long  delayed, 
while  D'Aurelle's  design  was  merely  to  help  Paris  by  means 
of  a  powerful  diversion.  His  project  might  perhaps  have 
been  the  better  of  the  two,  had  Paris  not  appealed  for  support. 
It  was  a  plan  that  meant  a  long  war.  By  waiting  on  the 
defensive  for  the  enemy,  and  taking  the  time  to  organise 
troops  with  the  triple  advantage  of  numbers,  supplies  and 
arms,  it  might  have  been  possible  eventually  to  secure  the  last 
word.  But  there  was  Paris  in  the  case — and  Paris  was 
issuing  orders.  A  choice  had  to  be  made  between  the  two 
schemes;  and  to  ask  D'Aurelle  to  carry  out  a  plan  he  thought 
impracticable  was  to  court  dangerous  complications. 

Meanwhile  Frederick-Charles  was  approaching  from  Metz 
by  forced  marches.  On  November  20  he  reached  Pithiviers 
with  14,000  infantry,  1,200  cavalry  and  84  guns.  The 
9th  Army  Corps  had  preceded  him  in  the  direction  of  Fon- 

85 


GAMBETTA 

tainebleau,  lo  cover  Paris  on  the  south.  On  the  17th  the 
Prince  had  thus  expressed  his  view  of  the  situation.  "It 
seems  to  me  not  impossible  that  the  enemy  at  this  moment 
may  mass  all  the  available  French  troops  near  Orleans.  The 
next  few  weeks  will  be  interesting;  they  will  decide  the  fate 
of  Europe  for  a  long-time  to  come." 

Three  days  later  he  judged  the  numbers  of  the  French 
forces  to  be  120,000  or  150,000.  "  I  think  the  destruction  of 
the  Army  of  the  Loire,"  he  said,  "or  even  its  mere  repulse, 
would  largely  contribute  to  the  end  of  the  war.  After  all, 
the  immense  exertions  of  France  can  only  inspire  respect,  and 
it  would  be  dangerous  to  the  last  degree  not  to  take  them 
seriously.  ...  I  am  going  in  search  of  the  enemy  in  the 
direction  of  Artenay  as  soon  as  the  loth  Army  Corps  is  suffi- 
ciently rested  to  join  me."  He  postponed  his  offensive, 
which  had  been  previously  fixed  for  November  21,  in  order 
to  make  the  attack  with  all  his  forces  united  and  in  good 
condition. 

In  the  meantime  the  Ministry  of  War  was  doing  its  utmost 
to  reinforce  the  two  army  corps  that  had  fought  at  Coulmiers. 
By  November  ig  three  new  army  corps,  though  far  from  com- 
plete, had  gone  to  the  front  :  the  i8th  and  20th  to  the  right 
wing,  near  Nevers  and  Gien,  under  Billot  and  De  Crouzat, 
and  the  17th  to  the  left,  under  Durrien,  who  was  soon  displaced 
by  De  Sonis.  The  i6th  Army  Corps,  which  comprised  only 
two  divisions,  was  reinforced  by  a  third  on  the  Chateaudun 
road. 

D'Aurelle,  faithful  to  his  plan,  still  considered  his  first  duty 
to  be  the  completion  of  his  entrenched  camp.  "  Not  until  all 
these  works  are  finished,"  he  wrote  to  the  Minister  of  War 
on  November  18,  "  and  these  batteries  mounted,  will  the 
Army  of  the  Loire  be  free  to  act." 

Gambetta  urged  the  Government  in  Paris  to  attempt  a 
sortie,  and  at  the  same  time  charged  D'Aurelle  (on 
November  19)  to  "  make  his  position  into  a  Sebastopol." 

Up  to  this  time,  then,  he  thought  it  rested  with  the  garrison 
of  Paris  to  take  the  offensive.  But  in  the  afternoon  of  the 
same  day  his  opinion  was  changed  by  the  latest  news  from 

86 


DELEGATION   OF   TOURS 

the  capital — the  food  supplies  must  infallibly  come  to  an  end 
by  December  15.  That  night  M.  de  Freycinet  requested  the 
Commander-in-Chief  to  draw  up  a  plan  of  operations  that 
should  bring  the  army  closer  to  the  capital.  "  We  cannot 
stay  at  Orleans  forever;  Paris  is  hungry,  and  needs  our  help. 
So  find  out  the  best  route  to  bring  you  into  touch  with 
Trochu,  who  will  march  to  meet  you  with  150,000  men,  at  the 
same  time  that  a  diversion  is  attempted  in  the  north.  We, 
too,  are  working  at  a  plan  here.  As  soon  as  you  have  made 
up  your  mind  on  this  serious  matter,  let  me  know ;  we  will 
meet  at  Tours  or  at  your  headquarters  to  discuss  it." 

The  next  day  the  general  answered  :  "  Before  I  can  make 
a  plan  for  meeting  General  Trochu  I  must  be  fully 
informed  of  the  course  of  events  in  Paris  and  of  the  intentions 
of  that  officer.  As  for  your  own  plan,  I  will  consider  it  as 
soon  as  you  are  good  enough  to  submit  it  to  me." 

"  Pray  think  of  a  plan  of  operations,"  answered  Gambetta, 
"  with  Paris  for  its  main  objective.  I  cannot  admit  that, 
before  you  can  do  so,  you  must  know  General  Trochu 's 
designs.  We  have  no  news  :  it  is  only  by  chance,  and  quite 
intermittently,  that  we  can  obtain  any  :  this  gives  us  another 
unknown  quantity  in  our  problem.  .  .  .  After  all,  it  is 
enough  to  suppose  that  Paris  knows  of  our  presence  in 
Orleans,  and  that  therefore  the  Parisians  will  infallibly  move 
in  the  arc  of  the  circle  of  which  Orleans  is  the  central  jx)int. 
I  am  presuming  that  you  would  take  into  consideration  the 
general,  but  certain,  information  upon  which  we  must  act." 

On  the  following  day,  the  21st,  M.  de  Freycinet's  secretary 
arrived  at  Villeneuve-dTngr^  with  these  instructions  for 
General  D'Aurelle,  written  hastily  on  a  sheet  of  notepaper:^ 

"  ist.  Des  Palli^res  to  set  out  towards  Pithiviers  on  the 
23rd  inst.,  with  about  thirty  thousand  men ;  2ndly,  Pithiviers 
to  be  occupied  by  the  same  officer  on  the  24th.  A  formal 
order  will  be  sent  in  the  course  of  the  22nd  to  General 
d'Aurelle  to  carry  out  the  above-mentioned  movement.  The 
whole  of  to-morrow  to  be  occupied  in  a  detailed  examination 
of  the  district."     M.  de  Freycinet  further  gave  direct  orders 

^  A rchives  his/oriqties  du  minist^re  -'e  la  Guerre,  carton  D.  6. 
87 


GAMBETTA 

to  General  Crouzat  to  proceed  on  the  22nd  to  Les  Bordes  with 
his  whole  army-corps,  the  20th.  On  the  22nd  he  telegraphed 
to  D'Aurelle  to  send  the  ist  Division  of  the  15th  Army 
Corps,  on  the  24th,  to  a  point  between  Juranville  and  Beaune- 
la-Rolande. 

What  were  the  Government's  reasons  for  making  these 
sudden  decisions,  when  only  the  day  before  the  Commander- 
in-Chief  had  been  instructed  to  "  think  of  a  plan  of  opera- 
tions "  ?  The  Grand  Duke  of  Mecklenburg's  victorious 
march  from  Dreux  on  Nogent-le-Rotrou  had  brought  a  threat 
of  danger  to  Le  Mans,  and  even  to  Tours.  "  We  tried  to 
meet  the  danger,"  wrote  M.  de  Freycinet,  "  by  making  on  the 
enemy's  left,  in  the  direction  of  Pithiviers,  a  diversion  that 
would  oblige  him  to  turn  back  his  troops  towards  the  north- 
east." But  at  that  moment  it  was  precisely  towards  the 
east  that  the  Grand  Duke  was  moving,  in  response  to  a 
summons  from  Frederick-Charles  on  the  21st.  Moreover, 
the  effective  forces  of  the  Germans  were  greatly  over-estimated 
at  Tours. 

Hearing  that  the  sortie  from  Paris  would  not  take  place  for 
several  days,  the  Minister  of  War  fixed  upon  the  24th 
and  25th  for  the  offensive.  General  d'Aurelle,  though 
"  desperate,"  gave  the  necessary  orders,  but  felt  it  his  duty 
to  express  his  views  on  the  subject  to  the  Minister. 

''  Saint-Jean-de-la-Ruelle,  2T,rd  November,  1870,  2  o'clock 
in  the  morning.  Having  made  all  my  arrangements  for  the 
execution  of  your  orders,  I  have  still  one  duty  to  perform, 
namely,  to  tell  you  my  frank  opinion  on  the  subject  of  the 
operation  you  demand,  and  the  consequences  it  may  entail." 
He  explained  that,  since  Pithiviers  was  within  the  concentra- 
tion-zone of  a  Prussian  Army,  "seventy  or  eighty  thousand 
strong,"  the  suggested  movement  would  provoke  a  general 
engagement,  within  one  day's  march  of  fortified  positions. 
"  Instead  of  remaining  in  our  own  lines  we  should  be  seeking 
out  the  enemy  in  his,  at  the  risk  of  our  guns  being  stuck  in 
the  mud  and  being  perfectly  useless  to  us,  since  it  is  impos- 
sible to  move  them  on  roads  that  are  not  metalled.  In  such 
conditions  as  these,  the  operation  you   have  ordered  me  to 

88 


DELEGATION   OF   TOURS 

undertake  on  Pithiviers  does  not  seem  to  me  to  present  a 
sufficient  chance  of  success  to  be  attempted.  If  it  were  a 
failure  it  mi^ht  place  us  in  a  very  serious  position." 

And  on  the  same  day,  answering  a  letter  that  Gambetta 
wrote  to  him  on  the  20th,  he  said  :  "  You  instruct  me  to  think 
of  a  plan  of  operations  with  Paris  for  the  chief  objective. 
The  solution  of  that  problem  is  not  the  least  of  my  labours. 
To  solve  it,  one  must  have  co-operation  and  mutual  under- 
standing between  the  Government  and  the  Army,  represented 
by  the  generals  to  whom  you  have  given  your  confidence. 
As  far  as  I  am  concerned,  you  can  count  on  my  absolute 
fTdelity.     May  God  make  my  powers  equal  to  my  devotion  !  " 

Gambetta  having  gone  to  Le  Mans,  M.  de  Freycinet 
answered:  "To  your  objections,  the  import  of  which  I  per- 
fectly understand,  I  will  simply  reply  :  If  you  were  to  bring 
me  a  better  plan  than  mine,  or  even  a  plan  of  any  kind, 
I  might  give  up  my  own  and  revoke  my  orders ;  but  you  have 
now  been  twelve  days  in  Orleans,  and  in  spite  of  reiterated 
requests  from  both  M.  Gambetta  and  myself,  you  have  not 
proposed  any  sort  of  plan.  As  M.  Gambetta  and  I  have 
already  explained  to  you,  Paris  is  hungry  cmd  asks  for  help. 
It  is  not  in  our  power,  therefore,  to  leave  you  for  the  whole 
winter  in  Orleans.  I  say  the  whole  winter,  because  there  is 
no  chance,  for  the  next  three  or  four  months,  that  the  weather 
will  become  less  severe  or  the  enemy  less  numerous  all  round 
you.  Now  the  numbers  of  the  Prussians  on  the  one  hand, 
and  the  wet  state  of  the  ground  on  the  other,  are  the  objec- 
tions you  put  forward.  These  conditions  will  persist,  I  repeat, 
for  a  much  longer  time  than  Paris  will  have  food  to  eat.  We 
must  therefore  put  an  end  to  the  state  of  passivity  from 
which  the  supreme  need  of  our  country  forces  us  to  rouse  our- 
selves. I  can  only,  then — save  for  some  slight  changes,  intro- 
duced in  consequence  of  your  letter  of  to-dav — adhere  to  the 
orders  already  given  for  the  movement  to  be  carried  out  by 
Des  Palli^res  and  De  Crouzat,  and  I  send  you  a  copv  of  mv 
despatch  of  this  evening,  which  I  now  confirm.  This  move- 
ment, I  may  say,  was  planned  in  concert  with  M.  Gambetta, 
and  has  his  full  approval."     (November  23.) 

89 


GAMBETTA 

Even  on  the  very  morninjr  of  the  25th  D'Aurelle  criticised 
the  plans  arranged  for  that  day  by  the  War  Ministry,  and 
seemed  ready  to  accept  the  idea  of  a  general  offensive  later 
on,  "  See  how  our  forces  are  scattered,"  he  said,  "  though 
they  are  expected  to  aim  at  the  same  goal,  and  it  would  be 
greatly  to  our  advantage  to  be  concentrated." 

To  this  M.  de  Freycinet  answered  :  "  I  have  discussed  the 
matter  with  M.  Gambetta,  and  this  is  the  reply  I  have  to  trans- 
mit to  you.  .  .  .'  We  admit  the  bad  state  of  the  roads,  and 
the  scattering  of  the  forces  that  is  entailed  by  a  simultaneous 
movement  towards  Montargis,  Beaumont  and  Pithiviers;  but 
everv  plan  has  its  risks,  and  we  must  believe  that  the  risks 
in  this  case  are  no  greater  than  in  others,  since  no  other  plan 
has  been  proposed  to  us  by  you,  and  yet  a  plan  of  some  kind 
is  absolutely  indispensable  in  view  of  the  urgent  circum- 
stances of  which  you  know.  This  is  the  first  we  have  heard 
of  your  plan  of  attacking  in  all  directions,  with  all  your  forces 
assembled  at  Orleans ;  and  whatever  may  be  its  intrinsic  value, 
vou  must  see  that  it  is  now  too  late  to  adopt  it,  since  our 
movement  has  made  considerable  progress.'  " 

Thus,  despite  the  representations  of  the  general  in  com- 
mand, the  Government  did  not  give  up  the  design  of  making 
a  diversion  at  Pithiviers,  but  only  consented  to  carry  it  out 
less  hastily,  at  the  same  time  reserving  the  right  of  issuing 
further  orders  from  Tours.  M.  de  Freycinet  expressly  says, 
in  his  book  La  Guerre  en  Province  :  "  The  operations  began 
in  the  morning  of  the  24th,  according  to  the  plan  laid  down. 
They  had  this  special  character,  which  was  shared  by  no 
other  undertaking  between  October  10  and  February  10 :  they 
were  conducted  directly  by  the  Ministry  of  War." 

It  seems  rather  inexplicable  that  General  d'Aurelle  de  Pala- 
dines  did  not  send  in  his  resignation  at  this  juncture.  He 
gave  the  most  honourable  reasons  for  not  doing  so :  his 
loyalty  to  discipline,  for  instance,  and  his  noble  desire  to 
serve  his  country  to  the  end.  There  have  been  notable 
examples,  however,  of  a  different  point  of  vie^^^  Cond^, 
Turenne  and  Luxembourg  all  stood  firm  against  Louvois, 
and  in  this  very  war,  at  this  very  time,  Moltke  refused,  in  his 

90 


DELEGATION   OF   TOURS 

Memorandum  to  the  King  on  November  30,  1870,  to  submit  to 
Bismarck's  interference. 

This  was  Napoleon's  opinion  in  the  matter  :  "  Any  general 
in  command  who  undertakes  to  carry  out  a  plan  he  considers 
bad,  is  blameworthy.  He  should  give  his  reasons,  and  insist 
on  the  plan  being  changed;  and  finally  send  in  his  resigna- 
tion rather  than  be  the  instrument  of  his  army's  destruction." 

Von  der  Goltz,  and  others  with  him,  declared:  "There 
were  two  courses  :  either  to  leave  the  Commander-in-Chief 
free  to  act  as  he  thought  best,  or  to  replace  him."  Certainly, 
if  Chanzy  had  replaced  D'Aurelle  at  this  moment,  the  issue 
of  the  war  might  have  been  changed ;  but  on  November  23 
Chanzy  was  not  yet  in  a  position  to  be  awarded  the  chief 
command.  Nor  was  it  possible  to  remove  the  general  who 
had  won  the  only  victory  of  the  war.  Neither  the  country 
nor  the  army  would  have  understood  such  a  measure. 
Dilemmas  of  this  kind  are  more  easily  stated  after  the  event 
than  solved  at  the  moment ! 

Be  this  as  it  may,  on  this  November  23  the  enemy  had  only 
two  bodies  of  troops  to  bring  against  us,  the  Grand  Duke's 
Army  of  46,000  men,  and  the  Army  of  Frederick-Charles, 
which  numbered  55,000.  They  were  separated  from  one 
another  by  a  distance  of  about  a  hundred  and  twenty  kilo- 
metres—the distance,  that  is  to  say,  between  the  Grand 
Duke's  headquarters  at  Theil  and  the  Prince's  headquarters 
at  Pithiviers.  We,  on  the  other  hand,  had  about  180,000 
men  between  Laigle  and  Gien.  It  is  easy  to  imagine  a 
manoeuvre  that  would  have  enabled  the  Army  of  the  Loire  to 
defeat  these  two  forces  successively  before  marching  on  Paris. 
What  happened  was  exactly  the  reverse  of  this  :  the  Army  of 
the  Loire,  instead  of  attacking  in  mass,  only  engaged  the 
right  wing,  which  was  repulsed  on  the  28th.  Four  days  later 
the  left  was  engaged,  and  defeated  for  the  same  reasons. 

On  the  24th,  Martin  des  Palli^res'  Division  and  the  20th 
Army  Corp  under  Crouzat  marched  on  Pithiviers — Des 
Palli^res  by  way  of  Chilleurs,  and  Crouzat  bv  Beaune-la- 
Rolande.  Near  Neuville,  Des  Palli^res  repulsed  a  Prussian 
reconnoitring   party,   but   Crouzat   met   two   of  the   enemy's 

91 


GAMBETTA 

brigades,  who  barred  his  way  to  Ladon  and  Maizi^res.  The 
movement  was  checked;  the  25th,  26th  and  27th  were  wasted; 
and  Frederick-Charles  gained  some  valuable  time.  On  the 
28th  the  offensive  was  resumed.  Crouzat  opposed  60,000 
men  to  10,000  Germans,  who,  from  eight-thirty  in  the  morning 
(o  three  in  the  afternoon,  held  back  our  troops.  All  the 
attacks  on  Beaune-la-Rolande  by  the  20th  Army  Corps  were 
failures,  in  spite  of  the  courage  of  our  men,  who,  as  the  enemy 
said,  "fought  with  a  sort  of  savage  enthusiasm  that  recalled 
the  splendid  days  of  the  first  Revolution."  The  i8th  Army 
Corps,  under  Billot,  broke  the  enemy's  first  line  in  the  Juran- 
ville-Lorcy-Corbeille  region,  but  failed  to  join  the  20th  Army 
Corps  in  time.  On  the  arrival  upon  the  battle-field  of  a  divi- 
sion hastily  despatched  by  Frederick-Charles,  Crouzat  was 
forced  to  fall  back  on  Nesploy,  Nibelle  and  Chambon. 

This  first  encounter,  then,  in  which  the  Army  of  the  Loire 
had  engaged  only  its  right  wing,  and  the  iSth  and  20th  Army 
Corps  had  fought  independently  of  one  another,  was  not  a 
success.  Gambetta,  however,  at  first  received  inaccurate 
news  of  the  battle,  and  wrote  to  Jules  Favre  :  "  Our  conscripts 
of  the  1 8th  Army  Corps  have  beaten,  at  Beaune-la-Rolande, 
the  loth  Prussian  Army  Corps,  commanded  by  Frederick- 
Charles  himself."  Such  was  his  belief  at  the  time,  and  he 
hoped  this  excellent  news  would  hasten  the  sortie  of  the  troops 
in  Paris. 

The  news  of  the  victory  at  Coulmiers  had  reached  Paris  on 
November  18,  whereupon  the  Government  had  immediately 
made  arrangements  for  a  sortie  on  a  large  scale  towards  the 
south.  A  plan  had  been  ready  by  the  20th,  and  on  the  24th 
Trochu  telegraphed  to  the  Delegation  at  Tours:  "On 
March  29  the  outer  garrison,  commanded  by  General  Ducrot, 
the  most  energetic  of  our  generals,  will  attack  the  enemy's 
fortified  positions,  and  if  he  carries  them  will  push  on  towards 
the  Loire,  probably  in  the  direction  of  Gien."  But,  by  one 
of  the  fatalities  that  so  often  occurred  in  this  war,  the  Govern- 
ment in  Paris  had  entrusted  the  telegram  to  one  balloon  only. 
On  the  25th  this  balloon  reached  the  ground  in  Norway,  at  a 
spot  a  hundred  leagues  north  of  Christiania  :  it  was  four  days 

92 


DELEGATION   OF   TOURS 

later  when  the  aeronauts  reached  the  French  Consul,  who 
telegraphed  to  Tours  at  once,  that  is  to  say,  on  the  29th ;  but 
when  the  message  was  received  by  the  delegates  on  the  30th 
the  sortie  had  (already  take.n  place  on  the  previous  day. 
Gambetta  was  distracted.  He  instantly  sent  off  five  messen- 
gers to  meet  General  Ducrot,  and  assure  him  that  the  Army 
of  the  Loire  would  march  to  join  him.  A  hundred  and  twenty 
thousand  men,  followed  by  a  reserve  corps,  set  out  towards 
Fontainebleau  in  two  columns,  one  by  Pithiviers  and  the 
other  by  Beaumont.  At  the  same  time  D'Aurelle  was 
instructed  to  "  prepare  a  vigorous  offensive."  The  general 
suggested  marching  at  once  upon  £tampes,  or  else  upon 
Rambouillet,  and  asked  to  be  informed  without  delay  what 
his  objective  was  to  be,  and  what  troops  he  was  to  take.  M. 
de  Freycinet  answered  :  "  I  will  explain  to  you  in  person  what 
we  want  you  to  do,  and  we  will  discuss  it  together."  (Novem- 
ber 30,  3.35  p.m.)  At  nine  o'clock  the  deputy  of  the  Minister 
of  War  reached  headquarters  at  Saint-Jean-de-la-Ruelle,  and 
a  Council  of  War  was  heTd  at  once,  with  Generals  d'Aurelle, 
Chanzy  and  Borel  present. 

"The  generals,"  says  M.  de  Freycinet  in  La  Guerre  en 
Province,  "did  not  for  a  moment  hesitate  to  go  to  meet 
General  Ducrot.  They  made  no  secret,  however,  of  the  draw- 
backs that  would  ensue  from  so  hasty  a  departure.  They 
approved  of  the  general  conception  of  the  enterprise,  the 
march  on  Fontainebleau  by  way  of  Pithiviers  and  Beaune-la- 
Rolande,  and  the  co-operation  of  the  five  army  corps  under 
the  supreme  command— from  the  morrow  onwards — of 
General  d'Aurelle." 

D'Aurelle  and  Chanzy  give  rather  a  different  account  of 
the  matter.  They  admit  that  they  accepted  the  principle  of 
the  design,  but  claim  to  have  made  definite  reservations  with 
regard  to  its  execution,  explaining  that  the  operation  would 
Ibe  very  dangerous  if  the  enemy  were  concentrated  round 
Pithiviers,  and  that  the  first  thing  to  be  done  was  to  defeat 
the  enemy's  troops  near  Janville,  using  the  15th  and  17th 
Army  Corps  for  the  purpose. 

In  La  Deuxieme  Armee  de  la  Loire  Chanzy  says  that  when 

93 


GAMBETTA 

M.  de  Freycinet  had  explained  the  plan  drawn  up  at  Tours 
the  generals  pointed  out  that  the  operation  would  be  full  of 
danger,  seeing  that  all  the  enemy's  forces  were  massed  round 
Piihiviers,  and  the  sortie  from  Paris  was  still  a  matter  of 
uncertainty.  But  the  plan  was  enforced,  as  being  a  definite 
order  from  the  Government.  "It  was  decided,"  he  adds, 
"  that  the  i6th  Army  Corps,  which  formed  part  of  the  left 
wing,  should  march  in  the  direction  of  Janville  and  Toury  the 
next  day;  that  the  17th  should  follow  it  and  serve  as  its 
reserve;  and  that,  on  December  2  the  15th,  18th  and  20th 
Army  Corps  should  advance  towards  Pithiviers  in  their  turn, 
by  means  of  a  concentric  movement." 

D'Aurelle,  for  his  part,  says  in  La  Premiere  armee  de  la 
Loire:  "  M.  de  Freycinet  maintained  that  Chanzy's  troops 
were  more  than  sufficient  to  beat  the  Duke  of  Mecklenburg, 
and  ended  by  declaring  that  the  plan  proposed  was  irrevoc- 
ably decreed  by  the  Government  at  Tours."  The  Com- 
mander-in-Chief answered:  "If  Chanzy's  Army  Corps  (the 
i6th)  be  left  to  carry  out  this  movement  alone,  it  will  be  in 
danger  of  extinction." 

The  operations  began  in  accordance  with  the  plan  laid 
down.  On  December  i  our  arms  were  successful.  Chanzy 
captured  Guillonville  and  defeated  the  enemy  at  Villepion. 
The  next  morning  a  proclamation  by  Gambetta  was  read  in 
every  corner  of  France.  After  describing  the  principal 
phases  of  the  fight  under  the  walls  of  Paris,  he  exclaimed  : 
"  The  genius  of  France,  which  for  a  moment  was  hidden,  has 
again  appeared !  Thanks  to  the  exertions  of  the  whole 
country,  victory  has  returned  to  us,  and  as  though  to  make 
us  forget  the  long  series  of  our  misfortunes,  is  favouring  us 
at  nearly  every  point.  .  .  .  Our  troops  from  Orleans  are 
advancing  with  all  speed.  Our  two  great  armies  are  march- 
ing to  meet  one  another.  .  .  .  Who  can  doubt,  then,  the  final 
issue  of  this  gigantic  struggle?  "  But  the  next  day  came  the 
news  that,  despite  prodigies  of  valour,  the  troops  from  Paris 
had  been  forced  back  within  the  walls :  the  blockade  was  in 
no  way  relieved.  And  while  the  sortie  from  Paris  was 
repulsed  at  Champigny,  on  the  same  day,  December  2,  after 

94 


DELEGATION   OF  TOURS 

a  battle  at  Loigny  which  lasted  from  nine  o'clock  in  the 
morning  to  six  in  the  evening,  the  i6th  Army  Corps  and  the 
17th  under  Son  is,  which  Chanzy  had  called  to  his  aid,  were 
completely  overpowered. 

At  half-past  one  in  the  afternoon  of  the  2nd,  Frederick- 
Charles  received  a  message  from  the  King  to  "  march  directly 
upon  Orleans  and  deliver  a  decisive  attack  without  delay/' 
The  Prince  at  once  gave  orders  to  his  troops,  and  to  those  of 
the  Grand  Duke,  to  converge  on  Orleans.  Passing  our  right 
wing — the  iSth  and  20th  iVrmy  Corps,  which  were  separated 
from  the  scene  of  action  by  a  distance  of  over  forty  kilometres 
as  the  crow  flies — he  hurled  all  his  forces  upon  our  centre.  By 
the  morning  of  the  3rd  the  French  Army  was  in  full  retreat. 

At  four  o'clock  on  that  same  night  the  Commander-in-Chief 
wrote  that  the  defence  of  Orleans  had  become  impossible. 
This  news  was  greeted  at  Tours  with  horror  and  despair. 
D'Aurelle  received  orders  to  concentrate  all  his  forces,  but 
replied  that  there  was  not  time  enough  for  the  purpose. 
Gambetta  then  summoned  his  colleagues  of  the  Delegation, 
and  it  was  decided  to  leave  the  general  to  choose  his  own 
method  of  retreat.  But  meanwhile  D'Aurelle  had  reached 
Orleans,  and  the  arrival  of  Des  Palli^res  with  his  division 
had  given  him  fresh  confidence  and  changed  his  view  of  the 
situation.  He  brought  the  i6th  and  17th  Army  Corps  to 
Orleans,  and  summoned  the  i8th  and  20th.  The  Delegation 
expressed  great  satisfaction  to  the  general,  adding:  "  M. 
Gambetta  sets  out  for  Orleans  in  half  an  hour." 

A  few  hours  later  D'Aurelle,  as  he  looked  at  the  streets  of 
Orleans,  thronged  with  a  confused  mass  of  disorganised 
troops,  again  felt  convinced  that  any  attempt  at  resistance  was 
vain.  At  four  o'clock  he  ordered  his  forces  to  withdraw  from 
the  town,  and  informed  the  Delegation  that  his  efforts  were  of 
no  avail,  and  Orleans  would  be  evacuated  during  the  night  of 
the  4th.  The  train  in  which  Gambetta  was  travelling  to 
Orleans  was  stopped  at  La  Chapelle-Saint-Mesmin  by  the 
fire  of  some  German  patrols,  and  sent  back  to  Beaugency. 
There  Gambetta  was  told  of  the  disaster,  upon  which  he 
returned  to  Tours. 

95 


GAMBETTA 

"  As  soon  as  we  rose  on  the  morning  of  the  5th,"  says 
General  Thoumas,  "we  went  to  M.  de  Freycinet's  house, 
where  we  found  Gambetta,  who  had  spent  several  hours  of 
mortal  weariness  waiting  at  the  station  of  Beaugency.  He 
had  heard  of  the  evacuation  of  Orleans,  and  had  returned  to 
Tours  in  despair.  When  I  saw  him  during  the  morning  of 
the  5th  his  eyes  were  swollen  and  red  with  weeping  :  he  gave 
my  hand  a  fervent  clasp  of  intense  feeling,  and  kept  silence 
for  several  moments.  Whatever  may  be  said  of  the  man,  I 
must  bear  witness,  after  seeing  him  on  this  and  several  other 
occasions,  that  he  loved  his  country  passionately,  and  his 
intense  patriotism  completely  effaces,  in  my  opinion,  any 
mistakes  he  may  have  made." 

"  Thus  befell,"  says  M.  de  Freycinet,  "  the  greatest 
disaster  of  the  second  period  of  the  w^ar,  the  disaster  that 
decided  the  fate  of  France."  To  say  the  least,  the  enormous 
achievements  of  Gambetta  and  his  eminent  colleague  had 
been  very  largely  neutralised. 

An  immense  amount  of  argument  has  been  expended  on  the 
causes  of  this  disaster.  The  civil  administration  held  the 
Commander-in-Chief  responsible ;  the  Commander-in-Chief 
blamed  the  civil  administration.  The  initial  cause  is  clearly 
apparent :  everything  was  subordinated  to  the  relief  of  Paris. 
The  civil  authorities  at  Tours  were  merely  delegates  of  the 
Central  Government,  to  whose  will  they  w'ere  subservient  in 
making  this  their  main  object.  Whenever  Paris  seemed  to 
offer  them  a  chance  they  expended  all  the  fervour  of  their 
patriotism  in  trying  to  take  advantage  of  it.  Had  the  matter 
been  left  to  the  Commander-in-Chief,  he  would  first  have 
seasoned  and  organised  his  troops;  he  thought  the  best  way 
of  aiding  Paris  was  to  await  the  enemy  under  the  walls  of 
Orleans ;  he  did  not  regard  Paris  as  his  most  immediate  objec- 
tive, whereas  in  the  eyes  of  the  delegates  at  Tours  the  relief 
of  the  capital  before  it  was  forced  to  surrender  was  the  first  of 
all  considerations.  The  presence  of  the  Government  in  Paris 
— that  was  the  great  blunder  that  dominated  this  period  of  the 
war. 

96 


DELEGATION    OF  TOURS 

But,  when  once  the  offensive  had  been  undertaken,  who 
was  responsible  tor  the  reverse  that  followed  ? 

On  the  evening  of  November  30  the  German  front  measured 
about  sixty-five  kilometres  in  length,  and  formed  a  barrier  of 
nearly  unvarying  width  between  Paris  and  the  Army  of  the 
Loire.  A  force  of  80,000  infantry  and  18,000  cavalry,  with 
472  guns,  had  been  concentrated  in  order  to  take  part  in  the 
impending  battle.  The  French  Army  was  disposed  in  a 
curve  measuring  about  seventy-five  kilometres.  The  outposts 
of  six  of  our  divisions  were  in  contact  with  those  of  the 
enemy:  the  ist  Division  of  the  i6th  Army  Corps,  the  three 
divisions  comprising  the  15th,  one  division  of  the  20th,  and 
one  of  the  i8th ;  that  is  to  say,  about  100,000  men.  Why  was 
it  that  not  one-third  of  these  forces  were  ever  combined  to 
deliver  a  decisive  attack? 

"  Because,"  said  D'Aurelle,  "  it  was  not  until  the  2nd  that 
I  received  the  command  of  the  right  wing,  that  is  to  say,  of 
the  i8th  and  20th  Army  Corps,  which  until  then  had  been  in 
the  hands  of  the  Minister  of  War.  They  were  at  so  great 
a  distance  when  they  received  their  orders  that  before  they 
were  on  the  march  the  Prussian  Army  was  already  at  the 
gates  of  Orleans." 

The  despatch  from  the  Minister  of  War  on  which  D'Aurelle 
bases  this  statement  was  written  on  December  2,  at  4.55  in  the 
afternoon.  "  It  is  understood,"  it  runs,  "  that  from  this  day 
forward  you  will  give  your  strategical  instructions  directly  to 
the  15th,  i6th,  17th,  i8th  and  20th  Army  Corps.  Until  yester- 
day I  issued  their  orders  to  the  iSth  and  20th,  and  occasionally 
to  the  17th  :  henceforward  I  shall  leave  this  duty  to  you." 
This  despatch  was  a  confirmation  of  orders  already  sent  on  the 
preceding  day.  As  a  matter  of  fact  the  Commander-in-Chief 
had  issued  instructions  to  these  army  corps  on  the  ist,  and 
even  as  early  as  the  evening  of  the  30th. 

Certain  military  critics  have  maintained  that,  since  our  out- 
posts were  in  contact  with  those  of  the  enemy  on  a  very  wide 
front,  our  various  army  corps,  separated  though  they  were, 
might  have  advanced  simultaneously.  It  is  conceivable  thai 
a  general  of  sufficient  daring,  had  he  followed  this  plan,  and 

97  H 


GAMBETTA 

converged  all  the  forces  of  his  right  wing  upon  the  enemy  on 
December  i,  might  have  won  a  victory.  This  is  the  opinion 
which  Colonel  V.  Dupuis,  head  of  the  historical  section  of  the 
General  Staff,  supports  in  his  book.  La  Direction  de  la  Guerre 
(1912).  But  this  plan  was  not  that  adopted  at  Saint-Jean-de- 
la-Ruelle  :  the  five  army  corps  were  ordered  to  advance  in  suc- 
cession, and  no  concerted  action  was  arranged  until  the  2nd. 

There  was,  moreover,  another  fact  that  was  greatly  to  the 
enemy's  advantage.  The  German  troops  were  well 
acquainted  with  their  leaders,  whereas  the  French  generals  in 
several  cases  were  appointed  at  the  last  moment.  Son  is 
received  the  command  of  the  17th  Army  Corps  on  Novem- 
ber 22,  and  since  D'Aurelle  was  unable  to  dispose  his  forces, 
as  a  whole,  until  December  i,  it  was  only  on  the  3rd  that 
Bourbaki  arrived  post-haste  to  command  the  right  wing. 
And  the  mutual  suspicion,  the  constant  skirmishes  between 
the  chief  military  command  and  the  civil  administration, 
neither  of  whom  knew  very  much  of  the  enemy's  movements, 
were  a  bad  preparation  for  a  decisive  battle,  which  demanded 
unity  both  in  will  and  action. 

Such  were  the  days  between  November  24  and  December  4, 
1870.  Sad  days  they  were — of  hopes  that  died  early,  of 
heroism  and  sublime  martyrdom,  of  mingled  sorrow  and 
glory  :  days  when  Chanzy  and  Jaureguiberry  won  endless 
renown,  when  Sonis,  Charette  and  Bouille  covered  themselves 
with  honour,  and  the  untried  troops  of  France  fought  with 
marvellous  courage :  yet  days  for  ever  accursed,  for  once 
again,  on  these  days,  the  fortunes  of  France  were  shamefully, 
and  most  cruelly,  hazarded  and  lost. 

It  was  at  this  moment  that  Bismarck  proposed  to  Austria 
an  alliance  with  Prussia.  His  first  suggestions  on  the  sub- 
ject appeared  in  a  despatch  of  December  14.  Until  then, 
Austria  had  observed  great  reticence  with  regard  to  Prussia's 
exactions.  Her  attitude  thenceforward  was  modified,  and  a 
few  months  later  Bismarck's  overtures  ended  in  the  Austro- 
German  Alliance  that  was  destined  to  weigh  so  heavily  on  the 
politics  of  Europe,  and  to  bring,  in  years  to  come,  such  terrible 
consequences  on  the  whole  world. 

98 


CHAPTER    VII 

THE     END     OF    THE     DELEGATION 

The  Delegation  at  Bordeaux — The  Eastern  ('ampaign — Denfert-Kochcreau  at  Belfon 
— Faidherbe  in  the  North — (December  8,  1S70 -February,  1871) — Tlie  Armistice 
— Gambelta's  Resignation — (January  29-February  6,  1871). 

The  Army  of  the  Loire  was  now  cut  in  two  :  the  15th,  i8th, 
and  20th  Army  Corps  were  in  retreat  on  the  southern  side  of 
the  river,  the  i6th  and  17th,  also  retreating,  were  on  the  right 
bank.  From  these  scattered  forces  the  Delegation  formed  two 
armies,  giving  the  command  of  one  to  Bourbaki  and  of  the 
other  to  Chanzy.  Tours  being  now  in  danger,  the  delegates 
themselves  retired  to  Bordeaux  on  December  8,  with  the 
exception  of  Gambetta,  who  first  spent  some  time  with  the 
army.  His  resolution  and  courage  were  unshaken.  "  I  will 
make  head  against  the  storm,"  he  wrote  to  Jules  Favre.  "  Not 
for  an  instant  have  I  dreamt  of  despair." 

Two  days  after  the  defeat  at  Orleans  Chanzy  was  in  a  con- 
dition to  face  Frederick-Charles  upon  the  plains  of  Josnes. 
There  Gambetta  joined  him.  "  I  found  everything  here  in 
perfect  order,"  he  says,  "  thanks  to  General  Chanzy 's  detei- 
mination  and  unconquerable  energy."  Chanzy  was  at  thai 
time  forty-seven  years  of  age  :  "  an  officer,"  Gambetta  says  of 
him,  "  whose  influence  with  his  troops,  military  experience 
and  decision  of  character  are  his  most  striking  qualities." 
At  Coulmiers  and  in  the  subsequent  battles  Chanzy  had  given 
evidence  enough  of  his  penetrating  sagacity  and  strength  of 
will.  His  temperament  was  calm  and  yet  energetic,  and, 
above  all,  he  believed  in  ultimate  victory.  Whether  victorious 
or  not,  those  who  have  believed  in  France's  destiny  have 
always  won  her  faithful  devotion. 

99  H  2 


GAMBETTA 

Chanzy  now  embarked  upon  the  series  of  battles  that  at 
least  delayed  the  final  success  of  the  enemy.  He  asked 
Bourbaki  for  his  support.  Moltke  feared  the  junction  of  the 
two  armies,  and  the  War  Office  strongly  urged  this  step. 
But  a  distance  of  a  hundred  kilometres  now  lay  between 
them,  for  Bourbaki  had  been  forced  to  retire,  by  snowy, 
ice-bound  roads,  as  far  as  Bourges.  His  troops  were 
greatly  exhausted,  and  Gambetta,  who  made  an  expedition 
to  Bourges  to  inquire  into  the  situation,  telegraphed  from 
thence  to  Bordeaux  :  "  The  i6th,  i8th,  and  20th  Army  Corps 
are  in  a  state  of  positive  collapse  :  they  are  the  saddest  sight 
I  have  ever  seen."     (December  12.) 

From  the  time  of  the  capture  of  Orleans  until  December  16, 
the  line  from  Gien  to  Orleans  was  held  by  a  narrow  belt  of 
German  troops,  who  would  have  been  quite  unequal  to  re- 
sisting any  determined  movement  on  the  part  of  Bourbaki's 
army.  The  latter  remained  inactive  till  the  19th,  Meanwhile 
Frederick-Charles,  being  aware  of  Bourbaki's  intentions,  left 
the  Loir  and  reached  Orleans  by  forced  marches  on  the  17th. 
Thenceforward  the  conditions  were  completely  changed. 

Bourbaki's  headquarters  had  already  been  moved  to  Baugy, 
when  M.  de  Freycinet  despatched  to  Bourges  a  certain 
engineer  named  De  Serres,  in  whom  he  placed  great  con- 
fidence, to  suggest  a  new  plan  to  Gambetta  :  namely,  the 
removal  of  Bourbaki's  army  to  the  east  of  France  by  rail,  to 
raise  the  blockade  of  Belfort  and  to  cut  the  enemy's  lines  of 
communication. 

Serres  laid  the  scheme  before  Gambetta.  The  Minister  of 
War  hesitated;  but  consented  to  an  interview  between  Serres 
and  Bourbaki,  and  promised  that,  should  the  general  approve 
of  the  plan,  he  himself  would  raise  no  objection.  Serres  then 
went  to  the  Commander-in-Chief  and,  having  pointed  out 
the  dangers  of  an  advance  in  view  of  the  Germans'  rapid 
approach,  found  no  difficulty  in  convincing  him.  That  same 
evening  Bourbaki  wrote  to  Gambetta  that  he  was  prepared  to 
carry  out  the  operation,  and  thus  the  affair  was  settled. 

The  idea  of  an  expedition  to  the  east  of  France,  which 
General  Le  Flo  had  advocated  as  early  as  the  previous  Sep- 

100 


THE   END   OF  THE   DELEGATION 

tember,  had  more  than  once  been  entertained  by  Gambetta. 
On  November  14  he  had  telegraphed  to  Freycinet  to  inquire 
into  the  practicability  of  an  offensive  in  the  east. 

On  January  2,  as  soon  as  Chanzy  at  Le  Mans  heard  of  the 
new  plan,  he  wrote  to  dissuade  Gambetta  from  it,  and  pro- 
posed another  :  that  the  three  armies — of  the  Lowe,  of  the 
East,  and  of  the  North— should  converge  on  the  capital.  But 
by  this  time  the  Government  in  Paris  had  already  sanctioned 
the  advance  eastwards,  and  Bourbaki  had  set  out. 

The  general  was  more  than  ever  convinced  that  resistance 
was  useless.  M.  de  Freycinet  in  his  fear  that  this  depressed 
attitude  of  mind  would  have  a  bad  effect,  sent  De  Serres  with 
the  expedition  in  the  capacity  of  special  Commissioner.  In 
his  pocket  was  the  general's  recall. 

The  success  of  the  aimpaign  was  endangered  from  the  first 
by  the  delays  in  transport :  the  journey  occupied  a  fortnight 
instead  of  six  or  seven  days. 

iiourbaki  had  good  reason  to  complain  that  two  promises 
made  to  him  were  not  fulfilled.  He  was  ied  to  expect  the 
support  of  100,000  militia  from  the  south,  whereas  only  18,000 
arrived;  and  he  was  promiseci  supplies  from  Besan^on.  Pie 
was  further  disapf>ointed  in  having  no  covering  troops  either 
on  his  flank  or  at  the  rear,  and  there  were  no  facilities  for 
organisation. 

The  operations  began,  however.  Bourbaki  advanced  on 
Vesoul,  and  on  January  9  captured  Villersexel.  The  march 
was  not  resumed  till  the  13th.  On  the  15th,  twenty-five 
days  after  the  departure  from  Bourges,  45,000  Germans 
and  120,000  French  joined  issue  in  the  battle  known  as  that 
of  H^ricourt,  the  battle  that  was  to  decide  the  fate  of  Belfort. 
On  the  1 6th  our  troops  were  no  more  than  two  leagues  distant 
from  that  town. 

But  the  rest  of  the  army  did  not  advance.  On  the  17th  a 
general  attack  was  repulsed.  A  temperature  of  eighteen 
degrees  of  frost  benumbed  the  troops,  while  their  provisions 
ran  short :  many  of  the  men  were  too  much  exhausted  or 
too  ill  to  fight.  The  horses,  too,  fell  in  harness.  Bourbaki 
lost  heart,  and  retired  on  Besanci-on  on  January  22. 

lOI 


GAMBETTA 

In  the  meantime  Moltke  had  despatched  ManteufTel  to  the 
scene  of  action.  He  reached  Gray  on  the  19th,  with  the 
intention  of  barring  Bourbaki's  way  and  trapping  him  in 
the  Jura.  He  marched  towards  the  Doubs  without  the 
smallest  effort  being  made  to  stop  him;  partly  because  the 
Ministry  of  War  was  receiving  inaccurate  news  of  his  move- 
ments from  Dijon,  where  Garibaldi  was  on  the  alert,  though 
ill ;  and  partly  because  Bourbaki  always  believed  that  the 
forces  opposed  to  him  were  stronger  than  his  own. 

What  was  he  to  do?  On  the  24th  he  held  a  Council  of 
War.  All  his  officers  were  agreed  that  he  should  fall  back  on 
Pontarlier,  and  towards  Pontarlier,  accordingly,  he  marched, 
with  the  intention  of  skirting  the  Swiss  frontier  in  the  direction 
of  the  Rh6ne  Valley.  But  Manteuffel  had  already  reached 
Salins.  The  trap  was  closing.  In  his  despair  Bourbaki 
pointed  a  revolver  at  his  forehead  and  pulled  the  trigger.  The 
bullet  flattened  on  his  skull,  but  it  failed  to  kill  him. 

At  the  same  moment  he  was  relieved  of  his  command.  The 
retreat  was  continued  by  Clinchant,  his  successor,  who  found 
himself  trapped  between  Werder  and  Manteuffel.  Even  then 
he  thought  he  was  saved  by  the  armistice  that  Jules  Favre  had 
just  signed  at  Versailles,  being  unaw^are  that  the  extent  of 
country  covered  by  the  treaty  was  not  to  be  defined,  as  far  as 
the  east  was  concerned,  until  the  military  situation  was  accu- 
rately known.  Moltke  telegraphed  to  Manteuffel  that  the 
truce,  as  yet,  did  not  include  the  departments  of  the  Cote-d'Or, 
the  Doubs,  or  the  Jura.  Clinchant,  in  his  ignorance  of  this 
clause,  had  checked  his  retreat,  with  the  result  that  he  w-as 
completely  hemmed  in,  and  forced  to  escape  into  Switzerland. 
On  February  2  he  and  His  80,000  men  crossed  the  frontier. 

While  these  events  were  taking  place  in  the  east,  General 
Faidherbe,  in  the  north,  was  bravely  upholding  the  honour 
of  our  flag.  *'  He  is  a  man  who  can  think,  and  can  look 
ahead,"  said  Gambetta,  "  and  that  is  a  man  rarely  found  in 
these  days  of  ours."  On  January  3  he  drove  the  enemy  from 
Bapaume;  but  on  the  19th  the  bitterly  disputed  Battle  of 
St.  Quentin  resulted  in  favour  of  the  Germans.     Gambetta 

102' 


THE   END   OF   THE   DELEGATION 

went  to  Lille,  where  he  found  the  inhabitants  greatly  dis- 
couraged. "The  war  is  horrible,"  he  cried,  "and  every  one 
of  us  should  hate  it,  but  it  is  a  necessity  in  the  circumstances. 
Do  not  forget  that  peace  means  the  mutilation  of  our  country. 
Have  we  any  right  to  sacrifice  three  millions  of  French  men 
and  women  to  that  greedy  Germany  ?  Should  we  not  feel 
ashamed  to  surrender  thousands  of  Alsatians?  It  would  be 
a  violation  of  the  rights  of  us  all,  to  tliink  that  a  part  of  our 
country  could  be  given  up  as  a  man  gives  up  a  part  of  his 
flocks  and  herds.  France  is  the  common  property  of  the  whole 
French  nation,  and  every  clod  of  earth  that  France  covers 
with  her  flag  is  owned  by  every  one  of  us.  This  sense  of 
solidarity  is  the  basis  of  our  policy — our  policy  of  resistance 
a  outrance.  .  .  .  No  weakness,  then  !  If  we  do  not  give  way 
to  despair,  we  shall  save  France  yet.  When  that  happy  day 
comes  it  will  be  seen  that,  if  I  am  possessed  by  a  passion  of 
patriotism  that  cannot  endure  a  foreign  invasion,  I  am  also 
deeplv  inspired  by  the  republican  faith,  which  has  a  horror  of 
dictatorship  !  "     (January  22.) 

On  the  morning  of  January  29  he  received,  at  Bordeaux, 
this  telegram  from  Jules  Favre  :  "  Versailles,  January  28, 
1871,  1 1. 15  in  the  evening. — We  have  signed  to-day  a  treaty 
with  Count  Bismarck. — An  armistice  of  twenty-one  days  has 
been  arranged. — An  Assemblv  is  convoked  at  Bordeaux  for 
February  15. — Publish  this  news  in  every  part  of  I*" ranee;  see 
that  the  armistice  is  carried  out,  and  convoke  the  electors  for 
February  8. — A  member  of  the  Government  is  starting  for 
Bordeaux."  All  officers  in  command  of  troops  at  once 
received  orders  to  cease  hostilities. 

The  whole  of  the  29th  was  spent  at  Bordeaux  in  the  expecta- 
tion of  further  news.  On  the  30th,  Gambetta  telegraphed  to 
Jules  Favre,  complaining  of  this  silence.  "  The  country  is  in 
a  fever,"  he  said,  "and  w^ill  not  be  content  with  those  three 
lines  of  yours.  Nothing  has  been  heard  as  yet  of  the  member 
of  the  Government  whose  arrival  here  you  mention,  but  whose 
name  you  have  not  told  us.  Meanwhile  it  is  impossible, 
beyond  the  mere  fulfilment  of  the  armistice  by  the  troops,  to 
which   we   have  attended,    to  take   the   proper   measures  for 

103 


GAMBETTA 

summoning?  the  electors,    without   further  explanations  from 
you,  and  without  knowing:  the  fate  of  Paris." 

It  was  Bismarck  who  received  this  tele2:ram.     He  did  not 
transmit  it  to  the  Government  in  Paris  until  the  following  day; 
but  he  answered  Gambetta  himself.     "  Versailles,  January  31, 
12.15  in  the  morning.— Your  telegram  to  M.  Jules  Favre,  who 
has  just  left  Versailles,  will  be  given  to  him  to-morrow  morn- 
ing in  Paris.     By  way  of  information  I  have  the  honour  to 
communicate  the  following  facts  to  you  :   The  armistice  that 
was  concluded  on  the  28th  will  end  on  February  19.     The  line 
of   demarcation    between    the  two   armies   starts  from    Pont- 
I'Eveque  in  Calvados,  crosses  the  department  of  the  Orne, 
leaves  to  the  German  army  of  occupation  the  departments  of 
•he  Sarthe,    Indre-et-Loire,   Loir-et-Cher,  Loiret,  and  Yonne, 
enters  obliquelv  the  region  of  the  Cote-d'Or,  the  Doubs,  and 
the  jura,  and  leaves  the  north,  with  Pas-de-Calais  and  Havre, 
intact.  .  .  .  Hostilities  w'ill  continue  before  Belfort,  and  in  the 
departments  of  the  Doubs,  the  Jura,  and  the  Cote-d'Or,  till 
some    further    agreement    has    been    made.       The    National 
Assembly  is  to  be  convoked.     All  the  fortifications  of  Paris  are 
to  be  surrendered.     The  troops  in  Paris  are  prisoners  of  war, 
except  such  as  are  necessary  for  maintaining  order  in  the  city. 
The   National  Guard  will   not  be   disarmed.       The  German 
troops  will  not  enter  the  city  during  the  armistice.     Paris  will 
be  re-victualled.     Freedom  of  movement  is  to  be  allowed  for 
the  elections.     I  may  add  that  ihe  forts  have  been  occupied 
to-day  by  our  troops,  and  I  think  the  elections  are  fixed  for 
the  8th,  and  the  meeting  of  the  Assembly  at  Bordeaux  is  to 
be  held  on  the  12th.     Food  has  absolutely  come  to  an  end  in 
Paris,   and  the  population   is  living  on  the  supplies  of  the 
German  army.     The  Assembly  will   decide  the  question   of 
the  w-ar,  or  fix  the  conditions  of  peace." 

To  Gambetta  and  his  colleagues  this  despatch  was  a  thunder- 
bolt. The  Army  of  the  East,  then,  was  excluded  from  the 
armistice,  the  lines  of  demarcation  had  been  arranged  at 
Versailles,  and  Jules  Favre  had  said  no  word  on  the  subject ! 

A  few  hours  later  Gambetta  received  from  Chanzy,  to 
whom  it  was  given  by  Prince  Frederick-Charles,  the  actual 

104 


THE   END   OF   THE   DELEGATION 

text  of  the  treaty.  Gambetta  at  once  telegraphed  to  General 
Clinchant,  and  to  Garibaldi  to  continue  hostilities.  But 
Manteuffel,  for  his  part,  had  no  intention  of  interrupting  his 
march  :  he  had  refused  Clinchant's  request  for  a  suspension  of 
hostilities  for  thirty-six  hours.  On  January  29  Clinchant  had 
still  thirty  hours  left  in  which  to  cross  the  Jura  and  approach 
the  Bresse;  but  those  thirty  hours  were  simply  thrown  away. 
The  Army  of  the  East,  obeying  orders,  had  remained 
stationary,  whereas  Manteuffel  had  been  told  to  carry  on  his 
operations  "until  they  produced  a  decisive  result."  Before 
the  armistice  the  campaign  had  failed,  but  the  army  had  not 
been  annihilated  :  it  was  the  armistice  that  gave  the  final  blow. 

Bismarck — treacherous  as  always,  and  proud  of  it — had  set  a 
trap  for  Jules  Favre.  In  Paris  there  were  still  hopes  of 
Bourbaki's  success;  and  it  was  to  avoid  interrupting  his 
advance  that  the  French  plenipotentiary  consented  to  leave  the 
Army  of  the  East  out  of  the  treaty  for  the  time  being.  His 
precautions  served  him  ill. 

As  for  the  lines  of  demarcation  in  the  other  invaded  depart- 
ments, Bismarck  insisted  that  they  should  be  fixed  at  Ver- 
sailles and  nowhere  else.  Now,  in  the  case  of  an  armistice, 
it  is  usual  to  leave  these  matters  to  be  settled  by  the  officers 
commanding  the  belligerent  forces  at  the  places  in  question. 
On  this  occasion  especially  the  rule  should  have  been  observed, 
since  the  person  acting  as  negotiator  had  been  in  a  besieged 
city  for  four  months,  and  could  not  know  how  the  armies 
outside  Paris  were  situated. The  line  of  demarcation  defined  at 
Versailles  in  these  circumstances  cost  us  two  arrondissements 
in  Calvados,  half  of  Indre-et-Loire  and  of  the  Loiret  with  the 
valleys  of  the  Cher  and  the  Vienne,  half  of  the  Yonne  and 
part  of  Morvan,  and  the  whole  of  the  left  bank  of  the 
Seine,  with  Saint-Val^ry-en-Caux,  Bolbec,  Lanquetot,  and 
Lillebonne. 

When  Gambetta  at  last  heard  of  these  stipulations  his  in- 
dignation and  grief  were  deep  and  bitter,  for  it  had  always 
been  understood  that  the  Government  in  Paris  should  treat  for 
Paris  alone  and  not  for  the  whole  of  France. — In  a  despatch 
he  had  sent  to  Paris  on  January  27  he  said  :   "  To  capitulate 

105 


GAMBETTA 

as  a  Government  you  have  neither  the  power  nor  the  right. 
Indeed,  having  been  surrounded  in  Paris  for  the  past  four 
months,  and  forced  by  famine  to  open  the  gates  to  the  enemy, 
you  can  only  negotiate  for  the  town,  and  merely  as  the  repre- 
sentatives of  the  town.  It  is  Paris  that  has  been  reduced,  in 
short,  not  France,  and  any  inclusion  of  other  territory  will 
end  in  your  giving  the  enemy  advantages  that  he  is  very  far 
from  having  won.  Anything  you  may  do,  over  and  above 
your  care  for  the  interests  of  Paris  itself,  will  be  null  and  void. 
...  As  for  us — the  central  authority,  and  the  actual  Govern- 
ment since  the  capitulation — our  way  is  clear.  We  must 
continue  the  war  till  we  are  rid  of  the  enemy- — that  is  the  task 
before  us." 

At  that  time  the  Government  in  Paris  was  of  Gambetta's 
opinion.  Jules  Ferry  wrote  to  him  on  December  15,  1870: 
"  If  the  enemy  should  subdue  Paris  by  famine  it  shall  be  made 
quite  plain  that  Paris  is  not  France  ;  and  he  will  find  no  one — I 
will  swear  to  that — w'illing  to  make  terms  with  him  for  France. 
Some  one  will  take  you  our  last  will  and  testament ;  but  we 
shall  bequeath  France  to  you  to  defend,  behind  the  Loire  or 
the  Garonne,  in  Touion  or  in  Cherbourg,  as  though  Paris 
did  not  exist."  Jules  Favre,  too,  said  on  January  9,  187 1  : 
'*  It  would  be  horrible  if  Paris  were  to  fall  on  the  very  eve 
of  deliverance.  However  that  may  be,  France  will  not  yield, 
and  whatever  our  fate  we  should  feel  we  had  a  share  in  her 
defence.  .  .  .  France  will  not  sheathe  her  sword  until  her 
cause  shall  have  triumphed."  On  the  14th,  General  Trochu 
wrote  to  Gambetta  :  "  I  think  with  you  that,  should  Paris  yield 
to  the  pressure  of  hunger,  France  and  the  Republic  should 
only  increase  their  exertions  and  carry  on  their  glorious 
struggle  to  the  death."  And  when  Jules  Favre,  on  the  21st, 
forty-eight  hours  after  the  Battle  of  Buzenval,  was  writing  to 
say  that  the  time  had  come  to  capitulate,  he  added  :  "  I  do  not 
know  what  the  conditions  will  be.  If  Prussia  w-ill  consent  not 
to  occupy  Paris  I  will  give  up  a  fort,  and  I  shall  ask  that  Paris 
may  only  be  subjected  to  the  payment  of  a  subsidy.  If  these 
proposals  be  rejected  we  shall  be  forced  to  surrender  at 
discretion.     In  that  case  it  is  probable,  supposing  we  are  not 

106 


THE   END   OF   THE   DELEGATION 

killed  in  the  threatened  riots,  that  we  shall  go  to  some  fortress 
in  Pomerania,  where  our  imprisonment  will  serve  to  encourage 
the  country  in  its  resistance." 

Thus,  twenty-four  hours  before  asking  Bismarck's  permis- 
sion to  go  to  Versailles,  and  there  negotiate  the  surrender  of 
Paris,  Jules  Favre — having  heard  on  the  previous  day  of 
Chanzy's  defeat  at  Le  Alans — was  picturing  himself  in 
Pomerania,  encouraging,  to  use  his  own  words,  the  country's 
resistance  by  his  imprisonrnent.  Gambetta  had  just  received 
this  despatch  when  he  heard  the  news  of  the  armistice. 

In  Le  Gouvernement  de  la  Defense  nationale  Jules  Simon 
lias  described  to  us  how  the  Government  in  Paris,  after  a  long 
debate,  was  led  to  modify  its  views.  At  first  all  were  agreed 
that  only  Paris  was  concerned,  that  neither  the  country  nor 
the  Delegation  must  be  involved.  But  then  arose  the  ques- 
tion,— supposing  the  enemy  were  to  refuse  this  condition,  what 
should  be  done?  Must  it  be  upheld,  at  the  cost  of  sur- 
rendering Paris  itself  unconditionally  ?  It  was  recognised 
that  this  w^as  impossible  :  an  attempt  must  first  be  made  to 
limit  the  armistice,  and  if  the  enemy  should  refuse,  the  point 
must  be  yielded.  There  next  arose  a  doubt  whether  the 
limitation  of  the  armistice  were  really  desirable.  A  treaty 
thus  limited  would  enable  the  powerful  army  then  investing 
Paris  to  march  against  such  of  the  French  troops  as  were  still 
in  the  field.  These  were  already  exhausted,  and  quite  in- 
capable of  contending  with  new  enemies.  Moreover,  an 
Assembly  was  necessary.  This  last  consideration  convinced 
the  generals  and  the  whole  Council  that  the  armistice  must 
apply  to  the  country  at  large. 

On  January  31  Gambetta  was  still  w^ithout  news  of  the 
member  of  the  Government  in  Paris  who  was  to  bring  him, 
according  to  the  telegram  of  the  28th,  instructions  with  regard 
to  convoking  the  electors.  Feeling  he  could  remain  passive 
no  longer,  he  published  this  proclamation  :  "  An  armistice  has 
been  signed  without  our  knowledge,  and  without  a  word  of 
warning  or  consultation.  Belated  information  has  reached  us 
of  the  culpable  weakness  with  which  departments  occupied  bv 
our  troops  have  been  delivered  into  the  hands  of  the  Prussians, 

107 


GAMBETTA 

while  we  are  pledged  to  remain  inactive  for  three  weeks.  Being 
the  delegates  of  the  Government  we  felt  it  right  to  obey,  as  a 
guarantee  of  moderation  and  good  faith,  and  to  carry  out 
the  rule  of  conduct  that  bids  us  remain  at  our  post  till  we  are 
relieved.  No  one  has  come  from  Paris,  however,  and  action  is 
imperative." 

This  proclamation  was  followed  by  a  Decree  arranging  the 
formalities  of  the  coming  elections,  and  disqualifying  as 
deputies  all  who  had  accepted,  between  December  2,  1851, 
and  September  4,  1870,  the  office  of  Minister,  senator,  coun- 
cillor of  state,  or  prefect,  or  the  title  of  official  candidate. 
This  measure  was  not  prompted  by  the  impulse  of  the  moment. 
Repeatedly  since  September,  1870,  whenever  there  was  any 
question  of  convoking  an  Assembly,  Gambetta  had  stoutly 
maintained  that  every  man  who  had  made  his  mark  under  the 
Empire  should  suffer  some  form  of  humiliation,  however  tem- 
|X)rary,  at  the  hands  of  universal  suffrage.  This  Decree,  which 
was  not  only  despotic  but  futile — since  of  the  768  deputies 
elected  an  enormous  proportion  were  Bonapartists — roused 
a  storm  of  protest.  Bismarck  seized  the  opportunity  to  meddle 
in  the  domestic  affairs  of  France.  According  to  the  terms  of 
the  armistice  the  Assembly  was  to  be  "  freely  elected."  Bis- 
marck forthwith  telegraphed  to  Gambetta:  "  In  the  name  of 
the  liberty  for  which  the  armistice  stipulates  in  the  elections,  I 
protest  against  the  measure  published  in  your  na^yne  for 
depriving  large  classes  of  French  citizens  of  the  right  to  be 
elected  to  the  Assembly.  Elections  carried  out  under  the 
pressure  of  tyrannical  force  cannot  confer  the  same  rights  as 
are  allowed  by  the  terms  of  the  armistice  to  deputies  elected  in 
freedom." 

Gambetta  informed  the  country  of  Bismarck's  telegram  in 
these  terms :  "The  insolent  claims  of  the  Prussian  Minister 
to  interfere  in  the  constitution  of  a  French  Assembly  is  a  most 
striking  justification  of  the  measures  taken  by  the  Government 
of  the  Republic.  The  lesson  will  not  be  thrown  away  on  those 
who  have  any  sense  of  national  honour."     (February  3.) 

Meanwhile,  on  February  i,  Jules  Simon,  the  envoy  from 
Paris,  arrived  at  Bordeaux,     lie  brought  with  him  a  Decree 

108 


THE   F.ND   OF   THE   DELEGATION 

passed  on  the  29th  by  the  central  Government,  defining  eligi- 
bility for  the  Assembly  in  accordance  with  the  Law  of  1849, 
and  thus  making  Gambelta's  measure  ineffectual.  Jules 
Simon,  in  the  name  of  the  sovereign  principle  of  universal 
suffrage,  demanded  the  suppression  of  the  disqualifying  clause. 
The  Delegation  refused  to  comply.  He  then  declared  that, 
in  virtue  of  the  full  powers  with  which  he  was  invested,  he 
would  annul  the  offending  Decree.  He  drew  up  a  proclama- 
tion, but  the  delegates  intercepted  it  and  prevented  it  from 
being  published. 

On  the  4th  a  meeting  was  held  at  the  Grand  Theatre,  with 
the  object  of  appointing  Gambetta  to  the  office  of  Dictator. 
He  refused  to  attend  the  meeting,  and  expressed  the 
strongest  disapproval  of  its  objects.  Above  all  things,  civil 
war  was  to  be  avoided. 

Jules  Simon  summoned  three  other  members  of  the  Govern- 
ment in  Paris — Garnier-Pag^s,  Emmanuel  Arago,  and 
Eugene  Pelletan — to  insure  a  majority  on  his  own  side. 
They  arrived  at  Bordeaux  on  the  6th ;  upon  which  Gambetta 
addressed  a  circular  to  the  prefects,  maintaining  his  views  on 
the  disqualifying  clause,  but  advising  them  to  proceed  with  the 
elections.  "  These  measures,"  he  said  of  the  action  taken  by 
the  Government  in  Paris,  "amount  not  only  to  strong  dis- 
approval, but  to  the  virtual  dismissal  of  the  Minister  of  the 
Interior  and  of  War.  The  divergence  in  opinion,  on  domestic 
and  foreign  affairs  alike,  is  so  plain  as  to  leave  no  room  for 
doubt.  It  is  my  duty  to  resign  my  position  as  a  member  of  a 
Government  with  whom  I  am  no  longer  in  accord,  either  in 
ideas  or  aspirations.  I  have  the  honour  to  inform  you  that  I 
have  sent  in  my  resignation  to-day." 

He  felt  the  parting  with  his  colleagues  very  deeply.  General 
Thoumas  has  described  the  scene  in  Paris,  Tours,  Bordeaux. 
"  Before  parting  from  you,  let  me  thank  you  for  the  devoted 
support  you  have  so  consistently  given  me,"  he  said.  **  As  for 
me,  I  have  played  my  part :  there  is  nothing  for  me  to  do  now 
but  to  retire."  "  Then  he  came  up  to  each  of  us  separately, 
and,  pressing  our  hands,  thanked  us  agam  most  warmly. 
Such    was   Gambetta's   farewell.       He   had   shown  immense 

109 


GAMBETTA 

energy  and  patriotism,  but  unfortunately  did  not  know  enough 
of  the  machinery  he  had  to  work.  1  liave  seen  him  since  then 
in  very  different  circumstances.  I  always  heard  him  speak 
of  some  future  day  of  reckoning  as  the  supreme  goal  of  his 
aspirations  and  hopes.  But  I  always  picture  him  on  that  cold 
January  day  when,  calm  outwardly,  but  in  a  voice  choked 
wfth  suppressed  sobs,  he  bade  us  a  despairing  farewell.  I 
confess  I  loved  that  man,  and  in  this  I  was  not  alone  !  " 


no 


CHAPTER    VIII 

WAR  A    OUTRANGE 

Gambetta's  Domestic  and  Forei^jn  I'olicy  during  the  War — The  Admiration  of  the 
Enemy — The  Prolonged  Resistance  did  not  Aggravate  the  Terms  of  Peact — It 
paved  the  Way  for  the  Future. 

Gambetta  once  said  at  Tours  :  "  I  should  feel  I  was  robbing 
the  country  if  I  were  to  take  one  hour,  or  even  one  minute, 
from  the  affairs  of  national  defence,  and  devote  it  to  domestic 
policy."  But  the  maintenance  of  unity  in  the  country  is  a 
matter  of  national  defence.  On  arriving  at  Tours  he  had 
found  the  authority  of  the  Government  treated  with  scant 
respect  at  several  places,  notably  at  Lyons  and  Marseilles.  At 
Lyons  the  municipal  council  had  voted  the  imposition  of  a  tax 
on  capital,  but  a  threat  of  dissolution  from  Gambetta  soon 
reduced  it  to  submission.  At  Marseilles  the  republican 
municipal  council  was  held  in  awe  by  a  departmental  com- 
mittee of  anarchical  tenets.  Esquiros  was  wavering.  Gam- 
betta, who  on  September  4  had  ordered  the  removal  of  the  red 
flag  that  adorned  the  prefecture,  telegraphed  to  him  :  "  Re- 
member, 1  beseech  you,  that  the  policy  of  the  Government  is 
national  defence,  and  nothing  but  defence."  And  when 
Esquiros  imprisoned  twelve  priests,  expelled  the  Jesuits, 
sequestrated  their  property,  and  proposed  to  apply  the  same 
treatment  to  other  communities,  Gambetta  wrote  :  "  It  is  with 
the  deepest  regret  that  I  see  people  neglecting  the  question  of 
defence  in  favour  of  other  matters.  As  regards  religious  com- 
munities do  not  forget  that,  though  it  may  be  possible  in 
extreme  cases  to  find  points  of  law  opposed  to  the  spirit  of 
federation — which  it  is  the  part  of  a  Republic  to  encourage — 
and  permitting  the  expulsion  of  Jesuits,  it  is  absolutely  neces- 

III 


GAMBETTA 

sary  to  respect  the  personal  liberty  of  individuals.  As  for 
foreigners  enrolled  in  the  Order  of  Jesuits,  they  can  go;  but 
in  the  case  of  Frenchmen,  the  moment  the  community  is  dis- 
solved your  power  over  them  ceases,  and  indeed  they  have 
every  right  to  count  on  your  protection." 

La  Gazette  du  Midi  having  published  a  manifesto  by  the 
Comte  de  Chambord  and  a  letter  from  the  Prince  de  Joinville, 
the  paper  was  suppressed  by  Esquiros.  "  I  hear,"  wrote 
Gambetta,  "that  the  office  of  the  Gazette  du  Midi  has  been 
raided  and  the  publication  of  the  paper  stopped.  Acts  of 
violence  against  liberty  and  property  cannot  possibly  be 
allowed  to  go  on.  I  count  on  you  to  take  prompt  measures  to 
safeguard  the  liberty  of  the  Press.  Of  course,  if  the  editors 
or  proprietors  of  the  paper  were  to  commit  any  act  contrary 
to  the  laws  of  the  Republic,  you  should  take  energetic 
measures  and  report  the  matter  to  me."  Esquiros  stood  to 
his  guns ;  and  Gambetta  answered  :  "The  Republic  owes  it  to 
itself  to  stand  firm  amid  all  the  strife  of  parties,  and  to  insist 
on  the  laws  being  respected,  but  on  nothing  more.  Firmness 
has  nothing  in  common  with  tyranny.  ...  It  is  out  of  the 
question  to  suspend  the  publication  of  a  paper.  If  individuals 
make  plots,  deal  severely  with  them,  but  leave  their  organ  free. 
It  is  a  question  on  which  I  cannot  yield."     (October  14.) 

Esquiros  sent  in  his  resignation ;  and  Gambetta  published 
two  Decrees. 

"  Touching  the  Decree  suppressing  the  Gazette  du  Mili," 
ran  the  first:  "Whereas  the  Government  of  the  Republic 
cannot  permit  newspapers  and  writers  to  suffer  penalties  save 
for  deliberate  violation  of  the  law;  Whereas,  on  the  other 
hand,  it  must  be  shown  that  the  Republic  is  the  only  form  of 
government  that  can  preserve  the  liberty  of  the  Press  in  its 
entirety,  and  since  it  is  not  for  those  who  have  always  de- 
manded that  liberty  when  in  opposition  to  limit  or  mutilate  it; 
it  is  decreed  :  The  Order  issued  by  the  Administration  of  the 
Bouches-du-Rhone  suppressing  the  Gazette  du  Midi  is 
annulled,  and  the  paper  is  authorised  to  appear  henceforward." 

The  second  was  as  follows  :  — 

"  Touching  the  prefect's  order  expelling  the  members  of 

112 


WAR   A   OUTRANGE 

unauthorised  religious  commuiHties,  and  sequestrating  their 
property  :  Whereas,  though  the  community  may  be  legally 
dissolved,  the  personal  liberty  of  the  French  citizens  who 
compose  it  cannot  be  infringed,  nor  their  right  of  residence  in 
France  violated ;  it  is  decreed  :  All  orders  of  expulsion  apply- 
ing to  any  French  member  of  an  unauthorised  religious 
community  are  null,  void,  and  not  to  be  enforced." 

Great  was  the  excitement  in  Marseilles.  The  Ligue  du 
Midi  extended  the  order  dissolving  the  local  community  of 
Jesuits  to  all  the  communities  in  the  department.  Violent 
demonstrations  took  place,  and  pressure  was  brought  to  bear 
on  Gambetta  from  every  quarter.  "  I  am  receiving  one  depu- 
tation after  another,"  he  wrote  to  Jules  Favre;  "but  I  shall 
not  yield  in  a  matter  of  principle."  And  he  appointed  Gent  to 
succeed  Esquiros. 

Like  Danton,  whom  the  horror  of  invasion  and  the  contact 
with  grim  reality  transformed  into  a  statesman  and  a  patriot, 
he  sought  for  unity  before  all  things,  and  condemned  every- 
thing that  tended  to  discord.  He  refused  to  countenance 
contentions  of  any  kind,  either  religious  or  social. 

His  policy  in  the  matter  of  municipal  councils  was  entirely 
dictated  by  the  needs  of  national  defence.  On  September  7  he 
addressed  a  circular  to  the  prefects.  "  Above  all,"  he  told 
them,  "you  should  make  it  a  rule,  as  far  as  you  can,  to 
preserve  the  existing  town-councils,  and  turn  them  to  the  best 
possible  account  in  the  cause  of  national  defence."  Very  few 
changes  were  made  in  these  councils. 

The  departmental  and  district  councils  were  treated  in  the 
same  way,  until  the  decree  of  dissolution  was  passed  on  De- 
cember 25.  By  that  time  the  difficulties  arising  from  the  war  had 
greatly  increased,  party-spirit  had  grown  aggressive,  and  there 
was  less  possibility  of  combating  it.  Gambetta  took  drastic 
measures.  He  called  upon  his  colleagues  to  "  use  the  knife 
ruthlessly,"  and  to  "  sweep  away  thege  creatures  of  the  fallen 
Monarchy,  who  are  openly  conspiring  against  the  Republic 
and  the  safety  of  France." 

He  has  been  blamed  for  forbidding  the  Prince  de  Joinville 
to  serve  in  the  Army  of  the  Loire.     The  question  arose  on  the 

113  1 


GAMBETTA 

very  morrow  of  the  fall  of  the  Empire,  and  the  Government 
was  unanimous  in  its  refusal  :  it  was  impossible  for  Gambetta 
to  override,  in  December,  the  decision  made  four  months 
earlier  by  the  Government  he  represented. 

Immediately  on  the  fall  of  the  Empire,  while  the  enemy's 
troops  were  pouring  into  the  country,  he  had  been  obliged  to 
organise  the  prefectorial  administration  in  every  corner  of 
France.  Men  were  suddenly  thrust  into  positions  that  are 
usually  only  attained  after  long  apprenticeship  in  lower  grades. 
Not  all  his  appointments,  certainly,  were  above  criticism; 
there  were  cases  of  excess  in  zeal,  failure  in  tact,  and  lack  of 
experience;  there  were  ardent  partisans  who  thought  more  of 
their  own  aims  than  of  the  public  interest.  It  may  be  noted, 
however,  that  among  the  prefects  he  appointed  there  were 
many  men  who  afterwards  filled  the  highest  offices  of  the 
State :  Sadi  Carnot,  Challemel-Lacour,  Antonin  Dubost, 
De  Freycinet,  Paul  Bert,  Ricard,  Allain-Targ6;  Tirman,  who 
became  Governor-General  of  Algeria;  Massicault,  afterwards 
Resident  General  in  Tunisia;  Camescasse,  who  became  Prefect 
of  Police;  Edmond  Valentin,  the  intrepid  Prefect  of 
Strasburg ;  Anatole  de  La  Forge,  the  gallant  defender  of 
St.  Quentin ;  Alphonse  Gent,  who  restored  order  in  the  South, 
and  a  great  number  of  men  who  have  since  represented  in  our 
Assemblies  the  departments  whose  affairs  they  then  ad- 
ministered. Ranc  was  at  the  head  of  the  Police.  With  few 
exceptions,  every  man  was  worthy  of  his  office,  and  played  his 
part  in  maintaining  order. 

When  Gambetta  arrived  at  Bordeaux  on  December  30  he 
said  with  some  pride  :  "  It  will  always  be  held  greatly  to  the 
credit  of  the  Government  of  National  Defence  that  it  had  both 
the  will  and  the  power  to  grant  a  remarkable  amount  of  liberty, 
in  the  midst  of  the  most  overwhelming  crisis  that  a  nation 
has  ever  endured."  On  the  following  day  he  again  pro- 
claimed "  respect  for  liberty— liberty  even  to  slander  and 
insult."  And  a  few  years  later,  when  he  was  again  in 
Bordeaux,  on  January  13,  1876,  he  cried  :  "  It  was  here- 
driven  back  and  held  at  bay  by  the  enemy,  with  forty-three 
departments  invaded  and  ravaged,  with  the  capital  besieged 

114 


WAR   A   OUTRANGE 

and  blockaded,  with  Europe  hostile  or  at  best  contemptuous, 
with  party-spirit  raging  round  it — that  the  Government  of 
National  Defence  held  its  own.  And  with  what  weapons? 
The  rights  of  the  public.  For  not  a  single  liberty  of  the 
public,  neither  the  liberty  of  the  Press,  nor  the  right  to  hold 
meetings,  nor  the  right  to  form  association*? — not  one  of  them 
was  ever  attacked  or  violated.     So  much  for  dictatorship  !  " 

This  testimony  that  he  bore  to  the  justice  of  his  own 
domestic  policy  during  the  war  has  long  been  echoed  by  all 
parties,  and  by  all  the  most  eminent  and  impartial  witnesses, 
with  regard  to  his  foreign  policy  at  the  same  time. 

In  September  and  October  Thiers  had  begged  the  Govern- 
ments of  other  countries  to  intervene,  but,  for  reasons  we  have 
already  given,  he  met  with  the  same  answer  everywhere  :  in 
London,  Vienna,  St.  Petersburg,  and  Florence.  The  foreign 
Governments  treated  him  with  the  most  perfect  courtesy,  but 
firmly  declined  to  take  action. 

On  October  29  Prince  Gortschakoff  took  advantage  of  the 
European  situation  to  evade  some  of  the  results  of  Russia's 
defeat  in  the  Crimea.  He  instructed  all  the  diplomatic  agents 
of  Russia  to  repudiate  the  treaty  of  1856,  and  especially  the 
clause  by  which  the  Black  Sea  was  made  neutral.  The  various 
Chancelleries  exchanged  views  on  the  subject,  and  it  was 
decided  that  a  conference  should  be  held  in  London  to  settle 
the  question.  Bismarck,  fearing  that  the  conflict  between 
France  and  Germany  would  be  brought  into  the  discussion 
by  the  French  envoys,  stipulated  that  the  conference  should 
concern  itself  with  nothing  but  the  navigation  of  the  Black 
Sea. 

Jules  Favre  had  sent  to  Tours,  to  superintend  foreign  affairs, 
the  Comte  de  Chaudordy,  formerly  private  secretary  to 
Drouyn  de  Lhuys,  a  keen,  shrewd,  able  negotiator,  educated  in 
the  best  school  of  diplomacy.  Chaudordy  took  with  him  some 
assistants  of  notable  talent,  among  them  a  young  secretary  who 
afterwards  became  a  famous  historian,  Albert  Sorel.  Gam- 
betta  perceived  Chaudordy's  diplomatic  ability,  and  gave  him 
his  entire  confidence.     The  part  that  France  might  play  at  the 

115  I  2 


GAMBETTA 

conference  was  clearly  apparent  to  these  two  men  :  it  was  an 
opportunity  for  her  to  escape  from  her  terrible  teie-d-tete  with 
Prussia.  Chaudordy,  in  the  name  of  the  Delegation,  wrote 
repeatedly  to  Jules  Favre,  urging  him  to  go  to  London. 

Jules  Favre,  at  first,  failed  to  see  any  reason  for  attending 
the  congress.  To  leave  Paris  at  the  height  of  the  bombard- 
ment, and  forsake  his  friends  in  their  hour  of  most  acute 
danger,  would  surely  be  an  act  of  the  basest  desertion  !  He 
told  no  one  of  Chaudordy's  first  letters,  and  consulted  none 
of  his  colleagues. 

Gambetta  then  tried  his  own  powers  of  persuasion.  In  a 
despatch  of  December  31,  which  reached  Jules  Favre  on 
January  9,  he  said  :  "It  rests  with  you  to  enlarge  the  very 
limited  programme  of  the  conference;  and  no  one  will  dare  to 
stop  you  when  you  speak  of  Paris,  and  the  war  with  France. 
No  protest  from  Prussia  will  have  any  power  to  stop 
you.  .  .  ."  And  again  on  the  16th:  "You  can  do  it,  and 
you  should.  I  attach  the  same  importance,  in  its  own  way,  to 
your  presence  in  London  as  to  an  immediate  sortie  from  the 
capital  by  General  Trochu.  After  all,  in  both  cases  it  is  the 
country's  salvation  that  is  at  stake." 

When  some  more  letters  from  Chaudordy  reached  Paris  on 
the  17th,  Jules  Favre  laid  them  before  the  Council,  and  it  was 
decided  that  he  should  be  present  at  the  conference.  But 
various  incidents,  in  which  Bismarck's  hand  was  apparent, 
led  the  Government  to  change  its  opinion  :  Paris  was  at  the 
end  of  its  resources,  and  its  fate  would  be  decided  before  the 
French  envoy  could  reach  England. 

If  we  ask  whether  France  would  have  met  with  any  supjxvrt 
in  London,  we  may  find  the  answer  to  our  question  in  Lord 
Granville's  despatch  of  February  4  to  Lord  Lyons  :  "  If  the 
French  plenipotentiary  were  to  introduce  the  question  of  a 
peace  at  the  conference,  I  should  have  no  choice  but  to  call  him 
to  order;  but  if,  at  the  end  of  the  conference,  or  after  one  of  the 
sittings,  he  should  wish  to  take  advantage  of  the  plenipoten- 
tiaries' presence  to  lay  any  particular  questions  before  them, 
there  would  be  no  need  for  me  to  interfere  :  each  plenif>oten- 
tiary  would  have  to  act  as  he  thought  right,  or  in  accordance 

116 


WAR   A   OUTRANGE 

with  his  instructions;  for  my^tli,  I  should  not  fail  to  pay 
attention  to  anythin*^  that  might  be  said  to  me  by  the  French 
plenipotentiary."  It  is  obvious  that  a  clever  diplomatist  or 
a  skilled  orator  might  turn  this  suggestion  to  excellent  account. 
In  any  case  the  attempt  must  be  made  :  anything  was  better 
than  absence  or  isolation.  Failing  Jules  F"avre,  Gambetta  and 
Chaudordy  had  thought  of  Thiers,  and  even  of  Guizot.  It  is 
possible  that  Gambetta  had  Chaudordy  himself  in  his  mind. 

On  December  i6  Chaudordy  requested  England  and  the 
other  powers  to  support  one  or  other  of  these  three  proposals  ; 
either  an  armistice  and  the  re-victualling  of  Paris,  to  enable 
the  general  elections  to  take  place ;  or  the  conclusion  of  peace 
without  the  cession  of  any  territory ;  or  the  meeting  of  a 
congress  that  might  prevail  on  France  to  make  greater  sac- 
rifices and  thus  end  the  unequal  struggle.  Lord  Granville  at 
once  laid  these  proposals  before  Bismarck,  but  on  the  19th 
the  Chancellor  answered  that  public  feeling  in  Germany 
forbade  him  to  consent  to  any  of  these  suggestions,^ 

In  recording  Chaudordy's  principal  diplomatic  activities 
we  must  on  no  account  forget  his  protest,  on  November  29, 
against  the  German  atrocities.  The  horrors  committed  by  the 
Germans  in  1870  were  less  numerous  than  those  of  1914, 
because  the  war  was  shorter  and  extended  over  a  smaller  area, 
but  their  nature  was  the  same.  In  1870  there  was,  indeed, 
an  even  more  serious  crime.  The  German  generals,  pro- 
fessing to  forget  that  in  1813,  in  obedience  to  a  Prussian  order 
of  April  2^y  "  the  Landsturm  wore  no  uniforms  or  special 
badges,  since  these  uniforms  or  badges  would  cause  them  to  be 
recognised  by  the  enemy,"  announced  at  the  opening  of  hos- 
tilities that  "our  jrancs-tireurs  would  be  shot  without  trial." 
This  practice  continued  throughout  the  war.  An  official 
proclamation  was  published  in  the  Ardennes  on  December  10, 
1870,  by  General  Senden,  Chief  of  Staff.  "Any  mdividual," 
it  ran,  "  who  is  not  a  member  of  the  regular  army  nor  of  the 
militia,  and  is  found  carrying  a  weapon,  whether  a  jranc-tireur 
or  known  by  any  other  name,  will,   if  taken   in  any  act  of 

^  Correspondence  respecting   War  between  France  and  Germany,   1870-1871    No 
317,  No.  320. 

117 


GAMBETTA 

hostility  against  our  troops,  be  regarded  as  a  traitor  and 
hanged  or  shot  without  further  trial.  Whenever  franc s-tireurs 
appear  in  a  commune  the  Mayor  must  inform  the  commandant 
of  the  nearest  Prussian  contingent.  .  .  .  Houses  and  villages 
sheltering  francs-tireurs  will,  if  the  troops  be  attacked,  be 
burned  or  bombarded." 

Chaudordy  scourged  the  Germans  before  the  eyes  of  the 
whole  world  for  their  shameless  exactions,  both  in  money  and 
kind,  their  summary  executions  of  harmless  citizens,  their 
barbarities,  their  willing  adoption  of  the  most  savage  methods 
of  warfare  in  order  to  terrorise  the  population.  He  gave  a 
long  list  of  authenticated  facts  proving  that  the  enemy  had 
been  guilty  of  violence  and  devastation  in  all  their  most  odious 
forms  :  robbery,  pillage,  rape,  murder,  massacre  and  mutila- 
tion of  hostages,  of  the  wounded,  of  doctors,  old  men,  women 
and  children.  At  Chateaudun,  for  instance,  sick  persons  were 
shot,  and  some  even  burnt  alive  in  their  beds  and  pulled  out 
of  the  flames  blackened  and  charred ;  hundreds  of  people  of 
every  age  and  condition,  invalids,  old  men,  and  lads,  were 
seized  at  random  and  sent  as  prisoners  to  Germany ;  235  houses 
were  drenched  with  oil  and  burnt. 

To  these  examples  must  be  added  the  bombardment  of 
cathedrals,  as  at  Strasburg,  of  museums,  libraries,  schools, 
ambulances,  hospitals — the  Val-de-Grace,  the  Salpetri^re, 
the  Charity,  and  others — and  the  burning  of  open  towns. 
It  was  always  the  same  "  system  of  terror,"  always  the  same 
justification  of  Goethe's  words:  "The  German  is  born  cruel, 
but  civilisation  will  make  him  ferocious."  And  Chaudordy 
closed  his  indictment  with  this  accusation  :  *'  These  horrors 
will  make  the  present  war  the  disgrace  of  our  century." 

The  Germans  have  never  made  war  in  any  other  fashion. 
They  were  equally  ferocious  in  1814  and  1815.  Their  military 
methods,  like  their  diplomatic  methods,  have  remained  the 
same  through  all  the  ages.  But  each  time  France,  in  her 
generosity,  has  forgotten. 

And  now  let  us  estimate,  as  far  as  possible,  the  part  played 
by  Gambetta  in  this  war. 

118 


WAR  A  OUTRANGE 

As  Minister  of  War  he  accomplished,  with  the  help  of 
Freycinet,  in  the  course  of  four  months,  a  work  so  colossal 
that  it  is  one  of  the  great  achievements  of  history.  Finan- 
cially, France  already  had  the  advantage  :  these  men  made  her 
superior  also  in  numbers  and  means  of  defence.  They  would 
have  won  the  war  for  her,  had  not  Germany  possessed  more 
seasoned  troops  and  more  experienced  generals.  Moreover, 
there  never  lived  a  more  inspired  orator  :  his  daring,  and  his 
deeply  moving  pathos  could  work  miracles,  could  rouse  the 
soul  of  an  entire  people.  It  was  France  herself  who  spoke 
with  his  lips.  Nothing  can  rob  him  of  this  double  title  to 
fame  and  honour. 

The  passage  of  time  was  not  needed  to  win  him  recognition 
abroad — and  there  is  a  famous  saying  which  describes  the 
foreigner  as  "  a  sort  of  contemporary  posterity." 

Five  days  after  the  surrender  of  Metz,  Moltke  wrote  to 
General  von  Stiehle  :  "  We  must  do  justice  to  the  great  re- 
sources of  this  country,  and  to  the  patriotism  of  the  French. 
After  seeing  her  entire  army  taken  prisoner,  France  has  con- 
trived in  a  very  short  time  to  put  into  the  field  a  new  army 
that  is  deserving  of  our  whole  attention."  And  in  December 
he  wrote  :  "The  German  army,  by  operations  of  unparalleled 
success,  captured  the  whole  of  the  forces  that  the  enemy  put  in 
the  field  at  the  beginning  of  the  war.  France,  none  the  less, 
found  means  to  create,  within  a  period  of  barely  three  months, 
a  new  army  that  was  still  larger  than  the  first.  The  resources 
of  the  enemy's  country,  which  are  apparently  almost  in- 
exhaustible, might  make  the  rapid  and  decisive  success  of  our 
arms  a  matter  of  doubt,  but  for  the  fact  that  on  our  side  the 
country's  effort  is  no  less  strenuous."  The  records  of  the 
Prussian  General  Headquarters  show  signs  of  his  surprise  on 
every  page.  "This  conflict  has  given  us  so  many  causes  for 
amazement  from  the  military  point  of  view,"  he  says,  "that  we 
shall  have  to  devote  long  years  of  peace  to  the  study  of  the 
subject." 

In  1874  Colmar  von  der  Goltz,  at  that  time  Chief  of  the 
Staff,  published  an  account  of  Gambetta  and  his  armies  in  the 
Preussische  Jahrhucher.     "Gambetta,"  he  said,   "  had  given 

119 


GAMBETTA 

evidence  of  the  most  brilliant  qualities  as  an  organiser  :  in  a 
short  time  he  had  united  all  parties,  aroused  the  masses,  and 
used  his  immense  will-power  to  direct  all  the  forces  at  his 
command  towards  a  single  goal,  war  a  outrance.  No 
one  can  deny  that  in  these  circumstances  he  showed 
great  courage  and  a  very  uncommon  degree  of  moral 
force.  The  immense  army  he  raised,  armed,  clothed,  and 
organised,  speaks  volumes  for  his  genius.  He  accomplished 
this  gigantic  task  in  a  shorter  time  than  any  organiser  before 
him  has  ever  required.  ...  It  is  unjust  to  accuse  him  of 
obtaining  these  results  by  sacrificing  quite  disproportionate 
sums  of  money  :  for  the  finances  were  most  ably  administered 
at  Tours  and  Bordeaux,  and,  if  the  circumstances  be  taken 
into  account,  by  no  means  extravagandy.  ...  As  for  the 
attacks  and  suspicions  to  which  Gambetta's  personal  honour 
has  sometimes  been  subjected,  they  are  not  worth  considering. 
In  this  he  only  shared  the  fate  common  to  fallen  greatness 
everywhere.  When  the  giant  is  overthrown,  the  pygmies  can 
fearlessly  trample  on  his  body.  Anyone  who  has  seen,  if  but 
for  a  moment,  this  man's  nature  reflected  in  his  open  counten- 
ance will  know  that  he  was  incapable  of  saving  a  sack  of  gold 
from  the  shipwreck  of  his  country.  .   .  . 

"  History  will  bring  his  greatness  to  light  and  will  wipe 
out  the  shadows  and  stains.  Two  claims  to  immortal  fame 
will  be  allowed  him.  The  first  is  that  he  restored  France  to 
a  sense  of  her  own  power  immediately  after  a  fall  so  great  as 
hers.  The  second  is  that  he  paved  the  way  for  a  moral  re- 
generation, of  which  one  cannot  deny  the  results  in  France 
to-day,  by  forcibly  impelling  his  compatriots  towards  an  ideal 
goal.  If  ever — which  God  forbid  ! — our  country  should  suffer 
a  defeat  such  as  France  suffered  at  Sedan,  I  trust  ihere  may 
be  a  man  like  Gambetta  to  inspire  her  with  the  spirit  of 
resistance  carried  to  its  utmost  limit." 

Louis  Schneider,  William  L's  biographer,  writes  thus  in  his 
Aus  meinem  Leben,  which  the  monarch  himself  read  and 
annotated:  "The  Emperor  always  listened  with  special  in- 
terest to  any  account  of  Gambetta's  marvellous  activity,  and 
on  several  occasions  spoke  of  him,  as  well  as  of  Generals 

120 


WAR   A  OUTRANGE 

Chanzy  and  Faidherbe,  with  great  respect.  Later  on,  I  was 
one  day  showing  him  at  Berlin  a  collection  of  illustrations 
which  very  strikingly  applied  the  best  known  passages  of 
Schiller's  Jun^frau  von  Orleans  to  the  war  with  France,  when 
I  came  to  the  line  :  '  Can  I  make  armies  spring  from  the  earth 
by  stamping  on  the  ground?'  'All  the  same,'  said  the 
Emperor,  '  I  know  some  one  who  can  do  that — and  that 
is  Gambetta.'  And  one  day  he  remarked  to  the  Crown 
Prince:  "Remember,  my  son,  that  if  by  the  grace  of 
God  our  successes  in  the  great  war  astounded  the  world,  there 
were,  none  the  less,  times  when  not  even  all  our  good  fortune 
saved  me  from  doubts  of  the  final  result.'  " 

On  the  other  hand,  Gambetta  received  more  than  one  tribute 
from  his  political  opponents  at  home.  On  December  3,  1870, 
Guizot  wrote  these  words  to  the  Government  of  National 
Defence.  "Many  people  are  not  as  grateful  to  you  as  you 
deserve.  You  believed — though  nearly  all  the  world  was 
sceptical — that  Paris  would  make  an  heroic  defence,  and  that 
in  the  provinces  there  would  be  an  outburst  of  patriotic 
enthusiasm.  You  have  carried  on  the  war  without  any  appeal 
to  revolutionary  passions,  and  while  advocating  peace,  pro- 
vided it  were  neither  shameful  nor  futile,  you  have  rallied  all 
the  available  forces  of  the  country  and  produced  armies  that 
have  proved  their  efficiency.  You  have  behaved  like  men  of 
tine  feeling  and  like  good  citizens." 

It  was  at  a  later  date  that  the  Due  Albert  de  Broglie  wrote  : 
"In  the  matter  of  patriotic  energy  the  France  of  1870  was  in 
no  way  inferior  to  her  predecessor  of  1792.  The  France  of 
our  day  was  indeed  superior  in  one  respect  to  the  France 
whose  glory  she  inherited  :  her  resistance  was  unanimous. 
Political,  social  and  religious  animosities,  which  cut  so 
deeply  athwart  the  first  ordeal,  on  the  second  occasion  were 
silent  in  the  presence  of  the  enemy.  Therefore  the  genera- 
tion that  will  soon  have  passed  away  will  have  a  place  in 
history  by  the  side  of  the  generation  that  preceded  it.  The 
Greek  orator  swore  by  the  memory  of  the  warriors  of  Platasa 
arid  Marathon  that  Athens  had  been  worthy  of  herself  at 
Chaeronea,  and    we,  too,    can    say    that    those    who   fell    at 

121 


GAMBETTA 

Jemmapes  and  Fleurus  found  worthy  successors  in  the  heroic 
dead  of  Loigny  and  Champigny." 

Albert  de  Mun  has  recorded,  not  without  pathos,  the 
enthusiasm  and  emotion  of  the  oflficers  of  the  Metz  garrison, 
when  they  heard  at  Mainz,  on  their  way  to  captivity  in  Ger- 
many, that  the  struggle  was  not  over.  "  Suddenly  we  pic- 
tured the  whole  country  under  arms,  convulsed  in  one  gigan- 
tic effort.  Paris  stood  firm,  the  provinces  were  arming.  How- 
it  comforted  our  bleeding  hearts  !  Whose  were  the  hands 
that  kept  the  flag  flying?  We  did  not  care  to  know,  since 
at  least  it  was  flying  still,  though  ours  were  captured.  Only 
those  who  experienced,  after  the  horrible  nightmare,  the  over- 
powering reaction  of  this  unexpected  awakening,  can  measure 
the  depth  of  our  emotion.  We  yielded  to  it  almost  proudly, 
and  while  we  felt  no  confidence  in  victory  the  hope  arose  in  us 
of  some  future  resurrection." 

The  great  lack  in  this  war  was  a  military  leader.  Chanzy 
was  not  in  command  of  an  army  sufficiently  early  :  by  the 
time  he  appeared  on  the  horizon  of  our  misfortunes  the  right 
moment  had  gone  by.  At  the  trial  of  Bazaine,  Bourbaki  thus 
expressed  himself:  "  The  moment  I  arrived  at  Tours  I  told 
the  Government  how  useless  I  considered  iheir  efforts.  I 
was  the  better  judge,  I  said,  because  fighting  was  my  pro- 
fession ;  and  they  would  add  to  the  misfortunes  of  France  by 
being  beaten  almost  disgracefully." 

Was  Bourbaki,  then,  the  only  one  whose  profession  was 
fighting?  What  of  Chanzy,  Faidherbe,  Jaur^guiberry, 
Jaures,  Gougeard,  De  Sonis,  De  Colomb,  Cremer,  Clinchant, 
Lecointe,  Derroja,  Rebillard,  Du  Bessol,  Borel,  Billot,  Ser6 
de  Rivieres,  Du  Temple,  Pallu  de  la  Barri^re,  Penhoat, 
De  Jevigny,  Saussier,  Denfert-Rochereau — all  the  generals  and 
admirals  who  fought,  not  only  w-ith  the  valour  of  the  soldier, 
but  with  the  faith  of  a  leader?  And  can  it  be  said  that  the 
troubles  of  France  were  increased  by  those  who,  though  not 
soldiers  by  profession,  placed  their  hearts'  blood  at  the 
disposal  of  France — Cathelineau,  Bouill^,  Charette? 

But  at  Sedan  and  Metz  we  were  bereft  of  many  officers,  and 

122 


WAR   A   OUTRANGE 

Gambetta  complained  that  the  new  officers  were  inadequate 
in  numbers  and  had  no  power  over  their  men.  In  a  decree 
of  January  i6  he  taxed  them  with  not  living  the  soldier's  life 
as  much  as  they  should. 

The  troops  fought  bravely  enough,  but  had  neither  the 
endurance  nor  the  hardihood  that  time  alone  can  give.  Gam- 
betta thought  they  were  lacking  in  strength  and  staying- 
power;  he  likened  them  to  a  hastily  made  piece  of  clockwork 
that  will  only  act  once,  and  must  be  wound  up  and  set  going 
again  at  regular  intervals.  Old  regiments  were  very  scarce. 
Individual  courage  does  not  take  the  place  of  collective 
strength,  which  nothing  but  time  can  produce.  Victories  are 
won  in  times  of  peace  as  much  as  in  war.  After  Sedan  our 
superiority  in  numbers  was  sometimes  enormous,  as  at 
Beaune-la-Rolande,  where  we  were  six  to  one ;  but  we  had 
none  of  the  previous  training  and  organisation,  nor  yet  the 
able  leadership,  that  constituted  the  enemy's  strength.  '"  If," 
said  Bismarck  to  Jules  Favre,  "  you  could  make  a  soldier  by 
arming  an  ordinary  citizen,  it  would  be  folly  to  devote  the 
greater  part  of  the  public  funds  to  the  maintenance  of  a  stand- 
ing army.  In  that  lies  the  real  advantage,  and  you  are 
defeated  because  you  failed  to  recognise  it." 

And  yet — and  yet — in  spite  of  all  these  disadvantages, 
France  was  not  without  her  victories  in  those  days,  and  her 
arms  were  not  altogether  inglorious  at  Coulmiers,  at  Chateau- 
dun,  at  St.  Ouentin,  at  Josnes,  at  Vendome,  at  Pont-Noyelles, 
at  Bapaume,  and  at  Villersexel  !  And  of  the  defence  of 
Belfort  and  other  fortified  towns  she  may  well  be  proud  ! 

These  successes,  moreover,  were  won  in  spite  of  the  evil 
fate  that  dogged  us  so  relentlessly,  and  turned  every  oppor- 
tunity into  a  mishap  :  the  capitulation  of  Bazaine  at  a  time 
when  only  a  few  days'  delay  w^ould  have  enabled  the  Army  of 
the  Loire  to  raise  the  blockade  of  Paris  before  the  arrival  of 
Prince  Frederick-Charles;  the  blunders  that  nullified  the  vic- 
tory at  Coulmiers;  the  delays  after  that  battle:  the  defeat  at 
Orleans,  which  might  have  been  avoided  if  the  plans  for  the 
sortie  had  been  entrusted  to  more  than  one  balloon,  and  the 
news  had  arrived  in  time  for  the  Army  of  the  Loire  to  prepare 

123 


GAMBETTA 

and  concentrate  its  forces  and  all  the  army  corps  had  made 
a  determined  advance  simuhaneously ;  the  long  delays  of  the 
eastern  campaign  in  difficult  country  and  a  peculiarly  hard 
winter;  the  deplorable  terms  of  the  armistice;  the  obligation 
of  the  delegates  of  the  Government  in  Paris  to  subordinate 
everything  to  the  deliverance  of  the  capital ;  the  disagreement 
between  the  Delegation  and  the  Commander-in-Chief;  and 
the  intervention  in  critical  moments  of  the  civil  authorities, 
though  even  they  could  not,  at  an  hour's  notice,  supply  the 
strategical  science  of  a  Moltke.  And  added  to  all  these  cir- 
cumstances was  the  indifference  of  the  European  Powers, 
who  only  considered  their  immediate  interests,  and  failed  to 
see  that  by  permitting  the  growth  of  an  ambitious  and  greedy 
neighbour,  intoxicated  with  success,  they  were  making  ready 
for  themselves  a  most  terrible  awakening. 

It  would  be  easy  enough  to  fill  a  pamphlet  with  the  mistakes 
of"  the  civil  authorities.  Indeed,  it  has  been  done.  It  cannot 
be  maintained,  as  Gambetta  maintained  before  the  Committee 
of  Inquiry  of  the  National  Assembly,  that  they  did  not  inter- 
fere in  the  military  operations ;  that  is  refuted  by  his  own 
despatches  and  by  M.  de  Freycinet's  narrative.  The  inter- 
ference was  not  always  fortunate.  It  would  be  easy  to  adduce 
instances  of  excessive  confidence,  and  even — why  shrink  from 
saying  it  ? — of  presumption.  Richelieu  at  Arras  refused  to 
answer  the  marshals,  when  they  asked  him  questions  on 
matters  outside  his  province.  But,  after  all,  if  these  men  had 
been  less  assured  of  themselves,  would  they  have  achieved 
so  much  in  so  short  a  time  ?  It  is  easy  to  blame  them  for  their 
mistakes,  and  their  political  opponents  have  not  failed  to  do 
so,  but  their  mistakes  should  not  blind  impartial  eyes  to  the 
greatness  of  their  work.  Posterity  forgets  the  former,  and 
remembers  only  the  latter ;  but  contemporaries  stand  too  near 
to  see  clearly.  Facts  alone  do  not  make  history.  In  the 
physical  world  distance  diminishes  the  apparent  size  of  objects 
and  men,  but  in  the  moral  world  it  makes  them  bulk  larger. 
History  sees  only  the  wide  views  and  the  great  high  roads. 
As  time  passes  on  its  way  the  dust  settles  and  the  air  clears. 
Moreover,  the  leaders  of  nations  are  not  only  what  they  are, 

124 


WAR   A   OUTRANGE 

but  also  what  they  seem.  Truth  is  not  realism;  truth  is  a 
compromise  between  the  real  and  the  ideal.  A  mere  repro- 
duction of  the  real  may  be  a  great  injustice,  nay,  a  betrayal. 
One  feature  may  suffice  for  the  portrait  of  a  man,  but  it  may, 
on  the  other  hand,  give  a  very  inaccurate  idea  of  him.  A 
detail  that  gives  one  man's  character  in  a  single  stroke  is  quite 
insignificant  in  another  man.  The  kodak  reproduces  move- 
ments that  the  eye  cannot  see,  and  thereby  destroys  the  har- 
mony of  the  whole  picture.  But  in  the  end  the  true  outline  of 
a  man's  character  is  revealed  to  the  minds  of  the  people. 
This  is  what  Renan  called  the  psychological  miracle;  and  this 
synthetic  reconstruction  in  the  popular  mind,  far  more  than 
any  analysis,  produces  a  complete  whole.  The  passing 
generations  credit  men  with  all  that  their  own  imagination, 
and  hopes,  and  faith  have  brought  to  them ;  they  kneel  at  the 
shrines  of  great  memories  :  fame  is  a  religion. 

In  any  case,  there  are  complaints  that  can  be  definitely  met 
and  refuted.  It  has  been  said,  for  instance,  that  Gambetta 
aspired  to  the  office  of  dictator.  It  was  he,  on  the  contrary, 
who  urged  the  election  of  an  Assembly  rather  than  the 
appointment  of  a  Delegation  at  Tours.  Up  to  the  last 
moment  he  refused  to  leave  Paris.  And  his  first  action,  on 
reaching  Tours,  was  to  offer  the  Ministry  of  War  to  a  soldier. 

It  has  been  asserted  that  the  protraction  of  the  war  rendered 
the  terms  of  peace  more  severe.  Thiers,  and  several  his- 
torians after  him,  maintained  that  if  negotiations  had  followed 
immediately  on  Sedan,  Lorraine  might  have  been  saved.* 
This  contention  is  not  supported  by  the  facts. 

Ever  since  1814  Alsace  and  Lorraine  had  been  the  objects  of 
Germany's  desire  :  the  war  had  no  other  aim.  On  August  21, 
twelve  days  before  the  capitulation  at  Sedan,  the  Cabinet 
issued  an  order,  dated  from  Pont-^-Mousson  and  published 
in  both  languages,  that  the  arrondissements  of  Sarrebourg, 
Chateau-Salins,  Sarreguemines,  Metz  and  Thionville  should 
no  longer  be  subject  to  the  administrative  authorities  of 
Lorraine,  but  to  those  of  Alsace.  And  it  was  careful  to  add 
that    these    districts    were    not,    thenceforward,    under    the 

*  See  M.  de  Lacombe  in  the  Cot  responaant  of  June  lO,  1903. 


GAMBETTA 


fit)  *UJ^kc  ica/rUiUiLb 

cJliXJO   eiofoL  Jffct^      a  ^  cUrru^naKm   ^  ^theurvw  , 
fUu4  dtcf^ftn^  tp.urd  imOJn^    flat  fi^  fun  a«^/uj 

do  Tiikt.  douttuX  ^   fa  bvrv»*!t    ^y^tnu:)  (jciO  y^r^ 

tUvU^  ^oiu3  sftufuryj    dorm  llttum>    et  no-o  ^iUndrary)  <»'«> 

126 


WAR   A   OUTRANGE 


tf2  l^t^     d'/Z^^a^^  ^^fY^^        cf^U-^^i-^^r^ 
^yanM    Ml  cO  ynrmt^    olc)  fed  JlrnielO  ^^^''^^''^ 


L/ 


GAMBETTA 


The  representatives  of  Alsace  and  Lorraine,  prior  to  all  negotiations  for  peace,  have  laid 
before  the  National  Assembly  a  manifesto  expressing,  in  the  most  positive  manner,  in  the 
name  of  these  provinces,  their  desire  and  their  right  to  remain  French. 

Thrust  under  a  foreign  yoke,  in  defiance  of  all  justice  and  by  a  hateful  abuse  of  power, 
we  have  a  last  duty  to  perform  :  we  once  more  declare  null  and  void  the  compact  that 
disposes  of  us  without  our  consent. 

The  vindication  of  our  rights  will  always  remain  open  to  us,  individually  and  collectively, 
in  such  form  and  degree  as  our  conscience  shall  dictate.  As  we  leave  these  precincts,  where 
our  dignity  will  not  allow  us  to  retain  our  seats,  and  in  spite  of  the  bitterness  of  our  grief, 
the  supreme  thought  that  permeates  every  fibre  of  our  being  is  a  feeling  of  gratitude  towards 
those  who  for  ten  months  past  have  never  wavered  in  our  defence  and  of  unswerving 
devotion  to  the  country  from  which  we  are  violently  wrenched. 

In  our  hearts  we  shall  follow  you.  and  with  an  entire  confidence  in  the  future,  we  shall  wait 
until  a  regenerate  France  once  more  treads  the  path  of  her  glorious  destiny. 

Your  brethren  of  Alsace  and  Lorraine,  severed  for  the  time  being  from  the  great  family, 
will  maintam  a  filial  love  for  the  France  that  is  absent  from  their  homes,  until  the  day  when 
she  shall  come  back  there  to  resume  her  rigluful  place. 

BORDEAUX,  March  i,  1871. 

128 


WAR  A   OUTRANGE 

sovereignty  of  the  French  Empire,  in  which  respect  they 
differed  from  those  of  Nancy,  Toul,  Luneville  and  Briey — a 
clear  indication  that  the  former  were  to  be  kept  and  the  latter 
restored.  The  new  Governor-General,  Bismarck-Bohlen, 
confirmed  this  arrangement  in  a  proclamation  dated  from 
Haguenau  on  August  30. 

On  September  2  at  Sedan,  at  a  conference  that  preceded  the 
capitulation,  Bismarck  declared  that  Prussia  had  a  very 
definite  intention  of  demanding  Strasburg  and  Metz,  Alsace, 
Lorraine  and  four  thousand  million  francs.^ 

On  September  7  the  Times  published  this  official  despatch 
from  Berlin:  "A  portion  of  Lorraine  having  been  placed 
under  the  Prussian  administration  of  Alsace,  that  adminis- 
tration now  includes  all  the  districts  whose  cession  will  prob- 
ably be  demanded  by  the  Cabinet  of  Berlin  on  the  conclusion 
of  peace.  .  .  .  The  territory  demanded  by  Prussia,  then, 
would  include,  in  addition  to  the  whole  of  Alsace,  these  dis- 
tricts of  Lorraine :  Sarrebourg,  Sarreguemines,  Metz, 
Thionville  and  Chateau-Salins." 

On  September  15  Bismarck  traced  the  future  frontier  (the 
frontier  of  the  Treaty  of  Frankfort)  upon  a  map  that  hung  on 
the  wall  of  Senator  Larabit's  house  at  Buzancy.  Simul- 
taneously the  same  map  was  published  in  Berlin  by  the  geo- 
graphical and  statistical  department  of  the  General  Staff. 
This  was  the  famous  map  "with  the  green  border"  which 
figured,  in  P'ebruary,  1871,  in  (he  negotiations  for  the 
preliminaries  of  peace. 

At  the  same  moment  Bismarck  unmasked  his  batteries. 
On  September  13  from  Rheims,  and  on  the  16th  from  Meaux, 
he  issued  circulars  to  the  Prussian  representatives  abroad, 
informing  them  that  Strasburg  and  Metz  had  been  annexed, 
as  being  necessary  for  the  safety  of  Germany. 

On  the  19th,  at  Ferrieres,  he  demanded  of  Jules  Favre,  not 
only  Alsace,  but  Sarrebourg,  Chateau-Salins,  Sarreguemines, 
Metz  and  Thionville.  On  September  27  and  October  i  he 
informed  the  confederated  princes  and  the  German  ambassa- 

^  See  Sedan,  by  Genenil  dc  Wimptfen,  p.  242  ;  snd  /.a  fourn^t  de  Sedatt,  hy 
General  Ducrol,  p.  62. 

129  K 


GAMBETTA 

dors  of   these   exactions;   and    on    October    17    Jules    Favre 
acknowledged  the  accuracy  of  his  statements. 

On  November  i  Bismarck  told  Thiers  at  Versailles  that  he 
would  have  no  elections  in  Alsace,  nor  in  the  German  portion 
of  Lorraine,  and  that  the  annexation  of  Alsace  and  Metz — 
which  had  fallen  on  October  27— was  simply  a  question  of 
safety  for  Germany.'  He  said  to  Gortschakoff  on  January  29  : 
"  We  must  keep  to  the  programme  we  communicated  to 
St.  Petersburg  five  months  ago.  Its  fulfilment  is  indispens- 
able to  our  safety,  and  Germany  would  not  tolerate  for  a 
moment  that  one  iota  of  it  should  be  changed.  We  must 
have  Metz  and  Lorraine."  He  spoke  in  the  same  sense  to 
Thiers  on  February  21  and  22,  1871.^ 

Thiers,  then,  seems  to  have  founded  his  assertion  that  we 
could  have  obtained  easier  terms  after  Sedan  on  very  slight 
evidence — on  nothing  more,  indeed,  than  a  word  or  two  from 
Bismarck  on  November  4. 

This  is  what  passed  between  them. 

Said  Thiers  :  "  If  we  ofifered  to  treat  with  you  at  once,  what 
\\ould  you  demand?  " 

"Alsace,"  answered  Bismarck,  "and  something  incon- 
siderable round  Metz^ 

"  And  what  of  Metz?" 

'*  If  you  treat  with  us  at  once  /  promise  to  do  my  best  to 
persuade  the  King  to  restore  it  to  you."^ 

That  was  all.  Thiers'  report  of  November  9  mentions  no 
concession  on  the  part  of  Bismarck.^  Now  the  object  of  this 
interview  was  to  procure  an  armistice,  and  it  was  to  the 
interest  of  both  parties  to  skate  lightly  over  very  thin  ice. 
Bismarck  had  no  desire  to  discuss  the  question  of  Metz  that 
day.-^  It  is  not  likely  that  he  should  have  seriously  contem- 
plated .-surrendering  Metz  on  the  very  morrow  of  its  fall.  He 
wished  to  gain  time.  As  Chaudordy  pointed  out  with  his 
usual  penetration,  he  preferred  to  postpone  any  definition  of 

*  Thiers,  Notes  e(  Souvenirs,  pp.  77,  79.  »  Jdid.,pp.  115,  118. 

»  No/es  et  Souvenirs,  pp.  95,  96.  «  See  the  journal  Offuiel  q{  December  2nd, 

'  Busch,  Bismarck  unci  seine  Leute. 


WAR   A   OUTRANGE 

his  peace-terms  "  until  the  armistice  was  arranged,  when  it 
would  be  almost  impossible  to  induce  the  country  to  resume 
hostilities. "1 

Thiers  wrote  his  Notes  at  a  later  date,  and  they  were  pub- 
lished in  1903  without  revision.  After  the  incidents  at  Bor- 
deaux, and  his  attack  on  Gam'betta  and  the  war  a  outrarice, 
he  had  reason  enough  for  trying  to  persuade  the  public — and 
indeed  for  persuading  himself — that  if  his  overtures  had  been 
successful  he  would  have  saved  France  from  some  of  the 
concessions  that  were  wrung  from  her. 

There  is  no  doubt  that,  at  the  Prussian  Court,  there  were 
moments  of  hesitation  on  the  subject  of  Metz.  Now  and 
then,  after  the  war,  Bismarck  assumed  a  very  innocent  air  : 
he  would  have  had  France  regard  him  as  a  simple,  well- 
meaning  creature,  whose  hand  was  forced  by  the  military 
party.  William  II.,  in  the  same  way,  said  later  on  :  "It  was 
no  wish  of  mine."  But  neither  Bismarck,  nor  the  King,  nor 
Moltke,  nor  the  General  Staff,  nor  any  German  professor,  or 
historian,  or  poet,  or  writer — from  1814,  from  Gorres,  Gagern 
and  Gentz,  to  Becker  and  Arndt  in  1840,  and  to  the  Liberals 
of  1843  (who  further  demanded  Schleswig  for  Prussia  and 
Lombardy  for  Austria),  and  to  Ad.  Schmidt,  Adolph  Wagner, 
Mommsen  and  the  "  young  democratic  party  of  the  German 
universities"  in  1870 — nor  any  German  who  ever  lived 
thought  it  possible  to  defeat  France  without  annexing  Alsace 
and  Lorraine. 

And  there  is  one  fact  that  has  not  been  sufficiently  empha- 
sised by  the  historians  who  favour  Gambetta  and  his  Govern- 
ment. In  September,  1870,  it  was  Bismarck's  opinion  that 
Germany  should  annex  the  whole  of  Alsace,  that  is  to  say, 
the  entire  departments  of  Bas-Rhin  and  Haut-Rhin.  The 
Gap  of  Belfort  has  always  been  considered  very  important 
from  a  strategical  point  of  view,  and  the  German  military 
party,  whom  Bismarck  used  as  a  kind  of  screen  behind  which 
to  establish  his  position  firmly,  by  no  means  undervalued  it. 
It  may  be  regarded  as  certain,  then,  that  the  Germans  would 
not  have  given  up  this  territory  if  the  prolongation  of  the  war, 

'  Emjw'le  iie  r Asseniblee  Xationa^e,  vdI.  II.  jl   \. 

i\\  K    2 


GAMBETTA 

due  to  Gambctta's  exertions,  had  not  enabled  Colonel  Denfert 
to  hold  Belfort  until  the  war  was  over.  The  territory  which 
the  Prussians  seem  to  have  demanded  and  obtained  in  Lor- 
raine, in  the  neighbourhood  of  Briey,  would  doubtless  have 
been  demanded  by  them  in  September,  since  the  frontier 
traced  on  the  map  used  at  Versailles,  when  the  preliminaries 
of  peace  were  signed,  was  the  same  as  that  determined  by  the 
Treaty  of  Frankfort,  and,  as  we  have  seen,  this  map  was 
printed  in  Berlin  in  September,  1870.  These  facts  refute 
Thiers'  assertion  to  the  National  Assembly  on  June  29, 
1871  :  "  Had  not  the  war  been  prolonged,  we  should  have 
lost  less  territory." 

Our  resistance,  then,  improved  rather  than  aggravated  the 
conditions  of  peace.  Above  all,  it  made  reparation  possible 
in  the  future.  A  nation  that  is  still  rich  and  still  powerful 
has  no  right  to  surrender  any  of  her  sons  till  all  her  resources 
are  exhausted  :  she  is  pledged,  to  them  and  to  her  forefathers 
and  to  posterity,  to  shed  the  last  drop  of  her  blood  in  defence 
of  her  children.  In  the  eyes  of  France  there  are  greater 
things  than  success :  there  is  duty,  and  there  is  honour. 
Gambetta,  by  assuming  his  splendid  but  terrible  role,  by 
keeping  the  flag  flying  to  the  very  end,  gave  his  country  a 
last  chance.  His  name  will  always  be  associated  with  the 
honour  of  the  Republic  and  the  faith  of  a  patriot.  A  people 
to  whom,  after  overw'helming  disasters,  heroic  resistance  was 
still  possible,  might  hope  great  things  for  the  future ;  and  the 
organiser  of  the  nation's  defence  will  always  be  the 
personification  of  that  great  hope. 

Even  after  the  capitulation  of  Paris  he  wished  to  continue 
the  war.  This  was  what  the  Germans  feared  most :  pro- 
longed resistance.  Gambetta  was  supported  by  Chanzy  and 
Faidherbe.  "Not  only,"  said  Chanzy,  "  do  I  believe  that 
resistance  is  possible,  but  I  think  it  could  not  fail  to  be 
successful  if  the  country  truly  desired  it  and  would  accept  all 
its  obligations  and  consequences.  We  could  obtain  better 
terms  if  v,e  showed  ourselves  quite  determined  to  resume  the 
struggle  rather  than  submit  to  a  humiliating  peace."  He 
then  (^numerated  the  country's  resources:    222,000  infantry, 

132 


WAR   A   OUTRANGE 

20,000  cavalry,  33,960  j^unners,  1,232  pieces  of  ordnance,  with 
242  rounds  of  ammunition  for  each,  4,000  transport  wagons; 
an  unorganised  reserve  of  354,000  men  in  the  territorial 
forces,  tlio  depots  and  Algeria;  132,000  recruits  of  the  1871 
class;  12,000  horses  that  the  remount  department  had 
promised  to  deliver  in  six  weeks;  443  guns  that  had  no 
carriages  but  were  otherwise  equipped,  with  398,000  shells 
and  1,200  carriages  in  the  arsenals;  98  batteries  of  4,  7  and  12 
guns  furnished  by  the  departments;  while  our  factories  were 
producing  25,000  chassepots  a  month  and  2,000,000  cartridges 
a  day,  and  arms  and  ammunition  were  arriving  from  abroad 
continuously.  Moreover,  we  still  had  a  rich  country,  with 
25,000,000  inhabitants,  wherein  the  enemy  had  not  yet  set  his 
foot. 

Chanzy's  figures  are  nearly  the  same  as  those  of  the  com- 
mittee charged  by  the  National  Assembly  to  enumerate  the 
military  resources  of  France.  This  committee  included 
Admiral  Jaur^guiberry,  eight  generals,  three  colonels  and 
several  retired  officers. 

Chanzy  declared  that  in  any  case  France  must  be  prepared 
for  war,  since  the  only  two  alternatives  were  war  a  outrance 
or  peace  at  any  price ;  and  those  who  desired  peace  would  find 
war  the  only  sure  way  of  securing  better  terms. 

France  was  rich — much  richer  than  Germany — and  she 
could  pay  for  peace.  She  was  too  deeply  disillusioned  to  go 
on  fighting.  Having  grown  used  to  conquest  in  the  Crimea 
and  in  Italy,  she  could  not  recover  from  her  surprise.  The 
fall  had  been  too  swift  and  too  immense.  She  was  weary. 
The  capitulation  of  Paris  robbed  her  of  her  last  hope  :  she 
could  do  no  more. 


^33 


PART    III 

THE   NATIONAL   ASSEMBLY   AND   THE 
ESTABLISHMENT    OF  THE     REPUBLIC 

(1871-1875) 


t35 


CHAPI  KR  IX 

THE  NATIONAL  ASSEMBLY 

Gambetta  Elected  by  Ten  Departments — SpuUer's  Wise  Advice— Gambetta's  Speech 
at  Bordeaux :  Principles  of  Conduct — The  Monarchists,  to  prove  that  the 
Assembly  possesses  the  Constituent  Authority,  Vote  for  the  Republic. 

The  elections  to  the  National  Assembly  began  on  Feb- 
ruary 8,  187 1,  and  were  carried  out  by  departments  and 
au  scrutin  de  liste.  The  east,  north  and  centre  of  France 
were  occupied  by  600,000  hostile  troops,  and  were  under  the 
rule  of  German  prefects;  while  420,000  Frenchmen  were 
prisoners  in  Germany.  The  number  of  Deputies  was  fixed 
at  768.  Some  of  the  candidates  were  elected  by  several  con- 
stituencies :  Thiers  by  twenty-six  departments,  and  Gambetta 
by  ten — Bas-Rhin,  Bouches-du-Rhone,  Haut-Rhin,  Meurthe, 
Moselle,  Seine,  Seine-et-Oise,  Var,  Alger  and  Oran.  His 
choice  fell  upon  Bas-Rhin. 

According  to  the  terms  of  the  armistice  the  Assembly  was 
to  "  decide  whether  the  war  should  be  continued,  or  fix  the 
conditions  on  which  peace  should  be  made."  It  was  on  this 
question,  then,  that  the  country  voted.  Paris  and  most  of  the 
towns,  with  Gambetta  and  the  leaders  of  the  Democratic 
party,  were  in  favour  of  continuing  the  war;  the  country  dis- 
tricts voted  for  peace.  The  parties  hostile  to  the  Empire — 
Legitimists,  Orleanists  and  Republicans — who  for  twentv 
years  had  been  repressed  and  excluded  from  public  affairs, 
reappeared  in  the  persons  of  their  most  eminent  members. 
The  Republican  Deputies  numbered  about  two  hundred. 
The  other  two-thirds  of  the  Assembly  were  composed  of  Legi- 
timists and  Orleanists,  the  latter  being  the  more  numerous. 
But  there  was  no  need  to  make  any  profession  of  political 

137 


GAMBETTA 

faith  :  the  electors  chose  their  representatives  chiefly  for  their 
social  position,  or  their  moral  qualities,  or  because  they  were 
in  favour  of  peace.  At  heart,  the  majority  of  the  voters  had 
two  ruling  passions :  hatred  of  the  Empire,  which  had 
engaged  in  the  war,  and  hatred  of  the  "  Gambettist  dictator- 
ship," which  favoured  its  continuance.  These  two  points  of 
view,  while  appearing  almost  identical,  were  leagues,  and 
worlds,  and  centuries  apart. 

The  Assembly  met  at  Bordeaux  on  February  13.  On  the 
16th  it  elected  Jules  Grevy  as  its  President,  in  accordance  with 
Thiers'  advice. 

Louis  Philippe's  former  Minister,  while  writing  the  history 
of  the  First  Empire,  had  not  neglected  to  point  out  the  mis- 
takes of  the  second,  and  the  dangers  that  threatened  us.  His 
speeches  in  1866  and  1867  were  prophetic;  he  had  done  his 
utmost  to  avoid  the  war;  quite  recently  he  had  pleaded  the 
cause  of  France  with  the  Governments  of  Europe.  His  con- 
duct in  these  matters  had  won  oblivion  for  a  political  past 
which  had  often  given  food  for  comment.  His  age  was 
seventy-three,  but  his  activity  and  enthusiasm  were  only 
equalled  by  the  lucidity  of  his  mind  and  the  youthfulness  of 
his  point  of  view.  Even  before  he  was  placed  at  the  head  of 
afifairs  it  seemed  to  be  his  natural  position. 

On  the  17th  a  Declaration  by  the  Deputies  for  Alsace- 
Lorraine  was  read  by  Keller,  Deputy  for  Haut-Rhin. 
"  Alsace  and  Lorraine  vehemently  protest  against  the  cession 
of  any  territory.  France  cannot  consent  to  it,  Europe  cannot 
sanction  it.  We  shall  regard  as  null  and  void  all  acts  and 
treaties,  votes  and  plebiscites,  which  favour  the  surrender  to 
foreigners  of  all  or  of  any  part  of  our  provinces.  We  declare 
that  the  right  of  Alsatians  and  Lorrainers  to  remain  members 
of  the  French  nation  is  for  ever  inviolable.  And  we  swear,  in 
our  own  name  and  in  the  name  of  our  constituents,  our  chil- 
dren, and  their  descendants,  to  uphold  this  right  to  all  time 
and  by  all  means,  in  the  face  of  all  usurpers." 

This  moving  protest  was  a  cry  of  sheer  pain,  prompted  by 
the  purest  patriotism.  It  would  have  been  wise  to  let  the 
matter  rest  there.    To  put  the  question  to  the  vote  was  im- 

138 


THE   NATIONAL   ASSEMBLY 

prudent,  since  the  Assembly  could  not  associate  itself  with  the 
protest  without  preventing  the  peace  it  was  convoked  to  con- 
clude, while  on  the  other  hand  to  refuse  its  adoption  would 
be  playing  into  the  hands  of  the  enemy. 

And  indeed  when  the  Assembly  declared  Keller's  motion  to 
be  urgent,  Thiers  at  once  intervened  :  "  I  share  M.  Keller's 
sentiments  in  every  respect,"  he  said;  "but  we  must  know 
how  far  we  intend  to  back  our  words.  Have  the  courage  of 
your  opinions:  is  it  to  be  war  or  peace?  Let  us  go  to  the 
bureaux  and  say  at  once  what  we  think." 

The  Committee  charged  to  discuss  the  motion  produced  the 
following  resolution  :  "  The  National  Assembly,  while  deeply 
sympathising  with  the  sentiments  expressed  in  the  Declara- 
tion of  M.  Keller  and  his  colleagues,  has  complete  confidence 
in  the  wisdom  and  patriotism  of  the  negotiators."  Thence- 
forward Bismarck  can  have  had  no  doubts  with  regard  to  the 
wishes  of  the  Assembly,  or  the  amount  of  resistance  to  be 
expected  from  our  plenipotentiaries. 

A  few  moments  later  the  Assembly  almost  unanimously 
placed  Thiers  at  the  head  of  the  executive  power.  "  Of  the 
French  Republic  "  were  the  w^ords  added  at  his  own  request. 

On  the  following  dav  the  extreme  Left  adopted  an  address 
declaring  that  neither  "  the  National  Assemblv  nor  the  entire 
French  nation  had  the  smallest  right  to  make  a  single  Alsa- 
tian or  Lorrainer  a  subject  of  Prussia."  This  address  was 
signed  bv  Victor  Hugo,  Louis  Blanc,  Edgar  Ouinet,  Victor 
Schaelcher,  Charles  Floquet,  Edouard  Lockroy,  Alphonse 
Peyrat,  Sadi  Carnot.  Edmond  Adam.  Henri  Brisson, 
Arthur  Ranc — and  Georges  Clemenceau,  who  was  destined 
to  play  so  prominent  a  part  in  our  history,  and  to  be  our 
representative  on  the  great  day  of  reckoning  in  igiS. 

On  the  19th  Thiers  laid  before  the  Assembly  the  names  of 
the  new  Cabinet :  Dufaure,  Jules  Favre,  Ernest  Picard,  Jules 
Simon,  Pouyer-Quertier,  De  Larcy.  Lambrecht,  General 
Le  F16  and  Admiral  Pothuau.  While  France  was  awaiting 
her  fate  there  was  a  truce  between  parties.  Thiers  made  an 
appeal  to  the  whole  House  to  work  for  the  restoration  of  the 
country.     "  At  this  moment  there  is  only  one  policy  possible, 

139 


GAMBETTA 

or  even  conceivable  :  to  work  for  peace,  to  reorganise,  to 
restore  our  credit  and  revive  industry.  This  is  a  policy  for 
which  any  sensible,  honest,  enlightened  man  may  work 
worthily,  whatever  his  views  on  the  Monarchy  or  the  Repub- 
lic. When  we  have  raised  the  stricken  Titan  we  call  France 
from  the  ground  where  she  lies,  and  have  healed  her  wounds, 
we  will  restore  her  to  herself;  when  her  mind  is  once  more  at 
liberty  she  will  tell  us  how  she  would  fain  live."  He  then 
set  out  to  Versailles,  to  negotiate  with  Bismarck. 

On  the  28th  he  returned  with  the  preliminaries  of  peace. 
On  March  i  Bamberger,  Edgar  Quinet,  Victor  Hugo,  Louis 
Blanc,  George,  Brunet,  Milli^re,  Emmanuel  Arago,  Keller 
and  Langlois  spoke  against  the  treaty.  "  If  this  thing  that 
they  call  a  treaty  becomes  an  accomplished  fact,"  cried  Victor 
Hugo,  "  the  peace  of  Europe  will  be  at  an  end."  "  The 
surrender  of  Alsace-Lorraine,"  said  Edgar  Quinet,  "means 
an  endless  war  behind  the  mask  of  peace."  Thiers,  Vacherot 
and  General  Changarnier  maintained  that  France  was  in  a 
dilemma  from  which  there  was  no  escape.  Buffet  declared 
that  four  Deputies  for  the  Vosges,  in  their  sorrow  at  parting 
from  their  colleagues  of  Alsace-Lorraine,  would  abstain  from 
voting.  On  an  attempt  being  made  by  Conti  to  defend  the 
Empire  there  was  an  outburst  of  agitation,  and  the  Assembly 
almost  unanimously  voted  the  deposition  of  Napoleon  HL 
and  his  dynasty,  declaring  him  to  be  "  responsible  for  the 
ruin,  the  invasion  and  the  dismemberment  of  France."  The 
treaty  was  adopted  by  546  votes  to  107.  Twenty-three 
members  abstained  from  voting. 

Then  Jules  Grosjean,  Deputy  for  the  Haut-Rhin,  read  the 
immortal  protest  whose  every  word,  for  forty-four  years,  has 
been  ceaselessly  falling  on  our  hearts  as  the  earth  falls  on  a 
coffin.  Tears  flowed  freely  as  the  representatives  of  Alsace- 
Lorraine  left  the  hall.  Gambetta  resigned  his  position  as 
Deputy  for  the  Bas-Rhin.  And  that  evening  the  Mayor  of 
Strasburg,  Kiiss,  a  Deputy  for  the  Bas-Rhin,  died  at  Bor- 
deaux, broken-hearted.  At  his  funeral  Gambetta  used  these 
words  :  "  By  force  we  are  being  parted,  but  only  for  a  time, 
from  Alsace,  the  traditional  cradle  of  French  patriotism.     Our 

140 


THE   NATIONAL   ASSEMBLY 

brethren  of  that  unhappy  country  have  done  their  duty  nobh, 
and  they,  at  least,  have  done  it  to  the  end.  They  must  com- 
fort themselves  with  the  thought  that  France  henceforward 
will  have  no  policy  but  their  deliverance  !  To  achieve  that 
result,  Republicans  must  be  closely  united  in  one  thought — 
the  hope  of  a  day  of  reckoning  that  shall  be  a  protest  of  right 
and  justice  against  force  and  infamy  !  "  Cries  of  Vive 
I' Alsace!  greeted  this  appeal. 

The  next  day  he  set  out  for  San  Sebastian.  He  was  ill, 
and  worn  out.  "  I  am  broken  down,"  he  wrote  to  a  friend, 
"  by  all  the  troubles  that  have  befallen  us.  Before  the  odious 
cession  to  the  enemy  which  the  Assembly  has  just  sanctioned 
I  can  only  retire;  I  shall  wait  for  Republican  France  to  find 
herself  again." 

Germany,  in  1815,  had  mutilated  our  frontier  by  taking 
Sarrebriick,  Saint-Jean,  Sarrelouis  and  the  coal-mines  of  the 
Sarre.  This  time  she  robbed  us  of  Alsace,  Metz,  the  iron- 
mines  of  the  Moselle  and  a  population  of  1,597,228 — thus 
depriving  us  of  the  power  to  initiate  an  offensive,  and  secur- 
ing that  advantage  for  herself.  She  further  obtained  the 
chief  essential  for  her  mineral-works,  namely,  iron  (29,000,000 
tons,  which  by  1913  had  become  36,000,000  tons),  with  the 
hope  of  some  day  taking  from  us  the  mines  of  the  Basin  of 
Briey  and  Verdun ;  for  witti  Germany  every  treaty  is  but  a 
truce,  or  a  stage  on  her  onward  journey,  every  frontier  is 
merely  provisional,  every  annexation  paves  the  way  for  the 
next.  Thiers  had  succeeded  in  saving  Belfort,  but  the 
indemnity  was  fixed  at  five  thousand  million  francs. 

The  Assembly  of  187 1  voted  the  preliminaries  of  peace  with 
a  knife  at  their  throats,  in  order  that  their  country's  martyr- 
dom might  be  curtailed  and  Paris  saved  from  occupation  by 
German  troops.  The  Treaty  of  Frankfort,  offspring  of  the 
criminal  falsification  of  the  Ems  telegram,  affected  Europe 
like  a  poison  for  forty-four  years,  and  brought  untold  torment 
to  many  a  human  soul. 

It  next  became  necessary  to  choose  a  place  for  the  sittings 
of  the  Assembly.     The  majority  were  alarmed  by  the  idea  of 

141 


GAMBETTA 

Paris,   and   on    Thiers'    suggestion    the   choice  fell   on    Ver- 
sailles. 

At  the  same  time  he  made  a  declaration  of  loyalty  towards 
all  parties.  "  I  give  you  my  word  as  a  man  of  honour  that 
when  the  country  is  reorganised  not  a  single  matter  that  has 
been  temporarily  set  aside  shall  be  altered  through  any 
disloyalty  of  ours."  This  was  what  is  known  as  "  the  Pact 
of   Bordeaux." 

The  Assembly  was  to  meet  at  Versailles  on  March  20. 
On  the  i8th  the  rising  of  the  Commune  broke  out.  Gam- 
betta's  enemies  have  often  blamed  his  inaction  during  the 
civil  war,  and  spoken  mockingly  of  "  the  orange-trees  of 
San  Sebastian."  He  was  no  longer  a  Deputy,  and  he  was 
ill.  And  what,  in  any  case,  could  he  have  done?  Every 
possible  attempt  was  made  to  reconcile  the  two  camps,  but 
all  was  in  vain  from  the  moment  when  the  first  blood  was 
shed,  and  Generals  Lecomte  and  Clement  Thomas  were  killed. 
At  first  the  Mayors,  the  Deputies  for  Paris,  Colonel  Langlois, 
Commandant  of  the  National  Guard,  and  after  him  Admiral 
Saisset,  made  every  effort  to  prevent  a  rupture ;  and  later  on 
the  Ligue  des  droits  de  Paris,  with  Schleicher,  Edmond 
Adam,  Ranc,  Lockroy,  Floquet  and  Clemenceau,  tried  in  vain 
to  intervene.  If  Gambetta  had  still  been  a  Deputy  during  the 
Commune  he  would  have  remained  in  the  hall  of  the 
Assembly  with  Louis  Blanc,  Edgar  Quinet  and  Henri  Martin. 
In  March  20  the  Deputies  and  Mayors  of  Paris  made  a  final 
supreme  effort  to  move  the  Central  Committee.  "  You  are 
insurgents,"  said  Louis  Blanc,  "  against  an  Assembly  elected 
under  conditions  of  the  utmost  freedom.  We,  who  are  regu- 
larly elected  representatives,  cannot  have  any  dealings  with 
insurgents.  We  would  gladly  prevent  civil  war,  but  we  cannot 
appear  as  your  associates  before  the  eyes  of  France."  During 
these  terrible  days  one  dominating  idea  inspired  these  great 
Republicans  :  they  desired  above  all  things  to  avoid  a  revolu- 
tion in  the  presence  of  the  enemy  :  they  feared  everything  that 
would  imperil  the  unity  of  the  nation. 

The  excitement  spread  to  Lyons,  Saint-Etienne,  Toulouse, 
Narbonne,  Marseilles  and  Limoges.  Many  towns,  in  their  agi- 

142 


THE   NATIONAL   ASSEMBLY 

tation,  sent  protests  to  Versailles  against  any  attempt  to 
restore  the  Monarchy.  To  save  the  country,  they  said, 
national  unity  must  be  preserved,  and  the  sole  means  of  pre- 
serving national  unity  was  to  preserve  the  Republic.  Thiers 
went  about  repeating  :  "  It  is  the  form  of  government  that 
divides  us  the  least."  On  March  27  he  said  in  the  Assembly  : 
"  There  are  enemies  of  law  and  order  who  assert  that  we  are 
preparing  to  overthrow  the  Republic.  I  absolutely  deny  it. 
i  shall  not  destroy  the  form  of  government  that  I  am  now- 
employing  for  the  restoration  of  order."  And  he  assured 
the  representatives  of  the  town-councils  who  came  to  tell  him 
of  their  uneasiness  that  if  a  plot  should  be  formed  for  the 
restoration  of  the  Monarchy,  he  would  take  no  part  in  it. 

An  attempt  at  co-operation  between  the  elder  and  younger 
branches  of  the  House  of  Bourbon  was,  however,  being  made 
under  the  auspices  of  Mgr.  Dupanloup,  Bishop  of  Orleans. 
In  March,  at  Dreux,  the  Due  d'Aumale  declared  to  the  repre- 
sentatives of  the  Legitimist  party  that,  if  France  desired  a 
Monarchy,  the  Princes  of  Orleans  would  advance  no  claim  to 
the  throne,  and  that  they  were  willing  to  be  reconciled  to  the 
Comte  de  Chambord. 

A  series  of  hitherto  unpublished  letters,  written  from  San 
Sebastian  by  Gambetta  to  Barthelemy,  French  Consul  at 
Southampton,  shows  how  great  were  his  perplexity  and 
distress. 

March  26. — "  What  is  to  become  of  us?  All  this  can  only 
end  in  a  catastrophe  :  the  September  massacres  or  the  White 
Terror  must  soon  be  repeated,  or  perhaps  both.  There  is 
only  one  possible  means  of  saving  the  situation  :  to  declare 
the  Republic  an  established  institution,  to  take  the  three  or 
four  radical  measures  that  would  give  it  free  play,  to  pass  an 
electoral  law,  dissolve  the  Assembly,  and  convoke  a  new 
Chamber  in  Paris,  at  the  same  time  announcing  in  advance 
the  legislative  programme  it  proposed  to  carry  out :  then  to 
return  boldly  to  the  capital  and  address  the  people  in  language 
worthy  of  France  and  of  the  population  of  the  great  city." 

He  puts  his  finger  on  one  of  the  cruellest  wounds  inflicted 
by   the   defeat.       "  Not  the  least  disgraceful   feature  of  the 

143 


GAMBETTA 

present  situation  is  that  all  parties  alike  are  trying  to  make 
capital  out  of  the  enemy's  threats  and  demands.  .  .  .  Ah, 
how  wretched  we  are  !  " 

June  5. — "  I  am  much  perplexed  with  regard  to  the  coming 
elections.  My  own  feelings  are  still  against  being  a  member 
of  an  Assembly  I  regard  as  finished  with,  and  as  having 
exhausted  its  mandate.  In  any  case  I  shall  be  obliged  to 
explain  my  position." 

June  14. — "  1  am  entirely  of  your  opinion  :  it  is  time  to 
speak.  As  for  the  question  of  the  legislative  mandate,  I  am 
inclined  to  think  that  it  would  be  best  to  refuse.  I  am  expect- 
ing Spuller  to-morrow.  I  must  discuss  the  matter  with  him, 
and  I  will  write  to  you  my  final  decision.  ..." 

Spuller's  visit  to  San  Sebastian  took  place,  and  Gambetta 
decided  to  return  to  public  life. 

Spuller,  from  his  retreat  at  Sombernon  in  Cote-d'Or,  had 
written  to  Gambetta  at  San  Sebastian  some  letters  of  remark- 
able wisdom  and  clearness  of  vision.  The  Commune,  he  said, 
was  doomed  to  failure.  The  Monarchy  "  would  fall  to  pieces 
at  the  last  moment."  There  was  a  great  role  to  be  filled, 
so  great  a  role  that  it  almost  frightens  me."  "You  are 
regarded  as  the  right  man  to  deal  with  a  situation  that  cannot 
fail  to  result  from  this  terrible  crisis.  .  .  .  You  are  being  kept 
for  future  needs,"  He  urges  him  to  make  frequent  speeches 
in  the  country,  and  to  travel  from  town  to  town  like  English 
statesmen.  "  Until  the  Republic  has  been  finally  proclaimed 
and  established,  the  proper  role  for  you,  it  seems  to  me,  is 
that  of  a  republican  O'Connell."  What  was  needed  was  not 
so  much  a  programme  of  reforms  as  a  programme  of  conduct, 
a  "  declaration  of  the  duties  "  of  the  Republican  party.  "  It 
is  you,  more  than  anyone  else,  who  must  undertake  the 
arduous  task  of  uniting  the  party's  scattered  forces,  of 
reviving  hope  and  soothing  resentment,  of  consoling  the 
sorrowful  and  reconciling  these  two  French  peoples  who  are 
fighting  one  another."  The  Assembly  was  not  constituent, 
it  was  true,  but  the  sovereign  power  was  vested  in  it.  It 
would  remain  in  authority,  and  one  must  act  accordingly. 
When    Thiers    declared    himself    willing    to    maintain    "  the 

144 


THE   NATIONAL   ASSEMBLY 

accomplished  fact  of  the  Republic,"  he  hurled  the  most  bitter 
invectives  at  Gambetta  and  those  who  liad  prolonged  the  war. 
Their  policy,  he  said  on  June  8,  was  that  of  "a  raving 
maniac."  "A  raving  maniac!"  Alas,  he  was  mad  with 
love  for  France,  for  her  honour  and  renown,  mad  with  despair 
that  she  should  be  outraged  and  mutilated  by  the  enemy  ! 
This  was  the  climax  of  her  sorrows,  this  hour  when  the  greatest 
of  her  servants  struck  at  one  another  above  her  bleeding  heart ! 
SpuUer  tried  to  heal  Gambetta's  wound  by  pointing  out  that 
Thiers  had  a  very  strong  motive  for  a  public  attack  on  one 
section  of  the  Republican  party,  since  it  enabled  him  to  praise 
another  section,  and  served  as  some  extenuation  of  his  present 
attitude  in  the  eyes  of  the  majority.  In  explaining  the 
injustice  he  half  excused  it.  The  best  answer  to  the  insult 
would  be  :5ome  calm  expression  of  confidence.  "  The  more 
violently  you  have  been  treated,  the  easier  it  will  be  for  you 
to  be  moderate ;  and  the  more  moderate  you  are,  the  more 
certainly  your  plans  will  succeed." 

He  then  points  out  to  his  friend  the  dangers  of  his  absence. 
"  Had  you  been  present,  this  attack  would  not  have  occurred. 
The  feelings  that  exist  between  you  and  M.  Thiers  would 
have  been  differently  expressed,  and  that  would  have  been 
better  for  everyone.  It  is  not  good  for  a  man  who  has  played 
the  most  brilliant  part  in  contemporary  history  to  have  his 
actions  and  motives  misrepresented  for  too  long  :  the  public 
soon  forms  a  wrong  opinion,  which  it  takes  a  vast  amount  of 
pains  to  efface.  Come  back  to  the  Chamber.  When  once 
you  are  there  no  one  will  ever  dare  to  say,  without  fear  of 
contradiction  and  criticism,  that  your  policy  of  honour  and 
courage  was  not  the  only  course  worthy  of  the  Republic  and 
of  France." 

These  letters  from  Sombernon  are  greatly  to  Spuller's 
credit.  And  the  seed  fell  on  ground  that  had  long  been  pre- 
pared to  receive  it.  As  appeared  in  his  speech  to  the  students 
in  1870,  Gambetta  was  naturallv  inclined  to  these  ideas.  His 
speech  at  Bordeaux  on  June  26,  1871,  gave  fresh  expression 
to  them,  and  formed  the  starting-point  of  his  new  career. 

He  began   with  a  reference  to   the   plebiscite  and  all    the 

145  L 


GAMBETTA 

disasters  that  followed  it.     Did  France  desire,   he  asked,  to 
forswear  her  privileges  again,  or  to  constitute  herself  a  free 
country?     The   "raving   maniac"   agreed   with  Thiers  that 
"authority  should  be  in  the  hands  of  the  wisest,  the  noblest, 
the    most   capable."       He    would    fain    transform    universal 
suffrage,  or  the  force  of  numbers,  into  a  power  enlightened 
by  reason.     The   Revolution   must  be  effected   without   vio- 
lence, and  the  Republican  party,  hitherto  accustomed  to  being 
in    opposition    and   defiant    of   authority,   must   become    the 
governing  party.     He  called  upon  all  parties,  and  upon  the 
masses  who  were  of  no  party,  to  support  the  Republic.     Then 
he  turned  to  those  who  held  other  views:   "  Do  you  wish  to 
rule  the  Republic?     Well,  we  ask  only  one  thing  of  you — to 
recognise  it  first.     When  once  you   have  recognised  it,  we 
shall  be  perfectly  ready  to  admit  you  to  the  conduct  of  affairs." 
He  expressed  the  social  problem  thus:   "  How  is  it  possible 
that  men  whose  only  contact  with  society  is  exasperating  to 
them,  who  only  know  it  through  effort  and  labour,  and  labour 
that  is  inadequately  paid  .  .  .  should  fail  to  be  embittered  by 
their  poverty,  and  should  not  at  last  break  out  before  the 
world  in  a  fury  of  passion  unspeakable  ?  .  .  .  There  will  be 
no  peace  and  no  order  until  all  classes  of  society  shall  have 
been  given  a  share  in  the  benefits  of  civilisation  and  science, 
and  can  regard  their  Government  as  the  legitimate  offspring 
of  their  own  sovereign  power,  rather  than  as  an  exacting  and 
greedy  master.     Until  that  day,  if  we  pursue  our  present  fatal 
path,  you  will  drive  the  ignorant  to  support  coups  d'etat  at 
one  moment,  and  swell  the  forces  of  street  rioters  at  the  next, 
and  we  shall  be  left  exposed  to  the  pitiless  fury  of  irresponsible 
mobs.  .  .   .  trying  to  avenge  themselves  by  looting  among 
the   ruins  .   .   ."     And   he  quoted  the   words  of  Channing  : 
"Societies  are    responsible   for  the   catastrophes   that   occur 
within  their  borders,  as  ill-governed  towns,  where  carrion  is 
left   to   rot   in   the   sun,   are   responsible  for  an   outbreak  of 
plague." 

To  the  peasant  he  offered  a  meed  of  admiration.  The 
blood  and  bones  of  France,  he  said,  must  be  re-made.  The 
reorganisation  of  the  army  was  the  first  work  to  be  accom- 

146 


THE   NATIONAL   ASSEMBLY 

pliahed.  Military  education  siiould  begin  at  school.  Of  ilic 
man  of  the  future  he  said  :  "  1  would  have  him  able,  not  only 
to  think,  read  and  reason,  but  also  to  act  and  fight.  Every- 
where we  must  have,  side  by  side  with  the  schoolmaster,  the 
athlete  and  the  military  instructor."  These  two  forms  of 
education  "  must  be  carried  on  side  by  side.  Otherwise  your 
schools  will  turn  out  literary  men,  but  never  patriots.  The 
whole  world  should  be  made  to  understand  that  when  a  French 
citizen  is  born,  he  is  born  a  soldier.  ..."  This  was  the 
Republican  tradition,  the  tradition  of  the  law  passed  by  the 
Convention  on  the  27th  of  Brumaire,  year  IIL,  which  decreed 
that  civil  and  military  education  should  proceed  hand  in  hand. 

This  appeal  reassured  the  country  and  paved  the  way  for 
the  demonstration  of  July  2,  187 1,  which  placed  the  Republic 
on  a  firm  footing.  There  were  11 1  Deputies  to  be  elected, 
of  whom  21  were  for  the  Department  of  the  Seine.  Forty-six 
departments  were  called  upon  to  vote,  and  Gambetta,  who 
was  elected  for  the  Seine,  Var  and  Bouches-du-Rhone,  chose 
to  represent  the  Seine.  Twenty-five  departments  had  to  find 
a  substitute  for  Thiers,  who  had  been  elected  for  twenty-six 
constituencies  and  had  chosen  the  Seine.  Only  three  of  the 
twenty-five  were  Conservatives. 

It  was  at  this  moment  that  the  Comte  de  Chambord  arrived 
in  France  and  announced  his  intentions  with  regard  to  the 
flag.  On  July  5  his  manifesto  appeared.  "  I  shall  not  allow 
the  standard  of  Henry  IV.,  Francis  1.  and  Joan  of  Arc  to  be 
torn  from  my  hands.  It  flew  above  my  cradle,  its  shadow 
must  fall  on  my  grave.  Henry  V.  cannot  surrender  the  flag 
of  Henry  IV."' 

Gambetta  seized  the  first  opportunity,  after  his  return  to 
the  Assembly,  to  give  his  support  to  Thiers.  When  the 
Italians  entered  Rome  a  certain  number  of  bishops  had 
addressed  petitions  to  the  Assembly  for  the  restoration  of  the 
Pope's  temporal  power.  The  Assembly  nominated  a  com- 
mittee who  favoured  this  object.  "  The  deed  is  done,"  said 
Thiers;  "  Italy  is  united;  I  am  not  the  author  of  her  unity, 
and  there  is  no  one  who  can  be  held  less  responsible  than 
myself.     We  must  not  be  forced  into  a  policy  that  would  end 

147  L    2 


GAMBETTA 

in  the  very  thing  you  are  most  anxious  to  avoid — a  war 
When  all  Europe  has  to  reckon  with  Italy,  would  you  have 
me  enter  into  relations  with  her  that  might  compromise  us  m 
the  future?  "  He  added  that  he  would  defend  the  interests 
of  religion  and  do  his  utmost  to  secure  the  independence 
of  the  Holy  See.  He  accepted  a  resolution  containing 
these  words:   "The  Assembly,   confident  of  the  patriotism 

and  prudence  of  the  head  of  the  executive  power "  and 

at  once  Gambetta  took  the  opportunity  it  offered  him. 
"  After  such  clear  and  decided  statements  concerning  our 
relations  with  Italy  and  the  Holy  See,  statements  that  have 
equal  regard  for  their  liberties,  for  the  claims  of  conscience, 
and  for  the  peace  of  Europe,  we  will  gladly  give  our  support 
to  the  resolution  that  has  been  accepted  by  the  head  of  the 
executive  power." 

Then  Keller,  representing  the  party  of  the  Right,  made 
this  announcement:  "From  the  moment  that  the  resolu- 
tion is  also  approved  by  M,  Gambetta,  its  significance  is 
changed,"  and  he  declared  that  his  friends  could  no  longer 
support  it.  Thiers  sprang  to  his  feet.  "  I  seek  no  man's 
support,"  he  said,  "but  neither  do  I  refuse  it  when  it  is 
offered  to  me.  You  would  be  setting  a  disastrous  example, 
and  one  that  would  lead  to  perpetual  discord  in  the  country, 
if  you  were,  virtually,  to  make  this  statement :  '  Since  our 
colleague  So-and-So,  with  whose  sentiments  we  do  not  at  this 
moment  agree,  accepts  the  same  form  of  words  as  ourselves, 
we  will  have  none  of  it.'  "  He  deeply  regretted  that 
M.  Keller  should  have  allowed  such  unfortunate  words  to 
escape  him,  for,  said  he,  "  if  Discord  had  a  voice,  those  are 
the  words  she  would  use." 

The  Assembly  passed  the  vote  of  confidence,  but  returned 
the  petitions  to  the  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs.  Jules  Favre 
resigned,  and  was  replaced  by  Charles  de  Remusat. 

The  V'icomte  de  Meaux,  a  Legitimist  member  of  the 
National  Assembly  and  Montalembert's  son-in-law,  who  left 
some  very  valuable  Souvenirs  of  the  years  1871-1877,  gives 
us  his  view  of  this  first  encounter  between  Thiers  and  the 
Right.     "  The  bishops  asked  the  Assembly  to  pass  a  resolu- 

148 


THE    NATIONAL    ASSEMBLY 

tion  that  would  have  embroiled  us  with  Italy ;  some  measure — 
I  do  not  know  what,  and  no  more  did  they — in  favour  of  the 
Pope's  temporal  power.  What  could  M.  Thiers  do,  and  what 
could  any  of  us  do  at  that  time?  Did  the  bishops  wish  to 
provoke  a  quarrel  with  Italy,  which  Germany  would  certainly 
have  encouraged?  Assuredly  they  did  not;  and  when  they 
protested  their  peaceable  intentions  they  were  as  sincere  as 
they  were  illogical.  But  they  did  not  feel  themselves 
resp>onsible  for  the  country  at  large;  and,  without  inquiring 
whether  they  were  pushing  us  over  a  precipice  or  forcing  us 
into  a  retreat,  they  were  content  to  satisfy  themselves  and 
their  immediate  circle." 

On  August  12  Thiers'  friend  Rivet  proposed  this  motion  : 
"  M.  Thiers  will  fulfil,  under  the  title  of  President  of  the 
Republic,  the  functions  that  were  assigned  to  him  by  the 
Decree  of  February  17  last.  He  will  hold  this  office  for  three 
years.  ..."  Gambetta,  in  the  bureaux,^  opposed  this 
motion.  He  held  that  the  true  cause  of  the  country's  disquiet 
was  the  divisions  in  the  Chamber  :  the  remedy,  in  his  opinion, 
lay  in  a  Constituent  Assembly. 

Rivet's  motion  gave  the  Assembly  an  opportunity  to 
declare  itself  constituent,  and  on  August  28  the  committee 
laid  this  resolution  before  the  Chamber:  "The  National 
Assembly,  considering  that  it  has  a  right  to  use  the  constituent 
power,  an  essential  attribute  of  the  sovereignty  with  which  it 
is  invested,  hereby  decrees  :  '  The  head  of  the  executive  power 
will  assume  the  title  of  President  of  the  French  Republic,  and 
will  continue  to  exercise,  under  the  authority  of  the  National 
Assembly  until  its  labours  shall  be  at  an  end,  the  functions 
assigned  to  him  by  the  Decree  of  February  17,  1871.  .  .  .'  " 

Rivet's  motion,  then,  was  amended  in  one  essential  matter  : 
Thiers'  powers,  instead  of  being  limited  to  three  years,  were 
to  end  only  with  the  dissolution  of  the  Assembly.  Gambetta 
and  his  friends  were  placed  in  a  dilemma  :  to  adopt  the  reso- 
lution was  to  recognise  the  right  of  the  Monarchist  majority 
to  settle  the  destiny  of  the  country,  to  reject  it  was  to  increase 

*  i.e.,  the  offices  in  which  committees   of   the   Assembly   meet. — Translator's 

NOTE. 

149 


GAMBETTA 

the  difficulties  of  Thiers'  position.  Gambetta,  to  whom  the 
restoration  of  royalty  was  the  worst  thing  that  could  happen, 
opposed  the  assumption  of  the  constituent  power  by  the 
Assembly.  "  It  was  only  elected,"  he  said,  "  to  rid  us  of  the 
invader.  When  a  form  of  government  is  to  be  established, 
whether  it  be  a  Monarchy  or  a  Republic,  the  chief  aim  of 
those  who  have  to  found  it  is  to  build  a  fortress  that  can  be 
defended  against  any  malcontents  who  attack  it,  rather  than 
a  tent  or  shed  that  is  open  to  all  the  winds  of  heaven  and  can 
be  overturned  by  any  passer-by.  That  is  what  you  will  be 
doing  if  you  draw  up  a  Constitution  in  your  present  state  of 
incompetence.  I  am  regarding  the  matter  from  the  monarchi- 
cal point  of  view  as  much  as  from  the  Republican."  And  he 
went  so  far  as  to  use  these  rather  bold  words  :  "If  from  this 
Assembly  there  should  emanate  a  Republican  Constitution 
I  should  not  feel,  I  honestly  declare,  sufficiently  strongly 
armed  to  deal  a  blow  at  anyone  who  dared  to  attack  it." 

This  statement,  to  which  later  events  so  strikingly  gave  the 
lie,  had  an  effect  that  the  speaker  was  far  from  anticipating  : 
it  reconciled  the  Right  with  Thiers,  and  won  them  to  the 
cause  of  the  Republic,  for  the  Monarchists,  in  their  anxiety 
to  show  they  possessed  the  constituent  power,  set  up,  at  least 
provisionally,  the  form  '^f  government  they  dreaded  the  most. 
By  434  votes  to  225  the  Assembly  declared  itself  constituent ; 
by  491  votes  to  94  it  endowed  the  head  of  the  executive  power 
with  the  title  of  President  of  the  French  Republic.  Thiers,  in 
expressing  his  gratitude,  drove  the  nail  home  :  '*  The  honour 
that    the    Assembly    has    done    me   in    appointing    me    first 

magistrate  of  the  Republic " 

Thus,  by  a  curious  paradox,  the  Left,  who  repudiated  the 
constituent  power,  believed  that  Rivet's  motion,  as  soon  as  it 
was  adopted,  would  have  the  force  of  a  constitutional  law ; 
while  the  Right,  who  were  so  vociferously  demanding  the 
constituent  power,  considered  themselves  to  be  passing  an 
ordinary  bill — nay,  a  mere  resolution  that  could  easily  be 
revoked .  There  may  have  been  some,  perhaps,  who  were  not 
averse  from  the  idea  of  saddling  the  Republic  with  the  respon- 
sibility of  the  Peace  Treaty.     Those  who  had  opposed   the 

150 


THE   NATIONAL   ASSEMBLY 

measure  rejoiced  in  its  adoption,  (hose  who  voted  for  it  were 
dissatisfied.  Those  who  desired  the  restoration  of  the 
Monarchy  were  strengthening  Thiers'  hands  and  setting  the 
Republic  on  a  firm  basis.  Gambetta  and  ids  friends  were 
clamouring  for  the  dissolution  of  an  Assembly  that  was 
destined  to  give  them,  after  a  few  years  of  struggle,  an  estab- 
lished Government  of  the  form  they  desired.  This  Chamber, 
to  which  they  would  fain  have  denied  the  constituent  power, 
was  in  the  f-nd— prompted  and  inspired  by  them — to  give 
France  her  Republican  Constitution.  But  there  was  a  pro- 
found reason  for  this  paradox :  the  divisions  among  the 
Monarchists,  and  the  mutual  hatred  that  kept  them  apart. 
The  Comte  de  Chambord,  in  shattering  his  crown,  shattered 
with  the  same  blow  the  younger  branch  of  his  House  :  he 
avenged  himself  for  1830.  The  Monarchists  were  obliged  to 
choo.se  one  among  several  possible  sovereigns,  whereas  the 
Republic,  being  an  impersonal  Government,  could  change  its 
form  if  necessary  and  adapt  itself  to  every  circumstance. 


151 


CHAPTER    X 

THE    NEW  REPUBLIC 

La  Ripublique  Franfatse  established — A  Political  Campaign— Gambetta  and  the 
Army  Bill — Speech  at  Versailles  (June  24th) — Journey  to  Savoy  and  Dauphine  : 
"  A  new  social  stratmn  " — The  Due  de  Broglie. 

Towards  the  end  of  1871  a  dream  that  had  long  been 
cherished  by  Gambetta  was  at  last  fulfilled.  As  early  as  the 
year  1868  he  had  discussed,  with  Lavertujon  and  SpuUer,  a 
scheme  for  starting  a  newspaper.  Dubochet,  the  owner  of  the 
Chateau  des  Cretes,  was  to  supply  the  funds  for  the  initial 
outlay.  The  paper  was  to  be  called  Le  Suffrage  universel. 
During  his  visit  to  San  Sebastian  he  referred  to  the  scheme 
in  his  letters  to  Barth^lemy.  At  last,  in  Novem.ber,  1871, 
with  the  help  of  his  friends  Arnaud  de  I'Ari^ge,  Dorian,  and 
that  fine  spirit  Scheurer-Kestner,  he  produced  La  Repuhlique 
frangaise.  Challemel-Lacour — whose  talents  increased  with 
every  year  that  passed — Spuller,  Ranc,  Dionys  Ordinaire, 
Charles  Floquet,  and  Gaston  Thomson  were  to  write  on  the 
subject  of  domestic  policy;  Antonin  Proust,  Gabrial  Hano- 
taux,  Camille  Barriere  and  Marcellin  Pellet  on  foreign  affairs ; 
Allain  Targe  on  finance,  Freycinet  on  war  and  public  works, 
Paul  Bert  on  public  education,  Berthelot  on  science,  and 
Lannelongue  and  Broca  on  hygiene  and  medicine.  Gustave 
Isambert  was  the  editor.  Joseph  Reinach  began  his 
career  in  this  paper,  and  later  on  Albert  Grodet  contributed 
to  it.  The  aim  of  the  founder  was  to  make  La  Repuhlique 
frangaise  an  organ  and  a  nursery  of  the  Government. 
It  was  an  educative  paper,  moderate  and  serious  in 
character,  and  its  leading  articles  gave  the  Republican  Party 

152 


THE   NEW   REPUBLIC 

their  cue.  Nearly  every  evening-  Gambetia  visited  tli<^  office, 
and  in  the  course  of  conversation  conveyed  to  his  friends,  in  a 
rough  form,  the  principal  features  of  the  articles  that  were  to 
appear.  One  of  his  colleagues  gives  us  a  picture  of  Gambetta 
in  an  almost  unknown  aspect — revising  the  first  page,  wel- 
coming with  genial  charm  the  help,  and  even  the  advice,  of 
the  humblest  and  youngest  writers,  describing  to  his  editors 
the  sittings  of  the  Assembly,  and  then  writing  a  letter  on  a 
corner  of  the  table.  "  It  was  an  indescribable  force,  a  focus; 
there  is  nothing  to  be  compared  with  it  !  " 

He  asked  the  help  of  his  Alsatian  friends.  He  wrote  to  the 
men  who  had  formerly  represented  Alsace-Lorraine  in  the 
National  Assembly:  "Until  we  have  restored  to  France  the 
territory  that  belongs  to  her,  we  have  no  right  to  feel  satisfied. 
I  am  firmly  persuaded  of  that."  The  publication  of  the  paper 
was  announced  in  Alsace-Lorraine  by  means  of  a  circular. 
"  I  w-ish  to  make  it  a  platform  from  which  the  whole  of  Europe 
mav  hear  us  clamouring,  day  by  day,  for  our  rights  and  our 
stolen  provinces.  France  is  at  the  mercy  of  Germany.  We 
are  in  a  state  of  latent  war;  neither  peace,  nor  liberty,  nor 
progress  is  possible  in  Europe." 

At  the  same  time  he  engaged  in  a  republican  and  patriotic 
crusade  all  over  the  country.  He  undertook  the  education  of 
the  masses.  His  progress,  amid  enthusiastic  crow-ds,  was 
marked  by  one  successful  skirmish  after  another.  He 
prophesied  the  coming  triumph  of  the  Republic,  hinted  that 
France  would  some  day  be  avenged,  left  hope  behind  him 
everywhere,  and  with  his  ardent  words  created  the  new 
democracy  as  miraculously  as  he  had  created  armies. 

On  November  i6  he  spoke  at  St.  Ouentin,  to  celebrate  the 
anniversary  of  the  town's  defence  and  to  honour  the  memory 
of  those  who  fell  there  :  "  What  was  lacking,"  he  said,  **  was 
what  all  nations  lack  when  they  have  allowed  themselves  to  be 
kept  too  long  in  servitude — faith  in  themselves  and  sufficient 
hatred  for  the  enemy.  France  must  resume  her  true  role  in 
the  world.  Let  us  never  speak  of  the  enem.y  without  making 
it  plainly   understood   that  w-e  are  always  thinking  of   him. 

153 


GAMBETTA 

Then  some  day  our  turn  will  come."     He  explained  what  he 
meant  by  laicisation  :   respect  for  liberty  of  conscience.     The 
Church    teaches    faith;    the    school    should    teach    scientific 
methods.     He  tried  to  win  the  country  clergy,  of  whom  he 
spoke  with  feeling  and  respect.     (The  distinction  between  the 
clergy  of  the  people  and  the  clergy  of  the  aristocracy,  and  be- 
tween the  secular  and  the  regular  clergy,  was  a  subject  as  often 
on  his  lips  as  it  had  been  on  those  of  Mirabeau.)     Finally 
he  demanded  that  France  should  be  free  to  di.spose  of  herself, 
and   he    called   upon   the  whole    nation,    after   the    series  of 
disasters  that  monarchical  governments  had  brought  upon  it, 
to  support  the  Republic.     "  It  may  perhaps  be  granted  us — I 
cannot   refrain   from   expressing   this   hope  even   on   so   sad 
an  occasion — to  have  a  share,  together  with  all  our  fellow- 
citizens,   in   the  founding  of  the  great  national   Republican 
Party,  whose  sole  ambition  is  to  seal  the  union  of  the  whole 
French  people  by  the  recognition  and  amalgamation  of  the 
rights  of  all.     Then  the  nation,  being  united  and  free,  can 
gather  up  all  its  forces,  and,  turning  its  attention  to  Europe, 
can  exact  the  restoration  of  its  property  and  the  place  that 
is  its  due." 

The  Assembly,  being  disappointed  by  the  failure  of  the 
coalition,  and  disturbed  by  the  progress  of  the  Republican 
Party,  was  more  than  ever  divided,  yet  hesitated  to  break 
with  Thiers,  whose  sympathies  were  growing  more  and  more 
Republican.  "  Believe  me,"  he  said,  "  you  who  wish  to  make 
trial  of  a  Republic, — as  you  are  right  in  wishing, — you  must 
make  it  loyal.  I  am  speaking  especially  to  those  to  whom 
the  Republic  is  a  constant  subject  of  thought,  and  I  am  one  of 
them."  (December  26.)  A  few  days  later,  on  January  7, 
1872,  twelve  out  of  seventeen  local  elections  resulted  in 
Republican  returns. 

On  January  20  Thiers,  being  defeated  on  a  measure  for  tax- 
ing raw  materials,  handed  in  his  resignation  ;  but  the  Assem- 
bly, pointing  out  that  a  vote  on  an  economic  question  could 
not  be  regarded  as  one  of  v/ant  of  confidence,  refused  to  accept 
it,  and  the  President  thereupon  withdrew  it.  The  Right  were 
making  ready  for  another  possible  crisis  in  connection  with 

154 


THE   NEW   REPUBLIC 

the  President's  office.  Negotiations  were  in  progress,  and  the 
Comte  de  Paris  had  announced  his  willingness  to  visit  the 
Comte  de  Cliambord  at  Antwerp.  The  point  at  issue  was  the 
nomination  of  tlie  Due  d'Aumale  in  place  of  Thiers.  The 
Comte  de  Chambord  took  the  matter  very  ill.  On  January  25 
he  made  an  attack  on  what  he  called  "  barren  coalitions"  in  a 
new  manifesto,  and  once  more  proclaimed  his  devotion  to  the 
white  flag.  "Nothing  will  shake  my  resolution,"  he  de- 
clared, "  nothing  will  wear  out  my  patience,  and  no  one,  on 
<iny  pretext  whatever,  will  induce  me  to  become  the  legitimate 
King  of  the  Revolution."  Thus,  every  time  that  the 
monarchists  made  any  attempt  at  union  and  resurrection,  the 
representativ('  of  the  legitimate  line  replaced  their  tombstone 
firmly  on  their  heads.  The  Bonapartists  tried  to  profit  by 
tliis  occasion.  On  February  11  Rouher  was  elected  in 
Corsica.  He  began  an  energetic  propaganda  in  France,  and 
created  in  the  Assembly  "  a  group  in  favour  of  appealing  to 
the  people." 

The  Assembly  was  prorogued  on  March  29  for  three  weeks. 
During  the  vacation  Gambetta  visited  Angers  and  Havre  in 
response  to  invitations  from  the  Republicans  of  those  towns. 

Speaking  at  Angers  on  April  7,  in  the  heart  of  a  district 
that  had  returned  Royalist  Deputies,  he  tried  to  reassure  the 
people,  and  inspire  them  with  confidence  in  the  wisdom  of  the 
Republican  Party.  To  those  who  made  distinctions  between 
Paris  and  the  provinces,  he  preached  the  importance  of  unity. 
He  laid  stress  on  the  divisions  that  existed  in  the  Right,  while 
the  Republican  Party,  on  the  contrary,  was  supporting  the 
established  Government,  and  devoting  itself  to  the  highest 
interests  of  the  nation  and  the  maintenance  of  peace  and 
order.  The  minority  in  the  Assembly  was  th*^  majority  in  the 
country  at  large.  The  speaker  proceeded  to  uphold  respect 
for  property,  liberty  of  conscience,  and  religious  liberty;  and 
ended  with  this  graceful  allusion  to  the  President  of  the  Re- 
public :  "He  knows  that  there  is  a  finer  thing  than  having 
written  the  annals  of  the  French  Revolution,  and  that  is  to 
accomplish   it." 

At  Havre,  on  April  18,  he  said  :  "  If,  amid  our  misfortunes, 

155 


GAMBETTA 

the  Republican  form  of  government  has  appeared  the  only 
one  possible,  it  is  because  no  other  was  in  a  position  to  con- 
front the  danger.  At  the  time  of  the  catastrophe  there  was  no 
thought  of  any  other  Government.  Where  were  the  claimants 
to  the  throne?  "  He  returned  to  the  problem  of  education. 
The  State  can  have  no  kind  of  authority  nor  power  in  matters 
of  dogma  and  philosophical  doctrine.  It  must  know  nothing 
of  such  things,  or  it  will  become  arbitrary.  When  he  was 
mockingly  described  as  a  commercial  traveller,  a  commis 
voyageur,  he  accepted  the  title  proudly.  "That  is  true 
enough,"  he  said.  "  I  travel  for  the  democracy:  I  hold  a 
commission  from  the  people.  If  I  believe  any  Government 
but  a  Republic  to  be  fatal  for  my  country  it  is  my  bounden 
duty  to  say  so  !  That  is  my  mission  !  I  will  fulfil  it,  come 
what  may  !" 

Incidentally  he  let  a  word  drop  which  led  to  much  argu- 
ment. "  Never  let  us  deny  the  poverty  and  suffering  of  a  sec- 
tion of  the  democracy.  But  let  us  also  beware  of  the  Utopias 
of  those  who  believe  that  a  panacea  or  a  formula  can  make 
the  world  happy.  There  is  no  social  remedy,  because  there 
is  not  one  social  question,  but  a  whole  series  of  problems  to 
be  solved  and  difficulties  are  to  be  overcome.  These  problems 
must  be  solved  one  by  one  and  not  by  means  of  any  single 
formula.  There  is  no  panacea."  He  did  not  say  :  "  There  is 
no  social  question."  He  said  :  "  There  is  not  07ie  social  ques- 
tion " — not  a  single  social  question,  nor  a  single  solution. 
His  formulae  must  be  thoughtfully  considered :  they  are 
composed  with  a  care  that  amounts  to  an  art.  They  may  lead 
one  astray.  Even  Challemel-Lacour  misunderstood  him  in 
this  case,  and  was  amazed  that  his  friend,  who  had  defined 
the  social  question  in  such  moving  terms  at  Bordeaux,  should 
now,  to  all  appearance,  deny  its  existence.  Louis  Blanc  made 
the  same  mistake,  and  protested  with  some  vigour.  This,  no 
doubt,  was  exactly  what  Gambetta  desired  :  to  oppose  the 
Socialists  without  cutting  off  communications  with  them.  He 
seized  his  opportunity.  La  Republique  frangaise  published 
an  answer  to  Louis  Blanc,  whom  Gambetta  at  heart  disliked, 
as  became  more  apparent  later.     Louis  Blanc  was  right  when 

156 


THK   NEW:  REPUBLIC 

he  said  there  was  a  social  problem,  the  problem  of  the  relations 
between  capital  and  labour.  But  this  problem  involves  a 
host  of  others,  and  Gambetta  affirmed  an  equally  obvious 
truth  when  he  said  that  there  was  no  remedy,  no  panacea. 

Finally  he  urged  that  a  new  Assembly  should  be  convoked 
in  Paris,  "  Paris,  the  cradle  of  our  civilisation,  the  buckler  of 
our  public  liberties,  the  teacher  and  guide  of  the  national 
genius,  Paris  that  may  be  made  a  mark  for  the  imbecile  hatred 
of  a  few  rustic  boors,  but  can  never  be  downtrodden  nor  dis- 
honoured." He  asked  for  the  support  of  the  new  c:jnveris. 
"  It  has  been  said  that  our  party  is  closed  to  newcomers.  It 
is  not  tru(^  !  "  Thus,  while  breaking  away  from  the  socialists, 
he  identified  himself  at  the  same  moment  with  the  reconcilia- 
tion with  Paris.     And  he  proclaimed  the  Republic  open  to  all. 

On  May  g  a  great  number  of  Alsatians  came  to  present  hmi 
with  a  bronze.  "  Tenacity  is  one  of  the  characteristics  of  your 
race,"  he  said  to  them.  "  It  is  for  that  reason  that  our  dear 
Alsace  was  especially  necessary  to  French  unity ;  it  represented 
that  unquenchable  energy  which  exists  among  us,  side  by  side 
with  a  fickleness  and  levity  which  at  times,  unfortunately, 
mar  our  national  character.  Until  Alsace  comes  back  into 
the  family  circle  there  will  be  no  France  and  no  Iiurope.  Let 
us  not  speak  of  revenge,^  let  us  utter  no  rash  word,  let  us  think 
over  the  matter  calmly  and  soberly.  For  my  part,  )  have  no 
other  ambition  than  faithfullv  to  observe  the  mandate  you 
have  given  me,  a  mandate  that  I  look  upon  as  my  greatest 
honour,  the  ruling  principle  of  my  life."  He  contmued  to  be 
the  representative  and  the  mouthpiece  of  the  exiled  provinces. 

The  Assembly  met  again  on  April  22.  The  Right  aimed 
at  compromising  Gambetta  by  a  debate  on  war  contracts. 
Members  had  already  talked  loudly  of  scandals  in  connection 
with  these  contracts,  and  some  startling  disclosures  were 
expected.  Rouher  launched  out  into  an  attack  on  the  National 
Defence  Government  and  a  defence  of  the  Fmpire.  The  Due 
d'Audiffret-Pasquier    replied    to    him     in     ringing     tones : 

*  Revanche,  as  applied  to  the  Franco- Prussian  quarrel,  has  various  shades  of  mean 
ing  according  to  the  context  ;  sometimes  it  merely  means  "return  match,"  at  other 
times  "  revenge,"  "  retribution,"  or  "  requital." — Translator's  note. 


GAMBETTA 

"  'Varus,  give  us  back  our  legions!  "■  Give  us  back  the 
glory  that  was  our  fathers'  !  Give  us  back  our  pro- 
vinces!  "  "  Mexico  has  you  in  its  grip,"  cried  Gambetta. 
*•  Mexico  is  dogging  your  heels.  Mexico,  through  the  eternal 
Nemesis  of  events,  has  already  wreaked  a  just  vengeance  on 
all  who  have  risked  the  honour  and  the  greatness  of  their 
country  in  that  nefarious  enterprise!  "  xA.mong  all  the  con- 
tracts of  September  4  the  only  one  that  gave  rise  to  serious 
comment  was  a  purchase  of  guns  in  America  by  the  "  Survey 
Commission."  Gambetta  shielded  the  Commission;  some 
letters  incriminating  the  lieutenant-colonel  who  was  its  presi- 
dent were  read  out  to  the  House,  and  the  Assembly  sent  back 
the  report  to  the  Ministers  concerned  in  the  matter.  The 
attack  had  missed  fire. 

Throughout  these  lively  debates,  Thiers  was  carrying  on 
the  negotiations  for  the  evacuation  of  the  occupied  territory 
and  the  vote  on  the  new  army  bill.  France's  rapid  recovery 
had  begun  to  inspire  the  Emperor  William  and  Bismarck 
with  misgivings.  The  Comte  de  Gontaut-Biron,  our  am- 
bassador in  Berlin,  wrote  :  "  The  preparations  for  our  army 
bill,  the  threats  of  revenge  that  seem  likely  to  materialise 
through  Gambetta's  activities,  and  the  rumours  of  an  under- 
standing between  him  and  Thiers  for  the  reorganisation  of  the 
army  have  created  a  profound  and  disturbing  impression  on 
the  Emperor's  mind."  Thiers  wrote  back  in  answer:  "We 
want  peace.  As  for  our  so-called  armements  ('  armaments  ') ; 
it  is  not  correct  French  to  describe  them  by  that  term."  Then 
he  set  forth  his  aims  as  regards  army  reconstruction  :  no  com- 
pulsory service,  but  a  professional  army;  a  reversion  to  the 
Act  of  1832,  w^hich  limited  its  effective  strength  to  400,000 
men.  He  was  compelled,  however,  to  bow^  to  the  will  of  the 
Assembly,  which,  yielding  in  its  turn  to  the  pressure  of  public 
opinion,  intended  henceforth  to  summon  to  the  colours  all 
citizens  capable  of  bearing  arms.  Thiers,  fearing  an  aggres- 
sion   on    Germany's  part — the    military    clique   were    busily 

*  The  Emperor  Augustus,  after  the  defeat  of  the   Romans  under    Varus  by  the 
Germans  under  Arminius  (Herrmann),  is  said  to  have  exclaimed  to  the  unfortunate 
eneral  :  "Varus,  give  me  back  my  legions  !  "—Translator's  note. 

158 


THE   NEW   REPUBLIC 

whispering  their  schemes  in  tiie  Emperor's  ear,  and  Bismarck 
was  beginning  to  growl — insisted  on  a  five  years'  term  of 
service,  threatening  to  resign  if  this  were  not  enforced.  We 
should  thus  be  enal)led  to  call  up  two  or  three  classes  imme- 
diately on  the  outbreak  of  hostilities  (we  had  as  yet  no 
reserves).  On  June  lo  the  Right  tried  to  compass  his  down- 
fall by  voting  an  amendment  which  would  reduce  the  term  of 
service  to  four  years.  It  was  through  Gambetta's  support  that 
the  venerable  statesman  carried  the  day.  The  Assembly 
passed  the  five  years'  service  clause,  to  the  signal  discomfiture 
of  the  German  Government  and  General  Staff.  Gambetta 
shares  with  Thiers  the  credit  of  having  reorganised  our 
military  system  after  1870. 

The  discussion  on  the  army  bill  had  ended ;  the  negotiations 
over  the  evacuation  of  our  territory  were  nearing  their  close  : 
the  Right  considered  that  the  hour  had  struck  for  laying  their 
terms  before  the  President.     A  deputation  of  nine  members; 
including  the  Due  Albert  de  Broglie,  who  had  just  returned 
to  France  from  his  post  as  ambassador  in  London,  the  Due 
d'Audiffret-Pasquier  and  General  Changarnier,  proceeded  to 
his  house  on  June  20  and  implored  him  "  to  relv  on  the  Right 
as  his  mainstay   in   ihe  light  against  Radicalism."     Thiers 
replied  that  he  had  not  failed  in  his  duty,  that  his  Ministry, 
drawn     from     Republicans     and     Monarchists     alike,     had 
triumphed  over  the  Commune,  and  that,  having  accepted  the 
stewardship  of  the   Republic,  he  would   not   be  justified   in 
opposing  the  election  of  Republican  candidates.     He  added 
that  the  rifts  within  the  Monarchist  party  made  a  restoration 
of  the  Monarchy  impossible  and  that  they  must  now  accept 
as    existing    de    jure    a    Republic    which    already    existed 
de  facto.     "  By  wise  enactments,"  he  said,  "  let  us  entrust 
the  legislative  authority  to  two  Chambers;  let  us  invest  the 
Upper  House  and  the  Executive  with  the  power  of  dissolving, 
by  a  common  agreement,  the  Chamber  of  Deputies  :    under 
these  conditions,  the  Government  will  be  strong  enough  to 
defy  the  leaders  of  the  mob  to  do  their  worst."     As  for  the 
Radicals,  he  expressed  his  disapproval  of  their  principles  and 
their    camf)aign ;    he    deplored    Gambetta's    attacks    on    the 

'59 


GAMBETTA 

Assembly.  It  the  country  voted  for  this  party,  it  thereby 
gave  proof  of  its  desire  to  set  the  Republic  on  a  firm 
foundation,  by  supporting  those  candidates  who  proclaimed 
their  attachment  to  the  institutions  now  in  force.  Moreover, 
the  Assembly  was  the  sovereign  body ;  it  could,  if  it  thought 
fit  to  do  so,  declare  for  a  Monarchy.  "  Seeing  that  you  are  in  a 
majority,  why  don't  you  yourselves  propose  that  the  kingship 
be  restored?"  The  "Council  of  Nine"  issued  a  Report 
which  wound  up  with  the  following  words  :  "  Regretting  their 
inability  to  come  to  an  understanding  with  the  President  of  the 
Republic  as  to  the  proper  form  that  a  Conservative  Republic 
should  assume,  the  delegates  were  compelled  to  withdraw,  but 
their  views  are  unchanged,  and  they  reserve  the  full  right  of 
upholding  those  opinions."  It  was  a  definite  breach.  One 
could  feel  that  the  storm  was  gathering.  The  Assembly  was 
prorogued  from  August  3  to  November  11.  Gambetta,  deter- 
mined to  make  the  most  of  this  respite,  went  off  to  spread  the 
gospel  of  the  new  Republic  throughout  the  length  and  breadth 
of  the  country. 

At  Versailles,  on  June  24,  he  celebrated  Hoche's  birthday. 
Henceforth  this  became  every  year  a  sort  of  pilgrimage  for 
the  Republican  party,  at  which  Gambetta,  the  loyal  guardian 
of  the  army,  the  inaugurator  of  its  renewed  greatness,  and  now 
in  some  indefinable  way  the  mouthpiece  of  the  nation  in  arms 
and  the  tribune  of  the  soldiers,  sought  to  imbue  France  with 
love  for  the  flag  and  with  the  cult  of  discipline  and  of  law. 
"  A  man's  first  duty  is  to  fight  for  his  country,"  he  declared. 
Those  who  call  him  a  demagogue  may  well  ponder  over  these 
sermon-like  trumpet-calls  to  military  and  patriotic  duty.  He 
sets  up  as  a  model  the  young  hero  who  writes:  "In  this 
country  you  will  have  no  peace  or  repose  in  the  future  without 
religious  toleration."  He  went  one  better  than  upholding  this 
principle  with  tongue  and  pen  ;  he  put  it  into  practice.  It  was 
in  his  eyes  the  only  real  means  of  avoiding  internal  discord. 
To  such  men  as  he  we  must  pay  that  supreme  homage  which 
Tacitus  recommended  in  the  case  of  great  citizens — the 
homage,  not  of  praise,  but  of  faithful  imitation.  He  preached 
further  that  after  civil  war  we  should  let  bygones  be  bygones, 

160 


THE   NEW   REPUBLIC 

reminding  his  hearers  how  Hoche  had  proclaimed  an  amnest) 
on  the  very  day  after  his  victory.  The  rules  of  politics  are 
eternal,  because  they  are  based  on  morality;  there  can  be  no 
true,  efficient,  fruitful  statesmanship  where  might  violates, 
even  if  only  for  the  moment,  the  laws  of  justice  and  humanity. 
On  July  14,  at  La  Fertd-sous-Jouarre  :  "The  unity  that 
was  attained  on  July  14,  1789,  must  be  restored.  Every  effort 
has  been  made  to  sow  divisions  between  peasant  and  artisan, 
between  artisan  and  bourgeois ;  these  elements  must  once  more 
be  welded  together."  He  urges  the  Republicans  to  exhibit 
their  principles  in  the  full  light  of  day:  "Let  your  fields, 
your  religious  festivals,  your  meetings,  your  markets, 
your  fairs,  serve  as  opportunities  for  political  discussion  and 
education." 

To  the  workers  of  the  Loire  Department  :  "  Wherever  there 
is  a  French  mother,  she  should  bring  up  her  children  to  show 
a  religious  love  for  France.  If  there  is  anything  to  console  us 
amid  the  sorrow  and  shame  of  our  bereaved  country,  it  is  the 
thought  that  the  mothers  and  the  patriots  of  France  will  supply 
her  future  champions  and  avengers.  But  before  we  think  of 
the  future  we  must  make  sure  of  the  present,  and  establish 
once  and  for  all  a  Government  founded  on  justice  and  equality, 
not  an  envious  and  grudging  equality,  but  that  equality  of 
rights  and  duties  which  recognises  no  other  distinctions 
betw^een  man  and  man  than  those  arising  from  character, 
intelligence  and  energy  in  the  battle  of  life." 

At  Chamb^ry,  the  Prefect  having  refused  to  authorise  the 
banquet  that  had  been  arranged  to  celebrate  the  anniversary  of 
the  First  Republic,  Gambetta  received  the  guests  at  his  hotel 
in  successive  batches.  Each  of  these  constantly  changing 
audiences  was  met  with  a  fresh  stream  of  eloquence.  These 
days  in  Savoy  remind  us  of  that  day  in  February,  1848,  when, 
on  the  steps  of  the  Hotel  de  Ville,  Lamartine,  for  hours  at  a 
stretch,  had  confronted  the  successive  waves  of  popular  fury 
with  all  the  resources  of  his  clear  intellect  and  dauntless 
courage.  In  the  case  of  Gambetta,  however,  the  crowd  were 
willing  listeners.  "The  Republic  should  not  mean  the  privi- 
leged rule  of  a  few;  it  should  be  a  tool  that  all  may  handle." 

161  M 


GAMBETTA 

He  advocated  caution  and  patience.  "  Let  us  shelve  the  dis- 
cussion of  theories  and  keep  for  the  time  being  to  questions  of 
conduct,  let  us  tend  the  Republic  with  all  possible  care  while 
It  is  still  in  the  bud,  let  us  watch  over  the  young  tree  with 
loving  devotion." 

Always  he  impresses  them  with  the  need  for  a  sense  of 
proportion.  "Let  us  draw  up  a  well-defined  programme,  let 
us  put  the  most  urgent  problems  in  the  forefront,  not  all  at 
once,  but  one  after  another.  We  must  learn  not  to  get  the 
threads  entangled,  or  we  shall  risk  losing  everything."  This 
is  the  golden  rule  of  Descartes:  "In  order  to  solve  diffi- 
culties the  more  readily,  split  them  up  into  as  many  parts 
as  is  possible  or  necessary." 

And  always  he  harps  upon  the  frontier  :  "  France  has  seen  a 
portion  of  her  inheritance  wrested  from  her;  she  must  recover 
her  loss.  That  is  the  work  we  have  to  do  :  let  us  think  of  it 
always,  but  speak  of  it — never  !  "  Yet  he  did  speak  of  it,  for 
all  that. 

At  Albertville  he  reverts  to  the  religious  question.  "  Go 
into  your  places  of  worship,  believe,  affirm,  pray.  What  I 
demand  is  liberty,  an  equal  liberty  for  you  and  for  me,  for 
my  philosophy  and  for  your  religious  beliefs.  We  are  not 
the  foes  of  religion  ;  we  want  to  see  it  set  on  a  firm  basis,  free 
and  inviolable." 

At  Grenoble,  on  September  26,  in  the  course  of  a  speech  that 
was  destined  to  have  far-reaching  effects  and  to  produce  its 
reactions  in  the  Assembly,  he  hails  the  advent  of  democracy  : 
"What  do  you  expect?  Even  now,  after  five-and-forty 
years,  certain  sections  of  society  cannot  bring  themselves  to 
acquiesce,  not  merely  in  the  Republic,  but  in  the  results  it  has 
entailed.  And  it  is  to  this  want  of  resolution  in  a  considerable 
section  of  the  French  bourgeoisie  that  I  attribute  all  that  is 
flaccid,  unstable  and  invertebrate  in  the  politics  of  the  day. 
We  are  really  inclined  to  ask  ourselves  how  these  people  can 
shut  ilicir  eyes  to  a  phenomenon  that  ought  to  be  glaringly 
obvious.  Have  they  not  seen,  since  the  fall  of  the  Empire, 
the  rise  of  a  new  generation,  keenly  intelligent,  showing  an- 
aptitude  for  aflfairs  and  a  proper  regard  for  the  rights  of  every 

162 


THE   NEW   REPUBLIC 

citizen  ?  Have  they  nut  seen  men  of  this  stamp  gaining  an 
entry  into  municipal  councils,  raising  themselves,  step  by  step, 
into  positions  on  the  other  elective  councils  of  the  country, 
claiming  and  making  good  their  claim  to  play  their  part— an 
ever  growing  part— in  the  electoral  contests?  Have  we  not 
seen  this  working-class  element  carve  their  way  into  the 
political  world  ?  Is  it  not  a  sign  of  the  times  that  the  country, 
after  testing  several  forms  of  government,  now  at  last  would 
fain  apply  to  another  social  stratum  in  order  to  make  a  trial 
of  the  Republican  form  ?  Yes,  I  feel  it  in  the  air,  it  is  coming, 
it  is  already  here — that  new  social  stratum  which  has  had  a 
share  in  political  affairs  for  nearly  eighteen  months  past,  and 
which  is  certainly  no  whit  inferior  to  its  predecessors." 

On  September  29,  at  Thonon,  a  deputation  of  Alsace- 
Lorrainers  came  from  Geneva  to  pay  him  their  compliments. 
At  this  very  moment,  on  the  other  side  of  the  new  frontier, 
our  country's  wounds  were  being  ripped  open  by  some  painful 
incidents.  It  was  decreed  that  after  October  i  all  Alsace- 
Lorrainers  who  had  not  chosen  to  remain  French  citizens 
should  be  regarded  as  Germans,  and  that  all  who  made  that 
choice  should  be  compelled  to  leave  the  country.  Then  began 
a  pitiable  exodus  :  during  the  second  fortnight  of  September, 
nearly  200,000  Alsace-Lorrainers  migrated  to  France.  Gam- 
betta,  heart-broken  at  these  expulsions,  which  left  the  country 
entirely  in  the  hands  of  Germans,  tried  to  speak:  "  Ah,  they 
never  trafficked  in  their  blood,  those  two  beloved  provinces  :  it 
was  their  children  whose  breasts  were  the  first  to  be  pierced  ! 
Noble  provinces,  always  heart  and  soul  for  France,  always 
looking  towards  her  flag. — *  Yes,  we  suffer,'  they  said,  '  but  it 
is  for  our  country's  sake  that  we  suffer,  the  very  life-blood  of 
the  nation  courses  through  our  veins  !  .  .  .'  Gentlemen,  I 
cannot  go  on,  I  cannot.  ...  It  is  .  .  .  those  provinces 
..."  and  utterly  spent,  his  voice  choked  with  tears,  he 
stopped,  and  flung  himself  into  a  seat.  His  hearers  were 
deeply  moved ;  the  sob  was  more  impressive  than  any  speech 
could  have  been. 

A  member  of  the  departmental  council  having  said  that  if 
the  kingship  were  restored  in  France,  Savoy  would  unite  her- 

163  M  2 


GAMBETTA 

srlf  with  Switzerland,  because  "  where  liberty  is,  there  is  our 
country,"  the  sensitive  patriotism  of  Gambetta  burst  into 
angry  flame.  "  It  is  well  to  weigh  our  words  carefully  when 
we  speak  of  France's  heritage.  France,  as  you  say  with 
justice,  will  be  all  the  more  attractive  when  her  destinies  are 
controlled  by  all  her  citizens,  and  not  swayed  by  the  caprice  of 
one.  Yes,  France  in  all  her  glory,  France,  under  the  auspices 
of  the  Republic,  once  more  at  the  head  of  civilisation,  offering 
to  the  world  her  legions  of  artists  and  workmen,  of  peasants, 
traders  and  professional  men — yes,  it  is  worth  while  to  belong 
to  such  a  France  as  that,  and  there  is  no  man  who  would  not 
then  be  proud  to  say,  in  his  turn,  '  I  am  a  French  citizen  !  * 
But  there  is  another  France  that  I  cherish  no  less,  another 
France  just  as  dear  to  me — the  France  that  has  been  van- 
quished, overwhelmed,  humbled  in  the  dust.  Yes,  I  adore 
that  France  as  a  mother;  it  is  to  that  France  that  we  must 
sacrifice  our  lives,  our  love  of  self,  our  personal  enjoyment;  it 
is  of  that  France  that  we  must  say,  '  Where  France  is,  there  is 
our  country  !  '  " 

At  the  very  moment  when  the  severance  was  becoming  even 
wider  and  more  cruel,  the  youthful  orator,  in  all  the  fervour 
of  his  filial  love,  proclaimed  with  ever  increasing  energy  his 
sacred  ideals  :  French  unity,  eternal  remembrance  of  the  lost 
provinces,  the  religion  of  patriotism.  He  loved  France 
passionately  and  tenderly,  as  one  loves  a  living  creature. 

His  growing  successes  made  no  little  stir  among  the 
Monarchists.  Above  all,  the  phrase  coined  at  Grenoble,  "  the 
new  social  stratum,"  caused  much  fluttering  in  the  dovecotes. 
On  October  lo,  the  permanent  committee  of  the  Assembly 
proceeded  to  acquaint  Thiers  with  their  gloomy  forebodings. 
The  President  replied  that  the  speech  in  question  was  "  deeply 
regrettable,  ill-advised,  very  ill-advised.  There  are  no  class 
divisions  in  the  nation.  If  any  such  theory  had  been  put 
forward  in  Parliament,  it  would  have  been  strenuously  opposed 
by  the  Government."  Thiers  was  wrong,  or  perhaps  he  mis- 
quoted intentionally.  Gambetta  in  his  Grenoble  speech  had 
not  referred  to  "classes."  He  had  always  and  everywhere 
scouted  the  idea  of  class  divisions ;  before  and  after,  he  never 

164 


THE   NEW   REPUBLIC 

ceased  to  advocate  tlie  union  of  the  proletariate  and  the 
middle  class;  he  was  ever  anxious  to  effect  a  combination 
between  artisan  and  bourgeois,  peasant  and  townsman.  What 
he  had  said  was  "  a  new  social  stratum."  It  was  a  fact,  a  fact 
that  such  men  at  Chateaubriand,  Royer-Collard,  De  Serre, 
Montalembert,  Tocqueville  and  Prevost-Paradol  had  lon^ 
since  proclaimed  in  far  bolder  language,  a  fact  that  has  per- 
sisted throughout  the  whole  of  our  history  as  a  very  law  of  our 
corporate  life.  We  see,  even  in  the  Middle  Ages,  the 
emergence  of  an  intermediate  caste  between  the  villeins  and  the 
nobles — the  men  of  trades  and  crafts,  the  burgesses;  then,  the 
continual  advance  of  this  Third  Estate,  gaining  in  the 
sixteenth  century  an  undisputed  influence  over  the  monarchy, 
reigning  supreme  under  Louis  XIV.  in  politics  and  in  the 
army,  in  letters  and  in  arts;  finallVi  under  the  Revolution, 
seizing  the  reins  of  Government.  Behind  the  Third  Estate 
and  below  it  we  see  another  social  layer,  the  one  that  under 
Louis  XIV.  provoked  Fenelon,  Vauban  and  Boisguillebert 
to  cries  of  pain  and  revolt,  those  sons  of  grooms,  coopers, 
stonemasons,  lackeys  and  stable-hands,  who  were  destined  to 
win  laurels  for  Revolutionary  France  on  the  battlefield  and 
save  her  from  the  clutches  of  the  European  coalition.  And 
when  the  vote  by  property  qualification  gave  place  to  universal 
suffrage,  which  Guizot  called  a  "  dark  and  immeasurable 
ocean,"  how  could  this  new  force  fail  to  thrust  the  popular 
element  into  the  local  councils  and  the  Dolitical  assemblies  ? 

The  son  of  a  grocer  at  Cahors  rising  to  be  the  administrative 
chief  of  France — is  it  not  a  downright  scandal  ?  In  the  eyes 
of  the  Parliamentary  Right,  it  was  something  akin  to  the 
invasion  of  the  Roman  Empire  by  the  barbarian  hordes. 
Under  Louis  XIV.  the  Due  de  Saint-Simon,  furious  at  being 
a  political  nonentity  and  at  witnessing  the  success  of  "men 
who  did  not  count,"  like  Colbert,  secretlv  vented  his  wrath 
against  "  this  long  reign  of  the  vile  middle  class." 

Tocqueville  had  gone  much  further,  as  regards  not  only  the 
advent  of  democracy  but  also  the  Concordat  and  ihe  rights  of 
property.  Pretexts  had  to  be  found,  however;  nothing  was 
exempt  from  attack.       It   was  essential  to  drive  Thiers  into 

165 


GAMBETTA 

a  corner,  by  laying  on  him  the  blame  for  the  growing 
diffusion  of  revolutionary  and  subversive  doctrines.  To  the 
Right,  the  Republic  was  merely  a  recrudescence  of  the  crises 
of  1793  and  1848,  in  more  fixed  and  enduring  form.  They 
dreaded  universal  suffrage,  although  they  themselves  had 
been  elected  under  that  system,  had  appealed  to  it,  and  were 
destined  in  the  end  to  preserve  it:  this  vital  contradiction 
proved  a  source  of  embarrassment  and  weakness  for  their 
party.  Gambetta,  on  the  other  hand,  did  not  kick  down  the 
ladder  by  which  he  himself  had  risen.  Instead  of  seeking  to 
rebuff  the  newcomers  whom  universal  suffrage  brought  into 
public  life,  he  gave  them  a  warm  welcome  and  did  his  utmost 
to  enlighten  them  by  his  superior  knowledge. 

As  soon  as  the  House  resumed  its  sittings  on  November  13, 
General  Changarnier  gave  notice  of  a  question  to  be  asked 
by  him  concerning  Gambetta's  tour  through  Savoy  and 
Dauphin(f.  The  Assembly  resolved  that  the  debate  should 
take  place  on  the  i8th. 

The  Due  Albert  de  Broglie  had  just  left  the  London 
Embassy  in  order  to  lead  the  campaign  against  Thiers.  He 
was  now  fifty-one  years  of  age.  A  grandson  of  Madame  de 
Stael  and  a  son  of  the  Minister  who  held  office  under  the  July 
Monarchy,  he  brought  into  the  political  arena  all  the  resources 
of  a  varied  and  exquisite  culture  allied  to  an  intellect  of  great 
natural  keenness,  a  lofty  pride  and  an  indomitable  courage. 
He  had  inherited,  among  other  things,  the  virtues  of  his 
father,  "sincerity  of  feeling,  frankness  of  speech,  and  a  con- 
tempt for  the  arts  of  winning  popularity  with  the  masses  or 
favour  among  the  great."  ^  Like  his  father,  too,  he  exhibited 
a  certain  shyness  of  manner,  a  certain  native  awkwardness, 
which  drew  around  him  a  barrier  of  reserve.  This  shyness 
made  him  seem  a  trifle  supercilious.  He  was  charged  with 
stiffness  in  intercourse ;  his  friends  called  him  absent-minded, 
and  he  was  indeed  absent-minded  when  it  suited  his  purpose. 
He  was  far  from  inattentive  to  men  and  things  that  seemed 

^  From  Albert  de  Broglie's  foreword  to  his  father's  book,   Vues  sur  U  gouvemement 
de  la  France. 

166 


THE  NEW   REPUBLIC 

to  merit  his  attention,  but  he  did  not  concentrate  on  anything 
that  seemed  unworthy  of  the  effort.  His  religious  preceptor, 
X.  Doudain,  who  really  belonged  in  spirit  to  the  eighteenth 
century,  had  no  liking  for  the  somewhat  undemocratic 
Liberalism  of  the  circles  in  which  his  pupil  moved.  Doudain 
had  sounded  him  to  the  core,  and  had  tried  to  warn  him 
against  developing  an  excessive  conceit  of  himself  and 
assuming  an  air  of  infallibility.  He  wrote  to  Albert  de  Broglie 
when  the  latter  was  a  young  man  of  twenty-four  :'*  May  God 
preserve  you  from  pride,  from  vanity,  from  insolence,  from 
scorn  of  your  fellow-men,  from  being  wedded  eternally  to  your 
own  opinions,  from  a  mocking  and  dictatorial  attitude,  in 
short,  from  all  the  vices  that  intellectual  superiority  brings  in 
its  train,  and  especially  from  the  worst  vice  of  all,  the  vice  of 
flattering  yourself  that  you  do  not  make  others  too  conscious 
of  your  superiority.  In  a  word,  my  dear  son,  I  wish  you 
what  you  can  never  attain."     (July  22,  1845.) 

The  Due  Albert  de  Broglie  had  a  distrust  for  democratic 
fickleness,  which  to  his  way  of  thinking  did  not  harmonise 
with  a  policy  of  foreign  alliances.  He  held  that  parlia- 
mentary government,  void  of  all  hereditary  tradition,  could 
not  take  firm  root  in  our  country,  and  that  the  elective  prin- 
ciple was  out  of  keeping  with  Presidential  irresponsibility. 
He  hit  the  mark  when  he  observed  that  the  form  which  the 
executive  should  take  in  a  parliamentary  republic  and  in  a 
centralised  State  is  the  crucial  problem.  But,  as  regards  the 
possible  solutions,  he  proved  more  uncompromising  than  his 
father,  who  had  foreseen  the  coming  of  parliamentary  institu- 
tions, whether  under  a  monarchical  or  under  a  republican 
regime.  He  had  framed  for  himself  a  theory  of  French  society 
and  of  the  conditions  necessary  to  its  existence,  and  thought 
it  beneath  him  to  modify  that  theory  in  any  particular. 
Imprisoned  of  his  own  free  will  in  a  world  where  social 
conventions  rank  so  high  and  are  the  very  keystone  of  the 
arch,  he  utterly  ignored  the  stresses  and  surges  of  popular 
feeling;  he  would  not  admit  that  any  reforms  could  be  success- 
ful in  France  save  those  that  had  already  gained  a  secure 
foothold    among    other    nations,    and    even    in    monarchical 

167 


GAMBETTA 

countries.  Within  certain  narrow  limits,  he  would  have  been 
a  great  Minister  under  an  absolute  or  even  a  constitutional 
monarchy.  He  looked  upon  democracy  as  vulgar,  and 
frankly  told  it  so;  democracy  looked  upon  him  as  insolent, 
and  told  him  so  with  equal  frankness.  He  found  balm  for  his 
wounds  bv  honouring  French  literature  and  becoming  an 
excellent  historian.  Whatever  one's  general  view's  might  be, 
the  burning  question  of  the  hour  was  whether  a  revival  of  the 
kingship  was  feasible,  and,  seeing  that  this  monarchist 
Assembly  had  no  monarch  at  its  head,  whether  France 
could  be  left  in  a  perpetual  state  of  interregnum. 


i68 


CHAPTER    XI 

THE    FALL   OF  THIERS  :    MARSHAL    MacMAHON. 

Kffect  of  Ganibella's  Speeches  on  the  Assembly— The  Barodct  Election— Fall  of 
Thiers— Marshal  MacMahon's  Presidency  (May  24th,  1873)— Gambetta  and  the 
Marshal— Final  Attempt  to  Restore  the  Monarchy. 

In  Thiers'  opinion,  the  system  under  which  France  was  then 
administered,  namely,  a  single  and  sovereign  Assembly  with 
an  executive  drawn  from  its  midst  and  responsible  to  it,  could 
not  last.  A  continuation  of  this  system,  he  held,  could  be 
desired  only  by  the  extremists  on  either  wing  :  by  the  extreme 
Left,  because  a  single  and  sovereign  Chamber  was  in  keeping 
with  its  political  doctrines;  the  extreme  Right,  because  it 
hoped  to  find  in  the  weakness  of  a  provisional  Government  an 
opportunity  for  restoring  the  Monarchy.  Thiers  regarded  it 
as  his  duty  to  warn  the  Assembly  that  by  leavmg  behind  it  an 
administrative  machinery  in  imperfect  working  order  it  was 
pursuing  a  course  fraught  with  danger  to  the  country.  He 
thought  that  he  was  thereby  aiding  the  cause  of  true  Con- 
servatism. It  was  not,  we  must  confess,  a  revolutionary  idea  : 
but  on  the  other  hand  it  was  not  a  step  towards  the  monarchy, 
and  hence  to  the  Monarchists  it  spelt  treason. 

On  November  13,  1872,  he  read  out  his  message,  the  most 
important  and  decisive  message  of  his  Presidential  career  : 
"  The  Republic  exists,  it  is  the  Government  of  the  country 
by  law  established  :  to  aim  at  any  other  form  of  government 
would  be  a  fresh  revolution,  and  the  most  appalling  revolution 
of  all.  The  country  has  entrusted  you  with  the  task  of  securing 
for  it,  in  the  first  place,  peace;  after  peace,  order;  with  order, 
the  recovery  of  its  former  power,  and  finally  a  regular  Govern- 
ment.    The   last-named    is  the   most   momentous   duty;   and 

169 


GAMBETTA 

when,  on  the  date  that  you  shall  determine,  you  have  selected 
from  amongst  you  the  men  who  are  to  consider  the  means  of 
carrying  it  out — then,  if  you  require  our  advice,  we  shall  give 
it  you  loyally  and  without  flinching."  The  Left  were  loud  in 
their  applause,  but  the  Right  gave  vent  to  indignation,  and 
proposed  to  nominate  a  committee  of  inquiry  with  reference 
to  the  message.  Next  day  La  Republique  frangaise  issued 
the  following  comment:  *'  Yesterday  marks  an  epoch  in  the 
history  of  France.  M.  Thiers  has  cut  the  painter.  He  has 
broken  with  the  Monarchy.  He  has  proclaimed  the  Republic 
as  the  sole  form  of  government  that  is  henceforth  suitable  for 
our  country.  Happy  the  man  who,  at  certain  moments 
of  his  life,  can  thus  act  as  interpreter  for  a  whole  nation  ! 
M.  Thiers  yesterday  introduced  our  young  Republic  to  old 
Europe." 

On  the  1 8th  General  Changarnier  put  his  question  on  Gam- 
betta's  tour,  entreating  the  President  of  the  Republic  to  sever 
all  connection  with  a  firebrand  who  was  ready  to  set  the  whole 
country  by  the  ears.  The  Due  de  Broglie  asked  the  Presi- 
dent to  repeat  the  statements  of  policy  he  had  made  before 
the  permanent  committee.  "It  is  an  insult,"  replied  Thiers, 
"  to  demand  in  this  House  that  I  should  make  a  profession  of 
faith,  when  forty  years  of  political  activity  have  made  the 
world  familiar  with  my  principles.  If  anyone  shows  signs  of 
distrusting  me,  I  have  a  right  to  find  out  from  the  House 
whether  I  possess  its  confidence.  I  request  that  a  vote  may 
be  taken  forthwith." 

Changarnier  accused  him  of  "senile  ambition."  "Yes," 
said  Thiers  in  reply,  "I  feel  offended,  and  with  good  reason. 
After  all  that  I  have  done  within  the  last  two  years,  even  a 
hint  of  distrust  is,  I  make  bold  to  say,  an  act  of  ingratitude. 
M.  Gambetta  may  have  been  the  ostensible  target  for  this 
question,  but  in  reality  it  was  aimed  at  me."  Then,  instead  of 
accepting  a  simple  vote  of  confidence,  he  inserted  the  following 
amendment :  "  The  Assembly,  confident  in  the  energy  of  the 
Government,  and  repudiating  the  doctrines  voiced  at  the 
Grenoble  banquet  ..."  The  extreme  Left  voted  against  the 
Government ;  a  large  section  of  the  Left  abstained  from  votings ; 

170 


THE   FALL   OF   THIERS 

only  379  votes  were  recorded,  263  for  the  Government  and  1 16 
against.  Thiers  was  cut  off  both  from  the  Left  and  the  Right ; 
this  was  just  what  the  Due  de  Broglie  wanted. 

Thiers  carried  a  resolution  to  appoint  a  committee  of  thirty 
members  for  the  setting  up  of  a  proper  administrative 
machinery.  A  vast  number  of  petitions  were  organised 
throughout  the  country  to  request  that  the  Assembly  might 
be  dissolved.  A  debate  on  these  petitions  was  opened  on 
December  14.  Gambetta  maintained  that  the  Assembly  had 
received  only  a  limited  mandate,  that  it  was  out  of  touch  with 
public  opinion,  and  that  the  electors  should  be  consulted  with- 
out delay.  Dufaure,  Keeper  of  the  Seals,  protested  against 
these  views,  and  declared  that  it  rested  with  the  Assembly 
alone  to  define  its  mandate.  The  Right,  regarding  this 
speech  as  an  attempt  to  counteract  the  Presidential  message, 
voted  that  it  should  be  posted  up  all  over  the  country.  The 
position  of  Thiers  between  the  cross-fires  of  Left  and  Right 
was  becoming  more  and  more  difficult. 

This  complete  change  of  front  on  the  part  of  the  Government 
was  mainly  due  to  the  external  situation,  to  the  frame  of  mind 
prevailing  at  Berlin.  Gambetta's  triumphal  progress  was  a 
thorn  in  the  flesh  of  the  Berlin  Government.  The  Comte 
de  St.  Vallier,  the  representative  of  the  French  Government 
attached  to  the  Commander-in-Chief  of  the  German  Army, 
wrote:  "  M.  Gambetta  is  still  the  chief  bugbear:  the  very 
mention  of  his  name  is  becoming  more  and  more  distasteful 
to  them."  In  order  to  reassure  Berlin,  Thiers  wrote  back  : 
"Gambetta  will  not  be  my  successor.  Things  are  moving 
towards  democracy  in  France  as  all  over  Europe  (and 
particularly  in  Germany,  but  not  towards  mob-rule." 

At  Versailles  the  Assembly  made  furious  onslaughts  on 
Gambetta  and  his  friends.  Challemel-Lacour,  brought  to 
book  for  the  contracts  granted  at  Lyons  during  the  war, 
defended  himself  with  scathing  eloquence,  and  charged  the 
Contract  Commission  with  having  set  itself  "to  afford  France 
pretexts  for  disparaging  herself."  The  Assembly  passed  a 
vote  of  censure  on  the  revolutionary  acts  of  the  Lyons  city 
council,  which  had  substituted  the  red  banner  for  the  national 

171 


GAMBETTA 

flag.  Challemel-Lacour  had  fought  the  city  council  at  the 
peril  of  his  life,  so  that  this  attack  on  the  National  Defence 
Government  over  the  question  of  contracts  led  to  a  unanimous 
condemnation  of  the  red  flag. 

Thiers,  indefatigable  as  ever,  wished  to  complete  the  libera- 
tion of  the  occupied  territory ;  he  had  already  shortened  by 
two  years  the  period  anticipated.  "  I  need  not  trouble  about 
the  rest,"  he  remarked,  "for  as  soon  as  the  convention  is 
signed  the  majority  will  declare,  in  a  beautifully-worded 
decree,  that  I  have  deserved  well  of  my  country,  and  will  then 
put  me  on  the  shelf." 

On  February  19,  the  committee  proposed  that  the  Assembly 
should  not  rise  without  having  come  to  a  decision  regarding 
the  machinery  of  the  legislature  and  the  executive,  the  creation 
of  a  Second  Chamber,  and  the  assignment  of  its  functions 
and  the  electoral  bill.  The  Orleanists,  in  view  of  the  Comte  de 
Chambord's  unbending  attitude,  had  parted  company  with 
the  Legitimists ;  from  now  onwards  they  were  to  help  in 
moulding  the  Republic.  The  Due  de  Broglie,  having  been 
appointed  to  draw  up  a  report,  read  out  his  report  on  the  21st. 
Questions  of  principle  were  for  the  time  being  set  aside.  They 
confined  themselves  to  fettering  the  activities  of  Thiers.  It 
was  suggested  that  when  he  wanted  to  speak  in  the  Assembly, 
he  should  ask  the  permission  to  do  so  through  a  message ;  the 
debate  would  be  suspended  and  the  President  would  be  heard 
on  the  following  day ;  the  House  would  adjourn  after  the 
President's  speech  and  the  debate  would  be  resumed  at  a 
later  sitting,  at  which  the  President  would  not  be  present; 
questions  would  be  addressed,  not  to  the  President,  but  to 
.  Ministers. 

Gambetta  condemned  this  "  elaborate  and  futile  cere- 
monial." In  accordance  with  the  Radical  tenets  of  the  day, 
he  opposed  the  formation  of  a  Second  Chamber,  "  a  Chamber 
of  obstruction,"  "  the  outcome  of  an  unnatural  combination," 
"an  everlasting  cause  of  strife,"  "a  breakwater  against 
universal  sufi'rage."  Furthermore,  pointing  to  the  results  of 
the  by-elections,  he  once  more  demanded  an  appeal  to  the 
country. 

172 


THE   FALL   OF   THIERS 

'llic  Due  de  Broglie  replied  thai  the  scheme  of  the  Thirty 
did  nothing  towards  solving  the  problem,  "  Republic  or 
Monarchy?"  Thiers  endeavoured  to  restore  the  Govern- 
ment's balance  between  Left  and  Right.  On  March  13  the 
scheme,  so  far  as  its  general  lines  were  concerned,  was  adopted 
by  411  votes  to  234.  Every  effort  was  made  to  muzzle  the 
foremost  orator  of  the  Republic;  but  at  the  same  time  the 
Assembly,  unintentionally,  and  in  the  hope  that  they  were 
not  committing  themselves  for  the  future,  had  begun  to  give 
statutory  expression  to  Republican  principles. 

Three  days  later  it  was  announced  in  an  official  note  that 
the  treaty  for  the  evacuation  of  our  territory  had  just  been 
signed  by  Germany.  The  last  milliard  of  the  indemnity  was 
to  be  paid  in  four  equal  instalments  on  June  5,  July  5,  August  5 
and  September  5,  1873.  In  return  for  this,  the  departments 
of  the  Vosges,  the  Ardennes,  the  Meuse,  Meurthe-et- 
Moselle  and  Belfort  were  to  be  evacuated  from  July  i,  the 
evacuation  not  to  take  longer  than  four  weeks.  Verdun  alone, 
as  a  pledge  for  the  two  instalments  which  would  still  have 
to  be  paid  after  July  28,  would  remain  under  occupation  until 
September  5.  The  news  was  received  with  rapture  all  over 
the  country. 

Remusat,  the  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs,  read  out  the 
Treaty  to  the  House.  As  soon  as  he  had  finished  his  state- 
ment the  Left  rose  as  one  man,  and  after  three  rounds  of  cheer- 
ing several  of  its  members  cried  out  over  and  over  again, 
"Long  live  the  Republic!"  while  "Long  live  France!" 
was  shouted  from  the  benches  of  the  Right.  The  President 
of  the  Left  Centre,  Albert  Christophle,  put  forward  a  resolu- 
tion in  the  following  terms  :  "  The  National  Assembly  declares 
that  M.  Thiers,  President  of  the  Republic,  has  deserved  well 
of  his  country."  The  Right  immediately  moved  a  counter- 
resolution  :  "  The  Assembly,  receiving  with  patriotic  satisfac- 
tion the  statement  that  has  just  been  made  to  it,  and  glad  to 
have  thus  accomplished  a  vital  portion  of  its  task,  decrees  a 
formal  vote  of  thanks  to  M.  Thiers,  President  of  the  Republic, 
and  to  the  Government."  In  the  end,  after  a  not  very 
edifying  debate,  a  motion  combining  the  two  resolutions  was 

173 


GAMBETTA 

passed  with  only  a  few  dissentient  votes.  Gr^vy,  the  President 
of  the  Chamber,  rose  and  said  :  "  I  am  fortunate  in  having  to 
proclaim,  by  virtue  of  my  office,  this  resolution  of  the 
Assembly.  A  nation  displays  true  moral  greatness  when, 
showing  a  gratitude  commensurate  with  the  services  rendered, 
it  can  proffer  to  the  men  who  serve  it  a  reward  worthy  both 
of  the  donors  and  the  recipients."  These  words  were  received 
with  thunderous  applause  by  the  Left. 

A  few  days  later,  on  April  i,  the  Right  had  its  revenge. 
The  presence  of  Gr^vy  in  the  Speaker's  chair  was  a  stumbling- 
block  that  tended  to  thwart  the  designs  of  the  Right  against 
Thiers.  A  coup  was  arranged.  In  the  course  of  a  debate  on 
a  proposal  to  alter  the  constitution  of  the  Lyons  city  council, 
Le  Royer,  after  enumerating  the  main  arguments  of  the 
Vicomte  de  Meaux's  report,  wound  up  with  the  comment : 
"That  is  the  Commission's  bag  of  tricks!"  Vociferous 
clamours  from  the  Right  ensued.  "A  piece  of  impertinence  !  " 
cried  the  Marquis  de  Grammont.  The  President  of  the 
Chamber  called  him  to  order.  The  uproar  grew  louder  than 
ever.  Gr^vy  offered  to  resign,  and  declared  the  proceedings 
closed.  Next  day,  Gr^vy  obtained  344  votes  and  Buffet  251. 
Gr^vy,  although  re-elected,  persisted  in  his  decision  to  resign, 
in  spite  of  warnings  from  Thiers,  who  was  not  blind  to  the 
danger  involved.  A  fresh  ballot  was  taken,  and  Buffet  was 
elected  President  of  the  Chamber  by  304  votes  to  285,  the 
latter  being  given  by  the  Left  to  Martel.  "It  was  the  first 
time,"  observed  the  Comte  de  Meaux,  "  that  the  majority  in 
the  Assembly  agreed  upon  an  appointment  that  was  a  direct 
challenge  to  M.  Thiers;  this  agreement  presaged  his  fall, 
M.  Buffet  being  used  as  a  weapon  to  strike  him  down.  With- 
out Buffet,  the  attack  that  was  to  overthrow  Thiers  would 
have  had  no  chance  of  success,  and  it  was,  no  doubt,  with  this 
idea  in  his  mind  that  the  Due  de  Broglie  had  pressed  for  the 
election." 

On  the  following  day  these  incidents  were  a  topic  of 
discussion  at  the  Cabinet  council.  Jules  Simon  said  to  the 
President,  in  a  bantering  tone  :  "  You  see  now,  your  work  is 
done  ;  you  must  sing  your  nunc  dimittis."    "  But  they  haven't 

174 


THE   FALL   OF   THIERS 

got  anyone,"  Thiers  objected.  "  Oh,  yes,  they've  got  Marshal 
MacMahon."  "  MacMahon  ?  I  can  answer  for  him— he'll 
never  accept ! 

The  House  adjourned  from  April  7  to  May  10.  By-elections 
were  due  for  April  27,  notably  in  Paris.  Thiers  pushed 
R^musat's  candidature;  he  felt  sure  that  on  the  morrow  of 
the  treaty  that  secured  the  liberation  of  our  territory  the  capital 
would  give  him  proof  of  its  gratitude.  Many  Republicans 
however,  were  in  angry  mood  :  Lyons  found  itself  shorn  of 
its  municipal  liberties  by  a  recent  vote  of  the  Assembly  :  and 
to  read  the  Assembly  a  lesson,  they  backed  the  candidature  (jf 
Barodet,  a  former  Mayor  of  Lyons,  who  had  once  been  a 
schoolmaster. 

The  party  was  divided.  The  Left  and  the  Centre  supported 
the  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs.  Grevy  took  the  same  line. 
Gambetta,  anxious  not  to  split  up  his  left  wing,  also  declared 
for  Barodet.  His  intervention  turned  the  scale.  His  friends, 
with  Louis  Blanc,  addressed  the  Paris  electors  in  a  proclama- 
tion which  stigmatised  R^musat  as  the  "official"  candidate 
and  urged  them  to  vote  for  his  rival.  The  Right  put 
forward  Colonel  Stoffel.  Thiers  was  caught  between  two  fires. 
Barodet  got  in  by  180,045  votes,  as  against  135,028  for 
R^musat  and  26,644  ^^'^  Stoffel,  while  11,290  electors  did  not 
go  to  the  polls. 

Ranc,  in  his  book  De  Bordeaux  a  Versailles,  maintains  that 
the  fall  of  Thiers  was  a  foregone  conclusion  before  the  elec- 
tion. This  is  true;  but  the  election  furnished  his  opponents 
with  a  new  pretext  and  helped  to  precipitate  the  crisis.  As 
was  only  to  be  expected,  the  Right  waxed  eloquent  over  the 
weakness  of  the  Government  and  the  victory  of  mob-rule. 
They  decided  to  bring  matters  to  a  climax.  On  May  17,  the 
Dues  de  Broglie,  d'Audiffret-Pasquier  and  Decazes  paid  a 
visit  to  the  Due  d'Aumale,  asking  him  to  stand  for  the  Presi- 
dency of  the  Republic.  On  the  following  day,  however,  a 
meeting,  attended  by  certain  members  of  the  Right,  was  held 
at  the  Due  de  Broglie's  house,  and  Lucien  Brun,  speaking  on 
behalf  of  the   Legitimists,   raised  objections.      The  Due  de 

175 


GAMBETTA 

Broglie  admitted  the  force  of  their  arguments,  and,  owing  to 
this  unforeseen  hitch,  Marshal  MacMahon  was  accepted  as 
candidate.  (This  incident  formed  the  subject  of  a  corre- 
spondence in  1903  between  M.  Hanotaux  and  one  of  the  Due 
d'Aumale's  executors.) 

The  Assembly  resumed  its  sittings  in  the  full  flush  of  the 
excitement  caused  by  the  Paris  election.  Thiers  made  the 
famous  speech  in  which  he  said,  in  reply  to  the  Due  de  Broglie, 
who  had  taunted  him  with  sheltering  under  the  wing  of  the 
Radicals:  "  And  you,  you  will  shelter  under  the  wing  of  a 
protector  from  whom  your  father,  the  old  Due  de  Broglie, 
would  have  recoiled  in  horror  :  you  will  shelter  under  the  wing 
of  the  Empire  !  "  The  vote  of  censure  having  been  passed  by 
360  ayes  to  344  noes,  Thiers  and  his  Cabinet  tendered  their 
resignation.  The  Assembly  at  once  appointed  Marshal 
MacMahon  as  his  successor. 

Thiers  had  fallen;  but,  thanks  to  him,  France  was  already 
set  on  her  feet  again.  The  Monarchists  overturned  him  in 
the  hope  of  steering  clear  of  the  Republic,  yet  they  themselves 
were  to  give  France  a  Republican  constitution. 

Marshal  MacMahon,  in  his  inaugural  message,  promised 
on  his  word  of  honour  as  a  soldier  to  show  deference  to 
existing  institutions.  He  entrusted  the  Due  de  Broglie  with 
the  task  of  forming  the  Cabinet.     (May  25.) 

Scarcely  had  the  House  reassembled  when  Gambetta 
flourished  before  it  a  confidential  despatch  from  the  Home 
Secretary  to  the  departmental  Prefects,  asking  them  for  a 
report  on  such  newspapers  as  were  Conservative  or  might 
come  over  to  the  Conservative  side,  their  financial  standing, 
what  consideration  they  would  expect  for  a  whole-hearted 
support  of  the  Government,  and  so  forth.  As  the  Right 
broke  in  with  noisy  interruptions,  Gambetta  thundered  out : 
"  You  have  been  charged  with  sheltering  under  the  wing 
of  the  Empire — why,  you  are  taking  a  leaf  out  of  its 
book!" 

On  June  24,  the  celebration  of  Hoche's  birthday  gave  him 

176 


THE   FALL   OF   THIERS 

an  opportunity  of  setting  forth  his  attitude  towards  the  new- 
Government.  By  a  clever  touch,  he  deliberately  ignored  the 
Ministers  and  addressed  his  remarks  to  the  eminent  soldier, 
the  incorruptible  great  man  whom  the  Assembly  had  raised 
to  the  highest  office  in  the  Republic.  He  did  not  doubt 
MacMahon's  word,  he  relied  on  his  straightforwardness.  He 
spoke  in  glowing  terms  of  the  Army,  of  its  loyalty.  He 
proceeded  to  point  out  that  the  working  of  the  constitutional 
machine  had  enabled  a  new  President  to  be  appointed  without 
any  jolt  or  jar;  that  while  the  men  were  different,  circum- 
stances remained  the  same;  that  France  had  not  changed  her 
intentions,  that  the  administrative  functions  had  not  changed 
their  names,  that  the  reign  of  law  still  prevailed;  power  had 
been  transferred  to  other  hands,  but  the  order  of  things  had 
not  been  altered,  since  power  was  impersonal. 

Marshal  MacMahon  had  always  done  justice  to  Gambetta's 
effort  during  the  war.  The  Vicomte  Emmanuel  d'Harcourt, 
who  had  not  left  the  Marshal's  side  at  Sedan,  nor 
even  when  they  were  prisoners  at  Wiesbaden,  has  re- 
marked :  "  Whenever  an  opportunity  offered,  the  Marshal 
stood  up  for  Gambetta.  On  one  occasion  he  wrote  to  him 
expressing  '  my  keen  appreciation  of  your  endeavours  and  my 
earnest  wishes  for  your  success.'  " 

Under  the  leadership  of  a  soldier,  France  was  now  for  the 
first  time  to  embark  upon  the  experiment  of  a  parliamentary 
Republic.  Thiers,  in  virtue  of  the  powers  confided  to  him, 
had  directed  affairs  in  person  from  his  place  in  the  House- 
Marshal  MacMahon,  outside  the  Assembly,  was  to  act  up  to 
the  maxim  :  "  The  President  presides,  but  does  not  govern." 
The  Republic  was  to  change  its  character,  and  to  exhibit 
that  pliancy,  that  elasticity  which  had  recently  been  claimed 
for  it  by  Gambetta  at  the  Versailles  banquet. 

On  August  5,  1873,  Nancy,  for  two  years  past  the  head- 
quarters of  the  German  army  of  occupation,  was  delivered 
from  its  thraldom.  General  von  Manteuffel  issued  marching- 
orders  to  his  troops,  and  amid  scenes  of  indescribable  emotion 
the  French  flag  was  once  more  flown  from  every  window.  Bv 
September  5,  a  year  before  the  date  at  first  assigned,  France 

177  N 


GAMBETTA 

had  paid  her  indemnity  to  the  uttermost  farthing.  On  the  13th 
the  Germans  cleared  out  of  Verdun,  and  on  the  i6th  the  last 
soldiers  of  the  invading  army  crossed  the  new  frontier.  After 
three  years  of  occupation,  our  territory  was  entirely  free  from 
the  German  yoke. 

The  Monarchists  now  put  forth  a  final  effort  towards  uniting 
the  two  branches  of  the  Bourbon  House.  M.  Gabriel 
Manotaux,  in  his  admirable  book  Histoire  de  la  France 
contemporaine,  has  told  the  story  of  its  curious  ups 
and  downs:  the  journey  from  Chesnelong  to  Frohs- 
dorf,  the  illusions  that  were  harboured  and  the  ultimate 
defeat. 

The  Left,  growing  restive,  began  to  marshal  its  forces. 
Thiers  made  overtures  to  Gambetta.  At  P^rigord,  on 
September  28,  and  at  La  Borde,  near  Chatellerault,  on 
October  3,  the  latter  called  for  a  union  of  all  Republicans, 
declaring  that  a  reactionary  policy  would  lead  to  the  most 
appalling  of  revolutions. 

On  October  18,  the  Due  d'Audiffret-Pasquier,  with  the 
consent  of  the  Due  de  Broglie,  revealed  to  the  Right  the  draft 
of  a  resolution  for  the  re-establishment  of  the  Monarchy,  with 
the  Comte  de  Chambord  and  the  tricolor.  Everything  was 
in  readiness  for  the  coming  of  the  King  :  the  costumes,  the 
decorations,  the  carriages,  the  horses  and  their  trappings, 
and  the  line  of  route.  The  Republicans  protested  more 
vigorously  than  ever.  The  deputies  for  the  Seine  department, 
Gambetta  and  his  friends  addressed  a  manifesto  to  the 
electors:  '*  It  is  no  longer  a  question  merely  of  upholding  a 
form  of  government,  but  of  guarding  those  civil,  political  and 
religious  liberties  which  our  fathers  have  won  and  which  are 
essential  to  the  very  existence  of  the  Republic.  Your  repre- 
sentatives will  stoutly  oppose  any  measures  likely  to  entrap 
the  country  into  restoring  a  system  that  it  profoundly 
disapproves." 

On  October  27,  however,  the  Comte  de  Chambord  wrote  his 
famous  letter  to  Chesnelong  :  "  I  am  expected  to  sacrifice  my 
honour.  I  have  nothing  to  retract  from  what  I  have  said  in 
the  past.     It  is  the  fashion  to  contrast  the  supple  dexterity  of 

178 


THE   FALL   OF  THIERS 

Henry  V.'  with  ihe  steadfast  determination  ot  Henry  IV.  1 
claim  to  be  no  whit  inferior  to  him  in  this  respect;  but  I  should 
like  to  know  what  he  would  have  said,  before  his  decision  to 
change  sides,  if  some  rasli  person  had  urged  him  to  disown  the 
principles  for  which  he  fought  at  Arques  and  at  Ivry  !  1  mean 
to  stick  to  my  guns,  without  swerving  an  inch.  .  .  ." 

.  ji;ilt'iiiig  words  I  but  Henry  IV.  would  have  spoken  to  a 
very  different  tune.  The  letter  drove  members  cf  the  Right 
to  despair,  and  gladdened  the  hearts  of  Republicans  and 
Bonapartists.  All  seemed  lost  for  the  Monarchy.  The 
Prince,  however,  did  not  give  up  hope.  He  took  a  clan- 
destine trip  to  Versailles  and  asked  for  an  interview  with  the 
Marshal,  but  met  with  a  polite  and  dignified  refusal.  The 
scion  of  kings,  in  his  gloomy  apartments  at  the  Comte  de 
Vanssay's  house,  waited  in  vain  for  a  fresh  turn  of  Fortune's 
wheel,  while  a  stone's-throw  away,  in  the  historic  palace  of 
Louis  XIV.,  the  Republic  was  being  brought  into  the  world. 
(November  10-22,  1873.) 

The  Due  de  Broglie  then  fell  upon  his  "  line  of  retreat,"  as 
he  called  it,  the  prolongation  of  the  Marshal's  term  of  office. 
He  aimed  at  assigning  to  it  a  definite  period,  and  making  the 
Presidential  powers  independent  of  the  Assembly,  and  above 
all  of  future  Parliaments.  He  thus  sought  to  invest  the 
supreme  authority  in  a  single  man,  since  he  could  not  incor- 
porate them  in  a  dynasty,  and  then,  around  this  temporary 
rulership,  to  build  up  parliamentary  institutions.  There  was 
in  his  eyes  no  other  way  of  escape  from  mob-rule  and 
Cjesarism. 

This  view  was  shared  by  the  Comte  de  Paris,  who  on 
November  11  wrote  to  one  of  his  friends:  "  We  must  give 
France  a  guarantee  of  stability.  This  guarantee  is  not  to  be 
found  in  a  constitutional  monarchy.  Seeing  that  we  cannot 
have  a  monarchy,  we  must  set  up  a  constitutional  government 
with  an  executive  raised  above  the  clash  of  party  strife, 
exempt  from  the  hazards  of  parliamentary  debate      I  cannot 

*  The  title  given  to  the  Comte  de  Chanibord  by  his  followers.  The  later  reference 
is  to  Henry  IV. 's  conversion  to  Catholicism  for  the  sake  of  gaining  the  French  throne, 
after  winning  victories  for  the  Huguenot  cause  at  Arques  and  Ivry. — Translator's 
NOTE. 

179  N    2 


GAMBETTA 


\ 


make  out  why  there  should  be  any  qualms  about  calling  this 
government  a  Republic,  so  long  as  we  keep  that  name  on 
coins  and  elsewhere.  Nor  do  I  see  any  other  means  of  remov- 
ing that  name  than  to  put  that  of  king— or  emperor— in  its 
place.  And  that  solution  is  the  one  that  I  wish  to  avoid  at  all 
(^osts." — This  letter  explains  all  that  was  to  follow. 

The  Comte'de  Chambord's  ruling  passion  was  his  fear  of  the 
Orleans  Princes;  the  ruling  passion  of  the  Orleans  princes  was 
their  fear  of  the  Empire.  It  was  this  fear  of  the  Empire  that 
was  destined  to  make  Orleanists  combine  with  Republicans. 
Rouher  upheld  the  appeal  to  the  nation ;  he  saw  clearly  the 
results  that  an  extension  of  the  President's  tenure  would 
entail,  and  pointed  them  out  to  the  Royalists  :  "  We  shall  at 
once  have  a  President  of  the  Republic  and  two  Republican 
Chambers.  The  Republic  will  come.  And  the  Royalists 
will  prove  to  have  been  its  founders!  " 

The  Assembly  prolonged  the  President's  tenure  to  a  period 

of  seven  years  and  appointed  a  committee  of  thirty  ;o  elaborate 

the  framework  of  the  constitution.     On  May  15  the  Due  de 

Broglie  set  forth  his  proposals  :    an   irresponsible  President 

with  a  Cabinet  responsible  to  Parliament;  two  Chfimbers;  the 

President  to  have  the  right  of  dissolving  Parliament,  with  the 

consent    of   the    Senate    or    "Grand  Council";    the    Grand 

Council  to  consist  of  members  elected  by  the  departments,  ol 

legal  members  and  of  life-members  nominated  by  the  Presi 

dent.    After  listening  to  this  pronouncement,  Gambetta  said  ; 

"  If  the  Right  has  the  good  sense  to  accept  this  scheme,  it  wil 

remain  in  power  for  fifty  years."     But  the  Right  would  no 

hear  of  it.     "  At  the  very  moment  when  he  (Broglie)  put  for 

ward  the  plan  he  had  thought  out,"  remarks  the  Vicomte  di 

Meaux  in  his  Souvenirs,  "  those  who  stood  to  gain  most  by  i 

drove  him  from  office."    The  Broglie  Cabinet  was  overthrow! 

by  a  coalition  of  Legitimists,  Bonapartists,  and  Republican 

on  May  16,  1874. 

Thus  the  Comte  de  Chambord,  through  his  hatred  c 
Orleanism,  had  made  a  restoration  of  the  monarchy  out  of  th 
question,  and  now  his  followers  were  sending  the  Due  d 
Broglie  to  the  right-about  and  wrecking  his  schemes  for 

180 


THE    FALL   OF   THIERS 

constitution.  Tiie  Ri^hl  was  perishing  from  internal  feuds. 
The  Assembly  had  pulled  down  Thiers,  seeing  in  him  the 
obstacle  to  a  revival  of  the  monarchy,  and  at  the  end  of  a  year 
it  found  itself  back  at  the  point  whence  it  had  started.  Hence- 
forth the  die  was  cast  :  after  the  legitimate  kingship,  a  con- 
stitutional monarchy  was  also  ruled  out,  and  the  same  applied 
even  to  a  constitution  not  based  on  a  hereditary  throne,  but 
calculated  to  work  against  democracy  and  pave  the  way  for  a 
return  to  the  monarchical  system.  All  parties,  whether  they 
would  or  no,  must  resign  themselves  to  setting  up  a  Republic. 

At  the  beginning  of  the  year  the  German  elections  had  been 
held.  The  annexed  provinces  had  been  called  upon  for  the 
first  time  to  choose  their  representatives  for  the  Reichstag. 
On  the  whole,  they  were  in  favour  of  absenting  themselves 
from  the  polls.  Gambetta  advised  them  not  only  to  vote,  but 
to  return  Catholic  priests,  who,  being  accustomed  to  preach  in 
German,  would  find  it  easier  to  speak  in  the  Reichstag 
(Auguste  Lalance :  Mes  Souvenirs).  The  ballot  of  1874 
showed  a  no  less  determined  front  than  that  of  1871,  and  the 
members  sent  to  the  Parliament  of  Berlin,  like  those  sent  to 
the  Parliament  of  Bordeaux,  went  only  under  protest.  In 
agreement  with  Gambetta,  Teutsch  introduced  a  motion  re- 
questing that  the  inhabitants  of  the  annexed  provinces  should 
be  consulted  as  to  their  incorporation  in  the  Empire.  His 
voice  was  drowned  by  shouts  and  derisive  laughter. 

Bismarck's  aim  was  threefold  :  to  hold  France  down  under 
a  provisional  regime  and  deny  her  the  opportunity  of  forming 
a  stable  government;  to  sow  discord  in  her  midst;  and  to 
prevent  her  from  gaining  allies.  He  set  his  face  against  a 
Monarchy,  but  was  equally  opposed  to  Gambetta.  What  he 
wanted  was  a  "  disintegrating"  Republic,  a  Republic  "with 
troubles  to  keep  it  occupied  at  home."  As  early  as  1871  he 
had  told  Graf  von  Arnim,  his  ambassador  in  Paris,  that 
Gambetta  was  the  only  potential  leader  dangerous  to  Ger- 
many, and  that  she  would  not  tolerate  his  accession  to  power. 
He  was  quite  willing  that  his  views  on  the  subject  should, 
if  the  need  arose,  be  divulged.  These  were  his  demands,  a.s 
toned  down  by  von  Arnim  :  "  Neither  a  settled  Republic,  for 

181 


GAMBETTA 

it  would  become  Radical,  Gambettist,  and  the  Chancellor 
did  not  want  a  Republic  after  the  Danton  pattern;  nor  a 
Monarchy,  because  such  a  Government  would  soon  become 
capable  of  procuring:  allies  for  France."  The  dilemma  he 
implied  was  obvious  enouj2:h .  Was  France  driftinor  towards  a 
Republic  ?  That  way  lay  anarchy.  Was  she  drifting  towards 
a  Monarchy  ?  That  would  mean  war.  He  wished  to  persuade 
the  Royalists  that  the  Republicans  were  leading  them  in  the 
direction  of  mob-rule,  and  the  Republicans  that  the  Royalists 
were  leadinjs:  them  into  risky  adventures.  The  unfortunate 
thing  was  that  both  parties,  in  the  relentless  fury  of  their 
conflicts,  w-ere  to  show  themselves  at  times  too  ready  to  be 
persuaded  and  to  accept  these  blasting  accusations  against 
their  opponents. 

On  November  21,  1873,  Pope  Pius  IX.  had  issued  an 
encyclical  in  which,  lamenting  over  the  recent  misfortunes  of 
the  Church  and  the  Holv  See,  he  depicted  in  the  gloomiest 
colours  the  position  of  the  Catholics  in  Italy,  Switzerland  and 
Germanv.  The  Swiss  Government  had  broken  off  diplomatic 
relations  with  him.  The  Italian  Government,  on  January  i, 
1874,  had  addressed  to  the  Powers  a  circular  confirming  its 
enactment  with  regard  to  the  guarantees.  In  France  a  large 
number  of  prelates  had  responded  to  the  Vatican's  appeal. 
In  various  episcopal  rescripts,  Bismarck's  policy  was  con- 
demned. The  Bishop  of  Nimes  wrote:  "The  Germany  of 
Bismarck  has  thought  fit  to  carry  on  the  tradition  of  mean- 
ness and  immorality."  The  Due  de  Broglie  deplored  these 
rash  utterances  :  "  It  is  easy  to  see,"  he  remarked,  pathetically, 
"that  these  bishops  are  not  weighted  with  responsibilities 
such  as  ours."  On  December  26  the  Cabinet  had  issued  a 
circular  reminding  the  community  that  nations,  in  com- 
menting on  each  other's  acts,  must  observe  a  certain  mutual 
forbearance. 

Bismarck,  who  wished  to  expand  the  military  forces  of 
Germany,  lost  no  time  in  turning  these  indiscretions  to 
account;  he  made  capital  out  of  them  at  Rome  and,  in  order 
to  alarm  Italy,  pretended  to  be  alarmed  himself.  He  told  our 
ambassador,  Gontaut-Biron,  that  the  circular  was  not  enough, 

182 


THE   FALL   OF   THIERS 

that  the  French  Government  had  more  effective  weapons  at 
its  disposal  for  putting  an  end  to  this  campaign.  If  driven 
to  extremities,  the  German  Government  would  have  recourse 
to  the  French  Act  of  iStQ,  which  empowered  it  to  prosecute 
such  offenders  in  person,  before  the  French  courts  of  justice. 
*'  For  us  it  is  a  question  of  security.  Certain  persons  are 
stirring  up  revolt  in  our  midst,  within  the  Empire.  Very 
well,  we  shall  be  compelled  to  declare  war  upon  you  before 
the  clerical  party,  seizing  the  reins  of  power,  declares  war 
upon  Germany." 

In  the  Assembly,  the  Right  fulminated  against  the  weak- 
ness of  the  Cabinet.  Du  Temple,  a  deputy  of  the  extreme 
Right,  begged  leave  to  put  a  question.  The  new  Reichstag 
met ;  the  Government  asked  for  an  emergency  vote  on  the 
army  bill,  designed  to  ensure  the  pre-eminence  of  the  German 
army.  The  Due  Decazes,  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs, 
replied  to  Du  Temple  on  January  20  :  "  France  will  continue 
to  regard  the  Sovereign  Pontiff  with  a  dutiful  respect,  with 
a  tender  and  filial  solicitude;  but,  in  all  good  faith,  she  will 
maintain  peaceful  and  friendly  relations  with  the  Italian  State 
as  at  present  constituted." 

The  Reichstag  met  on  February  i,  1874.  ^"  ^'^  speech 
from  the  throne,  the  Emperor  demanded  an  immediate  vote 
on  the  draft  of  the  army  bill.  Moltke  was  insistent  :  "  A  wild 
cry  for  revenge  assails  our  ears  from  bevond  the  Vosges ;  we 
might  be  called  upon  to  face  enemies  on  two  fronts,  both 
East  and  West."  The  bill  was  passed  on  May  2.  At  the 
end  of  the  year  Prince  von  Hohenlohe,  who  had  just  suc- 
ceeded Graf  von  Arnim  as  ambassador  in  Paris,  discussed 
Gambetta  with  Bismarck.  *'  We  have  nothing  to  fear  from 
that  quarter,"  said  the  Chancellor,  "even  if  he  knits  France 
together  as  firmly  as  you  think  he  will.  We  are  always  a 
match  for  France,  even  for  a  France  that  is  strong.  The 
danger  lies  in  a  coalition,  but  the  Republic  will  never  manage 
to  form  a  coalition  against  us." — Bismarck  was  right  as 
regards  Gambetta,  who  did  not  live  long  enough  to  forge  the 
alliances  that  he  contemplated;  but  he  was  wrong  as  regards 
France  and  the  Republic. 

183 


CHAPTER  XII 

GAMBETTA   AND  THE   CONSTITLTIOM 

Gambetu  advises  the  Left  to  acknowledge  the  Constituent  Power  of  the  Assembly— 
The  Constitution — "  The  Grand  Council  of  the  French  Communes" — End  of  the 
National  Assembly. 

The  Comte  de  Paris,  whose  path  was  blocked  by  the  Comte 
de  Chambord,  now  urged  his  friends,  from  fear  of  the 
Empire,  to  support  a  Republican  constitution.  Gambetta, 
on  his  side,  after  having  refused  to  admit  the  constituent 
power  of  the  Assembly,  soon  came  round  to  the  opposite  way 
of  thinking,  and  advised  his  friends  to  acknowledge  that  func- 
tion. From  this  double  change  of  front  the  Constitution  was 
to  be  born. 

The  Due  de  Broglie  having  fallen,  and  the  Legitimists 
being  at  variance  with  the  Orleanists,  Gambetta  saw  that  the 
moment  was  favourable  for  the  advancement  of  his  plans. 
He  said  to  himself  that  perhaps,  after  all,  something  could  be 
done  with  this  Chamber.  And  now  we  shall  witness  the 
triumph  of  that  policy  of  adjustments,  of  compromises,  of 
middle  courses  which  his  adversaries  will  call  "  opportunism." 

It  is  interesting  to  trace,  in  the  letters  and  memoirs  of 
adherents  of  the  Right,  their  successive  phases  of  opinion 
with  regard  to  Gambetta.  At  first  he  is  something  of  an  out- 
sider; no  one  quite  ventures  to  commit  himself  with  this 
"Bohemian,"  this  "demagogue,"  this  "pot-house  and 
street-corner  orator."  They  find  him  vulgar.  What !  Is  this 
the  great  tribune  of  the  people,  this  man  with  the  husky 
voice  (he  already  suffered  from  intermittent  attacks  of  ill- 
health,  and  his  speech  was  at  times  indistinct),  slovenly  of 
attire,  theatrical  in  his  gestures,  shallow  in  his  mental  out- 
look?    It   was   not  long,  however,  before   they    realised   the 

184 


GAMBETTA  AND  THE  CONSTITUTION 

subtlety,  the  adroitness  that  lay  underneath  this  Southern 
vehemence.  The  gulf  was  bridged  ;  soon  he  won  their  esteem  ; 
in  the  end  his  sway  was  complete.  He  had  the  same  irre- 
sistible quality  of  fascination,  the  same  inborn  gift  for 
attracting  and  dominating  that  had  graced  the  personality  of 
Mirabeau.  The  Vicomte  de  Meaux,  in  his  Souvenirs,  speaks 
of  the  "  bitter  di.sappointment  "  he  felt  when  listening  for  the 
first  time  to  the  quondam  "  dictator  " ;  then,  little  by  little,  he 
was  caught  in  the  toils,  like  the  others.  In  spite  of  them- 
selves, they  come  under  the  spell  of  his  ascendancy,  his 
magnetism  ;  even  the  most  stubborn  become  victims  of  the 
lure.  At  the  very  last,  in  an  article  in  the  Correspondant,  this 
same  M.  de  Meaux  dwells  upon  this  "  glamour,"  which  even 
after  his  death  will  continue  to  affect  generations  yet  unborn. 

The  breach  between  the  Legitimists  and  the  Right  Centre, 
and  their  successful  attack  on  the  Due  de  Broglie,  gave 
Gambetta  his  cue.  He  began  to  coquet  with  them  and  to  win 
them  over  to  the  side  of  the  Republic.  At  the  funeral  of  the 
Comte  d'Alton-Sh^e,  a  former  peer  of  France  who  had  turned 
Republican,  he  said  :  "  Let  us  prove  to  those  who  revile  us 
that  we  are  not  intolerant ;  let  us  show  that  this  Republic, 
which  we  are  bound  to  establish  sooner  or  later,  can  offer  a 
cordial  welcome  to  all  loyal  recruits,  and,  above  all,  to  those 
enlightened  sons  of  the  aristocracy  who  espouse  our  cause 
heart  and  soul.  The  old  aristocracy  is  an  essential  part  of 
France,  and  is  still  capable  of  doing  her  service.  If  our 
patricians  have  the  good  sense  to  rally  to  the  new  France,  to 
the  France  of  hard  work  and  scientific  research,  they  will,  bv 
their  lofty  patriotism  and  their  exquisite  polish,  help  to  confer 
on  her  that  bloom  of  refinement  and  distinction  which  will 
make  the  French  Republic  in  the  modern  world  what  the  / 
Athenian  Republic  was  in  the  ancient."  / 

At  Auxerre,  on  the  other  hand  (June  i,  1874),  he  hails  the  A 
Left  Centre  as  "  head  of  the  column,  almost  the  vanguard."/,, 
He  reminds  his  hearers  of  the  vigorous  action  taken  by  thisas 
group  when  the  plot  was  being  hatched  for  the  restoration  o/,st- 
the  Kingship  by  divine  right.  The  Left  Centre,  he  avers,  will:he 
be  no  less  staunch  against  Bonapartism.     He  harks  back  fgny 

1B5 


GAMBETTA 

the  famous  Grenoble  speech,  which  is  never-endingly  being 
cast  in  his  teeth  :  "  I  said  new  strata,  not  classes — an  undesir- 
able term,  which  I  never  use.  It  is  not  a  Republic  of  a 
partisan  character  that  our  Republican  democracy  calls  for, 
nor  an  exclusive  Republic,  a  Republic  of  close  corporations; 
but  a  Republic  of  all,  a  Republic  of  ten  million  electors, 
without  a  single  exception,  representing  as  a  whole  the 
sovereignty  of  the  nation," 

The  Bonapartist  party  once  more  raised  its  head.  Gambetta 
suggested  an  inquiry  into  its  acts.  A  violent  scene  with 
Rouher  ensued.  Gambetta,  on  his  way  back  from  Versailles, 
had  his  face  punched  by  Rouher  at  the  St.  Lazare  Station. 

He  persuaded  the  Republican  Left  group  and — this  was  not 
altogether  plain  sailing — the  majority  of  his  own  group,  the 
Republican  Union,  to  make  a  formal  statement  that  they  no 
longer  disputed  the  constituent  power  of  the  Assembly  and 
would  support  the  draft  scheme  for  Republican  institutions 
that  had  been  put  forward  by  the  Left  Centre  (June  13,  1874). 
He  thereby  gave  a  decisive  wrench  to  the  tiller.  "  The  next 
thirty  years,"  says  M.  Hanotaux,  "are  the  offspring  of  that 
day."  We  shall  see  how  Gambetta  evolved  a  Republic  from 
a  Monarchist  Assembly  and  a  Senate  from  a  Republican  party 
that  did  not  want  one. 

The  extreme  Left,  with  Louis  Blanc,  Edgar  Quinet,  and 
Ledru-Rollin,  could  not  make  up  its  mind.  It  dreaded  a 
Republic  bearing  the  Royalist  trade-mark,  and  still  advocated 
the  election  of  a  Constituent  Assembly.  The  view  was  shared 
by  Grevy. 

On  June  15,  Casimir-Perier,  the  friend  of  Thiers,  the  son  of 
the  Minister  under  the  July  Monarchy,  and  the  brother-in-law 
of  the  Due  d'Audiffret-Pasquier,  proposed  that  the  committee 
dealing  with  laws  for  the  constitution  should  take  the  two- 
Chamber  system  as  the  foundation  for  its  structure.  The 
.emergency  measure  was  passed  by  345  votes  to  341.  It  was  a 
^victory  for  the  Centre.  Broglie  protested,  delivering  a  general 
j^^ttack  on  the  Republic,  on  all  Republics,  the  Convention  of 
^^'92,  the  Directory,  the  Republic  of  1848,  engulfed  by 
iQ^archy  and  Caesarism,  and  those  for  which  Gr^vy,  Gambetta, 

186 


GAMBETTA    AND   THE   CONSTITUTION 

and  Louis  Blanc  were  sponsors.  Dufaure  asked  thai  what  was 
done  at  all  times,  for  all  countries,  might  be  done  for  France— 
that  a  name  and  a  fixed  principle  might  be  assigned  to  the 
Government  under  which  men  had  to  live.  General  de  Cissey, 
Vice-President  of  the  Council,  opposed  the  motion,  which  was 
thrown  out  by  374  votes  to  23^-  The  Assembly  was 
prorogued  for  a  period  of  four  months,  despite  Gambetta,  who 
said  to  the  Right:  "The  Republic  is  bound  to  come,  and 
you  will  have  to  accept  it,  not  as  party  men,  or  as  men  swayed 
by  mere  sentiment,  but  as  true  statesmen.  You  should  set  to 
work  in  a  resolute  spirit,  and  realise  thai  a  distinct  place  is 
allotted  to  you  in  this  free  democracy;  you  have  a  part  to 
play,  and  no  mean  part,  one  to  which  you  are  entitled  by 
virtue  of  your  high  social  position,  your  antecedents,  your 
ample  leisure.  The  Conservatives  have  found  by  experience 
that  a  restoration  of  the  kingship  is  impossible ;  it  is  a  political 
blunder  on  their  part,  perhaps  an  irreparable  blunder,  to  reiect 
an  alliance  with  the  democracy  that  would  bear  abundant 
fruit.  What !  you  imagine  that  a  coalition  of  three  or  four 
hundred  deputies  is  going  to  undo  the  work  of  the  French 
Revolution?  Do  you  believe  it,  or  do  you  not?  If  you  do 
not,  you  must  come  to  some  decision.  Take  a  holiday  for  a 
month,  and  think  matters  over.  If  you  are  capable  of  estab- 
lishing a  monarchy,  you  will  establish  one;  if  you  conclude 
that  a  Republic  alone  is  feasible,  you  will  set  up  a  Republic, 
and  you  will  set  up  a  strong  Government,  powerful  enough  to 
revive,  as  we  all  so  ardently  desire,  the  glory  and  the  honour 
of  France." 

On  July  23,  he  writes  to  Ranc  (unpublished  letter) :  "  We 
don't  want  a  Government  created  solely  for  the  majority. 
There  is  a  difference  between  the  welfare  of  the  community 
and  the  welfare  of  the  greatest  number." 

The  Assembly  was  convened  again  on  November  30.  At  the 
elections  held  during  the  recess,  the  successful  candidates, 
though  of  varying  shades  of  opinion,  had  been  Republicans 
to  a  man.  The  Assembly,  shrinking  from  the  debate,  post- 
poned it  to  January.  This  1875  session  was  fated  to  decide  the 
future  of  F'rance.  The  Moderates  of  the  Right,  more  than  any 

187 


GAMBETTA 

other  section,  viewed  the  prospect  of  an  Empire  with  alarm. 
The  extreme  Left  continued  to  propose  a  dissolution.  Thiers, 
who  since  his  fall  had  lost  all  interest  in  the  framing  of  a 
constitution,  and  Jules  Grevy  demanded  the  same  course. 
There  was  nothing  for  it  but  to  achieve  a  definite  result — or 
quit  the  scene. 

On  January  5,  the  Marshal,  in  a  message  to  the  Assembly, 
conjured  it  to  debate  forthwith  upon  the  Bill  relating  to  the 
Senate.  On  the  25th  the  Chairman  of  the  Committee  spoke  in 
favour  of  a  Second  Chamber— "  a  barrier  against  the  revolu- 
tionaries." The  first  reading  of  the  Bill  was  passed  by  498 
votes  to  173.  There  was  a  majority  for  the  setting-up  of  a 
Second  Chamber.  The  Extreme  Right,  the  Bonapartists  and 
Gambetta,  with  a  section  of  his  group,  voted  against  the 
measure.  The  form  under  which  the  proposed  Second 
Chamber  had  been  ushered  in  was  not  one  likely  to  reconcile 
the  Republicans  to  this  institution.  The  Legitimists,  through 
their  unremitting  hostility,  paved  the  way  for  an  alliance 
between  the  Right  and  Left  Centre. 

And  now,  from  amidst  this  seething  whirlpool  of  emotions, 
we  see  the  emergence  of  a  mature  and  dispassionate  type  of 
mind  :  men  of  the  lecture-room  and  the  study,  men  who  had 
read  widely  and  pondered  deeply,  men  primed  with  historical 
lore.  They  had  examined  all  the  political  systems,  and  had 
come  to  the  conclusion  that  we  cannot  swerve  with  impunity 
from  certain  indispensable  rules  that  have  stood  the  test  of 
experience. 

The  critical  days,  January  28,  2g  and  30,  had  now  arrived. 
The  Left  Centre  proposed  the  following  clause :  "  The 
Government  of  the  Republic  consists  of  two  Chambers  and 
one  President."  The  chairman,  Edouard  Laboulaye,  upheld 
the  clause.  This  distinguished  professor,  steeped  in  the 
history  of  the  United  States,  saturated  with  the  ideas  that 
inspired  the  founders  of  the  American  Constitution,  Hamil- 
ton, Madison,  Jay,  and  that  admirable  miscellany,  The 
Federalist,  now  gave  the  House  the  benefit  of  their  precepts  of 
liberty  and  wisdom;  but  he  knew  that  the  American  Con- 
stitution  is  applicable  only  to  a   Federal  State.     His  object 

188 


GAMBETTA   AND   THE   CONS'l  ITUTIOX 

was  not  to  demonstrate  the  comparative  merits  of  a  monarchi- 
cal and  a  republican  system,  but  simply  to  point  out  that  tlie 
sphere  of  action  was  growing  narrower  and  that  the  iron  laws 
of  necessity  were  coming  into  play.  "  The  external  danger 
is  close  upon  us;  France  is  perhaps  on  the  eve  of  another 
war.  Nor  is  the  danger  less  menacing  at  home.  With  the 
Republic,  you  can  have  a  Government.  If  you  will  not  put 
up  with  it,  you  will  not  have  a  Government  at  all.  If  we  do 
not  frame  a  Constitution,  our  mandate  is  at  an  end,  and  it  is 
our  duty  to  appeal  to  the  country.  The  worst  of  this  course 
is  that,  before  a  new  Assembly  can  be  got  together, 
the  whole  Parliamentary  system  may  break  down  and  in- 
volve France  in  its  ruin."  He  wound  up  his  speech 
with  this  exhortation:  "Yes,  seeing  the  plight  that  we 
have  reached,  it  is  not  too  much  to  address  you  with 
a  solemn  prayer,  to  entreat  you  to  consider  what  our 
position  will  be  to-morrow.  The  eyes  of  all  Europe  are 
upon  you,  France  implores  you,  and  as  for  us,  we 
earnestly  conjure  you,  we  say  to  you  :  '  Do  not  take  upon 
yourself  so  terrible  a  responsibility  !  Do  not  leave  us  in 
suspense;  and,  to  sum  it  up  in  a  few  words,  have  pity  on  our 
unhappy  country  I  '  " 

The  House  was  stirred  to  its  depths  by  this  moving  appeal. 
Louis  Blanc  rose  to  speak,  but  was  silenced  by  cries  of  protest 
from  the  Left.  Backed  by  the  Right,  he  insisted  on  being 
given  a  hearing ;  he  stated  that  he  and  his  friends  could  never 
vote  for  the  creation  of  a  Second  Chamber.  The  following 
day  La  Republique  fraiigaise  published  a  violent  tirade  upon 
him:  "  M.  Louis  Blanc's  speech  was  diametrically  opposed 
to  the  wishes  of  his  whole  party.  Intent  onlv  on  parading 
his  own  personal  views,  he  failed  to  see  what  was  going 
forward  in  the  ranks  of  the  Republic's  enemies.  He  gave 
them  time  to  lay  their  heads  together,  to  re-form  their  battle 
array,  to  adopt  a  line  of  action.  He  has  assumed  a  grave 
responsibility,  which  we  are  content  to  leave  entirely  upon  his 
.shoulders." 

"  Two  theories,  two  systems,  two  methods  confronted  each 
other,"  says  M.  Hanotaux.     "  The  seed  of  future  Republican 

iSg 


GAMBETTA 

disagreements  was  cast  into  the  very  soil  from  vviiich  the 
Republic  itself  was  to  spring." 

On  January  29  came  the  vote  in  the  House  on  the  clause 
advocated  by  Laboulaye.  Louis  Blanc,  Edgar  Quinet, 
Madier  de  Montjau,  Peyrat  and  Marcou  held  aloof.  Only 
five  votes  were  wanted  to  secure  the  passing  of  the  amend- 
ment. Peyrat  rushed  into  the  library,  where  Louis  Blanc 
and  Marcou  were  ensconced.  "  It  needs  five  more  votes  to 
bring  in  the  Republic,"  he  shouted;  "come  along!"  A 
crowd  gathered  round  them,  and  begged  them  to  change  their 
minds.  "  We  let  ourselves  be  hustled  into  the  Chamber," 
writes  Louis  Blanc,  "  and  one  after  the  other  we  dropped  our 
voting-papers  into  the  ballot-box,  amid  general  emotion  and 
to  the  sound  of  uproarious  cheers,  which  struck  like  daggers 
into  our  hearts  !  "  By  359  votes  to  336  the  clause  was  thrown 
out. 

Wallon,  a  painstaking  historian,  thereupon  suggested  the 
following  provision  :  "  The  President  of  the  Republic  is 
elected,  through  the  suffrages  of  the  majority,  by  the  Senate 
and  by  the  Chamber  of  Deputies  convened  in  the  National 
Assembly.  He  is  appointed  for  seven  years,  and  may  be 
re-elected."  It  is  no  longer  a  case  of  "  the  Marshal."  This 
time,  by  a  majority  of  353  to  352,  the  amendment  was 
accepted,  to  the  loudly  expressed  delight  of  the  Left.  All  the 
members  of  this  section,  including  the  five  members  of  the 
extreme  Left,  had  voted  for  the  amendment,  while  the  entire 
Right  took  the  opposite  line.  In  the  Centre,  a  slight  shifting 
of  votes  determined  the  majority. 

Leon  Say  writes,  on  February  i,  1875  :  "  The  carrying  of 
the  Wallon  amendment  by  a  margin  of  one  vote  will  lead  to 
some  astonishing  results.  Already  we  can  count  upon  a 
majority  of  sixty  for  passing,  as  a  whole,  a  bill  which,  intro- 
duced in  an  anti-Republican  garb,  will  go  forth  into  the 
world  stamped  w  ith  a  purely  Republican  hall-mark.  The  first 
member  I  spoke  to  at  the  time  when  this  majority  of  one  was 
announced  was  the  Prince  de  Joinville.  He  said  to  me  : 
'  Your  party  has  won  the  day,  and  I  am  very  glad  to  see  it. 
My  personal  position  compelled  me  to  vote  on  the  other  side, 

190 


GAMBETTA    AND   THE   CONSTITUTION 

but  nothing  could  have  given  me  greater  pleasure  than  our 
defeat.'  Pasquier  told  me  that  he  and  his  friends  accepted 
unreservedly  the  situation  created  by  this  margin  of  one.  We 
may  therefore  assume  that  the  Act  to  establish  a  constitution 
will  be  passed.  M.  de  Broglie  consoles  himself  with  the 
thought  that,  in  spile  of  all  appearances,  there  is  no  need  to 
fear  the  worst.  This  is  a  strange  delusion  on  his  part,  and 
his  friends  are  beginning  to  talk  in  a  very  difTerent  tone." 

M.  de  Vinols  informs  us  that  he  met  Gnmbetta  on  the 
evening  of  the  day  when  the  Laboulaye  amendment  was 
carried,  and  could  not  help  noticing  his  air  of  depression. 
"  I  saw  him  again  on  the  day  when  the  Wahon  amendment 
was  passed  ;  he  was  wild  with  joy,  and  hardly  seemed  the 
same  man  as  the  Gambetla  of  the  evening  before." 

The  next  question  was  to  determine  the  composition  of  the 
Senate.  The  Right  hoped  for  a  new  lease  of  life  as  members 
of  this  body.  The  committee  proposed  three  classes  of 
senators :  legal  experts,  nominees  of  the  President  of  the 
Republic  and  the  rest  appointed  by  election.  Pascal  Duprat 
moved  that  the  senators  should  be  chosen  by  universal 
suffrage.  The  Legitimists  held  aloof,  the  Bonapartists  voted 
in  favour  and  the  clause  was  carried  by  322  votes  to  310.  The 
Marshal  interposed,  and  through  the  medium  of  General  de 
Cissey  declared  that  the  Government  could  not  accept  this 
result.  The  Assembly  bowed  to  his  will.  Henri  Brisson 
moved  a  dissolution,  and  asked  that  the  matter  might  be  put 
to  the  vote  at  once.  Raoul  Duval  supported  him,  and  so  did 
Thiers.  Gambetta  observed  to  the  Cabinet :  "  Thanks  to  the 
jarring  note  that  has  been  introduced,  the  whole  issue  is  at 
stake.  We  have  voted  for  the  principle  of  the  Senate,  we 
have  swallowed  our  scruples,  and  now  you  come  and  tell  us 
that  you  want  a  Senate  entirely  of  your  own  making  !  This 
sort  of  thing  cannot  go  on.  Since  matters  have  reached  this 
stage,  let  us  dissolve,  let  us  appeal  to  the  country  !  "  The 
emergency  vote  on  dissolution  was  rejected.  Wallon  asked 
the  Chamber  to  adjourn  until  February  15.  The  Marshal 
was  urged  to  form  a  new  Cabinet  based  on  the  majority  of 
May  24,  and  including  the  Bonapartists.     MacMahon  suni- 

191 


GAMBETTA 

moned  the  Due  de  Broglie.  The  latter  maintained  that  "  the 
task  of  framing  laws  for  the  constitution  must  not  be  given 
up."  He  reproduced  the  views  of  the  Comte  de  Paris  in  the 
following  phrase  :  "  An  alliance  with  the  Bonapartists  is  out 
of  the  question."  Furthermore,  he  advised  the  Marshal  to 
send  for  Buffet. 

The  Right  carried  on  their  negotiations  under  the  aegis  and 
under  the  roof  of  Casimir-Perier  and  his  brother-in-law, 
D'Audiifret  Pasquier.  On  February  19  the  printed  form  of  a 
clause  signed  by  Wallon  was  distributed  among  the 
Assembly  :  "  The  Senate  consists  of  300  members,  225  elected 
by  the  Colonies  and  Departments  and  75  by  the  National 
Assembly.  .  .  .  The  senators  elected  by  the  National 
Assembly  are  irremovable."  Frantic  demonstrations  from  the 
extreme  Right.  The  Right  Centre  accepted  the  draft. 
Among  the  Left,  only  one  Deputy  opposed  it,  to  wit  Gr^vy. 
Of  the  Republican  Unionists,  Edgar  Quinet,  Louis  Blanc  and 
Madier  de  Montjau  also  fought  the  proposal ;  the  unity  that 
had  been  lately  re-established  was  in  danger  of  impairment. 
Gambetta  sprang  into  the  breach  and  rallied  his  scattering 
forces.  He  was  no  longer  merely  the  orator,  the  party  chief ; 
he  was  the  wary  negotiator,  the  far-seeing  diplomat,  who  could 
appeal  with  equal  force  to  the  intellect  and  to  the  emotions. 
It  was  an  impressive  scene  when  the  Republicans,  in  order  to 
save  France  from  a  dictatorship,  threw  their  traditions  and 
their  personal  preferences  overboard.  Through  the  supple 
genius  of  Gambetta,  realities  took  the  place  of  bloodless 
abstractions,  and  the  spirit  of  rigid  formalism  yielded  to  the 
spirit  of  enlightened  statecraft.  The  clause  was  passed.  The 
minority  comprised  the  Right  and  the  Bonapartists,  the 
majority,  the  Left,  the  Right  Centre  and  some  stray 
adherents  of  the  Moderate  Right.  Gr^vy  refrained  from 
voting.  The  Due  de  Broglie,  after  shilly-shallying  up  to  the 
eleventh  hour,  decided  to  record  his  vote.  The  Extreme  Left, 
Louis  Blanc,  Madier  de  Montjau  and  Edgar  Quinet,  did  not 
vote.  They  were  deaf  to  Gambetta's  entreaties.  Louis  Blanc 
remarks,  with  reference  to  Edgar  Quinet  :  "  He,  too,  stood 
his  ground,  but  at  what  a  cost  !     I  can  still  see  the  grand  old 

192 


GAMBETTA    AND    THE   CONSTITUTION 

man  collapsing  into  iiis  seat,  so  overwrought  that  the  tears 
were  trickling  down  his  cheeks  I  "  The  composition  of  the 
Senate  was  settled;  the  Republic  was  an  accomplished  fact. 
(January  25,  1875.) 

Thus  the  new  French  State  system  was  the  outcome  of  a 
series  of  compromises  between  the  Constitutional  Monarchists 
and  the  Republicans,  between  the  representatives  of  the 
bourgeoisie  and  of  the  democracy.  The  vanquished  were  the 
champions  of  royalty  by  divine  right  and  the  partisans  of  the 
Empire.  It  was  in  the  teeth  of  their  opposition  that  tlie  work 
of  1875  was  achieved. 

On  March  3  Gambetta  wrote  to  Ranc  (unpublished  letter) : 
"  The  Republic,  which  we  wish  to  build  up  on  a  rock-bottom 
foundation,  will  be  thrown  open  to  all  in  that  it  ceases  to  be 
directed  by  a  single  faction.  .  .  .  Whatever  the  merits  or 
drawbacks  of  the  Constitution,  our  aim  should  be,  not  to 
weaken  the  structure,  but  to  cement  it  more  firmly.  It  is  a 
work  of  peace-making  and  bridge-building,  which  has 
afforded  the  Republicans  a  unique  opportunity  of  displaying 
to  the  country  their  apparent  harmony.  We  have  done 
well  to  break  for  a  while  with  the  intractable  element. 
In  this  respect  I  don't  quite  see  eye  to  eye  with  you, 
who  are  forming  a  phalanx  of  the  Left  against  reaction. 
Our  new-born  infant  should  make  for  unity,  and  ac- 
cordingly for  patriotism.  At  last  the  country  will  see 
its  dream  come  true — the  achievement  of  a  combina- 
tion which,  if  it  had  been  brought  about  sixty,  forty 
or  even  thirty  years  earlier,  would  have  turned  the 
wheel  of  the  revolution  round  full  circle.  The  statesmanship 
that  paved  the  way  for  such  a  triumph  is  the  only  one  that 
can  properly  develop  its  results." 

On  March  1 1  Buffet  was  called  upon  to  take  office.  He  had 
neither  the  breadth  of  view  nor  the  literary  gifts  of  the  Due 
de  Broglie,  but  he  was  a  man  of  sincere  convictions,  energetic, 
strong-willed;  his  outspoken  address  and  his  solid  reasoning 
made  a  deep  impression  on  the  Assembly.  No  one  was  better 
versed  in  budgets  and  tariffs.  In  the  economic  and  financial 
sphere  he  was  a  tough  fighter  and  a  redoubtable  opponent. 

193  O 


GAMBETTA 

Moreover,  his  lofty  moral  bearing  earned  him  universal 
respect. 

On  the  29th  Gambetta  delivered  a  funeral  oration  over 
Edgar  Quinet.  He  paid  tribute  to  the  memory  of  Michelet 
and  of  Ledru-Rollin,  who  had  both  recently  died.  He 
recalled  Quinet's  prophecies  with  regard  to  Germany  :  "  This 
scholar  and  poet  saw  invasion  looming  up  behind  the  cloudy 
and  pedantic  theories  that  were  being  spun  in  the  German 
universities."  Then,  turning  to  the  benches  of  the  Extreme 
Left :  "  There  are  certain  rifts  within  the  lute,  but  our  agree- 
ment on  fundamentals  is  proof  against  all  attempts  to  destroy 
it.  We  follow  in  the  footsteps  of  our  predecessors.  Their 
principles  are  ours.  It  is  only  the  methods  of  upholding 
them  that  have  changed.  Democracy,  in  assuming  control, 
is  faced  with  great  dangers.  Power  brings  with  it  knotty 
problems  to  be  solved.  When  we  are  in  the  majority,  we 
must  govern  what  we  have  won,  we  must  show  ourselves 
worthy  to  keep.  Therefore  we  must  school  ourselves  to  discip- 
line and  patience,  and  learn  the  art  of  pulling  together.  Let 
us  combine  prudence  with  strength.  Let  us  beware  of  listen- 
ing to  the  counsels  of  hotheads.  We  are  on  the  right  track. 
We  have  only  to  go  on  as  we  have  begun  !  " 

At  M^nilmontant,  on  April  23,  he  made  a  speech  that  ranks 
among  the  most  memorable  and  important  of  his  career. 
Never  had  he  shown  more  political  insight,  more  clearness  of 
vision,  more  daring  originality.  "  Does  the  compact  still  hold 
good?  "  he  asked  his  constituents.  Cries  of  "  Yes  !  Yes!  " 
were  heard  from  all  sides.  Then,  for  a  space  of  several  hours, 
before  the  keen  scrutiny  of  this  huge  popular  audience,  he 
proceeded  to  take  to  pieces,  bit  by  bit,  the  whole  mechanism 
of  the  new  regime. 

What  a  masterly  feat  was  this  sort  of  lecture  in  constitu- 
tional law  to  a  gathering  of  labourers,  factory  hands,  artisans 
and  shopkeepers !  At  these  mass  meetings  one  finds  a 
remarkable  degree  of  shrewdness,  of  penetration,  of  intellec- 
tual curiosity ;  the  people  have  a  sense  for  the  finest  shades 
of  meaning,  they  are  aglow  with  eagerness  to  learn,  they  are 
all  warmth  and  fire.    Such  encounters  do  equal  credit  to  a 

194 


i 


GAMBETTA   AND   THE   CONSTITUTION 

public  quick  to  grasp  both  the  beauties  of  oratory  and  the 
force  of  ideas,  and  to  a  speaker  who  can  touch  the  right 
intellectual  and  emotional  chords  and  temper  the  passion  of 
the  multitude  with  wisdom. 

From  a  horror  of  Caesarism,  he  explains,  we  have  deter- 
mined to  end  a  dangerous  interregnum;  we  have  framed  a 
Constitution.  "  If  we  are  willing  to  take  this  Constitution 
to  our  bosom  and  use  it  as  our  own,  above  all  to  study  it 
thoroughly  so  that  we  can  put  it  into  practice,  it  may  well 
prove  to  have  furnished  the  Republican  democracy  with  the 
best  instrument  of  freedom  ever  placed  into  its  hands." 

First,  the  President  of  the  Republic.  Since  his  authority 
no  longer  springs  from  the  direct  suffrage  of  the  nation,  there 
can  be  no  further  question  of  setting  up  the  guardian  of  the 
laws  as  superior  to  their  makers,  the  representatives  of  the 
country.  His  position,  though  modest,  is  still  dignified 
enough  to  ensure  that,  with  the  powers  allotted  to  him,  he 
shall  be  a  worthy  first  magistrate  of  France  and  a  worthy 
executor  of  the  laws  committed  to  his  charge. 

Then  he  dealt  with  the  Senate.  Those  who  first  hit  upon 
the  idea  of  having  a  Senate  had  intended  to  provide  "  a  sort 
of  last  refuge  for  those  rejected  at  the  polls."  Their  concep- 
tion had  merely  been  one  of  establishing  a  check  upon  the 
popular  will.  It  remained  to  be  seen  whether  those  who 
cherished  this  idea  fully  realised  what  it  meant,  whether  in 
seeking  to  create  a  stronghold  of  reaction  they  had  not  set 
up  an  organism  essentially  democratic  in  its  origin,  its  ten- 
dencies and  its  future  career.  What  a  contrast  between  the 
Upper  Chamber  that  stood  for  birth,  wealth,  the  Church,  the 
great  landed  estates — the  Due  de  Broglie's  Senate,  appointed 
by  the  President  or  by  a  narrow  body  of  privileged  electors — 
and  the  Senate  that  had  finally  emerged  from  the  struggles  of 
the  Assembly.  "  We  must  look  upon  it  as  the  sheet-anchor 
on  which  the  safety  of  the  good  ship  '  State  '  depends.  Why  ? 
Because  it  is  the  handiwork  of  the  Communes.^     The  most 

*  The  commune  (originally  a  borough  which  had  obtained  self-governing  rights  by 
charter  from  the  feudal  lord)  is  now  a  territorial  division  administered  by  a  mayor  and 
municipal  council. — Translator's  note. 

195  O   2 


GAMBETTA 

royalist  of  Assemblies,  having  to  institute  a  Second  Chamber, 
has  actually  fixed  as  its  starting-point — what?  The  most 
democratic  thing  in  the  country,  the  communal  spirit,  the 
thirty-six  thousand  communes  of  France  !  What  is  going 
to  issue  from  the  ballot-boxes  ?  A  Senate  ?  No — the  Grand 
Council  of  the  French  Communes."  And,  with  a  presentiment 
of  the  crisis  of  1889,  he  adds:  "  It  is  in  the  Senate  that  the 
last  battle  will  be  fought  I  " 

"  Rest  assured  that,  once  you  have  tried  this  experiment, 
you  will  not  let  it  drop.  Political  institutions  nearly  always 
lead  men  further  than  they  anticipate,  and  this  institution  is 
no  exception  to  the  rule.  The  circumstances  and  the  men 
that  have  shaped  it  are  not  altogether  w^orthy  of  their  creation. 
You  must  give  it  a  trial,  and  your  labour  must  be  a  labour  of 
love." 

These  were  decidedly  novel  ideas  for  the  Republicans  of 
those  days.  They  had  hitherto  drawn  their  sole  inspiration 
from  the  revolutionary  theories  of  1 789-1 793  and  1848.  As 
for  the  Presidency,  the  men  of  the  Revolution,  taking  their 
stand  against  kingship,  had  never  desired  a  single  supreme 
authority  at  the  head  of  the  State,  These  points  had  not  been 
gained  without  wailing  and  gnashing  of  teeth.  Gambetta,  by 
inducing  the  French  democracy  to  accept  these  institutions, 
became  the  founder  of  the  parliamentary  Republic. 

The  Assembly  was  re-opened  on  November  4.  This  was 
the  last  phase. 

The  constitution  had  now  been  passed  and  a  parliamentary 
regime  set  up.  What  is  the  meaning  of  a  parliamentary 
regime  ?  It  means  the  existence  of  a  compact  majority  as  the 
basis  for  a  strong,  enduring  Government,  which  is  to  carry 
out  a  fruitful  and  vigorous  policy.  That,  indeed,  is  what 
Gambetta  demanded  and  did  his  best  to  secure.  Things, 
however,  did  not  move  so  fast  as  he  had  expected.  He  would 
allow  of  no  halting-places;  he  was  too  eager  to  quicken  the 
pace.  The  difficulties  of  parliamentary  life  are  tremendous. 
It  needs  an  uncommon  force  of  character  to  hold  out,  to  resist 
the  current,  to  keep  one's  head  above  water,  "  to  rule  over  the 
mob  of  petty  men  who  aspire  to  rule,"  as  Thiers  said  in 

196 


GAMBETTA   AND   THE   CONSTITUTION 

speaking  of  Pitt.     Yet  these  very  difficulties  lend  that  life  its 
greatest  charm. 

In  Gambetta's  opinion,  the  best  method  of  evolving  a 
majority  was  to  have  the  most  comprehensive  ballot-system, 
the  one  that  gave  prominence  to  ideas  rather  than  personali- 
ties, the  scriilin  de  listed  Not  that  he  saw  in  it  a  cure  for  all 
ills — the  electoral  system  is  an  affair  of  tactics  rather  than  of 
principles — but  he  subordinated  everything  to  his  main 
design  :  "  We  must  create  a  Governmental  majority,"  he 
said,  "and  put  an  end  to  our  internal  feuds.  The  policy 
that  we  should  strive  after  is  one  of  pacifying  and  reconciling. 
What  would  our  plight  be  to-morrow  if,  after  approving  these 
institutions,  explaining  them  to  the  country  and  getting  them 
into  working  order,  we  still  offered  to  the  world,  not  a  picture 
of  vigorous  and  concerted  action,  but  a  sorry  exhibition  of 
futile  wrangling  and  anarchical  chaos?  "  Then,  with  a  touch 
of  prophetic  sadness  :  "  You  smile  when  I  speak  of  modera- 
tion. Well,  we  shall  see  a  good  deal  of  each  other  yet;  and 
unless  I  am  struck  down  by  an  untimely  death,  I  hope  to  give 
you  fairly  conclusive  proofs  that  when  I  claim  a  spirit  of 
moderation,  it  is  no  idle  boast.  Alas  !  he  died  before  reaching 
the  goal.  He  had  the  last  word  before  the  tribunal  of  history, 
but  not  in  his  lifetime.  The  formation  of  that  Governmental 
majority  was  now  inevitable,  it  w'as  only  a  matter  of  time ;  but 
he  was  to  vanish  from  the  scene  before  he  could  attain  the 
object  of  his  unswerving  pursuit. 

He  had  a  foreboding,  by  the  way,  of  the  diflficulties  that 
strewed  his  path.  "One  sometimes  hears  of  'steam-tug' 
candidates,"  he  remarked  on  one  occasion.  Naturally,  he 
had  a  fellow-feeling  for  such  candidates!  "  We  may  treat 
this  electoral  delusion  with  the  contempt  it  deserves.  In  the 
first  place,  a  nation  would  have  no  cause  for  complaint  if  it 
were  favoured  with  a  large  number  of  men  capable  of  acting 
as  '  steam-tugs.'     This  w^ould  prove  that  the  parties  contained 

^  In  the  scrutin  de  liste  the  elector  votes  for  all  the  Deputies  and  Senators  of  the 
Department ;  in  the  scrutin  d'arroitdtssemenl  (see  below)  he  votes  for  one  reprcscnta- 
ive  only  (in  his  own  arrondissement).     The  order  of  territorial  divisions  is  depart- 
ment, arrondissement,  canton  and  commune;  the  two  latter  are  local,  not  parliamentar)'. 
— Translator's  note. 

197 


GAMBETTA 

some  exceedingly  brilliant  personalities,  and  the  richer  France 
was  in  personalities  of  this  stamp,  the  more  surely  could  she 
rely  on  a  constant  succession  of  statesmen  at  the  helm  to  save 
her  from  running  on  the  rocks  of  revolution — and  the  more 
cause  she  would  have,  I  think,  to  congratulate  herself!  "  A 
statement  that  many  will  dispute  ! 

From  this  time  on  he  has  one  overmastering  impulse,  one 
ideal  that  he  will  pursue  vainly  to  the  very  last,  and  he  puts  it 
into  these  words:  "In  the  present  plight  of  France  and 
Europe,  the  noblest  task  a  man  can  compass  is  to  build  up  a 
Government  that  shall  be  really  strong,  with  power  to  mould 
public  opinion,  not  only  in  France,  but  throughout  Europe  as 
well.  In  a  country  like  France,  the  function  of  the  statesman 
is  quite  different  to-day  from  what  it  was  in  times  gone  by. 
When  a  nation's  material  forces  are  still  intact,  when  the 
circle  of  its  frontiers  is  unbroken,  there  may  be  scope  for  dis- 
cussing questions  of  political  philosophy ;  but  in  a  country 
that  has  been  partly  shorn  of  its  territory,  such  a  course  is 
nothing  short  of  criminal  and  sacrilegious.  And  as  you  are 
trying  to  find  a  reason  for  what  was  done  on  February  25, 
and  for  the  policy  of  harmonising  and  pacifying,  I  will  give  it 
you  :  look  at  the  gap  in  the  Vosges  !  " 

Amid  the  din  and  clatter  of  warring  parties,  he  sought  to 
come  as  a  peace-maker,  to  bring  order  and  discipline  into  the 
Republic.  However  large  parties  may  be,  they  are,  as  their 
very  name  denotes,  partisan  and  parts  of  a  whole.  If  Par- 
liament is  the  mirror  of  the  nation,  it  is  a  mirror  shattered  into 
fragments.  What  a  labour  of  Hercules,  to  produce  from  the 
motley  concourse  of  parties  a  national  policy  !  England  had 
succeeded  in  the  task.  Gambetta  was  fired  by  the  most 
glorious  ambition  to  which  a  lofty  soul  can  aspire  :  he  sought 
to  become  leader  of  a  democracy,  to  govern  a  free  country, 
not  by  force,  but  by  persuasion,  by  reasoned  eloquence,  and 
thus  to  win  back  for  it  some  day  its  former  territory  and  its 
former  greatness. 

Buffet  advocated  the  scrutin  d'arrondissement,  which  was 
adopted  by  388  votes  to  322. 

First  of  all  the  Assembly  had  to  nominate  the  75  irremov- 

198 


GAMBETTA  AND  THE  CONSTITUTION 

able  senators.  Gambetta,  by  dint  of  a  compact  between 
Republicans,  Legitimists  and  Bonapartists,  ousted  the 
Orleanists.  He  thus  continued  to  make  the  Republic  reap 
the  benefit  of  the  institutions  which  its  enemies  had  devised 
for  its  undoing.  "  This  is  no  majority,"  cried  the  Due 
de  Broglie,  "  it  is  a  coalition  of  hatreds!  "  Alas,  there  was 
hatred  in  every  camp  ! 

The  Assembly  had  lived  its  allotted  span.  It  had  been 
elected  for  the  purpose  of  concluding  peace.  When  once 
peace  was  concluded,  was  it  its  duty  and  had  it  the  power  to 
give  place  to  another  assembly  ?  But  our  territory  was  still 
under  enemy  occupation.  When  once  the  territory  was  set 
free,  was  it  its  duty,  had  it  the  power,  to  let  the  voice  of  the 
country  make  itself  heard?  The  Republicans  favoured  this 
step,  for  they  feared  lest  the  Assembly  should  set  up  a  king. 
The  Royalists  clung  obstinately  to  their  hopes.  These  hopes 
dashed,  they  resigned  themselves  to  shaping  a  Republic. 
The  Assembly  was  far  from  showing  a  dead  level  of  medio- 
crity. No  party  was  without  men  of  conspicuous  talent,  and 
these,  when  taken  together,  formed  a  notable  array  of  intelli- 
gence and  patriotism.  This  Parliament  had  made  peace, 
restored  order,  improved  the  financial  position,  passed  impor- 
tant measures,  Army  acts,  acts  dealing  with  the  county  coun- 
cils, the  protection  of  children  and  girls  under  twenty-one 
working  in  factories,  the  protection  of  lads  employed  as 
errand-boys,  newsvendors  and  the  like,  the  prevention  of 
cruelty  to  young  children,  the  drink  question,  and  the  tax  on 
transferable  securities;  it  had  established  new  chairs  in  the 
universities,  instituted  an  inquiry  into  the  condition  of  the 
workers,  and  so  forth.  When  it  went  to  Bordeaux,  the 
country  was  at  its  last  gasp.  When  it  dissolved,  five  years 
later,  France  was  raised  to  her  feet  again,  the  Army  and  the 
finances  were  rehabilitated;  France  had  as  yet  no  allies,  it  is 
true,  but  she  was  no  longer  isolated  in  Europe ;  in  short,  a 
sound  political  fabric,  created  by  the  force  of  circumstances 
and  destined  to  endure,  had  been  built  up.  This  Assembly, 
though  handicapped  by  the  burden  of  the  past,  had  laid  the 
foundations  of  the  future. 

199 


CHAPTER   XIII 

THE  SPIRIT  OF  THE    1 875    CONSTITUTION 

Gambelta  and  the  Bicameral  System — The  President  of  the  Republic — Gambetta  felt 
certain  that  this  Constitution  would  last. 

The  Constitution  of  1875  can  already  boast  a  life  of  four- 
and-forty  years — a  longer  spell  than  any  of  its  precursors  since 
the  French  Revolution.  How  has  this  come  to  pass? 
Gambetta,  with  remarkable  insight,  had  shadowed  forth  some 
of  the  reasons. 

In  the  first  place,  he  realised  the  essential  niche  that  the 
Senate  might  fill  in  the  Republic.  Where  the  Royalists  of 
the  National  Assembly  had  originally  seen  nothing  more  than 
a  guarantee  for  their  survival,  a  means  of  counteracting  the 
effects  of  universal  suffrage,  Gambetta  saw  a  potential  weapon 
for  foiling  the  endeavours  of  reactionaries  and  would-be 
autocrats.  The  trend  of  events  during  the  Boulanger  crisis 
proved  his  contention  up  to  the  hilt.  Instead  of  being  a 
citadel  of  resistance  to  the  Republic,  the  Senate  became  a 
tower  of  strength  for  its  defence. 

It  was  also  quite  on  the  cards  that  the  Senate,  in  face  of  a 
Chamber  that  had  no  majority,  might  prove  a  factor  making 
for  Republican  stability.  The  1885  Chamber,  for  instance, 
elected  amid  the  throes  of  an  economic  crisis,  and  following 
close  upon  Lang-Son's  fiasco  in  Tonkin,  was  split  up  into  three 
sections,  two  of  which  combined  against  the  third  to  prevent 
it  from  governing.  Suppose  that  at  this  moment  the  Assembly 
had  been  the  sole  administrative  body,  and  the  Cabinet  crises 
had  developed  into  Presidential  crises,  how  far  might  the 
Roulangist  movement  not  have  carried  us?  Betw^een  1875 
and  1919,  France  has  had  fifty-three  Cabinets.      Had  the  Presi- 

200 


THE   SPIRIT   OF   THE    1875    CONSTITUTION 

dencv  chano^ed  hands  as  often  as  this,  how  could  the  Republic 
have  outlasted  such  a  regime  ? 

Gambetta's  conversion  to  the  two-Chamber  system  was 
gradual,  and  not  achieved  without  efTort.  Certain  of  his 
friends,  M.  de  Freycinet  in  particular,  had  done  a  good  deal 
towards  bringing  him  over.  The  Republicans  had  hitherto 
looked  upon  the  Republic  and  single-Chambor  Government 
as  synonymous  terms.  The  division  of  the  legislative  power 
between  two  Assemblies  seemed  in  their  eyes  a  return  to  the 
period  of  reaction,  to  the  year  1791,  to  Louis  XVIII.,  the 
July  Monarchy  and  Louis-Philippe.  They  were  not  altogether 
awake  to  the  signs  of  the  times  abroad ;  they  often  overlooked 
the  fact  that  all  the  important  States  of  the  day  had  bicameral 
Parliaments.  To  maintain  a  single  Assembly  was  scarcely 
practicable,  implying  as  it  did  either  that  the  President,  if 
chosen  by  that  body,  would  always  be  at  the  mercy  of  caprice 
and  might  at  any  moment  be  overthrown  as  Thiers  was 
overthrown  in  1873;  or  that,  if  chosen  by  the  people,  he  was 
in  danger  of  coming  into  conflict  with  the  representatives  of 
the  nation,  as  had  been  the  case  with  Louis-Napoleon 
Bonaparte  in  1851. 

As  regards  the  Presidency,  indeed,  the  lesson  of  1848  had 
not  been  lost  on  the  Republicans,  and  Gambetta  reminded 
the  country  that  if  the  First  Magistrate  was  appointed  by  the 
people,  he  might  easily  ride  rough-shod  over  the  Assembly. 
Some  theorists,  on  the  other  hand,  holding  that  a  President 
who  was  a  creation  of  the  Chambers  was  liable  to  become 
their  victim,  turned  their  eyes  towards  the  United  States.  Now 
if  the  architects  of  the  American  Constitution  had  invested 
the  President  of  the  United  States  with  ample  authority,  it  was 
only  because  in  the  beginning  that  authority  was  exercised 
over  a  somewhat  narrow  domain.  The  Federal  Constitution 
was  to  serve  only  as  a  useful  connecting-link — especially  for 
the  purpose  of  foreign  relations — between  the  various  political 
units  that  had  sprung  up  on  North  American  soil.  The 
individual  States  were  given  virtually  unlimited  control  over 
their  internal  affairs.  It  is  among  the  outstanding  portents  of 
history   that   this   mechanism    has    never   failed   to   suit   the 

201 


GAMBETTA 

expanding  needs  of  a  vast  empire,  whether  in  foreign,  colonial 
or  military  policy.  If  we  strove  to  apply  such  a  system  to 
our  over-centralised  France,  what  would  be  the  result?  For 
a  space  of  four  years  (since  the  term  of  the  President's  office 
would  inevitably  be  reduced)  we  should  have  the  undisputed 
sway  of  the  dominant  party,  a  minority  utterly  cowed  by  the 
majority,  and,  in  consequence,  less  stability  and  less  freedom. 
The  American  plan  presupposes  a  federated  State,  a  country 
in  an  advanced  stage  of  decentralisation. 

In  France,  the  President  of  the  Republic  enjoys  a  high 
privilege,  which  has  not  been  wielded  by  the  British  Sovereign 
since  the  days  of  George  I.,  and  which  is  regarded  with  no 
little  astonishment  by  our  neighbours  across  the  Channel  :  he 
takes  the  chair  at  Cabinet  Councils.  This  function  is  some- 
thing more  than  a  mere  formality ;  it  may  involve  the  play  of 
character,  the  expression  of  an  individual  will.  Such  a 
President  as  Jules  Gr^vy,  for  instance,  who  had  never  held  a 
Cabinet  post,  contrived  to  exert  a  commanding  influence  at 
meetings  of  the  Council.  He  would  first  allow  Ministers  to 
have  their  say,  without  interposing  a  single  comment;  then, 
under  plea  of  winding  up  the  discussion,  he  would  summarise 
the  leading  points  and  stealthily  introduce  his  own  opinion, 
with  such  flawless  tact  and  such  cogent  reasoning  that  in  the 
end  he  generally  succeeded  in  making  it  prevail. 

"  The  President  of  the  Republic,  acting  on  the  concurrent 
advice  of  the  Senate,  may  dissolve  the  Chamber  of  Deputies 
before  the  legal  expiry  of  its  mandate."  From  the  very  outset, 
from  the  day  after  the  Constitution  was  approved,  this  maxim, 
as  we  shall  see  later,  was  doomed  to  be  infringed.  In 
England,  ministerial  responsibility  has  no  meaning  apart  from 
a  consultation  of  the  people.  The  dissolution  of  the  House  of 
Commons  is  a  process  essential  to  the  working  of  the  demo- 
cratic machine,  the  regular  form  in  which  an  appeal  to  the 
country  is  clothed.  This  appeal  is  not  one  that  involves  a 
mere  answer  "yes"  or  "no" — a  snare  and  a  delusion — or 
the  acceptance  or  rejection  of  some  individual  leader — a 
frequent  means  of  avoiding  a  straight  issue — but  is  based  upon 
some  legislative  proposal  or  some  question  of  policy,   upon 

202 


THE    SPIRIT   GF   THE    1875    CONSTITUTION 

the  general  administration  of  affairs.  In  our  case,  the  dissolu- 
tion of  the  Chamber  is  nothing  more  than  a  ministerial 
decree,  since  every  Presidential  decree  has  to  be  countersij^ned 
by  a  Minister.  In  striking  contrast  w  ilh  the  English  practice, 
the  1875  Constitution,  from  distrust  of  personal  power, 
requires  for  a  dissolution  the  consent  of  the  Senate — a  provi- 
sion that  only  complicates  matters,  since  it  implies  a  previous 
discussion.  Finally,  when  the  maximum  term  of  life  for 
Parliament  is  four  years,  the  exercise  of  the  right  to  dissolve 
is  beset  with  difficulties;  it  would  be  well  to  fix  a  somewhat 
longer  term,  as  in  England.  '*  The  power  to  dissolve  Parlia- 
ment," Waldeck-Rousseau  has  remarked,  "  is  not  a  menace, 
but   a   safeguard,    for  universal    suffrage."  It    has   been 

provided,  not  in  the  interest  of  Governments,  but  in  the 
interest  of  the  community  at  large. 

The  1875  Constitution  did  not  emerge  fully  armed  from  the 
brain  of  any  one  man  ;  it  was  not  the  offspring  of  fine-spun 
theories  that  owed  nothing  to  practical  experience.  It  was  the 
child  of  circumstances,  slowly  and  painfully  brought  to  birth 
from  the  womb  of  reality,  and  a  long  series  of  struggles,  a 
clash  of  hostile  forces,  went  to  the  moulding  of  its  character. 
These  warring  elements,  which  might  have  proved  its  weak- 
ness, turned  out  to  be  a  source  of  strength,  just  as  the  stones 
of  an  arch,  while  seeming  to  drag  it  towards  its  fall,  serve  to 
buttress  it  up.  In  the  same  way  the  American  Constitution 
was  the  outcome  of  a  compromise  between  the  advocates  of 
federation  and  the  champions  of  vState  autonomy.  Like  ours, 
it  was  a  bargain,  a  compact,  a  peace  treaty.  It  was  the  joint 
work  of  oppyonents  who  had  resigned  themselves  to  the  in- 
evitable and  of  partisans  who  were  to  some  extent  sceptical  as 
to  the  merits  of  the  government  they  were  about  to  set  up. 
There,  too,  it  was  only  after  a  long  process  of  give-and-take 
that  the  advocates  of  State  separatism  on  the  one  hand,  and 
the  admirers  of  English  institutions  on  the  other,  found  their 
common  measure  in  a  document  which  did  not  give  entire 
satisfaction  to  either  side.  And  perhaps  it  is  just  because 
the  United  States'  Constitution  was  not  hatched  in  a 
day    from    the    brain    of    an     individual    or    the    doctrines 

20; 


GAMBETTA 

of  a  school,  but  was  created  by  the  force  of  events,  by 
historical  necessity — perhaps  it  is  for  this  very  reason  that 
it  has  worn  so  well  and  adapted  itself,  with  amazing 
elasticity,  to  the  most  unlooked-for  phases  in  the  growth  of 
this  Titanic  democracy. 

In  America  as  in  France,  rare  self-denial  was  shown  by 
some  who  from  their  great  services  might  well  have  claimed 
the  right  to  a  more  stubborn  attitude.  For  Franklin,  as  for 
Gambetta,  the  new  dispensation  was  not  good  enough ;  he 
would  have  liked  something  on  more  democratic  lines. 
Hamilton,  on  the  other  hand,  protested  that  it  went  too  far. 
Nevertheless,  both  men  voted  in  its  favour.  Washington 
doubted  whether  it  would  work.  No  one  was  sanguine  as  to 
its  chances  of  success,  but  no  one  cared  to  risk  the  ruin  of  the 
country  by  opening  the  sluice-gates  to  anarchy.  "  Let  us 
give  the  Constitution  a  trial,"  said  Franklin,  in  a  noble 
speech  ;  "  if  we  bring  good  will  to  bear  on  it,  we  shall  contrive 
to  amend  its  faults.  For  my  part,  I  accept  it,  since  I  can 
hope  for  nothing  better.  For  the  sake  of  the  public  weal  I 
will  smother  my  opinion  as  to  its  defects.  I  have  never 
uttered  a  word  on  the  subject  outside  this  Assembly.  Within 
these  walls  my  doubts  took  rise,  within  these  walls  they  shall 
be  buried." 

The  Versailles  Assembly  saw  men  surrender  their  convic- 
tions with  no  less  honour  and  no  less  regret.  And  what,  after 
all,  was  this  heart-racking  compromise  but  the  climax  of  a 
century  of  abortive  experiments,  of  kaleidoscopic  changes,  of 
endless  revolutions  ?  What  was  it  but  the  outcome  of  a  series 
of  conflicting  systems,  tried  and  found  wanting  by  our 
country  throughout  the  past  hundred  years?  How  long  a  life 
had  the  Constitution  of  1791,  which  endeavoured  to  combine 
the  authority  of  a  single  Chamber  with  the  royal  veto,  un- 
checked by  ministerial  responsibility,  which  never  said  the 
last  word  on  anything  and  which  provoked  Washington  to 
exclaim  :  "  If  I  know  anything  of  the  French  nation,  there 
will  be  plenty  of  bloodshed,  and  a  despotism  will  arise  more 
oppressive  than  the  one  that  she  boasts  of  having  swept 
away!  "  ?     How  long  a  life  Find  the  Constitution  of  1793, 

204 


THE   SPIRIT   OF   THE    1875    COXSTTrUTIOX 

which  resulted  in  ihe  tyranny  of  committees,  in  g^overnment 
by  local  Assemblies,  in  plebiscites  and  in  revolt?  Or  the 
Constitution  of  1795,  a  political  cross-breed,  engendered  by 
fear,  a  tangle  of  baffling  complexities?  Or  that  of  the  year 
VIII.  of  the  Revolution,  with  its  three  Consuls?  Or  the 
Consulate?  Or  the  Napoleonic  dictatorship?  Or  the  Con- 
stitution of  April  6,  1814,  restoring  the  monarchy,  or  that  of 
June  4,  with  a  suffrage  based  on  property  qualification  ?  Or 
the  Additional  Act  of  April  22,  1815,  which  also  let  the  ques- 
tion of  "the  last  word  "  hang  over — as  was  clear  enough  in 
1830?  Or  the  Charter  of  1830,  with  the  property  qualification 
again?  Or  the  Constitution  of  1848,  that  formidable  tete-d- 
tete  (in  Tocqueville's  pithy  phrase)  by  which  an  Assembly 
endowed  with  right  confronted  a  President  endowed  with 
might,  W'ith  the  inevitable  result  that  the  representative  of 
might  triumphed  over  his  rival  ?  Or  the  Constitution  of 
1852,  under  which  the  Emperor  was  responsible  to  the  nation 
in  name  but  not  in  fact,  and  the  Legislative  Body,  if  it  wanted 
to  change  its  policy,  could  not  change  the  Ministers,  the 
upshot  being  that  the  will  of  one  man  directed  everything  and 
could  land  the  whole  country  in  disaster?  Or,  last  of  all, 
the  Liberal  Empire  ?  From  all  these  ill-fated  ventures  the 
1875  Constitution  had  learnt  its  lessons. 

Two  books  issued  under  the  Second  Empire  had  a  marked 
influence  on  the  decisions  of  the  National  Assembly  :  Vues 
sur  le  gouvernement  de  la  France,  by  the  Due  Victor  de 
Broglie,  and  La  France  nouvclle,  by  Prevost-Paradol. 
De  Broglie's  book  was  written  in  1861,  but  after  a  few  copies 
had  been  run  off  the  press  it  was  seized  by  the  police,  and  did 
not  appear  till  1870.  Prevost-Paradol's  was  published  in 
1868.  It  was  to  these  fountain-heads  that  the  generation 
destined  to  fashion  the  1875  Constitution  resorted  for  its 
schooling.  Neither  work  lays  stress  on  the  nature  of  that 
regime.  Let  us  listen  to  Victor  de  Broglie  :  *'  Frankly  speak- 
ing, the  choice  for  lovers  of  freedom  lies  between  two  alter- 
natives— a  republic  bordering  on  a  constitutional  monarchy, 
and  a  constitutional  monarchy  bordering  on  a  republic  and 
differing  from  one  only  in  the  composition  and  tenure  of  the 

205 


GAMBETTA 

executive.  Any  other  kind  of  republic  means  a  Convention/ 
any  other  kind  of  monarchy  means  an  Empire."  He  adds: 
"  It  would  be  wise  to  choose  a  republic  rather  than  civil  war." 
He  was  the  first  to  give  some  hint,  as  early  as  1 86 1,  of  a  view- 
much  developed  by  Thiers  :  "  For  us  it  would  be  the  form  of 
government  that  causes  fewest  cleavages."  He  particularly 
set  his  face  against  a  Legitimist  restoration  :  "  The  worst  type 
of  revolution,"  he  says,  "  is  a  restoration." 

And  Prevost-Paradol :  "  We  are  trying  to  discover  institu- 
tions that  can  adapt  themselves  equally  well  to  a  monarchical 
form  or  a  republican  form,  to  preserve  liberty  within  the 
framework  of  democracy."  Again:  "The  preponderant 
influence  (or,  if  you  will,  the  last  word  in  every  dispute)  being 
granted  to  the  popular  Assembly,  with  the  sole  reservation 
that  the  right  to  dissolve  Parliament  is  confined  to  the  execu- 
tive, this  influence  will  be  exercised  in  three  ways  :  through 
the  vote  on  the  Estimates,  through  the  vote  on  legislative 
measures,  and  through  the  re-modelling  of  Ministries."  Thus 
he  claimed,  for  a  legislative  Assembly  chosen  directly  by 
popular  suffrage,  what  he  called  "  the  privilege  of  the  last 
word." 

Democratic,  Liberal,  parliamentarian,  the  representative 
system  cast  into  the  mould  of  universal  suffrage — these  were 
the  conceptions  revived  by  Thiers  in  1871,  epitomised  by 
Casimir-Perier  in  his  scheme,  later  by  Laboulaye  (who  himself 
had  championed  them  in  1863,  in  his  book  La  Partie  liberale 
and  in  the  third  volume  of  his  Histoire  des  Etats-Unis),  and 
Wallon,  finally  by  Gambetta  and  the  Republicans  who  helped 
to  pass  the  statutes  regarding  the  Constitution.  Dread  of 
Bonapartism,  which  was  beginning  to  raise  its  head  again, 
the  memory  of  disasters,  and  a  loathing  for  dictatorship  in 
all  its  forms,  were  the  chief  motives  at  the  back  of  their  minds. 
For  these  disappointed  Constitutional  Monarchists  and  these 
Republicans  who  had  ceased  to  kick  against  the  pricks,  the 
main  object  was  to  forestall  the  ever-threatening  dangers  of 
personal  rule,  and  to  safeguard  political  freedom.     In  approv- 

*  I.e.,  the  eflRcient  but  tyrannous  National  Convention  of  1792. — Tkansi  ator's 

NOTE. 

206 


THE   SPIRIT   OF  THE   1875   CONSTITUTION 

ing  the  Constitution  of  1875,  the  National  Assembly  sougiit 
to  prevent  a  repetition  of  the  misfortunes  in  which  it  fiad  been 
cradled.  A  division  of  the  legislative  functions;  cohesion  and 
responsibility  in  the  executive;  at  the  apex  of  the*  pyramid,  a 
ruler  with  sole  authority  (a  thing  that  the  Revolution  had  tried 
to  avoid),  but  not  hereditary;  at  the  base,  universal  suffrage, 
from  which  the  National  Assembly  itself  derived  its  power ; 
the  two-chamber  system,  as  in  England,  in  America,  in  all 
the  great  States,  whether  monarchiad  or  republican;  minis- 
terial responsibility,  collective  in  some  cases,  individual  in 
others;  an  appeal  to  the  country  in  the  event  of  disagreement 
between  Cabinet  and  Chamber — thus  was  the  edifice  rebuilt 
after  that  long  succession  of  earthquakes.  Incidentally,  the 
Constitution  was  no  cast-iron  fabric,  but  was  always  amenable 
to  revision. 

Gambetta  was  almost  alone  at  the  time  in  believing  that  this 
charter — a  compact,  not  merely  between  constitutional  theories 
that  were  pitted  against  each  other  in  the  Assembly,  but 
between  constitutional  systems  that  had  been  pitted  against 
each  other  in  France  for  well-nigh  a  century — was  of  the  stuff 
that  would  endure.  His  faith  was  justified  by  results.  But 
he  did  not  foresee  that  the  very  persons  on  whom  would  fall 
the  duty  of  putting  it  into  practice  would  modify  its  principles. 
The  difficulties  under  which  France  was  to  labour  for  forty 
years  to  come — imprimis,  fluctuations  in  the  Cabinet :  what 
human  undertaking  can  prosper  when  subject  to  incessant 
changes? — were  not  all  due  to  evils  inherent  in  the  Constitu- 
tion; on  the  contrary,  they  often  arose  from  breaches  of  the 
Constitution  in  the  letter  or  in  the  spirit. 

Modern  democracies,  up  to  the  present,  have  hit  upon  two 
methods  of  self-government,  and  two  only :  in  federalised 
States  the  American  system,  in  centralised  States  the  par- 
liamentary regime,  but  a  parliamentary  regime  with  its  indis- 
pensable laws,  its  essential  rules  of  procedure.  The  ensuing- 
chapters  will  illustrate  the  truth  of  this  maxim.  After  forty- 
four  years  of  experience,  France  will  have  to  investigate  by 
what  means — fresh  interpretation  of  the  existing  laws,  fresh 
legislation,  or  both — ^she  may,  through  delimiting  functions 

207 


GAMBETTA 

more  wisely,  redress  abuses  and  restore  whatever  elements  of 
good  have  been  suffered  to  lapse.  The  task  will  have  to  be 
carried  out  with  great  foresight,  care  and  knowledge.  We 
shall  be  compelled  to  guard  against  incompetence,  against 
hastily  devised  makeshifts,  against  abstract  dialectics  and 
theories  divorced  from  practice  (such  as  have  already  cost  us 
so  dear),  and  against  a  spirit  of  reckless  adventure.  In  any 
case,  the  most  scrupulously  worded  documents  will  not  be 
enough ;  we  shall  need  the  moral  principles,  the  good  sense, 
the  reasoning  faculty  of  living  men. 

Gambetta,  like  Mirabeau,  was  an  impassioned  orator  and  a 
sturdy  realist;  but  Mirabeau  said  (February  14,  1790):  "It 
fills  me  with  dismay  to  think  that  I  shall  have  done  no  more 
than  contribute  towards  a  vast  upheaval."  Gambetta,  on  the 
other  hand,  could  justly  claim  to  have  achieved  constructive 
work,  to  have  played  his  part  in  rearing  the  new  order.  If 
the  institution  of  a  Second  Chamber  has  ceased  to  be  an  exotic 
in  Republican  France,  it  is  he,  before  all  men,  to  whom  the 
credit  is  due.  And  if  the  Republic  has  managed  to  survive, 
it  is  thanks  to  the  establishment  of  a  Second  Chamber.  He 
had  seen  clearly  the  various  causes  that  had  kept  the  Repub- 
lican idea  from  prevailing  in  the  past ;  instead  of  theories  and 
abstractions,  he  brought  a  practical,  effective  statesmanship 
to  bear  upon  the  situation.  His  great  achievement  was  to 
make  this  new  departure  acceptable,  in  the  teeth  of  intellectual 
and  moral  prejudices,  of  a  scepticism  almost  universal.  After 
the  Republic  of  1792  and  that  of  1848,  which  had  lived  for  so 
brief  a  span,  he  founded  a  Republic  which  has  lasted  for  close 
on  half  a  century  and  has  withstood  the  mightiest  cataclysm 
that  history  records.  By  this  feat  he  has  earned  a  unique 
place  in  the  annals  of  French  political  thought. 


208 


PART   IV 

THE  EARLY   STAGES   OF   PARLIAMENTARY 
REPUBLIC 

(1876-1882) 


CHAPTER  XIV 


GAMBETTA  S   IDEAS 


Gambetta's  Ideas  on  Home  and  Foreign  Policy — The  1876  Kki  tions-danibciu 
leads  the  Campaign  :  his  Speeches,  his  Ideas — Gamhetta  as  Chairman  of  ihc 
Budget  Committee — His  Views  on  Foreign  Policy,  as  recorded  in  Unpublished 
Letters. 

The  elections  to  the  Senate  were  fixed  for  January  30,  those 
of  the  Deputies  for  February  20.  The  Buffet  Ministry  was 
divided,  Dufaure  and  L^on  Say  leaning  towards  the  Left, 
Buffet  towards  the  Right.  He  began  by  prohibiting  public 
meetings  and  banquets. 

Gambetta,  at  Aix,  on  January  18,  spoke  in  praise  of  the 
Constitution  :  it  might  well  be  the  best,  since  it  was  the  most 
practical  yet  devised  for  our  country.  The  Senate,  which 
some  had  hoped  would  act  as  the  scowling  and  suspicious 
gaoler  of  democracy,  would  become  the  enlightened  guardian 
of  internal  peace.  He  tells  the  Republicans  once  more  :  "  It 
is  the  Senate  that  will  be  your  refuge  and  your  sheet-anchor. 
You  greeted  this  institution  with  distrust  and  reserve,  but  you 
are  beginning  to  associate  with  it  on  rather  more  friendly 
terms.  You  can  take  it  from  me  that  when  a  few  more  years 
have  rolled  by  we  shall  all  be  going  out  of  our  way  to  stand 
up  for  the  Senate." 

He  traces  the  broad  outline  of  a  "  ConstMvative  "  pro- 
gramme :  We  are  Conservative  if  we  want  a  society  that 
knows  no  privileges,  such  a  society  as  was  organised  by  the 
Civil  Code;  we  are  Conservative  if  we  want  liberty  of  con- 
science, on  the  lines  laid  down  by  the  Civil  Code;  we  are 
Conservative  if  we  want  freedom  of  thought,  freedom  of 
worship,  consideration  for  the  child,  for  the  father  and  mother, 
under  the  aegis  of  equal  laws  for  all,  if  we  desire  that  every 

211  P  2 


GAMBETTA 

Frenchman  shall  share  both  the  burdens  and  the  advantages, 
the  guarantees  of  citizenship.  Once  more  he  summons  those 
who  should  gather  under  the  flag:  "  You  have  a  chance  of 
playing  a  momentous  part  in  the  republic,  for  education,  social 
weight  and  the  leisure  of  wealth  are  yours.  Join  our  side, 
and  we  can  assure  you  a  rank,  a  prestige  and  an  influence 
that  will  enable  you  to  use  your  capacities  for  the  public 
good."  Finally,  he  turned  to  the  Marshal  and  exerted  him- 
self to  reassure  him,  to  bring  him  over  as  well :  "  They  try 
to  persuade  the  First  Magistrate  that  we  are  apostles  of  revolu- 
tion. We  shall  confound  our  detractors  yet.  A  day  will 
come  when  it  will  have  to  be  recognised  on  all  hands,  and 
especially  in  the  most  exalted  governing  circles,  that  those 
who  cast  a  slur  upon  individuals  and  communities  devoted  to 
the  Republican  ideal  run  the  risk  of  ignoring  a  national 
force." 

After  the  elections,  the  Senate  was  made  up  of  the  following 
elements  :  Left  Centre,  84 ;  Republican  Centre,  50 ;  Extreme 
Left,  15;  Constitutionalists,  17;  Right  Centre  and  Moderate 
Right,  81;  Extreme  Right,  13;  Bonapartists,  40.  And  now 
for  the  elections  to  the  legislative  Chamber  ! 

Thiers  being  debarred  by  age,  Gambetta  alone  took  the 
field.  He  scoured  the  country,  with  unerring  vision  and  an 
eloquence  that  nothing  could  tire,  to  preach  confidence  and 
self-restraint. 

At  Lille,  on  February  6,  after  calling  up  the  memory  of 
Faidherbe,  he  maintained  that  the  Senate  had  come  out  of  the 
recent  elections  with  flying  colours.  "Some  may  think  that 
it  is  not  progressive  enough.  For  my  part,  I  see  every  reason 
to  be  satisfied.  It  will  fulfil  its  true  mission,  that  of  curbing 
any  abuse  of  political  power."  We  must  now  crown  the  vic- 
tory by  sending  Republicans,  champions  of  democracy,  to  the 
Chamber  of  Deputies:  "The  genuine  democrat  will  not 
merely  acknowledge  men  as  equal,  he  will  make  them  equal." 
Let  us  be  Liberals.  "  By  a  '  Liberal '  I  mean  one  who  is 
pledged  to  liberty  of  conscience  in  all  its  forms,  one  who 
prizes  all  religions  alike,  while  reserving  for  himself  the  free- 
dom to  profess  any  one  of  them  or  to  reject  them  all,  one  who 

212 


GAMBETTA'S   IDEAS 

will  not  trample  on  the  ministers  of  the  various  cults.  By  a 
"  Liberal  "  I  also  mean  one  who  has  made  up  his  mind  to 
prevent  any  clerical  faction  from  becoming  a  force  in  the  politi- 
cal  world.  I  propose  that  the  Church  shall  remain  the 
Church.  There  lies  the  peril,  not  merely  for  France,  but  for 
Europe."  Finally,  he  comes  back  to  the  great  idea,  though 
here  he  expresses  himself  in  guarded  language  :  "  For  the. 
sake  of  the  balance  of  I^urope  and  th(;  triumph  of  justice,  1 
hope  that  some  day,  merely  through  the  prevalence  of  right, 
the  brethren  now  sundered  from  us  will  return  to  the  fold." 

On  February  9  he  is  at  Avignon.  At  Cavaillon  stones  are 
thrown  at  him  :  he  is  refused  a  hearing.  On  the  13th  he  is  at 
Bordeaux,  where  he  recalls  to  the  minds  of  his  audience  the 
tragic  days  of  1870  and  his  own  programme  of  187 1  :  for 
already  the  history  of  contemporary  France  seems  to  be 
identifying  itself  with  the  history  of  this  man's  brief  career. 
He  shows  that  the  separation  of  Church  and  State,  the 
income-tax,  the  freedom  of  the  Press,  the  unfettered  right  to 
hold  public  meetings  and  form  trades-unions,  have  already 
been  introduced  elsewhere.  Nevertheless,  he  does  not 
demand  that  all  these  reforms  shall  be  effected  at  once  :  "  Far 
be  it  from  me  to  guarantee  that  your  representatives  will  carry 
them  out  during  their  four  years  of  legislative  activity ;  I 
don't  believe  it,  and  to  speak  quite  frankly,  I  should  be  sorry 
if  they  did." 

On  February  15,  in  Paris  :  "  The  period  of  danger  is  over; 
the  period  of  difficulties  has  begun.  Victors  in  the  electoral 
conflict,  with  a  majority  in  the  Assemblies,  we  are  now  going 
to  be  asked — as  indeed  is  only  reasonable — for  the  proof  that 
we  know  how  to  govern.  From  now  onward  we  shall  have 
to  keep  a  close  watch  on  ourselves  and  never  venture  on  a 
single  step  without  having  thoroughly  tested  whether  the 
ground  is  firm,  without  having  made  sure  of  our  rear.  This 
policy,  the  policy  of  results,  is  the  only  one  suited  to  the 
interests  of  the  democracy.  I  belong  to  a  school  that  refuses  to 
dogmatise,  that  believes  in  analysis,  in  observation,  in  the 
study  of  facts,  to  a  school  that  takes  account  of  environment, 
of  tendencies,  of  prejudices,  even  of  hostilities,  for  one  must 

213 


GAMBETTA 

take  account  of  everything ;  paradoxes  and  sophisms  have  no 
less  influence  than  truths  on  the  conduct  of  men." 

Certain  Republicans  began  to  complain  that  this  style  of 
speaking  was  not  bold  enough.  Alfred  Naquet,  Gambetta's 
rival  at  Marseilles,  called  for  a  single  Assembly,  with  power 
to  dismiss  the  Executive  whenever  it  thought  fit,  a  direct 
appeal  to  the  people  as  in  1793,  elective  judges,  and  the  aboli- 
tion of  standing  armies.  "  Gambetta  and  his  friends,"  he 
said,  "  have  fallen  into  the  rut  of  Constitutionalism,  let  them 
stay  there ;  we  must  form,  outside  their  circle,  a  group  that  will 
fight  in  the  van,  the  warriors  of  democracy." 

On  February  20,  out  of  533  seats  the  Republicans  gained 
300  (40  went  to  the  Left  Centre,  180  to  the  Left  and  80  to  the 
Extreme  Left) ;  the  Constitutionals,  20;  the  Orleanists,  45  ;  the 
Legitimists,  20;  and  the  Bonapartists,  50.  In  105  constitu- 
encies there  was  a  second  count.  The  Centres  had  suffered  a 
landslide.  The  leaders  of  the  Right,  Due  Decazes,  Target, 
Baragnon,  De  Carayou-Latour,  Casenove  de  Pradine,  were 
nearly  all  rejected.  Buffet,  the  Premier,  was  defeated  in  all 
the  four  constituencies  for  which  he  successively  stood ;  Gam- 
betta was  returned  in  Paris,  Marseilles,  Lille  and  Bordeaux, 
Thiers  in  Paris.  Among  the  new  Republican  members  were 
Georges  Clemenceau  and  Charles  Floquet  (who  had  handed  in 
their  resignation  in  1871),  Spuller,  Lionville,  Albert  Joly, 
Dev^s,  Antonin  Proust,  Allain-Targe,  Emile  Deschanel, 
Menier,  Jean-Casimir  Perier,  Raspail,  Marcellin  Pellet, 
Constans,  Emile  Loubet  and  Armand  Fallieres.  The  Con- 
servative chiefs  held  a  consultation.  Buffet  advised  resis- 
tance, but  the  Due  de  Broglie  was  of  a  different  opinion  ;  it 
was  better,  he  thought,  to  give  the  Chamber  rope  enough  'to 
hang  itself.     This  view  prevailed. 

On  the  28th,  between  the  two  ballots,  Gambetta  again 
warned  the  public  that  the  danger  of  foreign  complications 
must  not  be  overlooked.  The  clericals  were  naturally  a  pillar 
of  the  Conservative  Party — an  ominous  connection  for  both. 
The  religious  problem  must  be  looked  at  from  a  European 
standpoint.  Bismarck,  now  in  the  thick  of  the  Kulturkampf 
and  Italy,  fresh  from  the  triumph  of  achieving  unity,  were  not 

214 


GAMBETl'A'S   IDEAS 

anxious  to  see  the  Right  carry  all  before  it  in  France.  "  We 
have  nothing  to  hope  for  from  the  spirit  of  internationalism 
and  of  proselytism  at  all  costs.  It  is  the  policy  of  the  Second 
Empire  that  we  have  to  thank  for  the  unenviable  position 
that  we  hold  among  the  Powers  to-day.  We  must  see  to  it 
that  the  French  Republic  becomes  recognised,  not  merely  by 
the  peoples  but  by  the  Governments  of  F^urope,  as  a  force 
making  for  peace  and  general  security." 

A  further  appeal  at  the  Elys^e^  :  "At  home,  France  has 
done  her  best  to  secure  a  majority  that  shall  not  be  a  majority 
for  obstruction  but  a  majority  for  government.  The  Presi- 
dent of  the  Republic  may  rest  assured  that  it  will  not  be  the 
Republicans  who  will  call  in  question  the  authority  granted 
to  him  under  the  fundamental  pact.  We  want  the  Constitu- 
tion, the  whole  Constitution.  It  is  our  safeguard,  our 
strength.  ..."  He  grows  more  moderate  than  ever,  rousing 
the  Conservatives  again  and  again,  imploring  them  to  assume, 
in  the  new  order  of  things,  the  place  which  is  theirs  by  right 
of  tradition,  of  culture  and  of  influence.  "  Just  because  we 
are  the  stronger,  we  must  not  go  to  extremes.  The  statesman- 
ship of  to-morrow  must  be  the  statesmanship  that  has  made 
the  Constitution.  We  must  not  be  too  hard  on  the  Liberals 
who  have  clung  obstinately  to  the  political  creed  of  the 
governing  classes.  If  they  come  to  us,  we  must  give  them  a 
welcome,  open  our  ranks  to  them  and  say  to  them  :  '  That's 
better  !  Now  you  will  have  a  chance  of  playing  the  part  that 
you  deserve.  When  you  are  at  grips  with  your  opponent,  when 
you  are  struggling  to  gain  the  position  that  is  your  due,  then 
you  are  justified  in  letting  your  passion  run  riot ;  but  as  soon 
as  the  victory  Is  won,  you  must  keep  a  closer  watch  upon  your- 
self than  ever,  for  as  some  ancient  sage  has  observed,  there 
is  something  more  difficult  to  bear  than  adversity,  and  that  is 
good  fortune." 

At  the  re-counts,  49  seats  went  to  the  Conservatives  and  56 
to  the  Republicans.     All  told,   the  Chamber  contained   .^40 

»  The  residence  ot  the  President  of  the  Republic  ;  the  tenn  is  often  used  meta- 
phorically for  "Presidential  policy"  and  the  like,  rfi.  our  "Downing  Street."— 
Translator's  note. 

2i5 


GAMBETTA 

Republicans,  of  whom  98  belonged  to  the  Extreme  Lett, 
194  to  the  Left,  48  to  the  Left  Centre  and  22  to  the 
Constitutionalists. 

On  March  8  the  seals  of  office  were  handed  over.  Jules 
Grevy  was  elected  President  of  the  Chamber,  and  the  Due 
d'Audiffret-Pasquier,  President  of  the  Senate. 

The  victory  of  the  Republican  party  did  not  blind  Gambetta 
to  the  peril  from  without.  On  March  3,  1876,  he  writes  to 
Ranc,  who  had  taken  refuge  in  Brussels  after  being  sentenced 
to  death  by  default  (unpublished  letter)  :  "I  must  confess  I 
am  driven  to  distraction  by  our  everlasting  squabbles  over 
personal  matters,  the  perpetual  clash  of  private  interests. 
How  can  I  do  anything  for  my  country's  good  when  my 
hands  are  tied  like  this?  What  a  time  for  petty  wrangling  ! 
We  are  in  a  state  of  utter  chaos;  everything  is  at  sixes  and 
sevens  All  this  time,  Germany  is  growing  stronger  and 
Bismarck  has  the  whip-hand.  You  will  notice,  too,  that  every 
time  he  cracks  his  whip  it  is  just  after  some  piece  of  diplomatic 
bungling  on  our  part.  We  are  always  at  the  mercy  of  some 
'  incident.'  What  would  become  of  us  if  we  had  not  learnt  to 
dodge  these  blows,  if  we  were  as  innocent  as  when  we  fell 
into  the  trap  of  the  forged  telegram  from  Ems? 

"  Here  is  another  trap  that  the  Chancellor  is  preparing  to 
spring  upon  us  !  He  is  putting  out  feelers  through  the  jour- 
nalist Muller,  his  factotum,  who  in  various  newspaper  articles 
and  other  published  writings  has  outlined  a  scheme  for  the 
abolition  of  war  among  the  Powers.  To  think  that  Bismarck 
should  launch  this  project  of  eternal  peace  and  goodwill 
among  the  nations  is  simply  staggering — especially  when  you 
consider  that  all  the  time  the  German  schoolmaster  in  Alsace- 
Lorraine  is  running  the  anti-French  campaign  for  all  it  is 
worth,  impressing  it  upon  the  young  idea  of  Germany  that  the 
youth  of  France  are  detestable,  immoral,  ought  to  be  wiped 
off  the  face  of  the  earth,  to  be  crushed  out  of  existence  as  the 
hereditary  foe.  Germany  has  a  friendly  feeling  for  the  young 
men  of  every  country  except  France. 

"  As  far  as  I  can  see— since  we  cannot  arm  ourselves  to  the 
teeth— there  is  only  one  thing  to  be  done  if  we  wish  to  avoid 

216 


GAMBETTA'S   IDEAS 

the  terrible  conflict  that  is  brewing  :  that  is,  to  let  the  people 
have  full  details  of  this  pacifist  scheme,  which  of  course  is 
only  a  ruse  of  the  Chancellor's.  There  may  yet  prove  to  be 
something  stronger  than  that  will  of  iron  :  the  will  of  the 
masses.  .  .  .  Will  the  other  nations  rise  up  in  revolt  against 
this  barbarism  ?  " 

Duclerc  tried  to  bridge  the  gulf  between  Gambetta  and 
MacMahon,  but  the  soldier  had  his  orders :  he  was  not  to  let 
the  **  Radicals  "  pass  through,  and  for  him  it  was  a  question 
of  honour.  At  De  Broglie's  instance  he  sent  for  Dufaure  as 
successor  to  Buffet.  Dufaure  was  not  a  man  whom  people 
cared  to  fall  foul  of :  a  regular  wild  boar,  who  could  deal 
shrewd  blows  with  his  tusks;  he  was  now  seventy-eight,  but 
well  qualified  for  office  by  his  sane  and  robust  eloquence,  his 
merciless  logic  and  his  undisputed  probity. 

Gambetta  issued  a  clarion-call  for  the  massing  of  all  the 
Republican  forces.  They  had  been  united  when  he  led  them 
to  battle;  he  wished  them  to  remain  united  in  the  hour  of  vic- 
tory. "  Parties  are  made  by  ideas,"  he  wrote  to  Ranc, 
"  groups  by  interests."  A  different  view,  however,  found 
acceptance  through  the  agency  of  Jules  Ferry.  In  order  to 
maintain  unity,  he  alleged — a  real,  not  a  sham  unity — they 
should  keep  up  their  distinctions;  this  did  not  imply  that  the 
party  would  be  divided,  it  would  be  strengthened  through 
being  classified;  discipline,  without  which  the  parliamentary 
system  is  mere  anarchy  and  chaos,  could  only  be  acquired 
and  preserved  by  means  of  separate,  well-defined,  homo- 
geneous groups ;  the  extremes  could  only  be  brought  together 
through  the  action  of  the  intermediate  elements.  This  meant 
proceeding  by  stages  and  going  slow  where  Gambetta  urged 
the  need  for  rapid  advance. 

At  this  moment  Gambetta  perhaps  did  not  make  enough 
allowance  for  the  obstructiveness  of  men  and  things.  Genius, 
in  politics,  is  an  infinite  capacity  for  biding  one's  time,  but 
his  fortunes  had  been  such  that  lie  had  not  learnt  this  lesson. 
Whether  to  act  or  not  to  act,  w  helher  to  speak  or  not  to  speak, 
when  one  should  wait  and  be  silent— all  this  hardly  lay  within 
his  ken.     Everything  had  turned  out  well  for  him,  even  his 

217 


GAMBETTA 

defeats.  Since  he  led  the  movement,  since  his  was  almost  the 
only  voice  that  was  heard,  since  he  was  hailed  as  the  leader 
and  was  fast  becoming  the  leader  of  the  majority  in  the 
country,  he  already  saw  himself  leader  of  the  majority,  a  solid, 
compact  majority,  in  Parliament,  propelling  the  Republic  into 
action,  driving  her  under  full  steam.  Such  was  the  future  as 
he  mapped  it  out.  But  how  many  obstacles  were  still  to  be 
overcome  !  The  road  was  not  clear;  in  this  great  Republican 
party  there  were  colours  that  refused  to  blend,  divergences  of 
origin  and  of  temperament,  ambitions  and  egotisms  that 
would  not  be  denied,  and  finally  that  longing  to  be  "  different 
from  the  rest  "  which  is  so  ineradicable  a  trait  of  certain  public 
men.  There  was  Thiers,  whose  ambition  was  whetted  by 
age.  There  was  Gr^vy,  as  cold  and  reserved  to  outward 
appearance  as  Gambetta  was  fiery  and  demonstrative.  There 
was  Jules  Ferry,  who  had  no  intention  of  letting  himself  be 
merged.  There  were  the  members  of  the  Extreme  Left,  for 
whom  Gambetta  was  becoming  too  much  of  a  time-server. 
There  was  the  Senate,  in  which  the  National  Assembly  was 
enjoying  a  new  lease  of  life,  not  only  in  the  person  of  its 
President,  D'Audiffret-Pasquier,  a  sort  of  tribune  of  the  aris- 
tocracy, impatient  of  control,  all  nerves  and  quicksilver — not 
only  in  the  Right,  but  also  in  the  Left,  led  by  Jules  Simon, 
supple,  wheedling,  cat-like,  with  his  claws  always  ready  to 
scratch.  There  was  the  Elys^e,  looking  on  with  a  suspicious 
eye  :  the  Marshal  as  "  faithful  watchdog  of  the  Conservative 
interests,"  still  prompted  by  the  Due  de  Broglie;  a  world  in 
which  the  Left  were  treated  as  intruders,  and  felt  like  fish  out 
of  the  water.  Gambetta  now  showed  his  hand  too  clearly. 
He  was  not  used  to  contrary  winds,  and  here  were  reefs  and 
breakers.  He  could  not  always  keep  his  temper,  and  too  often 
gave  his  enemies  a  handle  for  attack. 

At  this  time  he  was  not  as  yet  truly  representative  of  average 
opinion  in  the  country.  His  influence,  though  much  dis- 
cussed, carried  no  decisive  weight ;  he  was  not  so  strong  as  he 
was  to  become  a  few  months  later,  when  his  adversaries,  by 
pitting  him  against  the  Marshal,  had  added  to  his  prestige 
and  revived  his  popularity.     In  vnin  did  he  do  his  utmost  to 

218 


GAMBETTA'S   IDEAS 

appear  moderate,  pliable,  accommodating^;  his  pro^^rammc,  in 
which  the  separation  of  Church  and  State  still  fig^ured,  at  anv 
rate  as  a  likely  contingency,  was  too  advanced  for  the  bulk  of 
the  community  and  for  the  Republican  party.  It  was  a  pro- 
gramme that  had  to  wait,  as  he  himself  was  forced  to  recog- 
nise; it  could  not  be  carried  out  at  once. 

For  the  time  being  he  had  to  be  satisfied  with  the  Presi- 
dency of  the  Budget  Committee  (y\pril  2).  The  tribune, 
scoffed  at  by  his  enemies  as  an  empty  windbag,  all  rant  and 
rhetoric,  was  now  to  handle  affairs,  to  deal  with  realities,  to 
gain  a  mastery  of  detail.  He  lost  no  time  in  getting  into 
touch  with  military  problems,  working  hard  to  secure  better 
conditions  for  officers,  N.C.O.s  and  men,  and  becoming  the 
most  prominent  figure  in  Army  debates.  Furthermore,  he 
induced  the  Committee  to  approve  a  scheme  for  an  income- 
tax. 

He  chafed,  however,  at  his  inability  to  act,  especially  in  the 
sphere  of  foreign  policy.  Bismarck's  retort  to  the  framing  of 
the  Constitution,  the  establishment  of  the  Republic  on  a 
firmer  basi.s,  and  the  proposal  for  increasing  the  Army  cadres 
had  taken  the  form  of  a  new  threat;  England  and  Russia  had 
parried  the  blow.  The  cloud  had  lifted  for  the  moment.  The 
Emperor  William  complained:  "It's  exasperating  to  see 
Thiers  joining  forces  with  Gambetta,  one  simply  can't  under- 
stand it."  Gambetta  was  anxious  to  take  advantage  of  the 
respite,  to  abandon  the  haphazard  course  that  had  hitherto 
been  followed  and  march  straight  ahead.  France's  absorp- 
tion in  her  internal  struggles,  her  utter  failure  to  grasp  the 
situation,  nearly  drove  him  to  despair.  His  eyes  were  always 
riveted  on  Europe.  An  active,  far-seeing  diplomacy  was 
what  he  craved. 

As  early  as  1874,  in  a  letter  to  Mme.  Adam,  he  had  outlined 
the  future  of  the  Jugo-Slav  peoples.  "  A  day  will  coine  when 
we  shall  have  to  grapple  with  the  German  monster  and  im- 
prison him  within  a  ring  of  Latins  and  Slavs.  It  is  by  join- 
ing hands  with  the  Southern  Slavs  and  those  of  the  Lower 
Danube  that  we  shall  lay  the  foundations  for  a  victor)'  over 
the   motley    Germanic    Empires.       Those   sturdy    Serbs  are 

219 


GAMBETTA 

getting  ready  to  play  their  part  as  the  Piedmontese  of  the 
Near  East.  .  .  .  When  once  the  South  Slavs  are  welded 
together  into  a  State,  the  Prussian  dictatorship  of  Europe  will 
be  a  thing  of  the  past." 

At  the  same  time,  before  the  scare  of  1875  and  the  Tsar's 
intervention  in  favour  of  France,  he  was  glancing  at  Austria. 
He  had  hopes  of  persuading  her  to  break  loose  from  Prussia. 
"  You  believe  in  Russia,"  he  wrote  to  Ranc  (an  unpublished 
letter,  May  3,  1874);  "  you  favour  an  alliance  with  her.  Well, 
between  ourselves,  let  me  tell  you  what  I  have  in  mind,  some- 
thing quite  different :  to  see  whether  we  cannot  disengage 
Austria  from  the  bonds  that  are  tightening  between  her  and 
Prussia." 

As  regards  the  principle  of  nationality,  which,  if  strictly 
applied,  would  resolve  such  nations  as  Belgium  and  Switzer- 
land into  their  component  parts  and  saddle  us  with  an  Empire 
of  a  hundred  million  souls  on  our  frontiers;  his  views  have 
not  changed  since  1863  :  "  Believe  me,  we  must  let  twenty 
years  elapse  before  we  allow  free  play  to  the  principle  of 
nationality,  with  all  the  results  that  it  entails.  .  .  .  This  prin- 
ciple cannot  but  serve  to  upset  the  balance  of  Europe,  to 
entangle  and  perplex  still  further  the  relations  between  the 
Powers.  ...  I  prefer  the  European  balance  as  conceived  by 
diplomatists  at  the  end  of  the  eighteenth  century  before  the 
Revolution.  .  .  .  We  shall  have  to  educate  public  opinion 
towards  an  alliance  between  France  and  Austria."  As  far 
back  as  17 15,  Louis  XIV.  had  hinted  at  this  idea  to  the  Comte 
de  Luc,  his  Ambassador  in  Vienna,  and  it  had  been  taken  up 
again  by  Choiseul.  "  Austria  might  be  reminded  of  her 
rivalry  with  Prussia  throughout  the  wars  of  the  Revolution 
and  of  the  Empire,  and  induced  to  forget  the  alliances,  the 
treaties  and  the  common  interests  by  which  the  two  Powers 
are  linked  together." 

He  went  on  to  remark,  in  another  letter  that  has  not  been 
published  :  "  There  is  springing  up  in  Austria  a  party  which, 
in  order  to  break  away  from  Prussia,  shows  sympathetic  lean- 
ings towards  France.  It  cuts  me  to  the  quick  to  see  our  states- 
men  turn   aside   with   scorn   from   this  path  of   safety.       A 

220 


GAMBETTA'S   IDEAS 

Franco-Austrian  alliance  might  quite  conceivably  prevent 
war,  and  would  in  any  case  be  the  only  effective  means  of 
resistance  to  the  grasping  designs  of  Prussia.  ...  It  will  be 
our  own  fault  if  we  find  ourselves  attacked  by  an  .Austro- 
Prussian  combination  !  I  have  the  gloomiest  forebodings  for 
the  future,  for  the  generations  that  we  want  to  save  from 
these  horrors." 

The  following  year,  when  the  scare  was  at  its  height,  he 
wrote  to  Ranc  :  "  The  forger  of  the  Ems  telegram  is  planning 
another  treacherous  stroke.  Our  coolness,  our  self-posses- 
sion will  keep  us  from  falling  into  the  trap  as  we  did  in  1870. 
.  .  .  Bismarck  has  managed  to  transform  a  weak  and  dis- 
united Germany  into  a  strong  and  well-ordered  Empire.  Less 
judicious,  both  for  him  and  for  us,  was  his  policy  of  insisting 
on  the  annexation  of  Alsace-Lorraine,  a  policy  fraught  with 
the  seeds  of  destruction  for  his  work.  At  the  stage  of  civilisa- 
tion which  we  have  reached,  it  is  impossible  to  conquer 
nations  against  their  will.  Material  victory  has  never  been 
followed  by  moral  dominance.  And  there,  in  Alsace- 
Lorraine,  the  populations  torn  from  our  side,  moulded  by  all 
that  is  most  chivalrous  and  most  alluring  in  French  culture, 
refuse  to  be  wooed  by  the  charms  of  Germanisation, 
'charms'  of  brutality,  of  ignominious  serfdom,  'charms' 
that  they  fail  to  appreciate.  The  more  the  superiority  of 
Greater  Germany  is  dinned  into  their  ears,  the  more  do  they 
sigh  for  what  they  have  lost.  Germany  has  struck  a  cruel 
blow  at  the  very  heart  of  Europe.  Until  she  has  atoned  for 
this  crime,  no  one  will  sheathe  the  sword.  The  peace  of  the 
world,  so  vital  a  necessity  for  every  nation,  will  constandy 
remain  at  the  mercy  of  any  untoward  incident." 

The  attitude  of  Austria,  now  that  she  was  more  and  more 
becoming  Germany's  vassal,  led  him  to  gravitate  towards  a 
Franco-Russian  connection.  Moreover,  looking  far  ahead, 
he  hoped  that  the  gulf  between  England  and  Russia  might  be 
bridged  : 

"  Russia's  political  aims  seem  likely  to  be  impeded  by 
Austria,  who  has  already  begun  to  assume  a  hostile  front. 
She  is  bringing  Roumania  within  the  orbit  of  her  influence. 

221 


GAMBETTA 

Can  you  see  all  this  culminating  in  an  alliance  between 
Austria,  Roumania,  and  Turkey  against  Russia?  What  a 
conflict  that  would  mean  !  To  the  Prince  of  Wales,  how- 
ever, the  prospect  seems  by  no  means  remote.  He  does  not 
share  the  anti-Russian  feeling  displayed  by  a  certain  section 
of  his  countrymen.  He  throws  all  the  weight  of  his  youthful 
authority  into  the  scale  against  any  step  that  might  prove 
harmful  to  Russia's  interests.  In  my  opinion,  he  has  the 
makings  of  a  notable  statesman.  He  condemns  the  too  widely 
prevalent  attitude  towards  the  Chancellor  who,  for  his  part, 
treats  all  alike  with  the  same  high-handedness  as  ever.  I 
want  to  see  our  enemies  become  Russia's  enemies  as  well. 
It  is  clear  as  daylight  that  Bismarck  is  angling  for  an  alliance 
with  Austria.  I  think  that  before  long  England  and  Russia 
will  be  on  our  side,  if  only  we  adopt  a  suitable  policy  at 
home." 

He  already  points  out  the  signal  importance  of  the  Rou- 
manian question  :  "  It  is  impossible  to  understand  the  succes- 
sive phases  of  the  Eastern  Question,  on  which  perhaps  the 
solution  of  the  Franco-German  problem  may  some  day 
depend,  without  paying  special  attention  to  the  Roumanian 
question.  The  Roumanian  question  is  one  of  European 
significance." 

On  June  2,  1875,  he  writes  to  Ranc  (unpublished  letter)  : 
"  The  Austrians  are  growing  more  and  more  irksom.e  to  the 
inhabitants  of  the  occupied  regions.  It  seems  as  if  they  were 
secretly  conscious  that  their  occupation  is  only  an  encamp- 
ment, and  that  they  will  soon  be  driven  out.  They  squeeze 
the  country  dry ;  their  armies,  as  they  retire,  make  a  wilder- 
ness of  the  districts  they  abandon.  It  is  the  Hungarians  who 
are  creating  a  Roumanian  question  by  their  oppressive 
methods  of  government.  Magyar  Chauvinism  is  the  root  of 
the  trouble.  A  constant  factor  in  the  evolution  of  the  Eastern 
Question,  on  whatever  lines  it  may  proceed,  is  the  danger  to 
Roumania,  in  any  Balkan  War,  either  of  a  Russian  invasion 
if  Austria-Hungary  holds  to  her  neutrality,  or  of  an  Austro- 
Hungarian  occupation.  The  Eastern  Question  cannot  there- 
fore be  considered  apart  from  the  Roumanian  problem." 

222 


GAMBETTA'S   IDEAS 

To  Ranc,  on  March  20,  1876  (unpublished):  "  Roumania 
is  on  the  high  road  towards  concluding  a  military  pact  with 
Russia.  It  is  our  duty  to  have  a  finger  in  this  pie,  and  to 
express  to  both  nations  our  secret  sympathy  with  an  under- 
standing that  is  not  yet  public  property.  But  who  is  there 
in  France  that  bothers  his  head  about  foreign  politics?  Yet 
to  follow  Russia  in  the  future  and  Roumania  at  the  present 
juncture  is  for  us  a  matter  of  supreme  moment.  I  can  con- 
template, in  Eastern  Europe,  a  revision  of  frontiers  which 
would  unite  all  the  Roumanians  in  the  Roumanian  Kingdom. 
By  '  all  the  Roumanians  '  I  mean  those  of  Bukovina,  of 
Hungary,  of  Serbia,  and  of  Macedonia  as  well.'" 

He  points  out  the  blunders  of  European  diplomacy  with 
regard  to  Hungary  and  the  danger  of  Budapest's  drawing 
closer  to  Berlin  :  "  From  the  dawn  of  its  history,  Hungary 
has  been  governed  in  its  own  peculiar  fashion.  The  Estates 
that  administered  the  country  had  more  real  control  than  the 
Kings.  They  deeply  resented  the  German  yoke.  Thev 
would  eagerly  have  seized  the  opportunity  of  shaking  it  oflf, 
but  they  ought  not  to  have  had  a  foreign  monarch  thrust  upon 
them.  If  Napoleon  had  guaranteed  the  Hungarians  their 
independence,  it  would  have  been  safe  to  let  them  alone;  they 
would  have  secured  their  emancipation  themselves.  And 
then,  no  doubt,  we  should  never  have  had  1870,  and  we  should 
be  free  from  the  menace  of  the  colossal  war  that  is  looming  on 
the  horizon.  .  .  ." 

To  the  same  correspondent,  on  May  25  (unpublished 
letter)  :  "  How  shall  we  get  the  Republicans  to  realise  that 
these  internal  struggles  prevent  us  from  settling  the  frontier 

question  ?    Even  X and  Z cannot  see  further  than  the 

end  of  their  noses.  It  is  useless  to  ask  them  about  anything 
outside  their  ordinary  political  routine.  What  allies  are  we 
trying  to  win  ?  What  do  we  do  in  the  way  of  making 
approaches  towards  Russia  and  England?  " 

In  September  he  takes  a  trip  to  Germany.  He  comes  back 
convinced  that  the  German  army  is  stronger  and  more  for- 
midable than  ever:  "We  must  keep  calm,"  he  says,  "and 
pay  the  utmost  attention  to  the  military  and  naval  Estimates." 

223 


GAMBETTA 

He  writes  to  Ruiz,  his  correspondent  in  Rome,  on  Novem- 
ber 2,  1876:  "  Bismarck's  main  idea  is  to  make  the  Danube 
Austria's  centre  of  gravity." 

To  Ranc,  on  February  10,  1877  (unpubHshed  letter):  "  A 
note  of  the  Prussian  Chancellor's,  which  I  will  let  you  have 
in  a  verbatim  copy  as  soon  as  possible,  aims  at  pushing  back 
the  Hapsburg  dynasty  into  the  Slav  territories,  in  order  to 
bring  them  into  active  contact  with  Russia.  This  gives  rs  our 
cue  :  to  work  hand  in  hand  with  Russia,  to  associate  ourselves 
with  her  schemes,  and  to  modify  them  if  the  need  arise.  On 
the  other  side,  Germany  will  remain  the  predominant  partner 
in  the  alliance  with  Austria  until  the  day  comes — as  I  hope  it 
will  come — when  the  grinding  weight  of  her  brutality  provokes 
a  reaction.  To  bring  it  home  to  the  Hapsburgs  that  the 
Hohenzollerns  are  using  them  to  strengthen  the  fabric  of 
German  unity — what  man  in  France  is  equal  to  such  a  task  ? 
How  I  long  to  realise  my  ambition  for  the  greater  glory  of  our 
country :  to  bring  about  a  Franco-Russian  agreement ;  to 
break  up  the  Hapsburg-Hohenzollern  alliance;  to  draw  Italy 
nearer  to  France  !  The  chief  business  is  to  isolate  that  appal- 
ling menace,  the  Hjohenzollern  dynasty.  The  Hapsburgs 
accept  the  Hohenzollern  yoke  with  a  smile  on  their  lips,  but 
with  bitterness  in  their  hearts.  In  Roumania  there  is  nothing 
but  hatred  for  the  Hungarian,  the  Magyar.  In  spite  of  this 
feeling,  Roumania  will  swing  to  and  fro  between  the  Ger- 
manic Powers  and  Russia.  Are  we  merely  to  be  lookers-on  at 
the  drama  that  is  unfolding?  " 

A  little  later  he  adds  (unpublished  letter)  :  "The  Chancellor 
has  managed  to  persuade  Italy  that  her  interests  are  identical 
with  Germany's.  It  lies  within  our  power  to  open  Italy's 
eyes.  From  now  on,  Germany  will  thwart  her  every  attempt 
to  realise  her  aims.  Italy  will  resent  this.  We  shall  then  be 
able  to  take  advantage  of  her  resentment  and  lure  her  away 
from  the  Germanic  Powers.  A  league  of  the  Latin  races 
might  even  now  be  formed,  with  three  centres,  Rome,  Paris, 
and  Madrid." 

On  January  17,  1878,  he  writes  to  Ruiz  (unpublished): 
"So   far   as   we  are   concerned,  peace   remains   our  guiding 

224 


GAMBETTA'S   IDEAS 

principle.  A  day  will  come  when  Fortune  will  play  into  our 
hands.  We  shall  not  venture  again  upon  external  action 
except  for  the  purpose  of  restoring  order  in  Europe  and  st-iting 
right  once  more  on  its  throne.  Till  then,  it  will  be  enough 
for  us  to  preserve  unity  among  the  sister  races  and  to  develop 
our  strength." 

To  sum  up  then  :  the  forecast  that  sooner  or  later  Europe 
was  certain  to  be  set  ablaze ;  Germany's  need  of  using  Austria 
as  a  tool  in  her  schemes  of  penetration,  peaceful  and  warlike; 
a  probable  understanding  between  Austria  and  Turkey ;  on 
the  other  side,  an  inevitable  alliance  between  France,  England 
and  Russia;  the  importance  of  the  Eastern  Question,  on 
which  perhaps  the  solution  of  the  F'ranco-German  quarrel  will 
come  to  depend ;  a  welding  together  of  the  Latin  peoples — 
France,  Italy,  Spain,  Roumania — and  of  the  Slav  races;  a 
strenuous  effort  to  sever  the  bonds  between  Vienna  and 
Berlin — such  is  the  programme,  as  mirrored  in  private  con- 
versations and  letters  with  Chaudordy,  that  Gambetta,  during 
those  months  of  1876  and  1877,  confides  to  his  friends;  a  pro- 
gramme of  singular  insight  and  wisdom,  dictated  alike  by 
geography  and  by  history,  but  utterly  ignored  by  all  around 
him,  since  France  was  wrapped  up  in  her  internal  disputes. 
It  was  the  great  political  combination  which  the  logic  of  events 
was  destined  to  effect  forty-four  years  later.  We  shall  see 
how  in  his  public  utterances  he  was  compelled  to  weaken  his 
programme  and  to  make  concessions  that  were  not  always 
understood. 

At  the  same  moment  several  members  of  the  Left,  at  the 
risk  of  blasting  all  hopes  for  a  revival  of  our  strength,  pro- 
posed that  the  term  of  military  service  should  be  cut  down. 
Gambetta,  in  agreement  with  Thiers,  combated  this  move. 
His  prime  concern,  since  1870,  had  been  to  restore  France  to 
her  former  rank  in  Europe;  hence  his  stubborn  determination 
that  our  people  should  be  induced  to  make  the  necessary  sacri- 
fices for  the  improvement  of  the  army. 


225 


CHAPTER   XV 

THE   SIXTEENTH   OF  MAY 

The  Jules  Simon  Ministry— The  363— The  Battle— Death  of  Thiers— Elections  of 
October  14th,  1877— Fall  of  Broglie— Leonie  Leon. 

The  Dufaure  Cabinet,  caught  between  the  devil  of  the 
Chamber  and  the  deep  sea  of  the  Senate,  had  fallen;  the 
Marshal  had  sent  for  Jules  Simon.  A  general  meeting  of  the 
Catholic  committees  was  to  be  held  on  April  3.  The  Govern- 
ment announced  that  it  would  not  sanction  this  meeting, 
which  at  the  time  was  illegal  (there  was  as  yet  no  Dis- 
establishment Act  to  grant  Bishops  and  Catholics  in  general 
the  right  to  hold  meetings  without  let  or  hindrance).  This 
Government  ukase  was  not  considered  valid,  and  an  Address 
was  sent  to  the  Pope  in  the  following  terms  :  "  Your  Holiness, 
in  claiming  the  independence  of  his  ministers,  will  be  up- 
holding the  cause  of  all  Catholic  peoples  and  especially  that 
of  France,  the  eldest  daughter  of  the  Church."  A  petition 
to  the  various  public  authorities  was  then  drawn  up:  "In 
view  of  the  grave  plight  in  which  the  Papacy  now  finds  itself, 
the  undersigned  request  you  to  use  every  means  in  your  power 
to  ensure  that  the  independence  of  the  Holy  Father  shall  be 
respected,"  etc.  The  Bishop  of  Nevers  urged  the  Marshal  to 
"  break  off  all  connection  with  the  Italian  revolution,"  and  sent 
an  official  rescript  to  the  mayors  and  justices  of  the  peace  in 
his  diocese,  asking  them  to  endorse  his  attempt  to  "  make 
these  views  prevail  in  the  councils  of  the  nation."  Jules 
Simon  condemned  the  petitions  and  the  episcopal  rescripts. 

On  May  i  an  interpellation  was  made  by  all  the  groups  of 
the  Left.  Jules  Simon  defended  the  action  of  the  Italian 
Government:   "  The  statement  that  the  Pope  is  a  prisoner  is 

226 


THE   SIXTEENTH   OF    MAY 

inaccurate.  These  repeated  assertions  are,  shall  I  sas 
'  false  '  ?  shall  I  say  '  mendacious  '  ?  I  will  go  no  further  than 
to  say  'seriously  exaggerated.'  "  He  proceeded  i(j  read  out 
the  text  of  the  law  of  guarantees. 

Gambetta  replied  (May  4)  :  "  Tiie  cjuestion  is  not  a  religious 
but  a  political  one;  in  the  name  of  religion  the  whole  Statr 
system  is  being  attacked.  Those  who  lead  this  assault  upon 
our  institutions  are  at  the  head  of  the  Catholic  leagues."  He 
quotes  a  l^apal  brief  granting  a  prelate,  the  Chancellor  of  Lille 
University,  the  power  "  to  confer  degrees  and  even  to  depute 
this  right."  He  demands  the  observance  of  the  acts  put  in 
force  by  M.  de  Vatimesnil,  by  Mgr.  de  Frayssinons,  by 
Charles  X.'s  Government,  By  that  of  Louis  Philippe,  by  the 
Empire.  "  Show  the  courage  of  your  convictions,  and  say 
outright  that  it  is  only  the  RqDublic  that  should  not  have  the 
privilege  of  defending  itself!"  Then  comes  the  famous 
peroration,  the  rallying-cry  to  battle  :  "  There  is  one  thing  no 
less  abhorrent  to  this  country  than  the  old  regime,  and  that  is 
to  see  clericalism  in  the  saddle.  I  am  only  voicing  the  senti- 
ments of  the  French  people  when  I  repeat  what  my  friend 
Peyrat  once  said  :'  Clericalism,  there  is  the  enemy  !  '  "  By 
clericalism  he  means  the  interference  of  the  clergy  in  political 
struggles,  that  often  ill-timed  activity  whTch,  as  we  have  seen 
in  the  course  of  this  narrative,  gave  even  partisans  of  the  Right 
grounds  for  complaint.  How  often  Gambetta  himself  had 
drawn  a  distinction  between  religion  and  clerical  meddling 
in  political  affairs!  How  often  he  had  proclaimed  his  respect 
for  freedom  of  conscience,  for  freedom  of  worship,  for  the 
national  priesthood  !  But  in  these  great  battles,  words  and 
blows  often  carry  men  beyond  their  objective  and  may  even 
injure  non-combatants.  Parties  always  find  it  to  their  advan- 
tage to  overdraw  the  picture,  whether  for  praise  or  for  blame. 
The  Conservatives,  hard  pressed,  declared  that  their  opponents 
had  flung  down  the  gauntlet  to  the  Church.  The  enemies  of 
faith  were  not  averse  to  this  interpretation,  and  the  orthodox 
were  able  to  assume  an  air  of  martyrdom.  Thus,  as  so  often 
in  our  country,  extremes  were  draw  n  to  each  other  by  a  sort  ol 
magnetic  pull,  and  fanned  each  other's  passions. 

227  0  2 


GAMBETTA 

An  article  was  published  in  Mgr.  Dupanloup's  Defense 
alleging  that  Jules  Simon  had  received  instructions  to 
break  with  the  Left,  and  next  day  in  the  House  a  certain 
deputy  brought  the  matter  to  the  Prime  Minister's  notice. 
"  My  honour  is  at  stake,"  was  Jules  Simon's  comment, 
"since  the  writer  of  the  article  labours  under  the  impression 
that  when  I  came  down  to  the  House  to  speak,  it  is  not  with 
the  motive  of  expressing  my  own  views,  but  in  obedience  to 
a  command  that  has  been  laid  upon  my  tongue  and  my  con- 
science. This  person  simply  does  not  know  an  honest  man 
when  he  sees  one  " — here  he  tore  up,  threw  down  and  stamped 
upon  the  copy  of  the  Defense  which  he  had  in  his  hand — "  if 
he  casts  aspersions  on  the  honour  and  the  truthfulness  of  a 
man  who  for  forty  years  has  spoken  his  mind  without  reserve 
on  every  possible  occasion,  and  has  told  the  truth  according 
to  his  lights,  without  regard  to  the  consequences."  Then, 
seeking  to  remain  in  the  good  books  of  the  Elys^e  :  "The 
honoured  name  of  the  President  of  the  Republic  has  been 
brought  into  this  article.  So  there  is  a  slander  on  him  as  well 
as  on  me.  The  profound  esteem  which,  in  spite  of  political 
disagreements,  I  have  always  felt  for  the  President's  character 
has  only  increased  since  I  have  had  the  honour  to  come  into 
closer  contact  with  him,  and  I  welcome  this  opportunity  of 
saying  that  his  political  conduct  fills  me  more  and  more  every 
day  with  respectful  admiration." 

The  Left  moved  the  following  resolution:  "That  this 
House,  maintaining  that  the  Ultramontane  activities,  whose 
renewed  outbreak  may  jeopardise  the  internal  security  of  the 
country,  are  a  flagrant  breach  of  the  State  laws,  calls  upon  the 
Government  to  employ  all  the  legal  means  at  its  disposal  for 
the  repressing  of  this  unpatriotic  agitation.  ..."  The  word 
"  confidence  "  was  not  inserted  in  the  text.  The  resolution 
was  supported  by  Gambetta.  Jules  Simon  tried  to  have  a 
vote  of  confidence  embodied  in  the  resolution,  but  was  un- 
successful.    The  resolution  was  carried  by  346  votes  to  114. 

The  Pope  took  exception  not  so  much  to  Gambetta  as  to 
Jules  Simon,  and  not  so  much  to  Jules  Simon's  speech  as  to 
his  reply.     On   May   i  r   he  remarked  to  a  party  of  French 

228 


THE   SIXTEENTH   OF   MAY 

pilgrims  who  had  come  lo  Rome  :  "  Whichever  way  we  look 
in  Europe,  the  prospect  is  far  from  hopeful.  What  reason 
have  we  for  hope,  indeed,  when  in  official  quarters  the  truth 
of  the  Pope's  words  is  flatly  denied  and  he  is  called  a  liar?" 
(this  was  a  direct  allusion  to  Jules  Simon's  epithet.  "  men- 
dacious"). "Such  language  is  altogether  un.seemly,  and  a 
disgrace  to  a  Catholic  Government." 

A  few  days  later  the  Ultramontane  newspaper  (iermavia 
spoke  in  no  uncertain  tones:  "The  French  Prime  Minister 
has  given  the  lie  direct  to  the  Pope,  and  his  Holiness  cannot 
swallow  this  insult.  He  has  made  up  his  mind  to  act.  The 
Papal  Nuncio  has  received  orders  to  inform  Marshal 
MacMahon  that  the  Vatican  has  decided  to  break  off  all  rela- 
tions with  France,  if  M.  Jules  Simon  remains  in  the  Cabinet." 
The  newspaper  added  :  "  The  Pope  has  issued  his  orders,  and 
he  has  been  obeyed."  As  a  matter  of  fact,  there  had  been  an 
exchange  of  letters  on  the  subject  between  the  Vatican  and  the 
President. 

The  President  was  exasperated.  His  satellites  could  wait  no 
longer.  The  municipal  councils  in  all  the  boroughs  and  half 
the  general  councils  in  all  the  departments  and  arrondissc- 
merits  had  to  be  renewed  in  this  very  year  1877,  and  a  third 
of  the  Senate  a  little  later.  They  had  weapons  in  their  hands, 
there  was  nothing  for  it  but  to  use  them.  The  first  pretext 
that  offered  itself  would  be  seized. 

On  May  5  came  the  debate  on  the  municipal  reform  bill. 
The  main  stress  was  laid  on  the  publication  of  rep>orts  of 
council  meetings,  which  was  approved.  Jules  Simon  was  ill. 
and  did  not  take  part  in  the  debate.  On  the  15th  the  bill 
for  the  regulation  of  the  Press  was  discussed.  The  Right 
upheld  the  principle  that  misdemeanours  of  the  Press  should 
be  subject  to  police-court  proceedings.  It  called  upon  Jules 
Simon  for  an  explanation  ;  he  made  a  discreet  reference  to  the 
embarrassing  position  in  which  he  was  placed  by  the  Marshal's 
attitude.     The  bill  was  thrown  out  by  377  votes  to  55. 

Next  day,  Jules  Simon  received  the  famous  letter  from  the 
President  reproaching  him  for  not  having  fought  against 
these  two  measures  :  "In  view  of  this  inaction  on  the  part  of 

229 


GAMBETTA 

the  leader  of  the  Cabinet,  the  question  arises  whether  he  still 
has  enough  influence  in  the  House  to  make  his  views  prevail. 
An  explanation  is  urgently  needed;  for  I  am  not,  like  you, 
responsible  to  Parliament;  I  am  responsible  to  France,  and 
this  responsibility  was  never  more  pressing  than  it  is  to-day." 

Jules  Simon  went  to  the  Marshal  to  tender  his  resignation. 
"  We  have  come  to  the  parting  of  the  ways,  you  and  I,"  said 
MacMahon.  "  I  would  rather  be  turned  out  of  office  than  con- 
tinue to  take  my  orders  from  M.  Gambetta."  And  he  decided 
to  appeal  to  the  country,  asking  the  Senate  for  a  dissolution. 

The  act  of  May  i6,  1877,  if  not  illegal,  was  undoubtedly 
against  the  spirit  of  the  Constitution,  for  the  blow  was  struck 
at  a  Cabinet  which  had  a  majority  in  the  two  Chambers,  and 
the  President's  letter  was  not  countersigned  by  a  responsible 
Minister.  A  hole  had  been  torn  in  the  Constitution  at  the 
very  outset.  Instead  of  a  normal  appeal  to  the  country,  in 
accordance  with  the  English  plan,  France  was  confronted 
with  an  exercise  of  personal  authority  which  had  certainly  not 
been  foreseen  when  the  new  State  system  was  devised. 

Many  years  later,  Jules  Simon,  in  the  course  of  a  witty  and 
spirited  eulogy  of  Marshal  MacMahon,  wrote  :  "I  have  a 
grievance  against  him.  When  he  dismissed  me  on  that 
sixteenth  of  May,  he  sinned  against  the  rules  of  Parlia- 
mentary procedure  and  the  rules  of  courtesy.  I  can  forgive 
him  for  the  second  olTence,  which  to  me  is  still  inexplicable." 

A  stranger  to  the  world  of  statecraft,  Marshal  MacMahon 
had  brought  into  political  life  all  the  loyalty  of  his  nature  and 
all  the  virtues  of  his  profession.  Under  the  Empire,  returning 
from  Italy  in  a  blaze  of  glory,  he  had  spoken  in  the  Senate 
against  the  General  Security  Act.^  He  was  a  Gallican.  But 
the  hero  of  Malakoff  and  Magenta  was  more  fitted  to  handle  an 
army  than  a  political  machine.  A  soldier  at  the  head  in  civil 
affairs,  civilian  interference  in  matters  of  strategy — these  are 
two  fatal  mistakes. 

Thus,  at  the  moment  when  the  Republicans  were  already 

*  A  sort  of  "  Defence  of  the  Realm  Act,"  passed  after  Orsini's  attempt  to  assassinate 
Napoleon  III.  in  1858,  and  bestowing  upon  the  Home  Secretary  somewhat  vague  and 
elastic  powers  to  deport  political  suspects.— Translator's  note. 

2.^nO 


THE   SIXTEENTH   OF   MAY 

beginning  to  split  up,  the  Oppcjsiiion  came  to  their  rescue 
and  forced  them  to  close  their  ranks  again. 

In  face  of  the  danger  that  threatened,  the  united  front  which 
Gambetta  had  vainly  counselled  in  the  previous  year  formed 
itself  spontaneously.  He  emphasised  the  need  for  keeping 
cool,  and  carried  a  resolution  which  recalled  men's  minds  to 
the  true  maxims  of  Parliamentary  government.  That  very 
evening  he  wrote:  "War  has  been  declared;  they  have 
challenged  us  to  the  fray.  Our  position  is  impregnable;  we 
occupy  the  high  ground  of  the  law." 

Next  day,  in  the  Cliamber,  there  was  no  Ministry,  A  note- 
informed  the  House  that  the  Marshal  "  had  resolved  to  take 
strong  measures  against  Ultramontane  intrigues."  "  Why, 
that's  just  what  we  want  !  "  exclaimed  Gambetta.  He  then 
paid  a  tribute  to  the  President's  loyalty  and  patriotism  :  "  Do 
not  turn  your  back  on  the  Constitution,  do  not  listen  to  the 
sinister  promptings  of  advisers  who  will  not  help  you  to  cope 
with  the  havoc  that  they  themselves  will  have  wrought. 
Beware  lest,  behind  these  schemes  for  a  dissolution,  the 
country  should  scent  other  designs,  and  should  cry  :  '  The 
dissolution  is  a  prelude  to  war  !  '  Criminal  indeed  would  be 
those  who  worked  for  it  in  that  spirit !  " 

"  The  dissolution  as  a  prelude  to  war  !  "  For  this  phrase  he 
was  severely  taken  to  task.  Nor  was  the  censure  unde.served, 
for  it  is  always  a  misguided  policy  to  drag  the  foreigner  into 
our  internal  quarrels.  Unfortunately,  it  was  not  the  first  time 
in  our  history  that  this  course  had  been  pursued,  and  it  had 
been  condemned  by  Gambetta  himself.  These  deplorable 
feuds  have  broken  out  in  all  ages  and  in  all  countries.  Parties 
are  merciless.  The  truth  is  that  Bismarck,  involved  in  a  fight 
to  the  death  against  the  Catholics  and  the  Papacy,  dreaded 
the  establishment  in  France  of  a  regime  which  would  have 
given  them  support.  Italy  was  in  like  case;  King  Victor 
Emmanuel's  journey  to  Berlin  had  been  determined  upon 
the  very  day  after  the  Frohsdorf  interview.  Alarm  was 
naturally  felt  in  Rome  at  every  sign  that  augured  for  the 
restoration  of  the  temporal  power.  On  May  iq  the  prefect  of 
the  Alpes-Maritimes  depnrtmrnt  dn>w  attention  to  a  massing 

231 


GAMBETTA 

of  troops  and  war  material  at  Ventimiglia,  and  the  official 
Press  beyond  the  Alps  announced  that  a  great  artillery  park 
was  being  formed  at  Piacenza  and  that  Spezzia  was  being 
fortified;  these  statements  were  bluff,  perhaps,  but  could  not 
be  altogether  disregarded. 

The  Marshal  once  more  summoned  the  Due  de  Broglie,  and 
the  sittings  of  the  Chamber  were  suspended  for  a  month,  which 
gave  the  Republicans  time  to  organise  their  forces.  "Keep 
to  the  path  of  legality,"  was  the  advice  given  to  the  Chamber 
by  its  President,  Gr^vy,  "keep  to  it  with  wisdom,  with 
firmness,  with  confidence." 

The  Left  laid  their  heads  together.  "  It  must  be  made 
known  to  the  world,"  said  Gambetta,  "that  we  are  the  whole 
Republican  party  united  in  defence  of  political  freedom." 
A  member:  "Like  the  221  !  "^  "  In  reminding  us  of  the 
Restoration  period,"  replied  Gambetta,  "  this  gentleman  has 
hit  the  mark,  for  we  are  faced  with  arrogant  claims  much  like 
those  of  Polignac."  Spuller  drew  up  a  manifesto:  "In 
five  months  at  the  outside,  the  voice  of  France  will  be  heard. 
The  country  will  not  go  back  upon  its  former  decision.  The 
Republic  will  emerge  from  the  ordeal  of  the  polls  stronger 
than  ever."     The  manifesto  was  signed  by  363  members. 

On  May  21  Gambetta  writes  to  Ruiz,  in  Rome  (un- 
published) :  "  We  may  have  as  much  as  five  months  to  waste, 
but  there  is  a  consoling  feature  :  the  Marshal  is  losing  three 
years  of  power.  Looking  upon  his  fall  as  a  foregone  con- 
clusion, I  think  that  we  may  well  see  the  Congress  appoint 
his  successor  within  a  few  months  from  now.  My  mind  is 
made  up ;  in  order  to  checkmate  the  schemes  of  my  opponents, 
who  fancy  that  it  is  a  master-stroke  on  their  part  to  raise  the 
dilemma  of  choosing  between  the  Marshal  and  me,  I  have 
decided  that,  when  the  favourable  moment  comes,  I  shall  put 
forward  Gr6vy  as  a  candidate.  I  shall  thus  have  the  advan- 
tage of  holding  serenely  aloof  from  the  struggle,  of  guiding 
public   opinion    towards   an    impersonal   solution    and,    if    I 

*  The  221  Liberal  deputies  who  in  March,  1830,  addressed  a  sort  of  "Grand 
Remonstrance  "  to  Charles  X.,  and  demanded[the  dismissal  of  the  reactioimry  Polignac 
Ministry. — Translator's  note. 

?3? 


THE   SIXTEENTH   OF   MAY 

succeed,  of  putting  an  end  to  military  control  and  ensuring 
that  the  civilian  spirit  shall  prevail  in  the  counsels  of  the 
State.  What  we  have  to  fear  is  not  some  violent  coup — this 
I  consider,  for  several  reasons,  out  of  the  question — but  the 
foreigner,  who  is  watching  us  closely  and  may  profit  by  our 
p)olitical  and  military  disorder.  I  cannot  gauge  Germany's 
designs  from  here,  but  I  am  afraid  that  she  is  capable  of 
anything.  The  spirit  of  ambition  that  has  become  the  very 
breath  of  her  being  might  lead  her  to  embark  in  all 
recklessness  upon  some  terrible  adventure." 

Abroad,  the  step  taken  on  May  i6  met  with  a  good  deal  of 
adverse  criticism,  especially  in  Germany  and  Italy.  Nor  nas 
it  hailed  with  any  great  enthusiasm  by  the  Comte  de  Paris, 
the  Prince  de  Joinville,  the  Due  d'Aumale  and  their  associates, 
the  Due  d'AudifTret-Pasquier  and  the  rest.  The  Bonapartists 
were  working  for  a  revolution.  One  day,  when  the  question 
of  attempting  some  bold  stroke  was  being  discussed  in  the 
presence  of  the  Comte  de  Paris,  He  exclaimed  :  **  If  necessary, 
I  shall  take  up  a  rifle  to  defend  tRe  Constitution,  and  the 
liberties  of  my  country  !  "  (Souvenirs  d'Estancelin  ci  de 
M.  de  Limhourg).  The  more  clear-sighte3  did  not  believe  that 
the  manoeuvre  would  succeed.  Taine  wrote  :  "  The  more  I 
think  over  the  Marshal's  latest  action,  the  more  injudicious 
does  it  appear.  It  is  like  the  charge  at  Reichshoffen*  after  the 
battle  was  lost.  The  elections  will  send  him  back  a  Chamber 
just  as  Radical  as  the  present  one,  or  even  worse.  He  will 
find  himself  forced  to  resign.  I  can  see  Gambetta  becoming 
President  of  the  Republic  four  months  from  now."    (May  21.) 

The  Government  made  arrangements  for  the  official  can- 
didatures throughout  the  country,  removed  the  administrative 
and  judicial  personnel  as  from  May  24,  threatened  with 
dismissal  the  lesser  functionaries  suspected  of  devotion  to  the 
Republic,  enforced  a  supervision  of  restaurants  and  public- 
houses,  withdrew  the  licences  for  newsvending,  called  upon 
the  courts  of  justice  to  take  proceedings  against  the 
Republican  Press,  forbade  the  representatives  of  the  army  to 

^  MacM.^hon  commanded  an   army  corps    in  this  battle  (August,  1S70). — Trans- 
lator's NOTE. 


GAMBETTA 

attend  the  Hoche  celebration  banquet,  and  endeavoured  to 
thwart  the  propaganda  of  the  Left  in  speech  and  in  writing. 

Gambetta  got  together  the  political  directors  of  the  great 
Paris  newspapers,  Emile  de  Girardin,  Adrien  H^brard, 
Jourde,  Jules  Bapst,  Edmond  About  and  Auguste  Vacquerie, 
and  organised  with  them  a  committee  for  opposition  and 
propaganda.  Mme  Adam's  drawing-room  became  a  head- 
quarters thronged  by  the  veterans  of  the  Republic  and  the 
new  party  that  had  gathered  in  their  wake.  There  he  met 
Edmond  de  La  Fayette,  Lasteyrie,  Duclerc,  De  Marc^re, 
Lesseps,  and  a  number  of  foreign  politicians. 

He  now  took  the  field  for  action.  On  June  g  he  spoke  at 
Amiens,  where  men's  hearts  could  still  be  stirred  by  memories 
of  the  invasion.  "The  country  is  sure  of  itself,  but  there  is 
no  self-confidence  in  those  who  started  this  enterprise  !  Every 
trader,  every  manufacturer,  every  business  man  was  at  once 
amazed  and  indignant,  and  asked  himself  whether  these  would- 
be  Conservatives  were  not  the  fomenters  of  perpetual  dis- 
order !  " 

On  June  lo,  at  Abbeville,  he  calls  attention  to  a  most 
ominous  symptom  :  the  spectre  of  personal  power  rising  up 
with  the  Republican  Constitution.  He  hurls  anathema  at 
those  who  are  working  for  a  coup  d'etat:  "Who  are  these 
people  who  dare  to  implicate  the  name  of  the  Army  and  the 
sacred  interests  for  which  it  stands  in  Heaven  knows  w'hat 
infamous  conspiracy?  " 

On  June  i6  the  Marshal  addressed  to  the  Senate  a  message 
demanding  a  dissolution.  In  the  Chamber  Fourtou,  the  Home 
Secretary,  took  the  offensive.  After  readfng  Gambetta's 
declaration  of  faith  in  1869,  he  added:  "We  should  have 
either  to  throw  the  country  into  confusion  or  to  break  our 
word  :  those  are  the  alternatives  before  us !  It  is  the 
Marshal  who,  bv  forestalling  a  Convention,  is  saving  the 
Constitution.  We  are  the  France  of  1789,  ranged  in  battle 
order  against  the  France  of  1793.  You  have  been  lavish 
with  your  promises  to  the  country  :  where  is  your  perform- 
ance ?  "  But  an  unlucky  phrase  was  to  stem  the  current  of 
this    impassioned   oratory.     "You    have   gone   so   far  as  to 

234 


THE   SIXTEENTH   OF   MAY 

assert,"  he  went  on,  "  that  the  Act  of  May  i6  was  a  menace 
to  external  peace,  forgetting  tliat  the  men  who  are  in  the 
Government  to-day  were  returned  at  the  polls  in  187 1,  that 
they  were  members  of  that  Assembly  which,  we  may  say, 
brought  peace  to  the  country  and  deliverance  to  the  occupied 
regions.  ..."  At  these  words  Gambetta  sprang  up,  and. 
pointing  with  outstretched  forefinger,  cried  out  in  a  resonant 
voice  that  filled  the  whole  Chamber  :  "  There  is  the  deliverer 
of  the  occupied  regions!"  The  Left  rose  from  their  seats 
and  repeated  his  gesture  and  his  words.  From  two-thirds  of 
the  benches  the  deputies  leapt  to  their  feet.  The  cry  was  re- 
echoed again  and  again,  the  Ministerial  benches  cheered,  even 
the  Strangers'  Gallery  joined  in  the  uproar.  Gr^vy,  the 
President  of  the  Chamber,  motionless,  looking  towards 
Thiers,  seemed  to  be  paying  him  the  same  compliment. 
Thiers  remained  in  his  seat  among  the  benches  of  the  Left : 
his  head  bent,  his  eyes  half-shut  and  moist  with  tears,  his 
hands  crossed  over  his  chest,  he  accepted  this  sudden  ovation, 
while  at  the  rostrum  Fourtou,  though  betraying  no  emotion, 
seemed  completely  tongue-tied.  "The  deliverer  of  the 
occupied  regions!  "  He  whom  they  had  called  "Raving 
maniac  !  "  had  paid  off  old  scores. 

Gambetta  replied.  In  the  midst  of  an  indescribable  din  he 
wrestled  with  his  foes  for  three  hours.  He  was  never  in  better 
form  than  when  the  fray  was  at  its  hottest.  He  argued  that 
they  showed  little  respect  for  the  Marshal  in  pitting  him. 
Gambetta,  against  the  President  of  the  Republic.  The  excite- 
ment was  at  its  highest  pitch  when  he  spoke  of  the  situation 
in  Italy.  "  You  have  no  right  to  bring  the  foreigner  into 
our  discussions  !  "  someone  shouted.  Gambetta  flashed  out 
in  retort  :  "  We  have  the  right  and  the  duty  to  make  it 
knowMi  beyond  the  Alps  that  if  by  a  teinporary  mishap  th»' 
government  of  F" ranee  should  fall  into  dubious  hands,  the 
nation  w^ould  disown  such  rulers  !  "  And,  as  a  parting  shot  : 
"  We  shall  go  out  363,  we  shall  come  back  400  !  "  ;\  resolu- 
tion of  want  of  confidence  in  the  Ministry  was  carried  by 
363  votes  to  158. 

In   the   Senate  the  Due  de   Broglie  spoke   in   favour  of  a 

235 


GAMBETTA 

dissolution  :  "  The  electors  will  have  to  choose  between 
Marshal  MacMahon  and  the  dictator  of  Bordeaux,  the  orator 
of  Belleville,^  who  can  barely  hold  in  check  the  seething  mobs 
of  Radicalism  and  the  upward  movement  of  new  social 
strata."  It  was  thus  that  his  adversaries,  by  their  very 
taunts,  enhanced  his  reputation. 

The  more  moderate  Senators  opposed  a  dissolution.  "  You 
have  deliberately  arranged  this  game,  and  you  will  lose  it," 
Ren6  B^renger  protested.  "You  are  playing  into  the  hands 
of  the  extremists,  and  the  moderates  cry  out  in  anger  that 
you  are  ruining  their  work."  "  A  plebiscite  will  be  held," 
said  Laboulaye.  "  The  people  will  be  asked  to  decide  between 
the  Marshal  and  the  Republic.  The  word  '  Marshal  '  will 
signify  all  that  the  Republic  does  not  stand  for.  You  are 
bound  to  fail.  Who  will  take  up  the  cudgels  for  a  Govern- 
ment that  has  no  name,  no  general  policy  ?  Such  an  idea  is 
mere  moonshine.  .  .  .  You  live  in  a  world  of  society 
drawing-rooms.  Society  drawing-rooms  are  the  worst  possible 
sources  of  inspiration,  a  sort  of  irresponsible  clubs,  remote 
from  all  actualities.  You  will  have  failed,  and  you  will  have 
placed  the  Marshal  on  the  horns  of  a  dilemma :  to  eat 
humble-pie  or  to  abdicate."  By  149  votes  to  130  the  Govern- 
ment was  authorised  to  dissolve  the  Chamber.  On  June  22 
Gr^vy,  before  announcing  the  decree  of  dissolution  to  the 
House,  addressed  it  in  these  words:  "  The  country  to  which 
you  must  now  make  your  appeal  will  say  that  this  Parlia- 
ment, in  its  all  too  brief  career,  has  never  ceased  for  a  single 
day  to  deserve  well  of  France  and  of  the  Republic." 

Gambetta  wrote  to  Ruiz  (unpublished) :  "  The  position  is 
clear.  The  Marshal  has  been  driven  into  a  blind  alley;  he 
must  either  yield  or  vanish  from  the  scene.  I  fancy  they  are 
already  regretting  their  crazy  enterprise.  Our  adversaries 
show  obvious  signs  of  preparing  for  a  climb  down.  You  can 
hear  them  reiterate,  in  every  key,  that  in  all  this  they  have 
had  no  other  end  in  view  than  to  uphold  the  Constitution, 

^  Belleville,    Gambetta's   constituency,    is  a  rougn   qaarter  of  Paris  ;  the  famous 
Limehouse "  taunt  which  used  to  be  levelled  at  Mr.  Lloyd   George  is  somewhat 
similar. — Translator's  note 

236 


THE   SIXTEENTH   OF   MAY 

to  preserve  peace  and  (save  the  mark  !)  freedom  of  thought. 
They  are  feeling  tlieir  way,  they  dare  not  take  the  plunge. 
The  extremist  sections  are  already  dissatisfied,  and  the 
Cabinet  is  splitting  up.  There  are  those  who  would  like  to 
proceed  to  any  lengths,  who  do  not  shrink  from  violence; 
there  are  those  who  would  like  to  make  terms,  to  patch  up 
the  quarrel,  and  to  escape  the  terrible  reckoning  that  is  at 
hand.  Whatever  happens,  the  ultimate  issue  is  not  in  doubt ; 
we  shall  emerge  victorious  from  the  ordeal." 

The  clash  of  arms  began.  Gambetta  proclaimed  that  the 
Republicans  were  united  under  one  standard,  from  Thiers 
and  Dufaure  to  Victor  Hugo  and  Louis  Blanc.  At  Lille,  on 
August  15,  he  prophesied  that  one  of  two  things  would 
happen.  (As  a  matter  of  fact,  both  events  came  to  pass,  one 
after  the  other.)  "  When  the  sovereign  voice  of  France  has 
spoken,  they  will  have  either  to  give  in  or  give  up."  He 
was  always  ready  in  this  way  with  some  arresting  phrase, 
some  trenchant  epigram,  which  summed  up  the  situation, 
became  a  rallying-cry,  and  was  not  easily  forgotten.  Lamar- 
tine  says  of  Mirabeau  :  "His  ringing  phrases  became  the 
proverbs  of  the  Revolution."  One  might  say  of  Gambetta 
that  his  ringing  phrases  became  the  proverbs  of  the  Republic. 
Never  had  this  great  leader  of  men  displayed  such  energy. 

The  Government  decided  that  judicial  proceedings  should 
be  taken  against  Gambetta  for  insults  to  the  Marshal.  Lc 
Soleil,  the  Orleanist  organ,  protested  :  "  The  trial  will  do  us 
just  as  much  harm  as  the  speech  did;  it  will  only  give  him 
a  splendid  advertisement."  Gambetta  was  sentenced  by 
default  to  three  months'  imprisonment  and  a  fine  of  2,000 
francs.  But  he  managed  to  drag  the  affair  out  so  skilfully 
that  the  new  Chamber  met,  and  his  immunity  as  a  Member 
of  Parliament  came  to  his  rescue  before  the  sentence  could 
be  carried  into  efifect. 

Thiers  was  drawing  nearer  and  nearer  to  Gambetta.  He 
now  entertained  the  idea  of  summoning  him  to  office  as  soon 
as  he  himself  was  reappointed  President,  and  of  "  introducing 
him  to  Europe."  On  September  3,  however,  his  plans  were 
cut  short  by  death. 

237 


GAMBETTA 

Gambetta  was  horror-struck  at  the  news:  "  When  1  think 
of  all  that  this  frightful  calamity  may  lead  to,  I  need  all  the 
confidence  that  I  feel  in  France's  firmness  to  refrain  from 
shuddering.  It  is  a  bolt  from  the  blue.  I  had  been  expect- 
ing M.  Thiers  at  five  o'clock  this  evening;  he  sent  me  word 
that  he  was  ill,  and  at  half-past  six  he  was  dead!  "... 
Paris  gave  her  former  President  a  magnificent  funeral. 
"  Never  should  I  have  dared  to  hope  for  so  dazzling  a 
triumph.  I  have  witnessed  the  most  imposing  ceremony  of 
a  century  which  has  seen  so  many  splendid  pageants.  Those 
who  took  part  in  it  are  determined  to  ensure  the  victory  of 
our  cause.  It  has  revealed  the  impotence  of  those  who  dream 
of  a  revolution,  and  proved  to  them  that  they  w'ill  soon  get 
their  marching  orders.  What  could  be  at  once  more  unex- 
pected and  more  reassuring  than  that  enthusiastic  Paris 
crowd,  riddled  and  raked  by  M.  Thiers'  gunfire  six  years 
ago,  and  now  showing  enough  discernment  and  patriotism 
to  forgive  the  victor  and  enrol  him  among  the  immortals?" 

The  drawing  up  of  the  list  of  official  candidates  w-as  a 
long  and  arduous  process.  The  "white  ticket"  candidates 
included  240  Bonapartists,  98  Legitimists,  and  27  Orleanists. 
On  September  19  the  Marshal  issued  a  manifesto:  "Hard- 
fought  elections  would  serve  to  embitter  the  conflict.  My 
duties  would  grow  more  onerous  as  the  danger  increased.  I 
can  neither  become  the  tool  of  Radicalism  nor  desert  the 
post  assigned  to  me  by  the  Constitution.  I  shall  remain,  to 
uphold  the  Conservative  interests  with  the  support  of  the 
Senate." 

The  elections  were  fixed  for  October  14.  The  clergy  threw 
themselves  into  the  fray.  The  Government  was  compelled  to 
urge  them  to  suppress  their  activities  through  the  medium 
of  the  prefects  (Circulars  of  October  3  and  6).  Six  hundred 
and  thirteen  municipal  councils  w^ere  dissolved;  1,743  mayors 
and  1,334  deputy  mayors  dismissed;  344  clubs,  societies,  and 
leagues  broken  up;  2,067  public-houses  closed;  4,779  civil 
servants  suspended  and  1,385  dismissed;  421  prosecutions 
were  instituted  for  Press  misdemeanours,  849  for  unlicensed 
newsvending,  216  for  booksellers'  offences,  170  for  seditious 

238 


THE   SIXTEENTH   OF   MAY 

utterances;  the  sentences,  fines  and  costs  amounted  to 
1,034,353  francs  and  46  years,  3  months  and  16  days'  impri- 
sonment, Fourtou  was  sanguine  of  victory.  Broj^he  said  : 
"The  silence  of  the  country  is  terrifying."  This  son  and 
grandson  of  enemies  of  the  Empire  was  led  by  fear  of  the 
democracy  into  applying  Empire  methods.  But  on  that  road 
one  must  either  go  to  the  journey's  end  or  fall  by  the 
wayside. 

In  face  of  this  "administrative  running  amuck"  (John 
Lemoine,  Journal  des  Debuts),  Gambetta,  the  advocate  of 
legal  resistance,  the  masterly  tactician,  organised  the  defence 
of  the  Republic  as  he  had  organised  that  of  the  nation. 
Presence  of  mind,  fertility  of  resource,  a  versatile  and  persua- 
sive tongue — he  had  all  the  gifts,  he  imparted  to  all  around  him 
something  of  his  own  fire,  he  stirred  the  country  to  its  depths. 
At  the  same  time  he  set  an  example  of  discipline  and  unsel- 
fishness. At  the  Chateau-d'Eau  circus,  before  an  audience  of 
7,000  electors,  he  backs  Grevy*s  candidature  for  the  Presidency 
of  the  Republic:  "This  man  so  rightly  respected  for  his 
unblemished  past,  his  sterling  integrity,  a  pattern  of  modera- 
tion and  wisdom,  of  loyalty  and  honour.  ..."  He  girds  at 
those  who,  in  speaking  of  the  ex-President  of  the  Chamber, 
declare  that  he  is  an  unknown  figure  to  the  country  at  large. 
"In  that  exalted  post  he  is  the  first  man  in  France;  the 
national  sovereignty  is  entrusted  to  his  keeping.  Set  the  seal 
upon  your  victory  by  appointing  him  to  the  supreme  magis- 
tracy of  France."  He,  the  leader,  is  generously  prepared  to 
play  second  fiddle  to  the  great  Republican  whom  he  classes 
as  his  superior  :  "I  remain  in  the  ranks,  not  wishing  to  raise 
myself  above  men  who  have  devoted  a  whole  lifetime  to  the 
service  of  our  party." 

On  October  14,  317  Republicans  were  returned  to  the  polls, 
293  of  them  having  been  among  the  363  of  the  late  Parlia- 
ment; 199  Conservatives,  including  99  Legitimists,  44  Bona- 
partists,  and  56  Orleanists.  In  the  Journal  des  Debats  the 
Comte  de  Montalivet  singled  out:  the  features  of  resemblance 
between  the  election  of  the  "221  "  and  that  of  the  "363"; 
similar  blunders  on   the  part  of  the  GovernnKent — faithfully 

-39 


GAMBETTA 

adhering,  by  the  way,  to  the  letter  of  the  Constitution — and 
a  similar  response  from  the  country. 

On  October  26  Gambetta  said  at  Ch^teau-Chinon  :  "  We 
can  imagine  what  the  elections  would  have  been  like  had 
there  been  no  obstacles  in  the  way,  no  pressure  brought  to 
bear."  He  made  an  appeal  to  the  eight  million  farmers  who 
held  the  fate  of  the  country  in  the  hollow  of  their  hand  :  "It 
was  not  we  who  started  France  upon  the  path  of  reckless 
adventure ;  it  is  not  we  who  dream  of  absolutism  under  a 
single  ruler."  Then  the  familiar  refrain  on  religion  and  the 
clergy,  an  echo  from  five  or  six  years  back,  from  the  speeches 
in  Picardy,  at  St.  Quentin  and  in  Savoy  :  "  It  is  alleged  that 
we  have  invented  the  clerical  bogey.  Now  I  have  never 
attacked  the  Church  or  its  ministers  when  they  confined 
themselves  to  their  religious  and  moral  sphere.  What  I  have 
attacked,  and  always  shall  attack,  is  the  men  who  try  to  make 
the  Church  a  lever  for  political  power  and  mastery,  when  its 
true  function  is  to  help  and  console." 

After  the  re-counts  the  Chamber  consisted  of  326  Repub- 
licans and  207  deputies  of  the  Right.  The  Republicans  lost 
37  seats,  so  that  their  majority  had  dropped  to  119. 

The  Marshal,  realising  his  defeat,  wished  to  resign,  and 
Fourtou  was  for  following  suit.  Broglie  dissuaded  them ; 
he  knew  that  the  game  was  up,  but  he  was  valiantly  deter- 
mined to  face  the  final  encounter. 

The  Left  proposed  the  appointment  of  a  Commission  of 
Inquiry  into  Ministerial  acts.  Here  were  Broglie  and  Gam- 
betta at  grips,  and  with  them  two  worlds,  two  epochs.  A 
superb  and  impressive  hand-to-hand  struggle  between  the 
aristocracy  and  the  democracy  !  Broglie,  pluming  himself 
upon  his  high  lineage,  with  his  haughty  air,  his  disdain  for 
the  rabble,  his  polished  diction,  but  hard  in  manner,  his 
voice  unsympathetic,  without  warmth  or  grace ;  the  other,  all 
flame  and  fury,  bubbling  over  with  plebeian  vitality,  scornful 
of  conventions,  prone  to  sweeping  gestures  and  outbursts  of 
wrath  and  sarcasm  :  whatever  opinion  one  may  have  of  the 
men  and  the  times,  such  combats  between  opponents  of  such 
mettle  are  a  credit  to  an  age  and  a  nation. 
•  240 


THE   SIXTEENTH   OF   MAY 

Broglie  would  not  hear  of  an  inquiry.  He  could  not  regard 
"a  new  Committee  of  Public  Safety  "  as  qualified  to  pass  a 
verdict.  He  felt  that  the  battle  must  be  fought  with  a  due 
sense  of  its  importance,  and  that  there  must  be  no  hitting 
below  the  belt.  He  took  up  the  challenge  :  the  Sixteenth  of 
May  meant  war.  "  To  make  our  neighbours  uneasy  as 
regards  France's  plans,  and  then  to  intimidate  France  with 
the  threat  of  the  foreign  peril,  that  is  the  manoeuvre  in  a  nut- 
shell.    I  blush  for  my  country  !  " 

Gambetta  was  no  less  ready  to  assume  a  lofty  tone.  Tiiis 
mighty  argument  had  been  degraded  into  a  sort  of  personal 
conflict  between  the  Marshal  and  him  :  "  No,  no,  such  a 
plebiscite  could  not  be  allowed.  I  want  neither  the  honour 
nor  the  disgrace  attached  to  it.  .  .  .""  Scorn  matched  scorn  : 
"You  are  behind  the  times,  M.  le  Due;  you  are,  and  you 
always  have  been,  an  enemy  of  the  democracy,  an  aristocrat; 
you  come  here,  with  your  air  of  patrician  elegance,  to  dazzle 
us  with  your  carefully  studied  epigrams ;  but  you  have  not 
told  us  how  it  is  that  M.  le  Due  de  Broglie,  formerly  the 
sworn  foe  of  the  official  candidate  system,  is  carrying  out  the 
will  of  the  Bonapartist  Party,  borrowing  from  that  party  its 
most  odious  methods,  trying  to  make  himself  a  name  among 
the  most  skilful  election  agents  of  the  later  Empire  !  " 

The  Due  de  Broglie  sought  to  resist,  to  rely  upon  the 
Right  in  the  Senate  against  the  majority  in  the  Chamber. 
But  the  President  of  the  Senate,  the  Due  d'AudifTret-Pasquier, 
maintained  that  an  interpellation  regarding  an  act  of  the 
Chamber  was  unconstitutional;  the  Orleanists  had  little 
inclination  for  resistance;  the  Comte  de  Paris  and  the  Due 
d'Aumale,  who  had  never  been  greatly  in  favour  of  the 
Sixteenth  of  May  coup,  were  anything  but  anxious  to  coun- 
tenance a  new  adventure.  On  November  20  the  Ministry 
handed  in  their  resignation.  Then  the  Marshal,  after  trying 
an  extra-Parliamentary  Cabinet,  with  General  de  Rochebouet 
at  its  head,  a  Cabinet  with  which  the  Chamber  refused  to 
have  any  dealings,  gave  up  the  struggle  and  sent  once  more 
for  Dufaure. 

On  January  7,  at  Marseilles,  Gambetta  repeated  his  declara- 

241  R 


GAMBETTA 

tions  of  1869  :  "  I  am  a  Government  man,  not  an  Opposition 
man ;  for  one  year  of  power  bears  more  fruit  than  ten  years 
of  heroic  opposition.  In  January,  1880,  we  shall  have  to 
get  past  the  danger  zone  of  the  Senatorial  elections;  till  then, 
no  rashness,  no  quarrelling,  no  mistakes  !  Let  us  call  a  halt 
and  pitch  our  camp  on  the  positions  we  have  conquered." 

In  February  Pope  Pius  IX.  breathed  his  last.  In  a  letter 
to  an  intimate  friend  Gambetta  writes:  "  To-day  will  be  a 
red-letter  day,  a  peace  offer  from  Berlin  and  perhaps  a  com- 
plete reconciliation  with  the  Vatican.  They  have  chosen  the 
new  Pope  :  the  urbane  and  subtle-minded  Cardinal  Pecci, 
Bishop  of  Perugia,  the  Cardinal  of  whom  old  Pius  IX.  was 
so  jealous  that  shortly  before  his  death  he  tried  to  rob  him  of 
the  tiara  by  making  him  Chamberlain.  This  Italian,  more 
diplomat  than  priest,  has  had  a  hand  in  all  the  intrigues  of 
the  Jesuits  and  the  foreign  clergy  in  Rome;  now  he  is  Pope, 
and  the  name  that  he  has  assumed— Leo  XIII. — seems  to  me 
a  most  auspicious  omen.  I  feel  sure  that  we  may  expect 
great  things  from  this  appointment.  He  is  not  openly  aban- 
doning the  traditions  and  the  expressed  views  of  his  pre- 
decessor; but  his  conduct,  his  acts,  his  dealing  with  other 
Powers  count  for  more  than  his  speeches,  and  if  he  does  not 
die  too  soon  we  may  look  forward  to  more  sensible  relations 
with  the  Church." 

Gambetta  was  well  aware  that  the  Concordat  of  1801,  whose 
repeal  he  had  demanded  in  1869  and  again  in  1872,  could 
not  last  for  ever,  that  in  this  respect  Bonaparte's  work  must 
be  set  aside  by  the  Republic.  He  had,  however,  too  much 
regard  for  authority  not  to  be  in  favour  of  maintaining  the 
influence  of  the  clergy  to  a  certain  extent.  He  knew  that  even 
under  a  system  of  disestablishment  there  are  several  points 
of  contact,  both  internal  and  external,  betv,^een  Church  and 
State.  He  realised  that  the  religious  conflict,  even  if  it  kept 
his  own  party  together,  was  bringing  about  a  split  in  the 
nation,  and  that  for  the  supreme  cause  the  unity  of  the  nation 
was  a  vital  need.  He  therefore  contemplated  the  prospect  of 
a  new  settlement  with  Rome.  He  dreamt  of  coming  to  terms 
with  Leo  XIII.,  as  he  had  come  to  terms  with  the  Orleanists 

242 


THE   SIXTEENTH   OF   MAY 

in  order  to  mako  tlip  Republic,  as  he  had  come  to  tprms  with 
the  more  old-fashioned  Republicans  in  order  to  make  them 
accept  the  Senate,  as  he  had  come  to  terms  with  the 
Legitimists,  and  even  the  Bonapariists,  in  order  to  eject  the 
Orleanists  from  the  permanent  vSenatorial  seats,  as  he  was 
now  coming  to  terms  with  his  Belleville  constituents  in  order 
to  make  them  accept  the  middle  way  in  French  policy.  He 
was  a  born  diplomat,  a  past-master  in  the  art  of  treaty- 
making,  of  compromise,  of  combination.  He  was  complex; 
at  times  there  appeared  in  him  even  a  vein  of  trickery. 
"  What  a  profession  !  I  have  to  deceive  them  all  so  that  1 
may  serve  them  better!  " 

The  letter  concerning  Leo  XHL  was  addressed  to  a  woman 
with  whom  he  had  been  deeply  in  love  for  several 
years  past,  and  who  had  linked  her  life  with  his. 
Before  the  war  he  had  seen  her  among  the  spectators 
at  the  Corps  L^gislatif,  and  soon  after  the  war  In- 
had  seen  her  again  at  the  National  Assembly.  L^onie 
Leon  was  the  second  daughter  of  an  otTicer  who  had 
served  at  Strasburg  under  the  Due  d'Orleans.  She  was  ;i 
devout  Catholic  withal.  She  asked  for  nothing  more  than  t(- 
live  unknown,  in  the  shadow  of  her  lover  and  for  him  alone. 
This  did  not  mean,  however,  that  she  renounced  her  own 
personality,  that  she  merged  it  entirely  in  his.  She  knew 
how  to  warn  him,  to  calm  his  transports,  to  hold  him  back. 
In  him  it  was  a  love  of  the  heart  and  of  the  mind,  in  which 
the  strands  of  passion  and  reason  were  interwoven.  He  wrote 
to  her  every  night  a  full  and  frank  recital  of  his  thoughts  and 
actions  during  the  day.  He  listened  to  her  advice,  asked  for 
iier  approval  in  all  that  he  said  or  did.  Keen-witted,  gentle, 
and  strong-willed  at  once,  she  contrived  to  exert  an  ever- 
growing influence  over  Gambetta's  conduct. 

A  number  of  his  letters  have  been  published  in  the  Revue 
de  Paris  (December  i  and  15,  1906,  January  i,  1907).  Those 
of  1882,  on  the  eve  of  his  death,  are  no  less  ardent  than  those 
of  1873  (the  correspondence  begins  in  February,  1873).  The 
whole  series  of  letters  form  a  romance  that  throbs  with 
passion.     Here  are  some  characteristic  passages  : 

243  R  2 


GAMBETTA 

1874. — "  Our  souls  were  never  in  more  complete  harmony, 
and  I  drink  deep  draughts  of  a  love  such  as  the  most  exalted 
types  of  the  human  race  have  dreamed  of.  You  alone  among 
women  have  succeeded  in  lifting  me  to  these  dazzling  heights 
of  passion  and  soul-communion." 

August  17,  1875. — **  For  me  you  are  always  the  steady  and 
clear-sighted  mentor;  however  deeply  I  probe  the  various 
phases  of  my  life  since  Fate  brought  us  together,  I  always 
come  upon  you  as  the  source  of  inspiration  for  my  best 
actions,  and  I  love  you  as  in  days  of  old  the  enlightened 
Greeks  must  have  loved  their  tutelary  genius,  their  own 
personal  Minerva.  How  many  mistakes  you  have  saved  me 
from  !  What  words  of  wisdom  you  have  often  put  in  my 
mouth  !  How  often  you  have  taught  me  not  to  betray  anger 
or  impatience  !  For  all  this  gracious  influence  I  bless  you 
from  the  depths  of  my  heart." 

March,  1876. — "  I  owe  you  the  greatest  of  my  triumphs, 
and  I  feel  in  every  fibre  of  my  being  that  I  cannot  fully 
achieve  them,  cannot  follow  them  up,  save  under  your  wing." 
May  23,  1876. — "  You  are  my  moral  and  intellectual  home. 
I  have  got  so  much  into  the  habit  of  consulting  the  oracle  that 
I  must  now  always  have  it  close  at  hand.  There  is  in  my 
love  a  strong  element  of  fetish-worship,  which  I  must  put  up 
with  as  best  I  can." 

July  2,  1876. — "  Where  you  are  so  potent,  so  divine,  is  in 
this  :  that  you  hold  me  to  my  duty,  recall  me  to  action,  and 
it  is  in  these  renewals  of  my  courage  that  I  fathom  the 
sincerity  and  the  worth  of  your  devotion." 

Often  there  is  a  profoundly  human  note,  a  glimpse  of  those 
complex  emotions  that  throw  such  a  revealing  light  upon  his 
life;  "  He  who  has  not  known  the  intoxication  of  love  has 
never  really  tasted  the  sweets  of  political  triumph.  What  an 
abundance  of  strength,  of  courage,  of  power  I  draw  from  you 
as  from  some  inexhaustible  mine  of  moral  wealth  !  In  the 
manifold  struggles  of  my  career  I  can  spend  what  I  v/ill,  with 
an  open  hand,  never  counting  the  cost,  from  the  hoarded 
reserve  of  my  brain ;  through  mere  contact  with  you  I  am 
sure  to  replenish  the  store.       In  the  words  of  the  Galilean, 

244 


THE   SIXTEF.NTH   OF   MAY 

thou  art  the  fountain  of  my  life,  my  fair  Samaritan  !  "  If 
Paradise  can  be  defined  as  enjoyment  without  satiety,  this 
woman  opened  its  gates  to  him. 

February  23,  1875. — "  Your  advice  is  the  surest  and  wisest 
guide  for  mv  own  thoughts,  and  in  the  love  which  I  have 
vowed  you  an  ever-growing  share  of  reason  and  judgment 
plays  its  part." 

February  22,  1879. — "  I  know  not  how  to  thank  you  for 
all  the  dignitv  and  beauty  that  you  confer  every  day  upon  our 
mating.  It  is  in  this  way  that  I  have  always  passionat^lv 
longed  to  love  and  to  be  loved.  To  meet  such  a  woman,  to 
devote  my  life  to  her,  to  unlock  for  her  the  most  hidden 
recesses  of  my  soul,  to  be  admitted  in  my  turn  into  the  inner- 
most shrine  of  her  heart,  to  fill  every  corner  of  that  heart  as 
a  lord  always  ready  to  obey  :  my  dream  has  come  true,  and 
she  whom  I  have  won  has  become  the  lodestar  of  my  life, 
the  secret  arbiter  of  my  Fortunes." 

Other  letters  are  extant;  let  us  hope  that,  if  they  are 
published,  the  work  will  be  done  with  discrimination.  In 
matters  of  this  sort,  a  great  deal  of  tact  is  needed.  It  is  an  act 
of  treachery  to  a  public  man  to  reveal  him  in  a  moment  of 
disgust,  bitterness  or  rage;  posterity  will  always  see  him 
under  that  aspect  and  will  judge  him  by  that  moment,  though 
he  himself  had  soon  forgiven  and  forgotten. 

Gambetta  wished  to  give  his  name  to  one  whom  he  alreadv 
looked  upon  as  his  wife.  AVith  her  usual  high-mindedness 
she  refused,  fearing  to  blight  his  great  political  future  and 
unable  to  face  a  marriage  unblessed  by  the  Church. 


245 


CHAPTER  XVI 

gambetta  and  bismarck 
The  Presidency  of  the  Chamber 

Plans  for  an  Interview  between  Gambetta  and  Bismarck — The  Congress  of  Berlin — 
Resignation  of  Marshal  MacMahon  and  Presidency  of  Jules  Grevy  (January  30 
1879) — Gambetta  President  of  the  Chamber  (January  31). 

In  187 1,  in  the  course  of  the  peace  negotiations,  Bismarck 
had  introduced  to  Thiers  a  financier  of  his  acquaintance, 
Graf  Henckel  von  Donnersmarck,  who  had  been  Governor  of 
]\Ietz  during-  the  war.  Graf  von  Donnersmarck  had  married 
the  Marquise  de  Paiva,  who  owned  the  chateau  of  Pontchar- 
train.  In  their  town  house  in  the  Champs-Elysees  they  used 
to  give  famous  dinners,  at  which  well-known  artists  and 
literarv  men  were  frequent  guests.  Gambetta  was  among  those 
invited.  "One  can  reconnoitre  only  in  the  enemy's  country," 
he  was  fond  of  saying.  On  October  17,  1877,  Von  Donners- 
marck wrote  to  Bismarck  informing  him  of  his  relations  with 
Gambetta  and  offering  to  place  at  his  disposal  whatever  he 
might  glean  from  the  French  statesman.  "I  am  on  such  an 
intimate  footing  with  Gambetta  that  he  comes  to  see  me  at 
my  place  in  the  country.  He  has  all  the  Southerner's  gift  of 
the  gab,  so  that  one  has  more  scope  for  listening  than  for 
talking  oneself.  Apart  from  this,  Gambetta  is  the  only 
Frenchman  who  has  trustworthy  and  accurate  information 
about  what  is  going  on  in  Germany.  He  has  acquired  this 
knowledge  through  repeated  visits  to  our  country  in  the 
course  of  the  last  few  years,  during  which  visits  nothing  of 
importance  has  escaped  his  notice.  If  a  man  who  knows  how 
to  keep  in  the  background  and  is  devoted  heart  and  soul  to 
your  service  can  be  of  any  use  to  your  Excellency  in  this 
matter,  let  me  assure  you  that  I  am  entirely  at  your  disposal." 

246 


GAMBETTA   AND   BISMARCK 

Bismarck  at  first  turned  a  deaf  ear  to  this  suggestion.  On 
October  30  Graf  Herbert  von  Bismarck,  speaking  on  behalf 
of  his  father,  wrote  in  answer  to  Von  Donnersmarck  :  "  We 
must  show  some  consideration  for  the  good  name  of  a  French 
statesman,  and  be  careful  not  to  compromise  him  through  any 
flagrant  dealings  with  the  Chancellor."  At  the  end  of  Decem- 
ber, Henckel  replied  :  "  I  undertake  to  send  Gambetta  to  you 
at  Varzin,  either  publicly  or  in  secret,  whichever  you  prefer." 
Bismarck,  however,  still  could  not  see  his  way  to  accept  the 
proposal.  He  again  declared  that  Gambetta  ought  not  to 
endanger  his  reputation:  "The  interests  that  he  stands  for 
must  be  scrupulously  guarded." 

Gambetta  left  for  Rome,  saw  the  King,  the  Prime  Minister 
Depretis,  and  Crispi,  the  Home  Secretary.  Still  relying  on 
his  lucky  star,  he  seemed  quite  ready  to  proceed,  by  way  of 
Vienna,  to  Berlin. 

The  war  between  Russia  and  Turkey  was  drawing  to  a 
close.  The  Russians  were  at  the  gates  of  Constantinople,  and 
the  Turks  were  asking  for  an  armistice.  On  February  19 
Bismarck  spoke  in  the  Reichstag  and  announced  that  a  Con- 
gress would  be  held.  Gambetta  wrote  to  his  confidante:  "I 
have  read  the  '  Monster's  '  speech.  I  am  delighted  beyond 
words;  it  is  just  what  I  wanted,  just  what  I  was  waiting  for, 
without  daring  to  count  upon  it  as  a  certainty.  Under  the 
cloak  of  an  indirect  allusion,  he  shows  that  we  are  a  force  to 
be  reckoned  with.  He  outlines  in  masterly  fashion  the  balance 
and  distribution  of  power  on  the  continent.  It  is  indeed 
more  than  we  could  have  hoped  for  from  the  capricious  and 
turbulent  spirit  of  the  adventurer  of  genius  who  has  welded 
the  new  Germany  by  fire  and  steel.  The  radiant  dawn  of 
Right  is  beginning  to  peep  forth  in  his  soul.  It  is  for  us  to 
take  time  by  the  forelock,  to  profit  by  conflicting  ambitions, 
so  that  we  may  squarely  assert  our  legitimate  claims  and,  in 
concert  with  hini,  lay  the  foundations  of  the  new  order.  Thus 
I  have  reached  the  pinnacle  of  my  desires  :  peace  assured  for 
many  years  to  come,  the  exhibition  no  longer  in  danger  of 
being  abandoned,  the  Powers  in  a  fair  way  to  draw  closer  to 
France  if  they  wish  to  act,  and  even  if  they  merelv  wish  to 

247 


GAMBETTA 

deliberate  and  keep  things  as  they  are.  To-day  will  be  a 
red-letter  day." 

In  this  first  impression  there  was  no  little  self-delusion, 
as  the  "wise  Minerva"  grasped  at  once;  in  reading  Bis- 
marck's speech,  she  had  not  been  moved  to  the  same  enthu- 
siasm. Spuller  said  of  his  friend,  later  :  "  He  was  too  good- 
natured.  He  did  not  judge  mankind  by  critical  standards." 
But  at  this  moment  Gambetta  felt  that  the  period  of  intolerable 
strain  for  France,  a  period  that  had  lasted  seven  years,  was 
over,  and  that  she  was  once  more  taking  her  place  as  a  Great 
Power  in  the  councils  of  Europe. 

Was  it  incumbent  on  France  to  go  to  Berlin,  if  invited  to  do 
so  ?  At  the  moment  when  Bismarck  was  minded  to  recast 
his  religious  policy;  when  Russia,  though  victorious,  was 
worn  out  by  the  struggle ;  when  a  new  reign  was  beginning  in 
Italy ;  when  a  new  Pope  was  ascending  the  pontifical  throne ; 
when  the  Universal  Exhibition  was  on  the  point  of  opening, 
should  France  remain  absent,  mute,  isolated,  or  was  it  in  her 
interest  to  take  her  place  once  more  at  the  European  council- 
board  ?  Gambetta  at  first  was  for  holding  aloof  {La  Repuh- 
lique  frangaise,  cf.  his  speech  of  February  21,  1878,  in  the 
Chamber),  suggesting  that  France,  in  a  conference  whose 
trend  was  one  of  opposition  to  Russia,  would  hazard  an 
estrangement  from  the  very  Power  that  she  ought  henceforth 
to  look  upon  as  a  prospective  ally.  After  an  interview  with 
Waddington  and  Freycinet,  however,  he  changed  his  opinion, 
and  asked  :  Could  we,  who  have  been  among  the  signatories  to 
the  Treaties  of  1856  and  1871,  allow  them  to  be  revised  without 
our  co-operation  ? 

Ought  he,  before  the  Congress,  to  see  the  man  who  was  to 
preside  over  it,  "squarely  assert  our  legitimate  claims,"  get 
to  the  bottom  of  his  real  intentions? — "  We  must  either  fight 
or  make  terms,"  he  used  to  say,  and  he  knew  that  as  yet 
France  could  not  fight.  The  Universal  Exhibition  was  about 
to  open,  and  France  was  to  display  there  her  renascent 
vigour.  He  had  just  returned  from  another  visit  to  Germany, 
he  had  inspected  her  army,  he  had  gauged  its  strength,  he 
knew  it  to  be  far  superior  to  ours  both  in  numbers  and  organ- 

248 


GAMBETTA   AND   BISMARCK 

isation.  We  had  no  allies.  The  only  thin^  for  us  to  do,  he 
held,  was  to  maintain  courteous  relations  with  Germany  for 
the  time  being-  and  to  profit  by  them,  if  we  could.  For  more 
than  two  years  past  he  had  secretly  harboured  the  idea  that 
some  agreement  might  be  reached,  some  scheme  of  barter 
devised.  The  letters  he  addressed  to  Ranc  from  the  end  of 
1875,  now  published  for  the  first  time,  betrav  scruples  of 
conscience  which  are  all  to  his  credit  and  disprove  certain 
imputations  that  have  been  cast  upon  his  character. 

September  20,  1875. — "  If  by  an  act  of  diplomacy  wp  could 
avert  from  our  own  heads  the  conflict  that  is  in  the  making, 
or  at  least  postpone  it,  or,  best  of  all,  stave  off  altogether  the 
orgy  of  bloodshed  that  we  see  as  in  a  vision,  you  and  I,  ought 
we  not  to  put  forth  our  best  endeavours.  How,  you  ask  ?  By 
means  of  the  colonies  !  With  you  I  can  be  perfectly  candid  : 
which  ought  we  to  think  more  of — our  outlying  dependencies 
or  our  future  generations?  Let  us  boldly  face  this  painful 
alternative  :  either  the  lives  of  young  Frenchmen,  or  slices  of 
our  dominions  overseas.  Should  we  not  take  advantage  of 
that  roving  spirit,  of  the  German  fondness  for  colonies? 
They  have  no  colonies,  and  they  want  some.  We  have  what 
they  want,  and  have  so  far  craved  for  in  vain.  Surely  this  is 
a  chance  not  to  be  missed,  if  only  we  know  how  to  grasp  it. 

X can  tell  you  a  good  deal  about  our  diplomacy  that  never 

rises  to  the  occasion,  our  home  policy  that  wrecks  our  position 
abroad  !  How  can  we  save  ourselves  from  the  coming 
deluge?  From  you  I  will  not  hide  my  uneasiness,  my  waver- 
ing moods,  my  perplexities  and  my  gloomy  forebodings. 
Whom  else  can  I  confide  in  ?  Who  else  is  there  among  my 
friends  and  yours,  who  would  not  stab  me  in  the  back  ? 
Would  they  understand  the  mental  agony  I  am  going 
through?     They  seem  to  have  forgotten  1870!  " 

December  i,  1875. — "  An  unlooked-for  opportunity  is  mine, 
if  I  care  to  take  it.  The  Chancellor  is  coming  to  Paris ;  he  is 
trying  to  make  the  visit  impressive,  and  says  he  wants  to  have 
a  talk  with  one  or  two  French  notabilities.  Ought  I  to  wash 
my  hands  of  the  business?  Should  I  be  doing  mv  duty  as  a 
Frenchman  ?     But  there,  you  know  that  he  has  visions  of  a 

249 


GAMBETTA 

colonial  future  for  his  country,  that  his  country  is  strong, 
perhaps  invincible.  Should  we  not  save  our  rising  genera- 
tion from  having  to  offer  a  noble,  but  useless  sacrifice?  If 
they  disappear,  France  will  be  crippled  for  ever." 

On  April  4,  1878,  Von  Donnersmarck  once  more  suggested 
the  interview  to  Bismarck.  This  time  the  Chancellor  con- 
sented, and  the  meeting  was  fixed  for  the  30th,  in  Berlin, 
where  he  had  to  go  for  the  session  of  the  Reichstag.  On  the 
1 8th,  however.  Von  Donnersmarck  received  the  following  note 
from  Gambetta :  "  Man  proposes.  Parliament  disposes. 
When  I  hastened  to  accept  your  invitation  yesterday,  I  had 
reckoned  without  my  host.  The  questions  that  concern  the 
War  Office  have  suddenly  become  extremely  urgent.  I 
cannot  desert  my  Parliamentary  post.  Consequently  I  am 
compelled  to  postpone  the  scheme  for  the  present."  A 
mere  pretext :  he  was  backing  out,  at  heart  only  too 
glad  to  break  his  appointment.  It  was  a  snub  from  the 
vanquished  to  the  victor,  to  the  man  at  whose  nod  all  Europe 
trembled. 

This  projected  meeting,  when  the  news  leaked  o'ut  later  on, 
gave  rise  to  much  angry  comment  and  to  controversies  which 
have  not  yet  died  down.  It  became  a  bone  of  party  conten- 
tion. All  its  features  were  magnified  and  distorted,  according 
to  the  dictates  of  interest  or  passion.  The  Royalists,  at  the 
time  when  they  thought  it  was  a  service  to  their  cause  to  assail 
the  memory  of  Gambetta,  made  the  most  of  Von  Donners- 
marck's  correspondence  with  Herbert  von  Bismarck.  One  of 
them,  the  shrewd  and  discerning  M.  Jacques  Bainville,  who 
has  since  written  a  remarkable  book,  Histoire  de  deux  Peuples 
[France  and  Germany],  translated  this  correspondence  under 
the  title  Corresfondance  Secrete  de  Gambetta  et  de  Bismarck. 
Another  issued  a  pamphlet  entitled  La  Republique  de  Bis- 
marck. M.  Henri  Galli  has  replied  to  these  Monarchists: 
*'  You  denounced  Gambetta  in  his  lifetime  as  a  prophet  of 
war  and  revenge,  and  now,  after  his  death,  you  denounce  him 
for  making  overtures  to  Bismarck  !  " 

To  assert  that  Gambetta,  in  going  to  see  Bismarck,  was 
writing  oflf  Alsace  and  Lorraine  as  a  loss,  is  sheer  nonsense. 

250 


GAMBETTA   AND   BISMARCK 

On  the  contrary,  it  was  for  the  sake  of  Alsace  and  Lorraine 
that  he  planned  the  journey. 

No  more  proof  is  needed  than  the  letter  we  have  quoted 
above  :  "  It  is  for  us  now  squarely  to  assert  our  h^p^itimate 
claims  and  lay  the  foundations  of  the  new  order/'  Where  he 
was  wrong  was  in  adding:  "in  concert  with  him"  (Bis- 
marck), and  when,  crediting^  the  great  forger  with  his  own 
sentiments,  he  exclaimed  :  "  You  see  how  the  radiant  dawn 
of  Right  is  beginning  to  peep  forth  in  this  man's  soul." 

One  might  have  thought  that  on  the  eve  of  the  Congress  of 
Berlin  Gambetta  intended  to  discuss  the  Mediterranean  with 
the  Chancellor.  As  the  event  proved,  this  topic  might  well 
have  given  food  for  interesting  conversations  and  profitable 
arrangements.  No,  his  mind  was  whollv  concentrated  on  the 
Treaty  of  Frankfort.  It  was  certainly  a  strange  delusion  on 
his  pari  to  imagine  that  the  conqueror  would  have  been 
inclined  to  discuss  this  subject.  Either  Bismarck  would  have 
cut  him  short — as  William  II.  always  did  when  French  poli- 
ticians tried  to  raise  the  question — or  he  would  have  reminded 
him  of  Jena  and  of  Germany's  need  for  guarding  against  an 
attack.  A  little  later,  in  an  interview  with  Baron  von  Hol- 
stein,  reported  by  Blowitz,  Bismarck,  in  alluding  to  the  possi- 
bility of  a  meeting  with  Gambetta,  is  said  to  have  laid  down 
the  condition  that  there  must  be  no  talk  about  the  provinces; 
if  the  discussion  should  become  public  property,  he  would 
thus  be  able  to  give  his  word  of  honour  that  the  question  of 
the  annexed  provinces  had  never  been  mooted. 

In  order  to  understand  why  Gambetta  was  so  hopeful,  we 
must  remember  the  amazing  triumphs  of  the  man  who  had 
marched  from  success  to  success,  who  knew  his  own  powers  of 
fascination ;  we  must  try  to  picture  ourselves  in  that  world  in 
which  Hohenlohe,  Von  Donnersmarck  and  Bismarck's 
agents  were  ceaselessly  burrowing;  we  must  not  forget  that 
Thiers  had  openly  declared  himself  in  favour  of  a  reconcilia- 
tion wMth  Germany;  that  Emile  de  Girardin,  an  intimate 
friend  of  the  Donnersmarcks,  deliberately  led  by  them  and 
by  Hohenlohe  on  to  a  false  track,  was  continually  striving 
towards    the    same    end    in    a    sensational    Press    campaign. 


GAMBETTA 

Finally,  as  M.  de  Freycinet  has  pointed  out  in  his  Souvenirs, 
Gambetta  was  at  this  time  conning  under  the  spell  of  another 
influence.  A  friend  of  Gambetta's  at  San  Remo  was  neigh- 
bour to  the  Crown  Prince  Frederick,  already  stricken  by  the 
disease  that  was  to  carry  him  off.  This  prince,  married  to  the 
English  princess  whom  Bismarck  hated,  had  always  given 
evidence  of  a  pacific  temper.  He  unbosomed  himself  to 
Freycinet  as  regards  his  conciliatory  attitude  towards  France 
and  his  desire  to  find  some  day  a  modus  vivendi  that  would 
be  acceptable  and  honourable  for  both  nations.  Gambetta 
hoped  that  the  reign  of  this  prince  would  bring  about  a  change 
of  policy.  "  Who  knows?  "  he  said  to  Freycinet,  "  the  all- 
pervading  justice  of  Providence  has  great  surprises  in  store 
for  us  !  "  Here,  too,  he  was  mistaken  ;  even  if  Frederick  HI.'s 
reign  had  lasted  longer,  he  would  never  have  agreed  to  give 
up  a  portion  of  Alsace-Lorraine. 

Why  did  Bismarck,  after  repudiating  Von  Donnersmarck's 
first  suggestions  at  the  end  of  1877,  change  his  mind  a  few 
months  afterwards  ?  Was  he  not  sorely  tempted  to  embroil 
France  with  Russia  over  the  1856  Treaty,  with  England  over 
Egypt,  with  Italy  over  Egypt  ?  What  attractive  topics  for  a 
discussion  !  The  interview  might  have  opened  up  alluring 
vistas  for  French  statesmanship.  Public  opinion,  however, 
would  not  have  understood,  an3  above  all  the  Alsace- 
Lorrainers  might  have  misconstrued  the  affair.  Evil  tongues 
would  have  described  as  a  renunciation  what  in  Gambetta's 
mind  was  the  very  opposite.  This  is  precisely  what  happened 
later  to  Jules  Ferry  when,  to  prevent  Tunis  and  Bizerta  from 
falling  into  the  hands  of  Italy  (who  was  leaning  towards  the 
Triple  Alliance),  he  had  first  to  explore  the  state  of  feeling  on 
the  point  in  Berlin.  It  was  for  the  same  reason  that  certain 
French  politicians  declined  to  return  the  artful  leads  of 
William  II.;  they  could  not  endure  the  thought  that  they 
might  cause  pain  or  misgivings  to  a  single  Alsace-Lorrainer. 
Once  more  the  astute  Spuller  intervened  to  guide  his  friend 
into  the  paths  of  prudence.  The  idea  of  a  parley  was 
dropped,  never  to  be  resumed.  Bismarck,  whose  pride  was 
wounded,  always  denied  these  plans  for  a  meeting— here  he 

252 


GAMBETTA   AND   BISMARCK 

has  been  given  the  lie  direct  by  his  secretary,   Busch — and 
treated  Gambetla  to  the  end  as  an  enemy. 

Gambetta's  opponents,  and  certain  sensitive  and  perfervid 
patriots,  taxed  him  with  having  altered  the  whole  course  of 
his  policy,  with  having  abandoned  the  idea  of  revenge,  with 
having  intended  to  work  for  an  understanding  with  Germany. 
If  he  had  wished  to  bring  France  nearer  to  Germany,  would 
he  have  made  the  entente  with  England  the  central  feature  of 
his  programme  ?  He  is  also  taken  to  task  for  having  con- 
certed with  Bismarck  to  substitute  St.  Vallier  for  Gontaut- 
Biron  as  our  Ambassador  in  Germany.  The  truth  of  the 
matter  is  that  after  the  elections  of  1877  Gontaut,  who  had 
always  been  scheming  for  a  restoration  of  the  Monarchy,  had 
become  impossible.  He  was  as  impossible  in  Berlin  as 
Von  Arnim  in  Paris,  and  for  the  same  reasons. 

In  our  own  day,  the  spirit  of  Gambetta's  former  enemies  has 
reappeared  to  frame,  with  more  justice,  a  general  indictment. 
I  can  imagine  one  of  those  great  Monarchists,  high-souled 
and  upright,  who  are  the  ornaments  of  their  party,  loyally 
searching  his  own  conscience  and  asking  :  Was  Gambetta 
to  blame,  were  the  Republicans  to  blame  if,  in  1871,  after  the 
manifesto  of  July  4  on  the  white  flag,  the  Royalist  majority 
created  the  title  and  functions  of  the  President  of  the  Republic 
and  decreed  that  the  Republican  system  should  last  as  long 
as  their  majority  held  together;  if  in  1873,  after  the  reading 
of  the  letter  of  October  27  on  the  white  flag,  it  decided  that 
Marshal  MacMahon  should  retain  for  seven  more  years  the 
magisterial  office  with  which  he  had  been  temporarily 
invested  ?  Were  the  Republicans  to  blame  if  the  .Monarchist 
Assembly  was  without  a  monarch ;  if  the  pretenders  succes- 
sively compassed  each  other's  downfall ;  if  the  Comte 
de  Chambord,  in  rejecting  the  tricolor,  buried  the  Legitimist 
kingship  with  his  own  hands;  if  a  section  of  the  Right  frus- 
trated the  Due  d'Aumale's  candidature  for  the  Presidency; 
if  the  Comte  de  Paris,  from  fear  of  the  Empire,  encouraged 
his  followers,  first  to  found,  then  to  maintain  the  Republic? 
'Were  the  Republicans  to  blame  if  the  Conservative  party,  in 
turning  out  a  Cabinet  which  had  a  majority  in  both  Cham- 

253 


GAMBETTA 

bers,  tampered  with  the  Constitution  and  the  parliamentary 
system  at  the  very  outset,  clogged  up  and  destroyed  the  safety- 
valve  and  discredited  the  appeal  to  the  country,  the  supreme 
safeguard  of  national  sovereignty  ?  And  could  he  not  add 
to-day  :  Were  the  Republicans  to  blame  if  the  Conservatives 
did  their  share  towards  upsetting  more  than  fifty  Ministries  in 
forty-four  years?  Could  he  not,  finally,  re-read  the  pages  of 
M.  Denys  Cochin  {Louis  Philippe,  1918,  pp.  77,  78)  on  the 
emigres,  who  "  by  contagion  with  the  world  "  did  "  incalcu- 
lable harm  to  the  king,"  and  those  of  M.  Jacques  Bainville 
(Histoire  de  trois  generations,  pp.  36,  37)  on  the  "  ultras  " 
of  the  Restoration  ("  no  one  thought  he  had  made  his  mark 
unless  he  demolished  something  "),  their  "  levity  "  and  their 
"mania  for  destruction,"  those  "ultras"  who  "gleefully 
mingled  their  ballot-papers  with  those  of  the  Left,  in  order  to 
overthrow  the  Ministers  whom  their  king  had  chosen  "  ?  The 
fundamental  trait  in  all  these  malcontents  was  a  "delight  in 
making  havoc,"  and  "  instinct  for  anarchy."  Ah,  if  only  the 
French  Conservatives  had  displayed  as  much  wisdom  in 
politics  as  they  have  displayed  courage  on  the  battlefield  ! 

We  have  seen  how  Gambetta  entrusted  Ranc  with  his  most 
important  secrets.  Arthur  Ranc  was  always  one  of  his  best 
friends,  one  on  whom  he  could  unfailingly  rely.  He  had  no 
Genoese  suppleness,  and  he  was  not  the  man  who  would  have 
made  the  speech  on  the  Athenian  Republic.  He  was  shy  at 
bottom,  taciturn,  a  stubborn  fighter  in  debate,  but  a  thorough 
gentleman,  honourable  and  trustworthy.  He  seemed  to  us  a 
sort  of  Alceste^  in  politics.  He  professed  a  keen  appreciation 
of  Blanqui,  He  was  a  first-rate  journalist.  Ranc  did  outpost 
duty  for  Gambetta  in  the  lines  of  the  Extreme  Left,  just  as 
Spuller  did  in  the  lines  of  the  Moderates  and  Liberals.  He 
was  the  Jacobin  Gambettist,  just  as  Spuller  was  the  Girondin 
and  Feuillant  Gambettist.  His  hatred  of  the  Empire  had 
proved  a  bond  between  him  and  the  young  barrister 
De  Delescluze.     Like  him,  he  thought  that  the  mingling  of 

^  The  leading  figure  in  Molieie's  Misanthrope,  distinguished  for  his  bluntness  of 
speech  and  cynical  views  of  his  fellow-men. — Translator's  note. 


GAMBETTA   AND   BISMARCK 

politics  with  religion  did  no  good  cither  to  religion  or  to 
politics.  He  was  too  astute  not  to  see  that  certain  men  who 
clamour  for  free  thought  are  impelled,  in  their  heart  of  hearts, 
by  instincts  of  the  confessional ;  but  his  own  attachment  to 
these  principles  was  free  from  any  such  alloy.  He  was  a 
robust  gladiator,  full-blooded,  a  trifle  rough ;  but  he  had  a 
political  brain;  that  is  why  he  loved  Gambetta  and  Gambetta 
loved  him,  though  all  the  while  fearing  him  and  striving  to 
keep  him  in  check. 

The  Chamber  resumed  its  sittings  from  April  29  to  June  1 1. 
Gambetta,  re-elected  chairman  of  the  Budget  committee,  was 
everywhere  at  once.  He  secured  the  voting  of  a  credit  which 
enabled  the  territorial  force  (o  be  summoned  for  the  first 
time  to  the  colours. 

Great  public  works,  canals,  harbours,  railways,  undertaken 
at  the  instance  of  M.  de  Freycinet,  who  had  become  Senator 
of  the  Seine  department  in  1876,  afterwards  Minister  of 
Works;  an  inquiry  into  the  economic  condition  of  France; 
schools  built :  the  Republican  party  and  the  community  as 
a  whole  had  every  reason  to  be  satisfied.  On  May  i  the 
Exhibition  was  opened.  It  seemed  as  if  the  dark  days  were 
over,  as  if  France  were  once  more  raising  her  head. 

On  May  24,  at  the  Cirque  Am^ricain,  Gambetta  exclaimed  : 
"  The  more  I  review  the  actions  and  the  progress  of  the 
French  nation,  the  more  do  I  feel  that  nothing  can  resist  or 
impede  the  onward  sweep  of  this  movement,  a  movement 
which  by  drawing  all  Frenchmen  close  together,  leaves  no 
further  loophole  for  division,  for  anarchy,  for  violence,  for 
corruption,  for  internal  feuds;  the  more  do  I  feel  that  we  are 
on  the  verge  of  that  blessed,  thrice-blessM  moment  when 
there  will  be  only  one  creed,  one  party,  one  flag,  one 
France!  "  In  this  cry  from  the  heart,  the  very  pith  and 
marrow  of  the  man  is  revealed.  And  the  famous  saying,  so 
often  quoted,  which  to-day  appears  to  us  a  truism,  but  which 
then  was  a  symbol  of  the  revived  national  unity  :  *'  As  for  me, 
I  am  broad-minded  enough  to  be  at  once  a  worshipper  at 
the  shrine  of  Joan  the  Maid  and  an  admirer  and  disciple  of 
Voltaire!  " 

255 


GAMBETTA 

June  3  saw  the  first  meeting  of  the  Congress  of  Berlin. 
Bismarck  barred  the  way  to  Russia,  installed  Austria- 
Hungary  in  Bosnia-Herzegovina  and  laid  the  train  for 
Teutonic  penetration  into  the  Balkans.  England  gained 
the  Sultan's  reluctant  assent  to  her  occupation  of  Cyprus:  it 
was  the  price  of  Austria-Hungary's  occupation  of  Bosnia- 
Herzegovina,  and  for  Lord  Beaconsfield  it  meant  fulfilment 
of  the  dream  he  had  toyed  with  as  early  as  1847  in  Tancred. 
For  France  it  was  a  slap  in  the  face.  Our  chief  mouthpiece, 
Waddington,  was  indignant,  and  told  Lord  Beaconsfield 
that  France  had  no  other  course  open  to  her  than  to  leave  the 
Congress.  Lord  Salisbury,  who  expected  something  of  the 
sort,  at  once  turned  the  talk  upon  Egypt  and  Syria,  and  said 
abruptly  to  Waddington,  "  You  can't  leave  Carthage  in  the 
hands  of  the  barbarians."  As  regards  Egypt,  Waddington 
wanted  no  more  than  a  statement  confirming  the  equal  rights 
and  equal  influence  of  the  two  Powers,  but,  alas  !  we  know 
the  value  of  these  dual  controls,  a  hotbed  of  eternal  disputes, 
in  which  one  of  the  two  parties  is  inevitably  a  dupe.  On 
Tunisia  Lord  Salisbury  added  :  "  There  you  can  do  whatever 
you  think  fit.  It  is  no  concern  of  ours."  This  line  he  took 
up  by  arrangement  with  Bismarck. 

Our  plenipotentiaries,  Waddington,  St.  Vallier  and 
Desprez,  fully  alive  to  tKe  advantage  of  having  England's 
proposals  ratified  by  the  Congress,  made  out  a  draft  for  a 
resolution  and  sent  it  to  Paris  for  the  Government's  approval. 
The  Cabinet,  however,  fearing  a  trap,  refused  to  commit  itself. 
After  the  Congress,  however,  Waddington  secured  Salis- 
bury's backing  for  his  suggestions  as  to  Egypt  and  Tunisia. 
"  His  Majesty's  Government,"  said  the  British  Minister, 
"  has  expressed  its  keen  appreciation  of  the  success  that  has 
attended  France's  experiments  in  Algeria,  and  of  the  great 
civilising  work  that  she  has  undertaken  in  that  country.  The 
presence  of  France  on  the  North  African  coast  must  result  in 
enabling  her,  whenever  she  thinks  fit,  to  exert  an  effective 
pressure  upon  the  Tunisian  Government.  The  contingency 
is  one  that  the  British  Government  has  long  regarded  as 
inevitable." 

256 


GAMBETTA   AND   BISMARCK 

This  exchange  of  letters  throws  a  vivid  light  on  what  is  to 
follow.  But  if  the  Chancelleries  knew  it,  France  was  com- 
pletely in  the  dark.  She  was  not  privy,  either  to  England's 
overtures  to  our  representatives,  or  to  the  correspondence 
between  the  two  Cabinets.  She  only  knew  the  announcement 
made  by  Waddington  in  the  Senate  during  the  Budget  debate 
of  1879,  when  he  congratulated  France  on  "  having  remained 
free  from  commitments."  In  truth,  it  was  no  policy  of  empty 
hands.  Yet  who  to-day  would  blame  our  representatives? 
They  would  deserve  censure  if  they  had  acted  otherwise. 
And,  in  our  opinion,  the  refusal  of  the  Government  to  concur 
in  their  suggestions  can  only  be  deplored.  Italy's  resentment 
would  have  been  less  acute,  and  we  should  not  have  furnished 
her  with  a  pretext — or  a  motive — for  allying  herself  with  the 
Central   Powers. 

After  the  Congress,  Gambetta  granted  to  the  Times  an 
interview  in  which,  commending  the  idea  of  closer  relations 
between  England  and  France,  he  added:  "  An  alliance  with 
Russia  resting  upon  absolutism  is  unthinkable."  It  was  con- 
sidered safe  to  infer  from  this  pronouncement  that  Gambetta 
set  his  face  against  the  scheme  of  a  Franco-Russian  alliance; 
[but  the  unpublished  letters  cited  above  show  that  he  did 
nothing  of  the  sort.  The  fact  of  the  matter  is  that  he  was 
addressing  the  English  public,  just  after  the  Anglo-Russian 
dispute  and  at  the  moment  when  the  Mediterranean  question 
was  coming  to  the  fore.  He  took  care,  by  the  way,  to  win 
Russia's  good  graces  by  saying  :  "  I  think  that  Russia  did 
a  great  service  to  the  ideal  of  public  law  when,  despite  the 
lack  of  cohesion  then  prevailing  in  Europe,  she  agreed  to 
submit  the  San  Stefano  Treaty  in  its  entirety  to  the  approval 
of  the  Powers."  He  went  on  to  observe,  regarding  the  Triple 
Alliance  of  1873:  "France  has  the  right  to  ask  herself 
whether  the  Congress  of  Berlin  has  left  the  Triple  Alliance 
of  1873  standing  where  it  did.  It  would  be  diflicult,  I  think, 
to  answer  this  in  the  affirmative.  The  position  assumed  by 
Austria  in  the  new  Slav  States,  of  which  Bosnia-Herzegovina 
is  justly  regarded  as  the  centre,  makes  that  Power  anything 
but  an  ally  of  Russia.   .  .  .  The  Congress  of  Berlin  has  com- 

^57  5 


GAMBETTA 

pletely  altered  the  basis  on  which  the  entente  of  1873  rested, 
and  France  has  every  reason  to  be  gratified  at  the  change  in 
a  combination  designed  to  leave  her  friendless,  if  not  to  attack 
her  point-blank." 

Bismarck,  after  successively  defeating  Denmark,  Austria 
and  Russia,  had  worsted  victorious  Russia  without  coming  to 
blows;  he  had  linked  Austria-Hungary  to  Germany  and 
widened  the  sphere  of  Teutonic  influence  in  the  Balkans,  The 
Congress  of  Berlin  bore  within  it  the  seed  of  future  Balkan 
wars  and  of  the  world-war;  but  it  gave  a  free  hand  to  England 
and  France  in  the  Mediterranean. 

About  this  time  Collectivist  Socialism  began  to  make  its 
appearance  in  France.  At  the  end  of  1877  M.  Jules  Guesde 
had  issued  the  first  number  of  L'Egalite.  In  a  Labour  Con- 
gress held  at  Lyons  from  January  28  to  February  8,  1878, 
the  disciples  oT  Collectivism  had  tried  to  force  their  views 
upon  the  rest,  but  the  effort  had  failed.  The  Exhibition  was 
seized  upon  as  an  opportunity  for  attempting  to  convene  an 
International  Labour  Congress.  Jules  Guesde  was  at  the  head 
of  the  movement.  The  organisers  were  arrested  (September  4), 
prosecuted  and  found  guilty.  Jules  Guesde  appeared  in  court 
on  October  22  and  pleaded  for  his  fellow-defendants.  He 
demanded  the  establishment  of  an  "  equalitarian  "  society  in 
place  of  the  "  feudal  "  society  of  to-day. 

At  the  Exhibition,  on  November  8,  Gambetta  said  to  the 
working-men's  deputation  from  the  Aveyron  :  "Those  who 
imagine  that  it  is  the  duty,  or  that  it  lies  wdthin  the  power,  of 
the  Government  to  secure  the  happiness  of  all,  are  pursuing  a 
mirage.  Strictly  speaking,  there  is  only  one  thing  that  a 
Government  owes  to  all,  and  that  is,  justice.  Every  man 
being  his  own  master,  it  rests  with  him  to  make  himself  happy 
or  unhappy  by  using  his  freedom  to  good  or  bad  purpose. 
The  State  does  no  more  than  guarantee  an  equality  of  rights 
to  everyone,  be  he  rich  or  poor,  high  or  low.  What  we  want 
is  not  an  aristocratic  or  a  middle-class  or  a  proletarian 
Republic,  but  a  national  Republic."  A  rather  limited  social 
programme — the  programme  of  a  generation  that  had  played 

258 


GAMBRTTA    AND    RISMAIICK 

i>s  part  under  the  Commune  !  Ihe  problems  still  remained 
and  cried  out  for  a  solution.  Collectivism,  with  its  slogan 
"the  rich  always  getting  richer,  the  poor  always  getting 
poorer" — a  theory  which  even  the  followers  of  Marx,  such 
as  Bernstein,  admitted  later  on  to  be  a  fallacy — the  class- 
struggle,  destined  to  culminate  one  day  in  Bolshevism, 
should  have  been  combated  with  a  programme  of  bold  and 
far-reaching  reforms;  but  other  questions  were  cropping  up 
at  the  moment.  Three  years  later,  when  Gambetta  came  into 
power,  his  Ministers  were  to  introduce  measures  dealing  with 
trades-unions,  old  age  pensions  and  accident  insurance. 

In  September,  Gambetta  went  on  a  tour  in  the  Dauphin^, 
where  his  voice  had  not  lost  its  power  to  thrill.  At  Valence, 
his  reception  was  enthusiastic.  Old  Madier  de  Montjau  was 
at  once  delighted  and  alarmed  :  delighted  because  his  young 
friend's  triumphs  were  all  to  the  good  of  the  Republic; 
alarmed  because  in  a  democracy  such  idolatry  has  its 
dangerous  side,  especially  for  the  idol  himself.  He  smiled, 
yet  could  not  repress  a  frown.  He  administered  to  the  con- 
quering hero  a  discreet  warning;  he  drank  "to  the  health  of 
the  Republic!  "  Gambetta  wittily  played  up  to  the  veteran 
warrior:  "We  must  be  on  our  guard  against  the  spell  of 
personality;  nothing  can  do  greater  harm  than  to  make  any 
man  the  object  of  blind  adoration.  ..."  He  urged  the  need 
of  unity  among  the  Republicans  :"  If  there  are  differences 
between  us,  they  are  differences  of  form  and  degree,  not  of 
kind.  And  in  these  disputes  we  can  always  appeal  to  an 
arbiter  who  will  give  us  his  casting  vote — I  mean,  public 
opinion.     It  is  only  a  trained  army  that  can  win  victories." 

At  Romans,  on  the  i8th,  flowers  were  strewn  in  his  path; 
his  audience  of  six  thousand  were  in  a  jovial  mood.  Yet  he 
seemed  far  from  well.  His  intimate  letters  tell  us  something 
of  this  growing  sense  of  fatigue.  He  dealt  with  the  possibility 
that  Marshal  MacMahon,  after  Senatorial  elections  in  favour 
of  the  Republicans,  might  feel  in  duty  bound  to  resign.  There 
was  nothing  to  fear,  he  held,  as  regards  an  interregnum;  if 
the  situation  seemed  likely  to  become  acute,  less  than  an  hour 

259  s  2 


GAMBETTA 

would  elapse  between  the  abdication  of  the  old  chief  and  the 
accession  of  the  new.  He  hoped,  however,  that  this  crisis 
would  not  arise,  for  it  was  in  the  public  interest  that  the 
Constitution  should  be  respected,  and  the  President  should 
exercise  his  mandate  up  to  the  last  moment. 

With  the  career  of  the  monarchy  for  the  past  hundred  years 
— throughout  which,  except  for  the  case  of  Charles  X.,  the 
sceptre  had  never  been  handed  on  in  regular  fashion  to  a  suc- 
cessor— he  contrasted  the  Republican  organism,  the  stability 
ensured  by  the  unbroken  rule  of  law.  "  And  when  you  can 
say  that  a  President  who  owes  his  position  to  your  opponents 
and  is  certainly,  in  his  heart  of  hearts,  no  passionate  admirer 
of  our  new  system — when  you  can  say  that  such  a  President 
has  fulfilled  his  mission,  and  that  at  the  expiry  of  his  term  of 
ofifice  the  nation  has  found  itself  passing  quite  smoothly  from 
one  Presidency  to  another,  then  you  will  have  vindicated  our 
movement,  not  only  for  France  but  for  the  world,  in  the  only 
possible  way  :  you  will  have  taken  a  step  forward." 

Knowing  all  the  while  how  many  weak  joints  there  are  in 
the  Ministry's  armour,  he  remains  "  a  staunch  Ministerialist." 
He  sings  the  praises  of  the  army,  which  must  remain  the 
Republicans'  first  care.  He  reminds  his  hearers  of  the  recent 
review  at  Vincennes,  where  our  reservists  appeared  for  the 
first  time  : "  On  that  day  I  saw  many  an  eye  grow  wet  with 
tears,  I  heard  many  remarks  that  were  passed,  and  I  realised 
that  no  interest  was  more  vital  to  the  nation  than  that  of  the 
army;  for  it  is  the  faithful  representative  of  France,  it 
should  no  longer  do  service  but  for  her  honour  and  her 
independence." 

On  religion,  he  strikes  the  familiar  note  :  "  No,  we  are  not 
the  enemies  of  religion.  On  the  contrary,  we  pay  willing 
homage  to  freedom  of  conscience,  we  respect  every  form  of 
religious  or  philosophical  opinion.  I  acknowledge  no  man's 
right  to  choose,  in  the  name  of  the  State,  between  one  creed 
and  another,  between  two  theories  on  the  origin  of  the  world 
or  upon  an  after-life.  For  the  ministers  of  every  Church  I 
have  the  profoundest  esteem.  They  have  duties  to  perform 
towards  their  fellow-men,  but  they  also  have  duties  towards 

260 


GAMBETTA    AND   BISMARCK 

the  State,  and  what  I  require  is  that  they  shall  carry  out  those 
duties.  ..."  His  remarks  are  always  aimed  at  the  official, 
not  the  secular,  clergy  :  *'  The  laws  must  be  enforced,  and  no 
one  must  be  specially  favoured." 

This  is  perfectly  sound.  The  State  cannot  determine  what  its 
citizens  are  to  believe  or  not.  Philosophical  tenets  lie  outside 
its  sphere.  If  the  State  attempted  to  impose  any  particular 
doctrine,  it  would  become  a  Church,  that  is  to  say,  a  corpora- 
tion of  men  professing  the  same  compulsory  beliefs.  That 
is  why  Mirabeau  said  :  "  Religion  can  no  more  be  national 
than  conscience."  The  State  can  neither  ordain  nor  condemn 
any  form  of  faith.  The  monarchy  tried  the  experiment,  and 
failed,  and  the  same  fate  befell  Napoleon. 

The  Romans  speech  wound  up  with  an  allusion  to  the 
amnesty  :  "  Then  a  France  that  has  recovered  her  calm,  a 
France  sure  of  herself,  solely  engrossed  in  developing  her 
ample  resources,  a  France  that  is  restored,  and  relies  on  a 
truly  national  army,  will  be  able  to  stand  before  the  world  free 
from  the  toils  of  her  enemies,  having,  I  hope,  by  mercy  and 
indulgence  gathered  all  her  children  under  her  wing,  and  to 
say,  "  I  am  strong,  I  am  invulnerable,  because  I  uphold 
liberty  and  peace." 

At  Grenoble  (October  lo)  he  sets  forth  the  programme  for 
the  approaching  Senatorial  elections  :  "  It  is  essential  to  have 
a  Senate  which  shall  be  a  school  of  Government,  a  friend  and 
a  mentor  to  the  Chamber  of  Deputies,  '  an  Assembly  of 
control,  not  of  conflict.  .  .  .'  " 

In  order  to  recruit  his  flagging  energies,  he  looked  for  a 
place  in  the  neighbourhood  of  Paris  where  from  time  to  time 
he  might  be  able  to  enjoy  a  brief  respite,  with  the  woman  who 
had  now  become  his  inseparable  companion.  On  the  boun- 
dary between  Sevres  and  Ville  d'Avray  he  had  found  a  modest 
abode,  Les  Jardies,  once  occupied  by  Balzac's  secretary.  He 
was  beginning  to  feel  the  limitless  depression  that  sometimes 
arises  from  the  sight  of  crowds ;  what  he  wanted  now  was  the 
trees  that  do  not  chatter,  the  waters  that  sleep,  and  more  than 
ever,  the  woman  who  could  make  him  forget  the  world  and  its 
troubles.    "  How  I  revel  in  the  unaccustomed  delights  of  soli- 

261 


GAMBETTA 

tude,  in  this  great  soothing  silence,  in  the  kindly  shelter  of 
the  woods,  in  these  unruffled,  slumbering  pools  set  in  masses 
of  fragrant  heather,  and  above  all  in  the  power  to  commune 
with  myself,  to  think  things  out  at  leisure,  beyond  the  reach 
of  the  jostling,  jeering  multitude.  It  is  not  my  body  but  my 
soul  that  here  gains  freedom,  peace,  the  healing  balm  of  rest." 
(July  28,  1878.)  And  on  November  3,  on  his  return  from  a 
speech-making  campaign  in  the  Dauphine  :  "  I  asked  Testelin 
to  stay  to  dinner.  He  sat  in  your  place  at  table.  He  rounded 
ofT  the  meal  with  a  toast  that  went  straight  to  my  heart.  He 
drank  a  glass  of  Cape  wine  to  the  honour  of  the  fair  wood- 
nymph  who  under  the  trees  of  Ville  d'Avray  has  brought  me 
back  to  health,  to  my  future.'' 

The  Chamber  reassembled  on  October  28.  There  was  an 
acrimonious  debate  on  the  subject  of  disputed  elections.  The 
ex-Minister  of  the  Interior,  Fourtou,  defended  himself  by 
attack.  Dufaure  flung  down  his  famous  challenge  to  the 
heroes  of  the  Sixteenth  of  May  affair  :  "  You  who  speak  and 
ask  me  what  I  stand  for,  will  you  be  good  enough  to  tell  me 
what  views  you  stand  for  ?  Yes,  there  is  a  party  without  a 
name  !  "  An  interruption  from  Gambetta  led  to  a  bloodless 
duel  with  pistols  between  him  and  Fourtou. 

On  January  5  came  the  Senatorial  elections.  There  were  82 
seats  to  be  filled.  Sixty-six  Republicans  were  returned,  this 
assuring  the  Left  a  majority  of  some  40  to  50  votes.  The 
Republic  had  the  upper  hand  in  both  Assemblies. 

On  January  28  nine  army  corps  commanders,  who  had  ex- 
ceeded the  legal  period  of  their  command,  w-ere  relieved  of 
their  duties.  To  the  Marshal,  this  was  the  last  straw  :  out  of 
a  fellow-feeling  for  old  comrades-in-arms  he  handed  in  his 
resignation.  Jules  Gr^vy  was  at  once  elected  in  his  stead. 
Waddington  became  Prime  Minister,  while  retaining  the 
position  of  Foreign  Secretary;  Leon  Say  remained  at  the 
Treasury,  Freycinet  at  the  Public  Works,  while  Jules  Ferry 
became  Minister  for  Education  (February  4,  1879). 

Waddington,  a  scholar,  an  expert  on  coins  and  archaeology, 
a  member  of  the  Acad^mie  des  Inscriptions  et  Belles-Lettres, 
a  devotee  of  book-lore,  Anglo-Saxon  in  his  bearing  and  his 

262 


GAMBETTA   AND   BISMARCK 

mentality,  seemed  to  have  studied  ancient  rather  than  modern 
history,  but  as  a  matter  of  fact  he  was  well  versed  in  both,  and 
was  to  prove  it  before  long.  He  was,  however,  less  at  home 
in  the  Chamber,  less  familiar  with  the  intricacies  of  the 
Parliamentary  chess-board. 

Ardent  admirers  of  Gambetta,  such  as  M.  Joseph  Reinach 
and  M.   Gabriel    Hanotaux,    maintain  that   Gr^vy,    when   he 
became  President  in  1879,  ought  to  have  offered  the  Premier- 
ship to  Gambetta,  the  real  leader  of  the  majority.  This  view 
does  not  find  favour  with  all  Gambetta's  partisans  :  some  hold 
that  at  this  juncture,  the   Senate    being   at    odds    with    the 
Chamber,  Gambetta  would  have  worn  himself  out  uselessly  in 
the  ensuing  conflicts.     He,  himself,  by  the  way,  thought  that 
his  hour  had  not  yet  struck  :    he    offered    himself   for    tho 
Presidency  of  the  Chamber  and  was  elected  on  January  31, 
by  a  majority  of  314  out  of  a  total  of  405.    He  took  his  seat  in 
the  Presidential  chair  on  February  6.     On  this  occasion  he 
spoke  most  flatteringly  of  Grevy  :   "  I  am  succeeding  to  the 
great  citizen,  the  great  statesman  whom  the  French  electorate, 
without  a  moment's  hesitation,  have  summoned  to  the  Presi- 
dency of  the  Republic.     In  that  office  he  will  enjoy  the  reso- 
lute support  of  France,  the  unswerving  loyalty  of  Parliament. 
and  the  esteem  of  the  world  at  large.    If  he  is  to-day  the  head 
of  the  nation,  he  remains  our  teacher  and  our  model."    Then, 
in  words  destined  to  mark  a  decisive  stage  in  his  thought : 
"  We  should  all  feel  now  that  the  Governments  whose  watch- 
word was  destruction   have  had  their  day.     Our  Republic, 
having  at  last  emerged  victorious  from  the  party  fray,  must 
enter  upon  an  epoch  of  organising  and  creating." 

Under  a  parliamentary  regime,  the  President  of  the 
Chamber  must  be  independent  of  parties  and  of  the  Govern- 
ment. This  independence  is  the  very  basis  of  his  authority. 
He  speaks,  he  acts  in  the  name  of  the  Assembly  as  a  whole. 
No  other  conception  of  the  Presidency  is  compatible  with  the 
existence  and  the  rights  of  a  responsible  Ministry.  In  the 
United  States,  the  representative  system,  under  which  the 
Ministers  are  not  members  of  the  Legislature  and  are  depen- 
dent on  the  President  of  the  Republic,  has  led  to  different 

263 


GAMBETTA 

results.  The  legislative  power,  unless  firmly  organised,  ran 
the  risk  of  being  crippled  by  the  executive,  and  accordingly  the 
threads  of  legislative  action  were  concentrated  in  the  hands  of 
the  official  who  presides  over  Congress,  the  official  known  as 
"  the  Speaker."  But  for  the  name,  he  has  nothing  in  common 
with  the  English  Speaker  of  the  House  of  Commons.  Origi- 
nally he  was  able  to  propose  Bills,  resolutions  and  amend- 
ments. Even  to-day,  he  is  not  merely  the  chairman  of  the 
deputies,  he  is  to  some  extent  their  chief.  At  times  he  has 
even  thwarted  the  President  of  the  United  States.  This  posi- 
tion of  the  Speaker  is  closely  bound  up  with  the  whole  repre- 
sentative system  of  the  country ;  it  is  an  extreme  consequence 
of  the  careful  separation  of  functions,  and  is  quite  in  keeping 
with  the  spirit  of  the  American  Constitution,  which  is  designed 
to  prevent  any  authority  from  absorbing  the  others  and  to 
maintain  the  whole  structure  in  a  state  of  perfect  balance.  To 
disturb  the  equipoise  of  functions  would  be  to  strike  a  blow  at 
the  very  vitals  of  the  Republic. 

In  the  nature  of  things,  there  can  never  be  any  parallel 
between  the  Presidency  of  the  United  States  Congress  and 
the  Presidency  of  the  French  Assemblies.  With  a  constitu- 
tional Chief  of  State  and  a  responsible  Cabinet,  a  political 
Presidency  of  the  Chamber  (by  which  I  mean  that  of  one  who 
remains  a  party  man)  is  an  absurdity.  If  ever  the  party  spirit 
should  raise  its  head  in  this  office,  the  parliamentary  regime 
w'ould  be  vitiated  in  its  first  principles. 

A  President  of  the  Assembly  must  keep  in  touch  with  all  the 
essential  business  of  the  House ;  but  a  President  who  comes 
down  from  his  chair  to  cross  swords  in  the  party  fray,  to 
support  or  oppose  a  Government,  to  dictate  a  policy  or  to 
defend  one — all  this,  from  the  standpoint  of  parliamentary  life, 
is  sheer  anarchy.  Such  fumbling  experiments  might,  at  a 
pinch,  be  excusable  where  a  Republic  was  still  in  its  infancy 
and  had  just  begun  learning  to  walk,  but  tliey  are  quite 
unworthy  of  a  mature  democracy.  The  Republic,  five  years 
after  the  enactment  of  the  Constitution,  would  have  had  to  be 
vigorous  indeed  to  survive  such  a  distortion  of  its  principles. 

In  France,  throughout  all  our  revolutions  and  changes  of 

^64 


GAMBETTA    AND   BISMARCK 

government,  we  have  had  in  the  Chamber  types  of  Presidents 
rather  than  a  type  of  Presidency.  We  have  had  more  than 
one  President  who  was  a  party  man,  even  a  fighter,  which 
shows  that  in  the  practical  working  of  parliamentary 
institutions  we  are  centuries  behind  the  English. 

Dupin,  in  the  Legislative  Assembly,  led  from  his  chair  a 
daily  campaign  against  the  Mountain,^  and  thus  indirectly 
paved  the  way  for  the  coup  d'etat.  In  the  same  way  as 
Sauzet's  weakness  had  contributed  towards  the  fall  of  the 
July  Monarchy,  Dupin's  pugnacious  temperament  contributed 
to  the  fall  of  the  Second  Republic. 

The  early  stages  of  the  Third  Republic,  on  the  other  hand, 
were  favoured  by  a  fortunate  event.  We  have  seen  how,  at 
Thiers'  advice,  Jules  Gr^vy  was  elected  President  of  the 
National  Assembly  by  the  Royalists  as  well  as  by  the  Repub- 
licans. Gr^vy  had  the  essential  virtues  of  a  President  of  the 
Chamber:  claritv  of  vision,  self-possession  and  fairness.  The 
honour  thus  paid  to  him  by  his  political  opponents  lent  his 
Presidency  a  unique  weight  from  the  very  outset.  Not  that 
a  President  elected  by  members  of  his  own  party  alone  cannot 
attain  to  the  same  degree  of  fairness;  but  it  is  obviously  more 
easy  for  this  functionary  to  hold  his  own  against  antagonists 
who  have  already  acknowledged  his  title  to  respect  :  better 
equipped  for  keeping  them  in  check,  he  also  is  under  a 
stronger  obligation  to  humour  them  and  to  ensure  that  their 
rights  shall  not  be  disregarded. 

Gambetta  presided  over  the  Chamber  with  tact,  kindliness 
and  good  humour.  But,  at  the  time  when  he  took  his  seat  in 
the  chair,  he  had  become  the  unquestioned  leader  of  the 
Republican  party;  in  the  eyes  of  his  friends,  his  real  place 
would  have  been  on  the  Ministerial  benches;  he  alone  could 
have  staved  off,  if  not  prevented  altogether,  the  disruption  of 
the  Republican  forces.  As  it  turned  out,  he  was  frequently  to 
come  down  from  the  presidential  chair  to  reappear  at  the 
rostrum  and  endeavour,  at  critical  moments,  to  direct  his  partv. 

'  The  name  originally  given  to  those  members  of  the  1792  Convention  who  occupied 
the  topmost  benches  in  the  Chamber,  and  were  always  in  favour  of  violent  measures. 
-Tkanslator's  note. 

365 


GAMBETTA 

The  Republicans,  in  nominating  him,  marked  him  out  as  the 
potential  head  of  the  Cabinet. 

Now  the  practice  of  making  the  Presidency  of  an  Assembly 
the  stepping-stone  to  the  Premiership  is  one  that  could  be 
resorted  to  in  the  early  days  of  a  new  system,  when  the  rules 
were  as  yet  not  clearly  defined;  but  in  normal  times  it  is  an  ill- 
advised  practice,  putting  the  Cabinet  in  a  false  position, 
forcing  it  to  meet  its  liabilities  before  they  fall  due,  and 
placing  it  at  the  mercy  of  its  successor.  The  influence  that 
the  President  of  an  Assembly  can  wield  over  those  who 
depend  upon  its  goodwill  is  already  great  enough,  and  there 
is  no  need  to  entice  him  by  the  bait  of  future  leadership  to 
assert  it  over  the  Executive.  From  this  point  of  view,  the 
Presidency  of  the  Senate  has  always  conformed  with  the  true 
maxims  of  parliamentary  government,  whereas  at  first  the 
Presidency  of  the  Chamber  did  not  observe  them  as  it  should 
have  done. 

Moreover,  the  qualities  and  virtues  essential  to  a  President 
of  the  Chamber  are  not  those  of  a  Prime  Minister.  Often 
they  are  very  opposite.  One  who  has  presence  of  mind  in  the 
chair  may  have  none  at  the  rostrum,  and  vice  versa.  The  two 
positions  are  entirely  different,  and  each  needs  special 
capacities.  The  fire  and  vehemence  that  are  a  source  of 
strength  at  the  rostrum  are  a  source  of  weakness  in  the  chair. 
They  marred  the  Comte  de  Serre's  Presidency  under  the 
Restoration,  and  they  proved  more  serviceable  to  Gambetta 
at  the  rostrum  than  in  the  chair. 

Jules  Gr^vy  had  shown  himself  n  model  holder  of  the  post, 
first  in  the  National  Assembly  and  then  in  the  Chamber.  At 
the  time  of  his  appointment  to  the  Presidency  of  the  Republic 
he  was  sixty-one.  By  one  of  those  paradoxes  that  occur  so 
frequently  in  history,  and  not  least  in  ours,  he  became  the 
watchdog  of  a  Constitution  which  he  himself  had  not  desired, 
which  he  had  fought  against  with  might  and  main,  clinging 
stubbornly  to  the  ideal  embodied  in  his  amendment  of  1848, 
which  had  made  his  name  :  a  single  Assembly,  and  a  Prime 
Minister  charged  with  the  executive  power  and  dismissible 
at  a  moment's  notice.     Later,  Gr^vy  had  reappeared  in  the 

266 


GAMBETTA    AND    BISMARCK 

Corps  L^gislatif.  He  had  refused  io  join  the  National 
Defence  Government,  for  he  would  recognise  no  government 
that  had  not  a  legal  basis.  A  fine  type  of  our  middle  class  at 
its  best,  he  was  much  addicted  to  letters,  knew  Horace  and 
Racine  by  heart  and  would  quote  them  at  length,  as  Gambelta 
used  to  quote  Rabelais  and  Mirabeau.  When  my  father  intro 
duced  me  to  him  at  the  Elys^e— I  had  then  just  entered 
Parliament — he  was  at  pains  to  show  oflf  his  literary  attain- 
ments, and  after  discoursing  eloquently  on  Hugo,  Lamartine, 
De  Musset  and  De  Vigny,  he  recited  to  us,  straight  off  the 
reel,  the  hundred  and  fifty  verses  of  Les  Eioiles,  from  the 
Secondes  Meditations  [of  Lamartine].  In  his  cult  for 
Lamartine,  who  had  not  yet  quite  retrieved  his  unmerited 
disgrace,  I  seemed  to  detect  a  certain  resentment  at  the  rather 
coarse  popularity  with  which  Hugo's  glory  was  then  alloyed  ; 
but  one  felt,  from  his  manner  of  delivery,  that  the  veteran 
jurist,  the  terse  and  lucid  orator,  admired  in  Lamartine  the  very 
reverse  of  what  so  many  people  have  seen  in  him,  those  touches 
of  faithful  and  vivid  realism,  the  clear  light  which  the  skies  of 
Milly  had  brought  to  the  eyes  and  the  soul  of  the  young  poet, 
and  which  he  compared  to  that  of  Attica.  Besides  being 
devoted  to  letters,  Gr^vy  was  learned  in  the  law,  and  also, 
when  he  went  to  Mont-sous- Vaudrey,  a  capable  sportsman 
and  a  crafty  peasant,  with  a  keen  sense  of  the  value  of  land,  of 
men,  and  of  money.  His  speeches  were  cold  and  laconic,  and 
every  word  of  them  told;  his  reasoning  was  vigorous  and 
subtle;  he  was  wary,  reserved,  always  courteous  and  dignified. 
His  genialitv  was  always  tinged  with  prudence,  he  never  let 
himself  go,  never  painted  in  flamboyant  colours.  A  striking 
contrast  to  Gambetta,  the  man  of  the  people,  with  his  ardent, 
generous  nature,  his  impetuous  flow  of  language !  The 
mountaineer  from  the  Jura  could  feel  no  real  sympathy  with 
the  child  of  the  sun-bathed  Mediterranean  shores.  He  found 
him  too  noisy,  too  effervescent.  Himself  like  a  sealed  book, 
he  had  no  love  for  one  who  wore  his  heart  upon  his  sleeve. 
His  eyes  could  not  stand  the  glare  of  that  mighty  flame,  his 
soul  was  oppressed  by  that  formidable  popularity.  He  had 
been  informed  of  the  plans  for  tiie  interview  with  Bismarck, 

267 


GAMBETTA 

and  scented  danger  in  the  proposal.  Then,  too,  Gambetta 
wanted  a  solid,  compact  majority,  with  a  strong  executive 
at  its  head,  and  himself  at  the  head  of  that  executive,  for  a 
drastic  policy  at  home  and  abroad.  Gr^vy,  on  the  other  hand, 
was  no  enthusiast  for  action,  he  shrank  from  adventures,  he 
saw  everything  from  the  angle  of  home  politics,  and  after  the 
fevers  and  shocks  of  the  past  decade  he  preferred  a  quiet  life, 
men  and  Ministries  that  would  let  sleeping  dogs  lie.  He  was 
a  President  for  a  convalescent  France.  (See  his  conversation 
with  Scheurer-Kestner  on  Alsace-Lorraine  in  July,  187 1, 
Publications  of  the  Gambetta  Society.)  After  Gambetta's 
d,eath,  his  legal  knowledge  and  his  self-possession  stood 
France  in  good  stead  at  the  time  of  the  Schnaebel^  incident. 

The  tribune's  fair  helpmate,  living  quietly  amid  the  shady 
bowers  of  Les  Jardies,  who  a  short  while  before  had  been  less 
favourably  impressed  than  he  by  Bismarck's  speech,  was 
again  none  too  well  pleased  at  his  appointment  to  the  Presi- 
dency of  the  Chamber.  He  might  think,  she  suggested,  that 
it  was  merely  a  temporary  side-tracking,  since  Gr^vy  did  not 
wish  to  summon  him  to  ofifice ;  but  was  he  certain  that  he  was 
not  being  driven  down  a  blind  alley?  And  was  it  a  position 
that  suited  him  ?  He  writes  to  his  w^ood-nymph,  trying  to 
reassure  her  :  "  It  seems  to  me  that,  at  a  distance,  you  pass  a 
stern,  a  bitter  judgment  on  what  is  done  and  cannot  be  undone. 
Your  vision  is  distorted  by  love.  I  should  like  to  explain  to 
you  the  reasons  for  being  glad,  to  prove  to  you  that  I  have 
chosen  the  better  part,  the  nobler  way.  .  .  .  From  now 
onward,  the  terrible  campaign  that  has  lasted  eight  years  is 
over  so  far  as  I  am  concerned.  I  shall  be  able  to  proceed  to 
the  second  programme,  to  external  action,  and,  keeping  above 
and  outside  the  party  turmoil,  to  choose  my  time,  my  path, 
my  methods.  ..."  Thus  the  Presidency  of  the  Chamber 
was,  in  his  eyes,  a  post  for  listening  and  waiting,  a  stepping- 
stone  :  "  I  shall  be  able  to  proceed  to  external  action,"  "  I 
shall  be  able  to  choose  my  time."  But  he  was  not  time's 
master ! 

On  July  14,  1879,  the  first  review  of  the  remodelled  army 

268 


GAMBETTA   AND   BISMARCK 

took  place.  He  wrote  to  Les  Jardies  :  "As  soon  as  I  set  eyes 
on  our  young  soldiers,  I  felt  my  loftiest  and  most  sacred 
hopes  stirring  in  my  soul,  and  those  great  designs  which  1 
can  never  abandon.  I  came  away  from  the  spot  with  my  mind 
braced  and  invigorated.  On  my  return  to  town,  I  found  once 
more  my  beloved  Parisian  populace.  They  gave  me  a  right 
royal  welcome,  they  cheered  themselves  hoarse,  but  at  heart 
I  regard  these  ovations  only  as  a  means  of  attaining  the 
patriotic  goal  I  have  set  before  me,  never  as  a  mere  personal 
tribute.  From  such  triumphs  I  always  come  back  better, 
stronger,  more  confident." 

Always  he  shows  optimism,  not  without  a  touch  of 
braggadocio,  but  a  fervent  patriotism,  a  passionate  devotion 
to  the  army.  Never  does  he  lose  sight  of  his  exalted  hopes, 
his  supreme  design,  fixed  and  unalterable.  How  has  anyone 
brought  himself  to  say  that  his  heart  had  changed,  that  his 
ideal  was  no  longer  the  same  ?  He  still  harbours  in  his  breast 
that  ambition  which  he  cannot  avow,  or  cannot  avow  without 
veiling  it  under  the  name  of  "  right." 

On  November  27,  the  Chambers  were  opened.  From  that 
time  forward,  he  received  at  the  Palais  Bourbon  all  the  nota- 
bilities of  the  country,  soldiers  and  diplomats,  writers, 
financiers,  captains  of  industry  and  commerce.  All  came 
under  his  spell,  but  they  found  that  this  great  talker  knew  how 
to  listen,  and  welcomed  talent  in  others.  He  was  always 
ready  to  learn.  Everywhere  he  had  correspondents.  One 
day  he  lunched  with  the  Prince  of  Wales,  another  day  he 
dined  with  Renan.  At  this  period,  Goncourt  [in  his  Journal] 
notes  the  following  remark  made  by  a  politician  :  The  only 
tables  in  Paris  to  which  foreign  statesmen  resorted  and  where 
the  hosts  dominated  the  whole  company  to  an  amazing  extent 
were  those  of  Girardin  and  Gambetla;  Gambetta's  lunches,  to 
which  every  man  of  mark  was  invited  sooner  or  later,  were  the 
real  cause  of  his  popularity  all  over  Europe;  it  was  in  this  way 
that  he  came  into  close  touch  with  members  of  the  Parliaments 
of  England,  Italy,  Hungary,  Greece.  .  .  . 

He  liked  the  society  of  artists,  and  himself  spoke  as  an  artist 
at  the  unveiling  of  Corot's  statue.     He  fascinated  the  men  of 

269 


GAMBETTA 

letters,  even  the  most  recalcitrant,  even  those  who  affect  a 
lordly  disdain  for  politics,  as  if  action  were  not  the  highest  of 
the  arts !  Flaubert,  then  on  intimate  terms  with  George 
Sand,  who  in  1870  had  displayed  a  rabid  antipathy  to  the 
Government  of  Tours  and  Bordeaux,  wrote  to  her:  "  Gam- 
betta  (since  you  ask  me  my  opinion  on  the  gentleman  in 
question)  seemed  to  me  at  first  grotesque,  then  sensible,  then 
amiable,  and  finally  charming  (the  word  is  not  too  strong). 
We  chatted  together  without  outside  interruption,  for  twenty 
minutes,  and  now  we  know  each  other  as  if  we  had  met  a 
hundred  times.  What  I  like  about  him  is  that  he  does  not 
indulge  in  threadbare  platitudes,  and  I  think  he  is  human." 
(The  gradation  is  very  characteristic.)  Alphonse  Daudet,  who 
had  penned  a  very  scathing  article  on  the  provincial  campaign, 
declared  that  he  would  cut  it  out  of  his  published  works,  and 
wrote  some  very  moving  and  graceful  pages  after  his  meeting 
with  Gambetta  in  the  shady  retreat  of  Les  Jardies  :  "  Gam- 
betta,  1  was  glad  to  admit,  read  everything,  saw  everything, 
always  showed  himself  an  expert  judge  and  a  man  of  fine 
literary  perceptions.  It  was  a  delightful  visit.  ..."  (Les 
Debats  d'un  homnie  de  leLtres.) 

He  was  lovable,  and  success  made  him  still  more  lovable. 
But  it  was  not  everyone  about  him  who  found  him  attractive 
in  an  equal  degree.  There  were  some  who  were  proof  against 
his  charm.  He  was  blamed  for  being  hard  on  the  Govern- 
ment :  how  could  he  have  been  otherwise  ?  His  friends 
chafed ;  they  regarded  themselves  as  being  victims  led  to  the 
altar.  They  accused  Grevy  of  having  infringed  the  rules  of 
parliamentary  procedure,  in  not  conferring  power  on  the  real 
leader  of  the  majority.  Cliques  were  being  formed  apart  from 
the  main  body,  new  men  were  coming  along  and  passing  over 
the  heads  of  well-tried  veterans;  there  was  general  unrest  and 
confusion. 

On  December  27  the  Waddington  Cabinet,  disunited, 
impotent,  seeming  only  to  live  in  the  shadow  of  the  President 
of  the  Chamber,  tendered  its  resignation. 


270 


CHAPTER    XVII 

"  THE  POWER  BEHIND    THE  THRONE  "  :    "  THE   DICTATORSHIP  " 

The  Freycinet  Ministry — The  Amnesty — The  Cherbourg  Speech  (August  9) — "  The 
Hidden  Hand  "—The  Journey  to  Cahors  :  "  the  Dictatorship  !  "—The  Belleville 
Programme  (August  12,  1881) — The  Tunisian  Aftair. 

Gr6vy  did  not  send  for  Gambetta,  but  for  the  Minister  ot 
Public  Works,  M.  de  Freycinet.  The  latter  was  given,  besides 
the  Premiership,  the  portfolio  of  the  Foreign  Office,  and  kept 
Jules  Ferry  and  the  bulk  of  the  old  Cabinet.  This  practice 
of  forming-  Cabinets  with  elements  of  former  Ministries  was 
contrary  to  the  principle  of  ministerial  solidarity  laid  down  in 
the  Constitution,  and  was  destined  to  prevent  it  from  working 
on  regular  lines  for  a  long  time  to  come.  The  President  of 
the  Republic,  in  his  inaugural  message,  announced  that  he 
would  "faithfully  obey  the  great  law  of  the  parliamentary 
system,"  but  his  performance  did  not  altogether  tallv  with  his 
promise.  Possibly,  if  his  attention  had  been  called  to  the 
fact,  he  would  have  answered  that  the  parties  were  not  yet 
well-marked  or  organised  enough  to  enable  this  law  to  be 
rigorously  carried  out,  and  that  the  survival  of  the  unconstitu- 
tional Opposition  was  a  stumbling-block  to  the  application  of 
the  rule  observed  in  England. 

M.  de  Freycinet,  besides  the  brilliant  qualities  that  he  had 
displayed  at  the  War  Office  in  1870,  a  luminous  intelligence, 
a  capacity  for  hard  work,  ingenuity  and  coolness,  had  won  his 
spurs  as  a  dexterous,  persuasive  speaker,  finding  a  path  into 
the  hearts  of  the  most  refractory,  gliding  adroitly  past  every 
rock  and  shoal.  He  seemed  frail,  yet  had  the  toughness  of 
steel.  His  thin  voice,  like  his  personalitv,  was  all-pervasive, 
wormed  its  way  into  men's  minds,  broke  down  every  barrier, 

271 


GAMBETTA 

and  swept  away  every  obstacle.  In  a  style  peculiarly  his  own 
he  was  a  great  debater  and  a  consummate  political  speaker. 
"  Since  Thiers,"  says  one  who  has  portrayed  French  society  of 
that  day,  "  no  such  captivating  oratory  has  been  heard  in  the 
House.  It  is  an  intellectual  treat  to  listen  to  M.  de  Freycinet 
when  he  has  an  unpopular  cause  to  plead.  His  voice, 
melodious  as  a  flute,  carries  to  the  furthest  corner  of  a  vast 
building.  His  periods,  full  but  not  redundant,  each  contain 
an  argument,  and  never  say  too  much  or  too  little.  Politics, 
for  this  great  man  of  science,  consist  in  solving  a  series  of 
equations,  in  co-ordinating  an  infinite  number  of  curves,  for 
which  circumstances  supply  the  elements.  He  takes  them  as 
they  come,  and  his  calculations  lend  themselves  to  every 
combination.  But  sometimes  there  are  jolts  that  upset  the 
mathematician's  table."  {La  Societe  de  Paris,  1888,  by  the 
Comte  Paul  Vasili.) 

M.  de  Freycinet  had  recently  identified  himself  with  the 
programme  of  public  works  which  were  giving  a  fresh  impetus 
to  the  economic  life  of  the  country.  His  personal  opinion  was 
that  the  President  of  the  Republic  had  no  longer  any  valid 
reason  for  not  offering  Gambetta  the  Premiership ;  he  looked 
upon  himself  as  a  means  to  this  end  and  as  merely  holding  the 
reins  until  his  old  chief  of  the  National  Defence  should  take 
them  over.  Gravy's  real  idea  was:  "A  majority  with  a 
Parliamentary  leader,  that  would  be  all  very  well  if  only  it  were 
not  for  Gambetta!"  The  man  was  too  powerful.  He 
weighed  on  the  Government  like  an  incubus.  He  threw  the 
Ministers  and  the  President  of  the  Republic  into  the  shade. 
Democracies  are  always  suspicious.  Ours  was  particularly 
so,  just  after  the  disasters  caused  by  absolute  rule.  Many 
Republicans  dreaded  its  revival,  even  under  Parliamentary 
forms.  Gambetta  took  up  too  much  room,  he  trespassed,  he 
overflowed.  If  France  was  committed  to  an  unassuming 
policy,  why  all  this  commotion?  Grevy,  himself  a  quiet  man, 
liked  to  have  quiet  men  about  him.  To  put  it  in  a  nutshell, 
he  lacked  confidence.  As  a  rule,  under  a  parliamentary 
system,  when  a  party  carries  its  chief  to  power  it  stands  by 
that  chief  and  remains  united.     It  is  easy  to  see  why  events 

272 


THE  POWER  BEHIND  THE  THRONE 

took  a  different  turn  in  our  case  from  the  very  first  days  of  the 
Third  RepubHc. 

Gambetta  was  re-elected  President  of  the  Chamber,  but  only 
by  257  votes  out  of  a  total  of  308;  40  ballot-papers  were 
blank.  At  the  previous  ballot  he  had  obtained  314  votes. 
Here  was  already  a  warning,  but  he  had  to  let  things  take 
their  course.  He  was  blamed  for  hanging  back,  but  nothing 
had  been  offered  him.  As  a  matter  of  fact,  however  much 
his  friends  wanted  it,  he  himself  had  no  wish  to  be  summoned 
to  office. 

The  Government  was  for  a  postponement  of  the  general 
amnesty.  In  June,  however,  one  Trinquet,  who  had  been 
deported  under  the  Commune,  was  elected  borough  councillor 
in  the  P^re-Lachaise  ward,  as  against  the  candidate  supported 
by  Gambetta.  The  latter,  fearing  to  lose  Paris  at  the 
approaching  elections  and  wishing  to  break  with  the  advanced 
wing  of  the  Left,  convoked  the  members  of  the  Left  Centre  in 
the  Senate  and  the  Chamber  to  a  meeting  in  M.  de  Freycinet's 
room  at  the  Foreign  Office.  He  pleaded  for  a  general 
amnesty,  a  measure  which  he,  who  could  bear  no  malice,  had 
always  desired.  The  proposal  was  a  timely  one,  inasmuch  as 
the  arrangements  for  the  Fourteenth  of  July  festivities  and  the 
distribution  of  new  colours  to  the  army  were  at  hand.  He 
won  the  Government  over  to  his  way  of  thinking  :  a  Bill  was 
drafted  and  came  up  for  debate  on  June  21.  Freycinet  ex- 
plained why  the  Government  had  changed  its  mind  :  "  We 
considered  that  amnesties  are  peculiarly  suited  to  special  occa- 
sions." (Cries  of  "  Oh  !  oh  !  "  from  all  parts  of  the  House.) 
Gambetta  realised  that  he  was  called  upon  to  speak.  Never 
was  his  declamatory  skill  more  in  evidence,  his  ascendancy 
over  the  Chamber  more  pronounced.  "  In  asking  the  House 
kindly  to  give  me  a  hearing,  I  have  yielded  to  an  overpower- 
ing sense  of  duty.  It  is  as  President  of  the  Chamber,  as  the 
mouthpiece  of  the  majority— on  that  score  and  on  no  other — ■ 
that  I  have  been  consulted.  I  am  not  above  the  Government. 
I  know  my  rank  and  my  place.  I  remain  at  the  post  which 
you  have  entrusted  to  my  charge;  but  I  should  be  failing  to 
grasp  its  full  responsibilities  if,  when  the  moment  has  come 

273  T 


GAMBETTA 

for  passing  a  verdict  on  the  timeliness  of  a  Government 
measure,  1  could  bring  myself  to  hold  selfishly  aloof,  and  to 
look  on  at  what  the  rest  were  doing,  without  contributing  my 
share  to  the  work."  Yet  he  was  the  very  man  who  had 
brought  pressure  to  bear  on  the  Ministry  and  on  the  Senators 
in  order  to  win  them  over  to  his  views ! 

He  admits  that  France  "  shows  no  warmth  or  enthusiasm  " 
on  the  point  in  question,  but  '^'  she  has  another  feeling,  one  of 
weariness.  She  is  tired  of  hearing  an  endless  series  of  debates 
upon  the  amnesty,  and  she  says  to  her  administrators  and 
members  of  Parliament:  "When  will  you  sweep  away  this 
miserable  relic  of  the  Civil  War?  " 

Finally,  the  moving,  impassioned  appeal  to  the  coalescence 
of  all  the  popular  forces,  in  one  great  impulse  to  forgive  and 
forget :  "  I,  who  am  the  oldest  soldier  of  extreme  democracy, 
and  its  loyal  spokesman,  have  nothing  to  learn  about  its  weak- 
nesses or  its  reckless  outbursts  of  feeling.     But  there  is  one 
thing  that  I  insist  upon,  and  that  is  the  unfettered  right  to 
form  my  own  judgment.    They  know,  those  men  of  the  ad- 
vanced wing,  that  I  have  never  toadied  to  them,  never  misled 
them.     Yesterday,  they  made  a  mistake"  (referring  to  the 
Trinquet  election)  ..."  Did  you   imagine  that  you  could 
prevent  this  propaganda  from  succeeding?    Don't  you  realise 
that  you  can  nip  such  ill-advised  movements  in  the  bud  ?  .  .  . 
It  has  been  said,  and  with  justice,  that  the  Fourteenth  of  July 
is  a  national  festival,  a  meeting-place  where  the  army,  which 
the  country  properly  regards  as  its  pride,  will  for  the  first  time 
find  itself  face  to  face  with  the  powers  that  be,  where  it  will 
recover  those  colours,  alas  !  so  shamefully  thrown  away.  ..." 
I  was  present  in  the  House,  and  can  still  see  the  great  orator, 
with  his  head  bowed,  as  if  overwhelmed  by  the  defeat  and  the 
treachery,  his  voice  failing  him  :   '*  Yes,  on  that  day,  in  the 
face  of  the  country,  in  the  face  of  authority,  in  the  face  of  the 
nation  as  represented  by  its  faithful  stewards,  in  face  of  that 
army,  '  ever  first  in  our  hearts,'  as  was  safd  by  a  poet  who,  in 
other  precincts,  before  the  whole  world,  had  pleaded  the  cause 
of  the  vanquished — on  that  day  you  must  close  the  book  of  the 
past  decade,  and  rear  a  tombstone  of  oblivion  over  the  crimes 

274 


THE  POWER  BEHIND  THE  THRONE 

and  the  last  remaining  traces  ot  the  Commune,  and  you  mubt 
say  to  all,  to  those  whose  absence  we  shall  all  deplore,  to  those 
whose  feuds  and  disagreements  we  sometimes  regret,  that 
there  is  but  one  France  and  one  Republic  !  "  Amid  rousing 
cheers,  the  Bill  was  passed  by  312  votes  to  1 16. 

In  the  Senate,  Jules  Simon  replied:  "  I  prefer  a  Cabinet 
which  applies  its  own  theories  to  a  Cabinet  which  applies  the 
theories  of  others,  and  adopts  the  methods  of  its  adversaries 
for  fear  that  they  may  supplant  it  !  "  Thanks  to  an  amend- 
ment excluding  from  the  amendment  those  guilty  of  crimes  of 
arson  and  murder,  the  Bill  was  carried  in  the  Senate. 

After  this  new  and  resplendent  victory,  Gambetta  appeared 
more  than  ever  as  the  chief,  by  the  side  of  and  above  the 
official  Government.  The  country  pinned  its  faith  on  him, 
and  he  waited  for  it  to  act.  But  in  Parliament,  such  a  state 
of  affairs  could  not  but  lead  to  collisions,  to  conflicts,  by 
creating  a  general  impression  that  the  Cabinets  were  only  pro- 
visional, and  lived  always  on  the  brink  of  a  precipice.  The 
Presidency  of  the  Republic  was  no  less  trammelled  than  the 
Presidency  of  the  Chamber.  In  the  lobbies  and  the  Press,  the 
phrase  "  power  behind  the  throne  "  was  freely  bandied  about, 
and  malicious  tongues  whispered  "  dictatorship  !  " 

On  July  14  the  ceremony  of  distributing  the  new  colours 
to  the  army  took  place.  Gambetta  was  greeted  with  up- 
roarious applause.  In  the  evening  he  gave  a  splendid 
reception  at  the  Palais  Bourbon.  Ke  loved  the  army,  and 
the  army  loved  him  in  return.  The  rooms  were  crammed 
to  overflowing  with  generals  and  other  officers.  He  spoke  to 
them  again  of  his  anxiety  to  promote  the  strength,  the  glory, 
the  well-being  of  the  army.  He  knew  well  enough  that 
France  could  not  regain  her  old  position  save  through 
alliances,  and  that  she  would  only  find  allies  in  proportion 
as  she  waxed  stronger  :  *'  I  have  never  lost  hope  of  the  future  : 
you  should  look  forward  to  it  with  confidence,  as  I  do.  Can 
we  be  forbidden  to  hope,  when  we  have  men  at  hand  who  will 
know  how  to  defend  our  soil  against  every  onslaught  ?  I 
will  only  add  this,  '  Let  us  never  forget!  '  "  Old  Marshal 
Canrobert,    with   tears   in   his  eyes,   embraced  him.     At  the 

275  T  2 


GAMBETTA 

dinner  given  on  July  17  to  the  generals  from  ail  the  garrisons 
of  France,  the  menu  bore  the  dates,  1880-18—,  a  significant 
blank,  to  remind  them  of  their  duty. 

But  as  his  popularity  advanced,  so  the  danger  was  height- 
ened. The  army  had  been  granted  its  colours  on  July  14  :  it 
was  decided  that  the  navy  should  receive  its  colours  on 
August  10.  The  President  of  the  Republic  and  those  of  the 
Senate  and  Chamber  proceeded  to  Cherbourg.  Gambetta 
proposed  the  health  of  the  President  of  the  Republic,  "  whose 
name  is  graven  on  the  heart  of  every  Frenchman,  whose 
signal  services  are  appreciated  as  they  deserve." 

After  the  official  banquet,  while  the  President  of  the 
Republic  was  paying  a  visit  to  the  headquarters  of  the  naval 
division,  Gambelta  went  off  to  a  reception  given  in  his 
honour  at  the  "Traders'  and  Manufacturers'  Club."  Owing 
to  a  misunderstanding,  only  a  few  people  were  present.  But 
the  speech  was  ready  :  "I  have  never  forgotten  who  I  am, 
whence  I  come  and  w'hither  I  am  going.  I  know  that  I  am 
sprung  from  the  most  humble  ranks  of  the  democracy  of 
workers,  and  that  I  am  bone  of  their  bone,  flesh  of  their 
flesh.  In  those  fatal  days  that  you  all  remember,  I  never 
aspired  to  the  dictatorship,  and  I  do  not  aspire  to  it  now.  I 
wish  to  be  nothing  more  than  a  servant  of  the  democracy,  to 
serve  it  in  my  proper  station,  in  my  due  place.  When  I  came 
to  Cherbourg  ten  years  ago — I  may  as  well  mention  it,  since 
we  have  spoken  of  that  tragic  period — I  came  to  fulfil  a  sacred 
duty.  Fortune  turned  her  back  on  us.  In  all  those  ten  years, 
we  have  not  let  slip  one  word  of  rashness  or  vainglory.  ..." 
Then  came  those  famous  words  :  "  We  may  have  a  full  resti- 
tution if  it  be  based  upon  right;  we  or  our  children  can  look 
forward  to  it,  for  no  power  on  earth  can  say  to  any  man, 
'  Thou  shalt  not  hope  !  '  It  has  sometimes  been  alleged  that 
our  adoration  for  the  army,  that  army  in  which  to-day  all  the 
national  forces  are  centred,  amounts  to  a  cult.  Yet  it  is  no 
sabre-rattling  spirit  that  inspires  and  enforces  that  cult :  it  is 
grim  necessity.  We,  who  have  seen  France  fall  so  low,  must 
raise  her  to  her  feet  and  restore  her  to  her  rightful  place  in  the 
world.     If  our  hearts  beat,  it  is  to  reach  this  goal,  and  not  to 

276 


THE  POWER  BEHIND  THE  THRONE 

pursue  an  ideal  of  blood  and  slaughter ;  it  is  to  ensure  that 
not  one  jot  of  the  France  that  remains  shall  be  lost ;  it  is  to  feel 
that  we  can  count  upon  the  future,  to  know  whether,  here 
below,  there  is  an  immanent  justice  in  things  that  will  come 
on  its  appointed  day  and  at  its  appointed  hour  ! 

No  bellicose  speech  this:  "  We  are  not  striving  after  an 
ideal  of  blood  and  slaughter."  "  We  may  have  a  full  resti- 
tution if  it  be  based  upon  right."  How  far  he  was  sincere 
has  been  revealed  in  his  private  correspondence.  Neverthe- 
less, his  opponents  began  to  exclaim  :  "  Gambetta  spells 
w^ar  !  " — drawing  down  upon  themselves  the  just  reproach 
that  they  themselves  had  so  often  appealed  to  him  to  bring 
the  foreigner  into  our  quarrels.  And  long  after  his  death, 
with  palpable  inconsistency,  they  accused  him  of  having  by 
this  speech  renounced  the  idea  of  action  and,  through  holding 
out  hopes  of  a  peaceful  retribution,  weakened  the  moral  fibre 
of  France.  M.  Charles  Maurras,  whose  attitude  towards 
Gambetta  has  always  been  severely  critical,  could  still  write 
in  1916  that  his  patriotism  was  "  purely  moral  and  legal," 
"cared  little  for  territory,  and  recked  nothing  of  history." 
{Quand  les  Frangais  ne  ^'aimaient  pas.)  Gambetta's 
patriotism  was  indeed  moral  and  legal,  but  it  is  not  true  to  say 
that  it  cared  little  for  territory  and  recked  nothing  of  history; 
and  it  certainly  throbbed  with  passion.  Only,  Gambetta  was 
compelled  to  gain  time,  and  this  explains  his  conduct  and  his 
language  after  1875. 

A  week  later,  Gr^vy,  in  passing  through  Dijon  station  on 
his  way  to  Mont-sous- Vaudrey,  read  a  lesson  to  "  men  of 
personal  ambitions":  "To-day,"  he  said,  "it  is  no  in- 
dividual, whatever  be  his  station,  who  should  be  praised,  it  is 
France  as  a  whole,  France  that  is  so  sensible,  so  wise,  so  keen 
a  judge  of  her  own  interests.  Let  us  go  on  being  wise,  let  us 
not  be  driven  into  the  sins  of  impatience,  of  exaggeration  or  of 
violence." 

Not  a  month  elapsed  before  M.  de  Freycinet  handed  in  his 
resignation.  His  Cabinet,  lacking  unity,  melted  away  like 
the  Waddington  Cabinet. 

Seeing  that  the  Waddington  and  Freycinet  Cabinets  had 

277 


GAMBETTA 

lasted  less  than  a  year,  was  Gr^vy  going  to  send  for  Gam- 
betta?  The  controversies  to  which  the  Cherbourg  speech  had 
given  rise  were  not  calculated  to  incline  him  towards  this 
step.  Attempts  to  persuade  him  were  met  with  a  blank 
refusal.  "No,"  he  declared,  "I  am  keeping  Gambetta  in 
reserve."  And  he  sent  for  Jules  Ferry.  Jules  Ferrv  had 
made  great  strides  at  the  Ministry  of  Public  Instruction.  Solid 
and  uncompromising,  this  robust  Vosgian  seemed  at  first  a 
little  rugged,  like  the  flint  of  his  native  mountains;  but, 
beneath  a  chilling  exterior,  he  was  good-natured  and  tactful, 
and  his  soul  was  ardent  and  courageous.  He  kept  almost  the 
same  Cabinet,  with  Barth^lemy  St.  Hilaire,  a  former  hench- 
man of  Thiers,  at  the  Foreign  Office,  and  Sadi  Carnot  at  the 
Public  Works. 

On  December  12,  at  the  Sorbonne,  Gambetta  proclaimed 
his  adherence  to  the  Positivist  school  and  described  Auguste 
Comte  as  "  the  most  powerful  thinker  of  the  age."  Already, 
in  1873,  at  the  dinner  given  in  Littr^'s  honour  to  celebrate 
the  completion  of  his  Dictionary,  Re  had  evinced  his  leanings 
towards  Positivism  :  "  There  will  come  a  day  when  statecraft, 
restored  to  its  true  functions,  no  longer  a  profession  for 
dexterous  wire-pullers,  no  longer  a  field  for  disloyal  and 
treacherous  manoeuvres,  for  corrupt  practices,  for  all  those 
tactics  of  hypocrisy  and  evasion,  will  become  what  it  should 
be,  a  moral  science  and  a  standard  of  justice  for  human 
societies." 

We  sometimes  hear  of  Gambetta's  "  philosophy."  He 
scarcely  gave  a  thought  to  metaphvsics,  he  did  not  indulge  (as 
has  been  aptly  remarked)  in  "  that  habit  of  restless  question- 
ing which  we  cultivate  under  the  name  of  philosophy."  In 
his  younger  days  fie  had  been  a  Deist,  and  had  expended  no 
little  rhetoric  on  the  subject.  The  teachings  of  Auguste 
Comte  had  at  this  lime  a  widespread  influence.  They  corre- 
sponded pretty  closely  to  the  views  held  by  most  men  of 
science,  especially  by  those  who  were  experimentalists  before 
everything  and  distrustful  of  theory.  Some  of  them  have 
shown  that  this  Positivism  was  over-simplified,  and  ought  to 

278 


THE   POWER   BEHIND   THE   TimOXE 

be  extended  by  a  more  searching  analysis.  C'omie  declared 
that  the  chemical  composition  of  the  heavenly  bodies  was  for 
ever  unknowable;  a  few  years  later  spectral  analysis  was 
invented.  Other  men  of  science  have  pointed  out  that  there 
are  certain  fundamental  problems  which  science  can  never 
solve.  Gambetta,  for  his  part,  did  not  gfo  so  far;  he  cried  a 
halt  at  the  unknowable,  and  at  "relativity"  in  philosophy 
as  in  politics.     For  him,  science  was  the  last  word  in  wisdom. 

His  enemies  banded  tog"ether  to  attack  him.  A  pamphlet 
entitled  "Gambetta  Spells  War!  "  ran  into  a  hundred  thou- 
sand copies.  The  involuntary  author  of  this  unrest,  he  now 
became  its  victim.  He  was  hard  pressed  on  the  one  side  by 
the  impatience  of  his  friends,  on  the  other  by  the  hatred  of 
his  foes.  He  could  not  repress  a  sense  of  irritation  and 
disgust.  What  public  man  has  not  known  such  moments? 
He  writes:  "All  our  guests  were  enchanted  with  your  beau- 
tiful flowers.  You  know  what  I  still  want  to  fill  the  cup  of  my 
happiness — your  presence  at  these  entertainments  and  the 
good  that  you  always  find  an  opportunity  of  doing  on  these 
occasions.  You  have  only  one  word  to  say,  one  sign  to  give 
(before  the  Mayor,*  it  is  true) ;  but  it  is  brief,  if  heroic, 
and  we  shall  enter  into  the  Promised  Land — mark  you, 
promised!  "     (Feb.  13,  1881.) 

In  January  he  was  re-elected  President  of  the  Chamber  by 
262  votes  out  of  a  total  of  307.  Foreign  suspicions  having 
been  hinted  at,  he  tried  to  blunt  the  edge  of  controversy  : 
"France,"  he  said,  "harbours  no  secret  designs  or  adven- 
tures." Yet  his  finger  was  traced  in  every  pie;  he  was 
charged  with  having  influenced  the  Government's  policy  over 
the  affairs  of  Greece.  Bismarck,  astonished  at  the  Cherbourg 
speech,  had  said  :  "  Gambetta,  at  the  head  of  the  French 
Ministry,  would  act  upon  the  nerves  of  Europe  like  a  man 
beating  a  drum  in  a  sick-room."  Jules  Ferry  and  Barth^lemv 
St.  Hilaire  feared  complications;  they  were  anxious  not  to 
make  it  look  as  if  they  were  obeying  the  will  of  another.     Tn 

*  This   refers  to   the  civil   mairiajjc  ceremony   (sec  the  close  of  Chapter  XV.).— 
Translator's  notk. 

279 


GAINIBETTA 

the  debates  in  the  Chamber,  Gambetta  was  put  on  his 
defence;  and  he  "takes  upon  himself  the  right  to  speak," 
pointing  out  that  he  has  not  been  called  upon  to  declare 
himself.  *'  As  for  the  policy  of  the  Government,  I  put  my 
trust  in  it,  but  I  have  to  do  so  with  my  eyes  shut.  I  am  not 
bound  to  say  whether  I  have  a  policy  or  whether  that  policy 
would  differ  from  that  of  the  Government.  I  have  my  own 
feelings,  my  own  views,  about  foreign  affairs,  and  7  can  bide 
my  time." — The  position  was  becoming  more  and  more  false 
for  everybody. 

He  went  on  to  explain  his  Cherbourg  speech  :  "  For  a 
whole  week  after  my  speech  at  Cherbourg,  no  one  noticed  in 
it  any  threatening  or  provocating  language,  any  criminal 
design.  An  interval  was  needed,  until  the  comments  upon  it 
should  be  warped  by  passion  or  prejudice.  And  when  the 
comments  were  made,  the  word  was  passed  round,  and  these 
charges  were  made  to  appear  the  general  verdict  of  the 
country.  My  speech  at  Cherbourg  was  no  more  bellicose 
than  the  one  delivered  at  the  same  time  and  under  the  same 
circumstances  by  the  President  of  the  Republic." 

It  was  not  for  the  President  of  the  Chamber  to  say  whether 
he  trusted  or  distrusted  the  Government.  What  sort  of  a  life 
would  a  Cabinet  have  when  the  President  of  the  Republic 
kept  the  sword  of  Damocles  hanging  over  it :  "I  can  hide  my 
time  "  ? 

In  order  to  put  an  end  to  his  period  of  expectancy,  he 
needed  the  comprehensive  ballot,  the  one  that  admits  of 
agreements,  compacts  and  reconciliations  between  individuals 
and  between  the  various  shades  of  opinion  within  the  party. 
The  Ministers  were  not  at  one.  Jules  Ferry  declared  that 
the  Government  would  remain  neutral.  The  Elys^e  started 
a  campaign  for  the  maintenance  of  the  scrutin  d'arrondisse- 
ment}  On  May  19,  1881,  Gambetta  once  more  came  down 
from  the  chair,  and  in  all  the  fulness  of  his  talent,  with  all  the 
wealth  of  his  oratorical  resources,  made  one  of  his  most 
famous  speeches.  First  of  all,  he  repudiated  the  idea  that  he 
was  thinking,    in  his  own   interest,   of  multiple  or   "  plebis- 

*  See  note,  p.  196. 
280 


THE  POWER  BEHIND  THE  THRONE 

citary  "  candidatures,  that  might  "  impair  the  authority  and 
prestige  of  the  Executive."  In  speaking  of  the  Republican 
elections  of  July,  1871,  to  1875,  elections  which  "  fully  ex- 
pressed the  voice  of  the  whole  country,  and  not  that  of  a  merf» 
arrondissement,  he  ventured  on  the  famous  simile:  "a  sort 
of  shattered  mirror  in  which  France  would  not  have  recognised 
her  own  image."  With  the  363,  it  was  the  unified  liste  that 
had  triumphed.  They  could  not  hope  to  establish  a 
republican  Government,  capable  of  discharging  its  duties, 
without  placing  the  consultation  of  tHe  country  on  the  broadest 
possible  basis.  When  it  was  a  question  of  representing 
France,  in  other  words  the  highest  moral  entity  in  the  world, 
they  might  well  ask  themselves  whether  those  chosen  would 
represent  a  hundred  thousand  electors,  or  six  thousand.  And 
how  could  they  deal  with  the  larger  issues,  administrative, 
judicial,  military  and  economic?  "Certain  principles  have 
made  you  what  you  are,  and  you  cannot  depart  from  those 
principles.  The  future  lies  in  your  hands;  it  depends  upon 
you  whether  a  party  fit  to  hold  the  reins  of  government  shall 
come  into  being,  a  party  that  is  solid  and  sincere,  to  lead 
France  to  the  end  of  her  glorious  destinies.  Surely  you  have 
no  wish  to  incur  the  reproach  of  the  Roman  poet  :  '  To  save 
their  life,  they  threw  away  all  that  makes  life  worth  living  '  : 
Propter  vitam  vivendi  perdere  ca^isas." 

The  scriitin  de  liste  was  approved.  Gambetta  had 
triumphed;  the  road  was  clear.  .  .  .  But  now  the  wind  was 
to  veer  round  once  more. 

He  had  promised  to  be  present  at  the  unveiling  of  a  monu- 
ment erected  in  his  native  city  to  the  men  of  the  Lot 
department  who  had  fallen  in  the  war.  He  was  given  an 
enthusiastic  reception.  He  let  himself  go,  launched  out  into 
a  patriotic  harangue,  and  sang  the  praises  of  President  Gr^vy. 
"  Another  good  tug  at  the  rope  of  universal  suffrage,  and  we 
shall  have  all  this  aggregation  of  effort  and  goodwill  placed 
under  a  free  and  stable  government."  He  gave  his  hearers 
to  understand  that  if  the  Senate  passed  the  scriitin  de  liste, 
it  would  obviate  a  revision  of  the  Constitution  such  as  had 
already  been  proposed  in  the  Chamber.     "  This  country  has 

281 


GAMBETTA 

now  enjoyed  a  Constitution  for  five  years.  True,  it  is  no 
law  of  the  Medes  and  Persians ;  it  is  open  to  improvement ; 
it  will  be  improved,  and  in  a  democratic  direction ;  but  we 
must  not  be  in  a  hurry,  and  until  the  house  is  secure,  until 
it  has  properly  settled,  we  must  do  nothing  to  disturb  any  of 
its  courses.  Let  us  not  raise  objections  to  everything  at  once, 
let  us  not  say  that  this  Constitution,  our  saviour  and  our 
shelter,  a  rallying-point  for  all  Republican  France,  needs  to  be 
recast  out  of  hand.  I  only  aslc  you  to  wait  until  the  powers 
set  up  by  this  Constitution  have  completed  their  circuit." 

He  could  not  contain  himself;  he  cried  out :  "  I  have  never 
seen  anything  to  touch  this  ceremony;  the  very  earth  and  sky 
are  taking  part  in  it,  and  It  is  the  most  splendid  affair  of  the 
kind  that  anyone  has  been  privileged  to  witness  on  his 
native  heath."  (May  26,  1881.)  But  this  time  he  goes  too 
far;  the  cup  overflows.  One  is  reminded  of  Louis  Napoleon's 
tours  in  1851.     This  is  indeed  the  "  dictatorship  "  ! 

On  June  3,  in  the  Senate,  Waddington,  in  introducing  the 
Bill,  points  out  the  danger  of  "  a  partial  plebiscite,  department 
by  department."  The  same  difficulty  had  risen  in  the  case  of 
Thiers,  in  1871  ;  but  in  1871  Thiers  stood  by  himself;  now, 
there  were  established  authorities,  the  President  of  the 
Republic,  the  Senate,  the  Cabinet.  There  was  reason  to 
apply  to  Gambetta  what  had  been  said  earlier  of  Lamartine  : 
"  He  is  a  comet  whose  orbit  no  man  can  calculate."  Wad- 
dington exposed  the  danger  of  multiple  elections,  which 
throw  the  machinery  of  the  Constitution  out  of  gear,  upset 
the  balance  of  power  and  reduce  the  Presidency  of  the 
Republic  to  a  cipher.  "  How  can  you  expect  that  the  Presi- 
dent, confronted  by  the  nominee  of  a  million  or  a  million  and 
a  half  voters  throughout  a  large  number  of  departments, 
should  remain  free  to  pick  and  choose  his  ministers?  "  (The 
truth  of  this  was  seen  later  in  the  Boulangist  crisis,  and  the 
system  of  multiple  elections  was  then  abolished.)  The 
Senate  refused  to  proceed  to  a  discussion  of  the  separate 
clauses. 

The  very  next  day,  Gambetta,  exasperated  at  this,  made  a 
right-about  turn  and  declared  himself  in  favour  of  revising 

282 


THE  POWER  BEHIND  THE  THRONE 

the  Constitution,  the  only  way,  he  maintained,  of  battering 
down  the  resistance  of  the  Senate.  It  must  be  admitted  that 
such  abrupt  changes  of  front  were  apt  to  shake  the  people's 
faith  in  the  merits  of  the  institutions  that  they  had  been  so 
often  called  upon  to  admire.  They  seemed  to  betray,  not 
merely  in  the  Government,  but  in  the  whole  constitutional 
system,  that  instability  with  which  the  Republic  had  been  so 
often  taunted  by  its  enemies.  Jules  Ferry  said,  with  his 
robust  common  sense  :  "  You  don't  pull  up  a  tree  to  see  if  it 
has  taken  firm  root."  Many  Republicans  thought  that  this 
Tours  speech  looked  too  much  as  if  it  had  been  composed  on 
the  spur  of  the  moment.  It  showed  too  great  an  eagerness 
to  take  short  cuts.  J. -J.  Weiss,  with  all  the  zeal  of  a  convert, 
wrote,  by  way  of  apology  for  Gambetta  :  "  Repulsed  by  the 
Right,  he  was  compelled  to  fall  back  upon  the  Left."  A 
very  weak  argument.  Tactics  of  this  kind  are  not  permissible 
in  politics.  The  point  at  issue  was  not  whether  the  consti- 
tutional changes  he  proposed  for  the  Senate  were  good  or  bad 
in  themselves;  an  equality  of  suffrage  for  each  commune, 
with  regard  to  its  population,  and  the  irremovability  of 
Senators  were  two  principles  difficult  to  maintain  in  an 
equalitarian  democracy  and  certain  to  disappear  sooner  or 
later.  What  did  call  for  censure  was  the  suddenness  of  the 
manoeuvre,  quite  out  of  keeping  with  Eis  recent  pronounce- 
ments and  his  whole  political  theory.  Some  sage  observers 
looked  upon  his  action  as  an  outburst  of  ill-temper  against  the 
Senate,  a  sort  of  revenge  on  the  part  of  a  spoilt  child  of 
fortune,  who  would  not  be  baulked  of  his  will  in  any  particular. 
Jules  Ferry,  swept  off  his  feet,  was  obliged  in  his  turn  to 
reverse  his  judgment  and  support  the  plan  of  a  revision ;  the 
position  of  his  Ministry  had  become  critical. 

The  elections  were  fixed  for  August  21.  The  twentieth 
arrondissement  of  Paris,  which  had  elected  Gambetta  four 
times,  was  now,  owing  to  the  grow^th  in  its  population,  split  up 
into  two  constituencies.  Gambetta  offered  himself  in  both. 
There  was  a  spice  of  personal  vanity,  blended  with  shrewd- 
ness, in  his  notion  of  keeping  Belleville  while  conquering 
France.  On  August  12  he  held  his  first  meeting  at  the  Elys^e- 

283 


GAMBETTA 

M^nilmontant.  Here  he  was  *'?ace  to  face  with  that  other 
Monster,  more  massive  and  harder  to  tackle  than  the  Monster 
of  Varzin."  Faithful  to  his  word,  he  had  had  no  intention, 
he  said,  of  coming  forward  anywhere  else.  He  protested 
against  the  outrageous  calumny  that  he  was  exercising  a 
"dictatorship.''  "They  don't  speak  of  my  dictatorship  of 
May  24  and  May  16  !  "  They  have  found  a  new  name  for  his 
policy — "  a  misbegotten  compound  of  T.atin  and  Greek  " — 
"  opportunism."  "  If  this  barbarous  word  means  an  astute 
policy,  which  never  fails  to  take  time  by  the  forelock,  to  make 
the  most  of  favourable  contingencies,  but  never  leaves  any- 
thing to  chance,  never  allows  free  play  to  the  spirit  of  violence 
— then  they  may  apply  to  my  policy,  as  often  as  they  like,  this 
ill-sounding  and  not  even  intelligible  epithet;  but  I  will  only 
say  that  I  know  no  other,  for  it  is  the  policy  of  sound  sense, 
and,  I  may  add,  the  policy  of  success." 

He  warms  up  to  his  work,  recalling  the  bloody  defeats  of  the 
old  Republican  party,  the  excesses  followed  by  reactions,  and 
the  alarm  shown  by  the  "  governing  classes  "  of  the  bour- 
geoisie. "All  these  things  induced  me  to  break  with  the 
past,  and  say  to  myself :  *  You  will  give  up  your  life  to 
diverting  the  spirit  of  violence  which  has  so  often  led  the 
democracy  astray.  You  will  warn  democracy  to  beware  of 
dogmatising.  You  will  guide  it  towards  the  study  of  facts,  of 
concrete  realities.  You  will  reveal  yourself  as  a  sort  of 
mediator  between  the  interests  of  both  sections,  and  if  you 
succeed  in  bringing  about  that  alliance  of  the  people  with  the 
bourgeoisie,  you  will  have  set  the  Republican  order  upon  an 
unassailable  foundation." 

After  dwelling  on  the  work  that  has  already  been  achieved, 
he  glances  at  the  future.  He  has  no  intention  of  changing 
his  method  :  "  My  method  is,  not  to  cope  with  all  1he 
problems  at  once,  not  to  make  a  frontal  attack  along  the 
whole  line  or,  if  I  may  put  it  differently,  to  bring  all  the  bricks 
for  the  house  at  one  load,  but  to  approach  questions  one  after 
another,  in  their  proper  order,"  Reforms  in  the  judicature; 
the  reduction  of  the  term  of  military  service  to  three  years, 
compulsory  for  all,   without  any  exemptions,  and  with   full 

284 


THE  POWER  BEHIND  THE  THRONE 

cadres  of  N.C.O.s  (this  makes  three  stages — in  1872  it  was  he 
who  had  helped  Thiers  to  gei  the  five  years'  term,  in  1S76  it 
was  he  who  caused  it  to  be  retained,  and  now  in  1881  he  lavs 
down  these  essential  conditions  for  a  reduction  in  the  term  of 
service);  legislation  on  trades-unions  and  mortmain;  a  strict 
enforcement  of  the  Concordat;  an  income-tax.  Me  puts  his 
finger  on  the  weak  spots  :  "  We  are  living  under  a  democracy, 
not  under  a  system  of  privilege.  When  1  uphold  the 
independence  of  the  Government,  I  maintain  that  i  am  more 
Liberal,  more  democratic  than  those  who  want  everything  to 
be  left  at  the  mercy  of  rivalries,  of  backstair  intrigues,  of 
parliamentary  chicane."  A  believer  in  political  centralisa- 
tion, he  demands  administrative  decentralisation;  he  would 
like  to  see  each  municipality  enjoying  its  full  rights,  with 
powers  to  administer  its  property,  to  borrow,  to  mortgage 
its  risks  and  to  be  undisputed  master  in  the  sphere  of  its  local 
interests. 

In  foreign  affairs,  there  is  only  one  thing  that  he  asks  for : 
that  we  should  be  firm  and  dignified,  keeping  our  hands  clean 
and  not  letting  them  be  tied;  to  show  no  special  favour  to  any 
individual  Power  in  Europe,  but  to  be  on  good  terms  with 
all  alike.  In  a  letter  of  June  5,  1875,  he  writes  :  "  Our  role  is 
to  be,  like  the  Sosie  in  Moli^re  ['s  Amphitryon],  a  friend  to  all 
the  world,  free  in  our  movements,  and  to  avoid  the  collision 
as  long  as  possible."  He  reverts  to  the  theme  of  the  Cher- 
bourg speech  :  "  W' ho  would  make  bold  to  say  that  there  will 
not  come  a  day  of  mutual  agreement  on  a  basis  of  justice  in 
our  old  Europe?  ...  I  do  not  think  I  am  passing  beyond 
the  bounds  of  political  prudence  when  I  express  a  desire  that 
my  Government,  my  Republic,  shall  be  attentive,  watchful, 
always  courteously  asserting  her  right  to  interpose  in  affairs 
that  concern  her  throughout  tiie  world,  but  never  giving  way 
to  the  spirit  of  incendiarism,  of  conspiracy  and  of  aggression. 
And  I  hope  I  shall  see  the  day  when,  through  the  ascendency 
of  law,  of  truth  and  of  justice,  we  shall  be  once  more  united 
with  our  lost  brethren." 

By  this  warm,  sincere  and  heartfelt  utterance  he  recovers 
and  retains  his  grip  on  his  party;  he  tames  the  most  rebel- 

285 


GAMBETTA 

lious;  he  is  homely,  ironical,  vehement  by  turns;  he  allays 
their  fears,  quells  their  murmurs,  and,  while  handling  the 
driest  problems  for  a  space  of  several  hours,  amuses  them  and 
makes  them  laugh.  A  strange  and  moving  sight :  this  one 
man,  alone,  confronting  a  vast  assemblage  whose  feelings 
have  been  wrought  upon  and  who,  with  the  memory  of  his 
great  services  still  fresh  in  their  minds,  none  the  less  begin 
to  doubt,  begin  to  ask  themselves  whether  to-day  his  policy 
is  not  too  slow,  too  time-serving. 

On  the  other  hand,  such  phrases  as  "  not  letting  our  hands 
be  tied,"  "on  good  terms  with  all  alike,"  caused  no  little 
astonishment  to  those  of  his  friends  who  shortly  before  had 
heard  him,  in  his  private  intercourse,  advocate  an  understand- 
ing with  England  and  an  alliance  with  Russia.  In  reality, 
he  had  not  changed  his  mind — his  first  acts  as  Foreign  Minis- 
ter were  soon  to  prove  this — but  he  feared  that  he  might  give 
offence  to  Bismarck  by  any  public  statement  of  his  real  views ; 
that  the  Chancellor,  who  dreaded  nothing  so  much  as  these 
alliances,  might  thus  be  induced  to  draw  closer  to  St.  Peters- 
burg; and  that  his  own  designs,  if  announced  to  the  world, 
might  come  to  grief.  He  might  speak  in  an  undertone  of  his 
desire  for  an  alliance  with  Russia;  but  would  it  be  wise  to 
proclaim  it  from  the  house-tops?  He  thought  that  Russia 
would  become  an  ally  for  offensive  purposes,  but  that  demon- 
strations of  Franco-Russian  friendship  would  only  serve  to 
irritate  Germany  and  make  her  threats  more  dangerous. 
Even  M.  de  Freycinet,  who  was  amazed  at  the  Belleville  pro- 
nouncement, points  this  out  in  his  Souvenirs,  a  mine  of  price- 
less information  for  the  history  of  this  period  :  "  Germany," 
Gambetta  told  him,  "  would  like  to  attract  us  into  her  orbit 
and  wean  us  away  from  England  and  Russia;  let  us  maintain 
a  correct  attitude ;  let  us  keep  the  alliance  with  those  two 
Powers  as  a  reserve  for  the  future."  (July  28,  1881.)  "  We 
must  not  neglect  our  friends  in  Russia  and  England.  But 
there  must  be  no  alliance  just  yet;  it  would  be  dangerous. 
Bismarck  is  watching  us;  let  us  give  him  no  handle."  (Sep- 
tember 2.)  And  he  remarked  to  Jules  Hansen  {L' Alliance 
franco-russe)  :    "  France   is  condemned  to  play  an  insignifi- 

286 


THE  POWER  BEHIND  THE  THRONE 

cant  part  in  Europe,  and  must  keep  very  quiet  until  she  has  a 
really  strong  army.  The  task  that  lies  before  us  at  present  is 
to  create  that  army.  .  .  .  When  this  weapon  is  fit  for  use,  we 
shall  find  allies,  I  have  no  fears  on  that  score;  and  then,  like 
you,  1  shall  be  in  favour  of  an  alliance  with  Russia,  I  have 
often  discussed  this  prospect  with  General  SkobelefT,  for 
whom  I  have  a  great  liking  and  respect." 

M.  de  Freycinet  himself,  by  the  way,  had  taken  up  this  very 
line  at  the  Quai  d'Orsay.  Waddington,  when  giving  him  the 
portfolio,  had  said:  "  Russia  is  disposed  to  make  a  compact 
with  us,  but  Prince  von  Bismarck  has  his  eye  on  us.  The 
menace  of  a  Franco-Russian  treaty  might  decide  him  to  open 
hostilities.  Read  St.  Vallier's  despatches;  they  are  very 
instructive."     (Freycinet,  Souvenirs,   II.,   no.) 

It  seemed  to  Gambetta  that  any  public  statement  in  favour 
of  a  Franco-Russian  agreement  would  at  this  moment  arouse 
the  suspicions,  not  only  of  Germany,  but  even  of  England. 
Then,  too,  an  alliance  with  Russia,  if  it  was  to  bear  full  fruit, 
must  be  manipulated  with  great  discretion.  If  ever  it  became 
an  excuse  for  noisy  demonstrations  to  serve  the  Interests  of 
home  politics,  Germany  would  clearly  exert  herself  to  the 
utmost  in  order  to  deflect  its  course.  And  an  alliance  with 
no  firm  guiding  hand,  one  that  was  allowed  to  drift,  one  in 
which  the  savings  of  French  thrift,  instead  of  being  used  to 
our  advantage,  would  be  turned  against  us — to  Gambetta,  no 
doubt,  such  an  alliance  would  have  been  meaningless.  It 
may  plausibly  be  conjectured  that,  if  he  had  lived,  we  should 
not  have  lost  twelve  years  in  coming  to  terms  with  Russia, 
and  twenty  years  in  coming  to  terms  with  England.  For 
such  an  alliance,  handled  with  firmness  and  discretion,  the 
time  was  not  yet  ripe.  That  is  why,  from  1876  to  1881,  he 
was  far  more  reticent  on  the  subject  of  alliances  in  his  speeches 
than  in  his  private  letters,  so  that  some  imagined  that  he  was 
less  eager  to  form  them  and  others  that  he  was  bent  upon 
avenging  1870. 

Four  days  later,  on  August  16,  another  public  meeting  was 
held  in  another  constituency,  at  Charenton.     It   was  in   the 

287 


GAMBETTA 

Rue  St.  Blaise,  an  enclosure  walled  round  by  canvas,  partly 
covered,  badly  lighted ;  there  were  no  seats,  and  much  over- 
crowding and  jostling  ensued.  It  was  raining.  Eight  thou- 
sand persons  were  packed  into  this  space.  His  first  words 
were  interrupted  by  shouts.  He  tried  to  go  on,  but  the  shout- 
ing increased.  Sides  were  taken  for  and  against  him. 
Whenever  he  came  forward,  the  uproar  started  again.  In  the 
rare  intervals  of  calm,  struggling  for  over  an  hour,  Gambetta, 
exhausted,  indignant,  hurled  forth,  in  a  raucous  voice,  his 
famous  invectives:  "Are  you  the  people  of  Paris?  ...  I 
only  ask  you  to  hear  me.  .  .  .  What,  when  I  have  come 
here  .  .  .  What,  you  are  powerless  to  restore  order  ?  .  .  .  You 
accuse  me  of  being  a  dictator  !  Do  you  know  what  you  are  ? 
Do  you  know  ?  You  are  drunken  slaves,  not  responsible  for 
your  actions  !  .  .  .  The  ballot  of  true  and  loyal  citizens  will 
atone  for  this  infamous  treatment !  .  .  .  Yes,  mark  what  I 
say,  I  shall  manage  to  track  you  down  to  your  innermost 
lairs!    ..."     He  would  have  done  them  too  much  honour  ! 

He  secured  an  absolute  majority  in  the  first  constituency,  a 
relative  majority  in  the  second,  and  announced  that  he  would 
remain  Deputy  for  the  first.  A  trivial  incident,  a  mere  mole- 
hill of  which  his  opponents  made  a  mountain.  His  popularity 
in  the  country  as  a  v.^hole  was  unimpaired. 

At  his  left,  the  uncompromising  brigade  were  led  by  M. 
Clemenceau,  already  known  as  a  keen  polemical  journalist, 
the  wielder  of  a  caustic  pen,  sharp  as  a  scalpel,  with  his 
brilliant  staff  of  La  Justice,  Camille  Pelletan,  Georges 
Laguerre,  Stephen  Pichon,  Alexandre  Millerand,  who  were 
also  destined,  each  after  his  own  fashion,  to  cut  a  conspicuous 
figure  in  Parliamentary  debates  and  in  the  affairs  of  the 
country.  On  an  intermediate  plane  between  Clemenceau  and 
Gambetta  were  now  to  be  found  old  friends  of  the  latter,  such 
as  Henri  Brisson  and  Charles  Floquet,  for  even  they  thought 
him  too  slow-moving,  too  conciliatory.  Thus,  while  he  was 
steadily  drawing  nearer  to  supremacy,  he  felt  the  ground 
caving  in  beneath  his  feet.  He  was  taxed  with  having 
flinched  from  his  position  on  the  disestablishment  of  the 
Church,  with  having  altered  his  attitude  on  standing  armies, 

288 


THE   POWER   BEHIND   THE   TIHIOXE 

on  the  Single-Chamber  system,  and  on  the  Presidency  of  the 
Republic,  and  with  playing  fast  and  loose  over  the  income- 
tax.  How  far  he  was  now  from  i86q!  His  adversaries 
branded  these  inconsistencies  with  the  all-embracing  name  of 
"opportunism."  Yet  how  many  of  those  who  flung  this 
taunt  at  him  were  to  find  it  recoil  upon  their  own  heads  ! 
Things  wear  a  totally  different  aspect  according  as  men  are 
in  opposition  or  in  power.  Unfortunately,  the  country  has 
to  pay  dear  for  these  training-courses  in  political  wisdom. 
In  France,  on  the  other  hand,  the  past  is  soon  buried,  so  that 
public  men  can  afford  to  make  light  of  their  mistakes.  The 
Frenchman  forgets  everything,  never  looks  ahead,  and  lives 
for  the  moment.  All  that  is  expected  from  those  who,  in 
perfect  good  faith,  have  changed  their  mind,  is  that  they  shall 
show  some  indulgence  for  others  who,  while  they  saw  what 
was  coming,  have  had  no  reason  to  shift  their  ground  and 
have  been  able  to  make  their  conclusions  tally  with  their 
premises. 

The  ballot  of  1881  sent  to  the  Palais-Bourbon  467  Repub- 
licans and  90  Conservatives.  The  Right  lost  some  sixty 
seats.  Jules  Ferry  and  Gambetta  commanded  a  majority  of 
400.      The  gains  of  the  Extreme  Left  amounted  to  40. 

The  country  had  marked  out  Gambetta  for  office.  Early  in 
September  he  went  on  a  lour  in  Normandy,  and  at  Neubourg 
delivered  a  speech  on  State  policy.  Peaceful  Normandy,  the 
proverbial  "  land  of  the  canny  "  (pays  de  sapience),  with  its 
shrewd,  calculating  spirit,  its  distaste  for  adventures  and 
reckless  innovations,  was  an  admirable  field  for  displaying  a 
policy  of  moderation  and  prudence.  The  issue  before  the 
electors  here  was  not  the  personal  programme  of  Gambetta, 
the  candidate  for  Belleville,  but  the  national  programme  of 
Gambetta,  the  French  statesman.  The  Chamber  would  have 
to  carry  out  "  the  modicum  of  reform  demanded  by  the 
country."  It  would  be  extremely  hazardous  to  go  too  far  in 
advance  of  public  opinion.  He  wanted  "  a  Republic  bent 
upon  reforms,  but  not  a  Republic  of  levellers  or  Utopians." 

He  seemed  now  to  aim  at  dissociating  himself  from  the 
campiiign  for  the  scrutin  de  listc  and  even  from  the  campaign 

289  V 


GAMBETTA 

for  a  revision  of  the  Constitution.  His  idea  is  to  make  the 
path  smoother  for  the  two  Assemblies — for  the  Senate,  which 
the  threat  of  a  revision  kept  on  tenterhooks,  and  for  the  Cham- 
ber, whose  members  owed  their  seats  to  the  scrutin 
d'arrondissement.  He  reassured  the  newly  elected  Deputies 
by  declaring  that  it  would  not  be  wise  to  revive  the  question 
of  the  ballot  system  at  the  outset  of  the  new  Parliament's 
career,  and  that  the  matter  must  be  shelved  until  the  expiry  of 
its  term,  adding-  the  reservation:  "or  until  the  Constitution 
is  remodelled,  if  that  step  is  ever  undertaken." 

Thus  he  shelves  the  question  of  the  ballot  system  and  looks 
upon  a  revision  of  the  Constitution  merely  as  a  possible  con- 
tingency. The  country  regarded  the  latter  course  as  prema- 
ture. When  speaking  at  Tours,  he  had  still  been  smarting 
under  the  Senate's  adverse  vote  and  the  disappointment  it 
caused  him;  now,  he  was  quite  willing  to  gain  time. 

He  expressed  a  hope  that  the  Chamber  would  manage  to 
suppress  the  rivalries,  the  personal  vendettas,  even  the  most 
lawful  ambitions  in  its  midst,  in  order  to  give  the  country  a 
solid,  steady  majority,  assuring  the  Government  no  less 
weight  than  the  Republic  itself  possessed.  He  had  every  con- 
fidence, he  declared,  in  the  nominees  of  universal  suffrage. 

At  Honfleur  he  dwelt  upon  the  mercantile  marine,  public 
works  and  the  seamen's  voting  registers;  at  Pont  I'Eveque,  on 
the  breeding  of  live-stock.  He  took  another  trip  to  Germany, 
visiting  Bremen,  Hamburg,  Lubeck  and  Stettin.  He  went  to 
Friedrichsruhe,  Bismarck  being  away  at  the  time;  on  seeing 
the  table,  removed  from  Versailles,  on  which  the  peace  pre- 
liminaries had  been  signed  in  1871,  he  remarked:  "  I  shall 
not  be  satisfied  until  I  have  that  piece  of  furniture  in  my 
study." 

On  his  return  (October  25)  he  spoke  at  Le  Havre,  setting 
forth  the  conditions  for  an  economic  struggle  against  Ger- 
many :  an  improvement  in  our  industrial  plant;  (speaking  at 
Pont-Audemer)  a  development  of  our  natural  resources 
"along  that  magnificent  stream  which  is  better  than  the 
Thames,  for  it  runs  between  an  ocean  that  washes  1,200  miles 
of  our  coast-line  and  a  citv  that  is  the  capital  of  the  civilised 

zgo 


THE  POWER  BEHIND  THE  THRONE 

world.'  He  likes  to  parade  the  fact  that  he  knows  all  about 
local  matters,  that  he  is  as  solicitous  of  material  as  of  moral 
progress,  that  he  has  a  keen  eye  for  jjusiness;  he  sets  up  as 
the  champion  of  the  farming,  manufacturing,  trading  and 
shipping  interests. 

The  Chambers  met  again  on  October  28.  Cambetta, 
appointed  interim  President  by  .^7  votes  out  of  a  total  of 
364,  waived  all  idea  of  standing  for  the  regular  Presidency; 
in  other  words,  he  kept  himself  at  the  disposal  of  the  Presi- 
dent of  the  Republic  and  the  majority. 

At  the  Congress  of  Berlin  Bismarck,  in  the  course  of  his 
first  inter\iew  with  Lord  Beaconsfield,  had  said  :  "  You 
ought  to  come  to  an  understanding  with  Russia:  let  her  have 
Constantinople  and  take  Egypt.  France  would  be  given 
Tunisia  or  Syria  by  way  of  compensation."  W'e  have  seen 
how  the  British  Ministers  took  Cyprus  and  oflered  us  Tunisia, 
and  how  the  French  Government  had  not  thought  it  right  to 
respond  to  England's  overtures.  Waddington  had  not  made 
public  the  despatches  which  had  passed  between  him  and 
London.  Some  weeks  later,  a  rumour  having  appeared  in 
the  Press  to  the  effect  that  Bismarck  had  offered  Tunisia  to 
Italy,  Waddington  directed  our  ambassador  in  Rome,  the 
Marquis  dc  Noailles,  to  warn  the  Italian  Government:  "It 
is  absolutely  essential  that  the  Italian  Government  should 
clearly  understand  that  Italy  cannot  cherish  dreams  of  con- 
quest in  Tunisia  without  coming  into  collision  with  France's 
will  and  risking  a  conflict  with  her."'  Italy  thus  had  a  fair 
warning.  She  knew,  too,  the  attitude  of  the  British  Govern- 
ment;  a  Deputy  announced  in  the  Italian  Chamber,  on 
July  21,  1879,  that  "  England  would  give  France  a  free  hand 
in  Tunis." 

The  Bey's  Government  was  tottering ;  the  Regency  was 
menaced  by  financial  collapse,  by  famine  and  by  revolt.  The 
Italian  consul,  Maccio,  and  the  French  consul,  Roustan, 
backed  by  Chanzy,  the  Governor-General  of  Algeria,  were 
openly  at  daggers  drawn.  Since  the  Congress  of  Berlin,  the 
question  of  the  country's  future  had  been  under  discussion. 
Had  the  hour  come  for  reaping  the  fruit  of  the  advantages 

291  u  2 


GAMBETTA 

gained  at  the  Congress,  for  guaranteeing  the  security  of 
Algeria,  and  stabilising  our  position  in  the  Mediterranean, 
opposite  Toulon  ? 

Nearly  a  year  elapsed.  Albert  Grevy,  brother  of  the  Presi- 
dent, who  had  succeeded  Chanzy  as  Governor-General  of 
Algeria,  wrote  letter  upon  letter  asking  the  home  authorities 
to  settle  the  business  once  and  for  all.  At  last  there  occurred 
an  incident  which  compelled  France  to  act.  The  Government 
was  informed  that  the  railway  from  Goletta  to  Tunis — 
the  only  line  then  existing  in  the  country — had  just  been 
bought  from  the  Bey's  Government  by  the  Rubattino  Com- 
pany, whose  steamers  plied  between  Goletta  and  Palermo, 
in  order  to  monopolise  the  whole  foreign  trade  of  the  Regency 
for  Italy's  benefit.  Rubattino  was  a  brother-in-law  of  Crispi. 
The  deed  of  purchase  had  been  signed  at  the  German  Con- 
sulate by  the  Italian  Consul.  The  affair  was  all  the  more  dis- 
concerting in  that  the  Algerio-Tunisian  frontier  was 
completelv  uncovered. 

Everything  now  depended  on  Gambetta ;  he  alone  could 
exert  pressure,  for  or  against,  on  public  opinion  and  Parlia- 
mentary circles.  He  had  too  much  feeling  for  national  tradi- 
tion, too  firm  a  grip  on  the  realities  of  history,  merely  to  con- 
sider France's  interests  without  calculating  the  chances  of 
success.  He  knew,  as  well  as  anyone,  the  difference  between 
the  Algerian  and  the  Tunisian  peoples,  between  our  military 
resources  in  1830  and  in  1869,  and  also  between  an  annexed 
dependency  and  a  protectorate.  It  was  with  these  points  in 
mind  that  he  said  to  Father  Charmetant,  who  had  been  sent  by 
Cardinal  Lavigerie  to  find  out  what  was  going  on  in  the 
Regency  :  "  You  see,  Crispi 's  newspaper  is  attacking  Car- 
dinal Lavigerie  and  your  missionaries ;  it  is  doing  them  an 
honour  by  these  attacks,  for  they  are  worth  an  army  corps  to 
France  in  Algeria."  And  when  Father  Charmetant  made  a 
note  of  this  statement,  remarking  that  it  "sang  a  different 
tune  from  the  old  battle-cry,  Gambetta  retorted,  with  some 
heat :  "  That  was  a  question  of  home  politics ;  anti-clericalism, 
you  know,  is  not  one  of  our  exports."  The  advice  of  the 
Baron  de  Courcel,  then  Director  of  Political  Affairs  at  the 

292 


THE  POWER  BEHIND  THE  THRONE 

Foreign  Office,  turned  the  scale.  "  I  had  no  difficuhy,"  said 
the  Baron,  "  in  overcoming  his  objections,  especially  so  far 
as  Italy  was  concerned.  From  that  moment  I  found  it  all 
plain  sailing.  Everywhere  I  was  conscious  of  his  influence, 
his  energy,  his  radiation,  and  at  the  same  time  of  his  solici- 
tude, his  foresight,  his  wonderful  mastery  over  men.  .  .  . 
M.  Jules  Ferry,  in  his  turn,  came  to  the  same  decision.  He 
did  not  appear  on  the  scene  till  near  the  end,  but  his  part  was 
essential  to  the  piece;  he  shouldered  the  final  responsibilities 
with  a  firmness  that  has  deservedly  won  him  lasting  credit." 
On  iVIarch  31,  1881,  it  was  reported  that  certain  Tunisian 
tribes  from  the  Kroumirie  Mountains  had  leagued  together 
and  had  made  their  way  into  the  province  of  Constantine  and 
had  there  killed  some  French  soldiers.  A  few  days  later, 
these  raiding  parties  had  swollen  into  a  host  of  several  thou- 
sands. Roustan  proposed  to  the  Bey  concerted  action  on  the 
frontier  by  our  troops  and  his,  but  the  Bey,  at  the  promptings 
of  Maccio,  refused.  On  April  4,  Jules  Ferry  announced  the 
matter  to  the  Chambers  and  proclaimed  his  intention  of 
restoring  order.  He  asked  them  to  give  him  6,000,000  francs 
for  an  expeditionary  force.  These  credits  were  voted  by  the 
entire  Chamber,  with  a  few  dissentient  voices,  and  by  the 
Senate  unanimously.  Turkey  protested,  but  her  advances 
met  with  no  response  from  the  Powers.  Bismarck  informed 
our  Ambassador,  St.  Vallier,  that  "  no  obstacles  would  be  put 
in  the  way  of  our  action,  whatsoever  form  it  might  take,  even 
if  an  annexation  were  the  result.  '  It  undoubtedly  suited  the 
Chancellor's  plans  that  France's  policy  should  gravitate 
towards  the  Mediterranean,  as  that  Austria's  should  gravitate 
towards  the  Danube;  but  as  a  matter  of  fact,  so  far  as  Berlin 
was  concerned,  we  had  from  that  time  onward  nothing  to  fear. 
England  had  pledged  herself  to  support  us.  Without 
England,  Italy  could  do  nothing.  She  was  under  no  delu- 
sion as  to  the  true  state  of  affairs.  In  1880,  General  tl'ialdini 
had  been  despatched  by  the  Prime  Minister  Cairoli  to  explain 
to  M.  de  Freycinet  that  if  France  established  herself  in 
Tunisia,  Italy  would  feel  herself  entitled  to  some  offset.  "  in 
May,  1881,"  Jules  Ferry  observes,  "  Cairoli  was  disappointed 

293 


GAMBETTA 

and  surprised,  but  he  w^s  not  deceived."  The  credits  had 
been  approved  on  April  8.  On  May  ii  the  French  Army 
(11,000  men,  8,000  of  them  from  Algeria)  was  before  the  city 
of  Tunis,  and  a  French  squadron  entered  Bizerta.  The  Bey 
accepted  the  terms  offered  him  by  General  Br^art,  but  he 
obtained  the  further  concession  that  the  French  troops  should 
not  occupy  Tunis.  On  the  following  day.  May  12,  the  Cham- 
bers reassembled.  Jules  Ferry  disclosed  the  Treaty  of 
Bardo,  setting  up  a  protectorate  modelled  on  that  of  England 
in  the  Native  States  of  India.  The  Act  sanctioning  the 
Treaty  was  passed  in  the  Chamber  on  May  23  by  a  majority 
of  430  to  I,  and  in  the  Senate  on  the  27th  without  a  single 
adverse   vote. 

Gambetta,  as  soon  as  the  news  that  the  Treaty  had  been 
signed  readied  Paris,  had  written  to  Jules  Ferry  :  "  My  dear 
friend,  I  thank  you  for  your  note  and  congratulate  you  with 
all  my  heart  upon  this  speedy  and  admirable  result.  Our 
carping  critics  will  have  to  recognise  it  now,  with  the  best 
grace  they  can — France  is  rising  again  to  her  old  rank  as  a 
Great  Power.  Once  more,  my  heartfelt  congratulations. 
Friday,  the  13th  (do  you  believe  in  omens?)." 

Never  had  so  fruitful  a  campaign  been  carried  through  with 
such  rapid  strokes.  It  will  earn  for  Jules  Ferry  and  his  col- 
leagues in  the  work  the  undying  gratitude  of  France,  but  at 
the  moment  it  earned  him  nothing  but  murmurs,  calumnies 
and  insults.  Paris  jeered.  A  section  of  the  Press  came  to 
the  conclusion  that  the  number  of  the  troops  despatched  to 
the  Regency  was  too  large,  and  clamoured  for  their  repatria- 
tion ;  the  Government  reduced  the  army  of  occupation  to 
15,000  men.  An  initial  blunder  had  been  made  in  yielding 
to  the  Bey's  request  and  not  occupying  his  capital,  and  a 
second  blunder  was  made  in  giving  way  to  the  demands  of  an 
ill-informed  Press.  The  South  of  the  Regency  was  in  a 
state  of  utter  chaos.  Sfax  and  Gabes  were  occupied.  Jules 
Ferry  cut  short  tFie  session  of  the  Chambers  (July  29)  and 
fixed  the  polls  for  August  21. 

The  very  day  after  the  elections  50,000  men  were  sent  to 
Tunis,  under  the  command  of  General  Saussier.     Kairouan 

294 


THE  POWER  BEHIND  THE  THRONE 

was  occupied  (October  2O,  1881).  Hy  the  end  ol  th^  year 
peace  was  restored  throughout  the  wliole  Regency.  Parha- 
ment  opened  on  October  28.  General  Saussier's  despatch 
announcing  the  occupation  of  Kairouan  was  received  by  the 
Chamber.  One  Deputy  shouted:  "  Tlie  comedy  lias  missed 
fire!" 

Jules  Ferry  stated  that  he  was  determined  to  resign,  but 
first  he  had  to  say  what  was  on  his  mind  :   "  To  hear  people 
talk  one  would  really  think  that  some  national  disaster  had 
just  befallen   us  !       The  Right  and   Left  are  never  tired  of 
telling  us  that  the  Tunisian  expedition  is  a  dire  misfortune, 
that  it  has  caused  us  to  lose  allies  in  luirope,  that  it  has  dis- 
organised our  army,  that  it  must  be  placed  on  the  same  foot- 
ing as  the  ever  regrettable  expedition   to  Mexico."       They 
allege  that  France  has  been  rushed  into  the  war  without  time 
for   reflection;   he  asks  them   not  to   lose   sight  of   realities. 
"  Our  real  enemy  is  not  the  native  or  the  foreigner,  it  is  the 
apparent  uncertainty  that  prevails  as  to  the  true  intentions  of 
the  French  Government.     In  this  debate,  two  great  interests 
confront   each   other — a  great   military   interest  and  a  great 
political  interest.     These  two  things  should  always  be  sacred 
to  us  in  the  midst  of  all  our  discussions.      Lay  no  profane 
hands  on  France  or  on  the  Army  !   .  .  .  Some  say  :   "In  the 
event  of  a  European  war,  would  not  the  position  of  the  mili- 
tary chessmen  be  altered?  "     My  answer  is  that  it  would,  but 
to  our  advantage,  since  we  are  shutting  a  door  through  which 
our  territory  might  be  entered." 

In  all  these  feverish  debates  the  Chamber's  main  concern 
was  home  politics.  The  majority  tried  to  come  together,  and 
the  opposition  did  its  best  to  prevent  this  concentration.  After 
four  days'  wrangling,  they  were  no  further  than  when  they 
started.  Twenty-three  resolutions  had  been  tabled.  Many 
demanded  a  formal  indictment  of  the  Cabinet,  others  a  court 
of  inquiry;  but  both  schemes  were  rejected,  and  the  House 
had  no  opportunity  of  expressing  either  its  censure  or  its 
confidence. 

Finally,  amid  all  this  tumult,  Gambetta  appeared  on  the 
scene.     "  France  has  appended   her  signature  to  the  Treaty 

295 


GAMBETTA 

of  Bardo.  I  ask  the  Chamber  to  declare,  in  an  unequivocal 
fashion,  thai  the  terms  of  this  treaty  shall  be  carried  out, 
honestly  and  wisely,  but  without  any  qualification.  I  there- 
fore propose  the  following  motion  :  '  The  Chamber,  deter- 
mined that  the  treaty  endorsed  by  the  French  nation  on 
May  12,  1881,  shall  be  faithfully  carried  into  effect,  proceeds 
to  the  resolution.'  " — This  was  passed  by  355  ayes  to  68  noes. 

That  same  night  he  wrote:  "  At  last  we  have  settled  that 
interminable  Tunisian  afifair.  About  9  p.m.  all  was  over, 
thanks  to  a  fit  of  indignation  which  drove  me  to  the  rostrum 
after  eighteen  successive  resolutions  had  been  mooted.  1 
felt  unable  to  endure  that  France  should  humble  herself  in  the 
dust  before  the  whole  of  Europe,  and  that  is  why  I  interfered. 
1  made  them  ratify  a  policy  in  which  the  national  honour  was 
involved.  But  my  intervention  pledges  me  up  to  the  hilt ;  I 
am  now  compelled  to  have  an  interview  with  the  President  of 
the  Republic,  if  he  is  willing  to  submit  to  the  '  dictatorship,', 
since  dictatorship  it  is." 

On  November  10  Jules  Ferry  tendered  the  resignation  of 
the  Cabinet,  and  Gambetta  was  called  upon  to  form  the  new 
Ministry. 


296 


CHAPTER    XVIII 

THK  GRAND   MINISTRY 

Gambetia  crowns  Jules  Ferry's  Work  in  Tunisia — The  J-^gypiian  Affaii — The  Bills  for 
a   Revision  of  the  Constitution  and  a  Scrutin  de  Liste — Fall  of  the    Ministry 

(January  26,  1S82). 

■  It  was  not  a  monlh  since  Gambetta,  on  iiis  return  from 
Germany,  had  seen  the  President  (October  13).  He  was 
marked  out  for  office  by  the  votes  of  the  Chamber,  and  the 
time  for  raising  objections  was  past.  (Jn  October  22  Daniel 
Wilson,  Under-Secretary  of  State  at  the  Treasury,  had 
become  Jules  Grevy's  son-in-law;  he  was  a  sworn  foe  of 
Gambetta.  Among  Gambetta "s  opponents  there  was  a  spon- 
taneous outburst  of  glee  when  they  saw  that  he  "  could  not 
get  out  of  taking  Cabinet  honours."  The  bull  was  coming 
into  an  arena  already  bristling  with  picadors.  "  Now  for 
the  Grand  Ministry  !  "  was  the  significant  cry.  It  was  an 
understood  thing  that  there  would  be  a  combination  of  five 
parliamentary  Presidents  :  Gambetta,  Freycinet,  Jules  Ferry, 
L^on  Say,  President  of  the  Senate,  Henri  Brisson,  ex-Presi- 
dent of  the  Chamber.  Public  opinion  welcomed  the  idea;  it 
seemed  a  guarantee  of  unity  and  strength.  Gambetta,  too,  at 
first  thought  he  ought  to  try  the  experiment.  Jules  Ferry, 
however,  had  suffered  defeat,  and  was  opposed  to  the  scruiin 
dc  liste.  Leon  Say  insisted  on  the  formula:  "  Neither  con- 
version nor  borrowing  nor  redemption,"  and  Gambetta  did 
not  wish  to  commit  himself  so  far.  He  had  seen  M.  de 
Freycinet  on  September  16,  and  had  told  him  that  he  was 
anything  but  anxious  to  take  office,  that  his  health  would  not 
allow  him  to  bear  the  burden  very  long,  but  that  on  the  other 
hand  he  could  not  back  out  altogether.  He  had  asked  his 
own  fellow-worker  to  help   in   the  task  of  Cabinet-making  : 

297 


GAMBETTA 

"  It  will  be  our  joint  product,"  he  added,  "and  the  manage- 
ment of  it  I  will  leave  to  you,  for  I  don't  want  to  remain  in 
harness  for  more  than  a  few  months ;  after  that  I  shall  have 
to  retire,  to  take  a  rest  and  travel  about  Europe.  You  will  be 
given  the  War  Office  portfolio  and  act  as  my  right-hand 
man."  On  November  ii  Gambetta  paid  another  visit  to  M. 
de  Freycinet,  and  again  asked  for  his  co-operation,  but  by 
now  some  changes  had  been  made  in  the  proposed  list  of 
Ministers.  The  names  of  Jules  Ferry  and  L^on  Say  had  been 
struck  off,  and  Freycinet  was  to  become  Minister  for  Foreign 
Affairs  instead  of  for  War.  Most  of  the  new  men  who  were 
ultimately  to  be  members  of  the  Cabinet  were  now  included. 
After  taking  a  night  to  think  things  over,  M.  de  Freycinet 
wrote  to  Gambetta  saying  that  he  did  not  feel  capable  of 
adequately  filling  the  post  which  the  future  Prime  Minister 
had  allotted  to  him,  and  requesting  that  he  might  be  allowed 
to  keep  his  seat  in  the  Senate,  where  he  would  always  remain 
a  loyal  and  devoted  friend. 

Gambettas  intention  was  to  assume  the  Premiership  with- 
out portfolio.  Henceforth,  the  Prime  Minister  alone  would 
communicate  with  the  President  of  the  Republic.  The  latter 
would  no  longer  take  the  chair  at  Cabinet  meetings.  It  was 
a  startling  reversal  of  constitutional  practice.  The  Premier, 
as  in  England,  would  become  the  real  and  sole  head  of  the 
Government.  It  is  not  hard  to  imagine  how  Gr^vy  looked 
upon  these  innovations — Grevy,  who  had  always  managed  to 
keep  his  Cabinet  meetings  well  under  control. 

The  days  were  slipping  past,  however,  and  matters  could 
be  delayed  no  longer.  Gambetta  had  a  notion  that  the 
refusals  he  was  encountering  were  part  of  a  pre-arranged  plan, 
and  shrewdly  suspected  that  the  £lysee  had  a  hand  in  the 
business.  On  November  8  he  writes  to  Les  Jardies  :  "  I  got 
your  letter,  and  I  am  answering  it  before  going  to  rack  my 
brains  over  that  abominable  Cabinet  problem.  Yes,  it  w'ould 
be  much  pleasanter  to  be  at  Zuppat,  or,  better  still,  at 
Sorrento.  There  is  still  time.  Do  you  feel  like  eloping?  I 
am  ready,  and  I — or  rather  we — can  run  away.  One  word, 
one  little  '  yes,'  and  we  are  free  for  ever!  .  .   ." 

298 


THE   GRAND   MINISTRY 

On  November  15  the  Journal  Officiel  (Gazette]  publish<Kl 
the  names  of  the  new  Cabinet.  Gambetta  was  to  take  the 
Foreign  Office  with  the  l^rcsidency  of  the  Council  [Premier- 
ship], and  was  assignin<^  the  Ministry  of  Justice  to  Jules 
Cazot,  that  of  the  Interior  to  Waldeck-Rousseau,  that  of  War 
to  General  Campenon,  that  of  Marine  to  Captain  Guugeard, 
that  of  Public  Instruction  and  Worship  to  Paul  Bert,  that  of 
Finance  to  Allain-Targe,  that  of  i^il)li{  W^orks  to  Ravnal, 
that  of  Commerce  and  the  Colonies  to  Rou\  ier,  that  of  Agri- 
culture to  Dev^s,  that  of  Fine  Arts  to  Antonin  Proust,  the 
Under-Secretaryship  of  Foreign  Affairs  to  Spuller,  that  of  the 
Colonies  to  Felix  Faure,  etc.  The  list  was  at  once  greeted 
with  contempt:  "A  Ministry  of  (jovernment  clerks!  "  "A 
Cabinet  of  nonentities!  "  Gambetta  had  had  to  take  a  firm 
stand  before  he  could  include  young  Waldeck-Rousseau,  a 
fluent  speaker,  excelling  in  the  frigid  style  of  oratory,  though 
inwardly  of  a  fiery  temperament.  The  only  senatorial 
member  was  Cazot,  and  this  exclusion  of  senators  was  not 
likely  to  find  favour  with  the  Luxembourg.  Two  new  Minis- 
tries were  created,  and  the  Chambers  had  to  be  asked  for  tlie 
necessary  credits. 

The  Ministerial  announcement  of  policy — a  limited  revision 
of  the  Constitution,  a  cutting  down  of  military  expenditure, 
a  strict  enforcement  of  the  Concordat,  etc. — met  with  a  chilling 
reception  in  both  Assemblies.     (November  15.) 

A  "  limited  revision  "  :  here  was  the  field  for  the  coming 
battle  :  the  senators  feared  a  diminution  of  their  powers,  the 
Deputies  trembled  for  their  very  existence.  Barodet  intro- 
duced a  proposal  for  "  unlimited  "  revision.  He  asked  for 
an  emergency  vote.  This  was  opposed  by  Gambetta,  and 
then  supported  by  Clemenceau.  Gambetta  replied,  and 
carried  the  day. 

On  December  8  the  supplementary  credits  for  the  two  new 
Ministries  and  Under-Secretaryships  were  discussed.  Under 
the  Waddington  Cabinet,  a  Decree  of  February  5,  1879,  insti- 
tuting a  Postmaster-General,  had  evoked  no  criticism.  The 
committee,  however,  expressed  a  desire  that  in  future  no  new- 
Ministerial  post  should  be  created  without  the  previous  con- 

299 


GAMBETTA 

sent  of  both   Houses.       This  was  tantamount  to  a  censure. 

Gambetta  asked   the  Chamber  to   repudiate   the  suggestion. 

M.  Ribot,   with  a  skill  and  adroitness  which  foreshadowed 

the  great  part  he  was  to  play,  succeeded  in  getting  it  retained. 

Gambetta  was  under  no  illusion;  he  saw  that  he  would  not 

be  able  to  govern  with  a  majority  thus  torn  by  dissensions. 

He  knew  that  he  was  expected  to  work  miracles,  and  he  also 

knew  that  to  work  those  miracles  was  beyond  his  capacity. 

We  needed  superior  military  strength,  and  this — as  he  had 

once  more  found  out  by  personal  observation — Germany  still 

possessed :     we    needed    alliances,    and    the    time    for  those 

alliances  was  not  yet  ripe.     He  cherished  the  same  dream  as 

every  statesman  worthy  of  the  name,  the  vision  of  a  France 

united,  reconciled,  massing  all  her  forces  for  a  great  external 

action— the  vision  that  was  to  become  a  reality  thirty-three 

years  later,  under  the  impact  of  a  fresh  German  assault,  when, 

if  he  had  lived,  he  would  have  been  sixty-three.    But  he  had  to 

deal  with  furiously  warring  parties,  w  ith  political  and  religious 

animosities  skilfully  fanned  by  the  victor,   with  Assemblies 

that  shivered  at  the  slightest  puff  of  wind.     The  man  of  1870 

bore  1914  in  his  soul;  but  the  man  of  1870  was  not  destined 

to  be  the  man  of  1914.     Fortune,  which  had  showered  on  him 

all  her  gifts  at  thirty,  was  to  desert  him  at  forty. 

Physically  he  was  not  up  to  the  mark.  That  feverish, 
wearing  existence,  "  unbalanced,"  as  he  used  to  call  it,  that 
constant  delirium  of  passion,  the  excitement  of  the  war  and  of 
Parliamentary  struggles,  that  portentous  career  had  aged  him 
before  his  time;  he  was  tired.  He  was  beginning  to  be 
aflfected,  too  (though  he  would  never  openly  admit  it),  by  the 
calumnies  and  insults  which  his  enemies  relentlessly  heaped 
upon  him — a  cup  of  bitterness  that  he  was  to  drink  to  the  last 
minute,  to  the  last  drop. 

When  someone  suggested  that  he  should  refuse  the  burden, 
he  had  replied  :  "  And  what  of  all  those  who  are  reckoning 
upon  me?"  Yet  he  did  nothing  to  win  over  the  majority. 
Quite  the  contrary  !  Waldeck-Rousseau  was  so  bold  as  to 
write  to  a  prefect  [chief  magistrate  of  a  department]  :  "A 
system  of  Government  resting  on  the  notion  that  the  opinion 

300 


THE   GRAND   MINISTRY 

of  a  prefect  counts  for  nothing,  and  that  tho  recommendation 
of  a  Deputy  is  everything,  would  be  a  system  fatal  alike  to 
the  independence  of  the  electorate  and  to  that  of  Ministers." 
Scandalous!  Gambetta  had  said  at  Tours  : "  The  adminis- 
tration is  the  steward  of  the  democracy;  if  you  lay  a  finger  on 
any  of  its  prerogatives,  you  undermine  the  whole  structure." 
And  at  Belleville  :  "  The  administration  is  no  longer  mast«*r 
in  its  own  house,  the  executive  ceases  to  control  its  agents, 
when  they  are  no  longer  left  in  undisputed  exercise  of  their 
functions."  The  Republicans  were  too  near  to  the  Empire, 
to  the  Twenty-fourth  of  May,  to  the  Sixteenth  of  .May,  not  to 
distrust  what  was  known  as  a  "  strong  "  Government.  The 
difference  between  a  solid  and  enduring  parliainentarv  autho- 
rity and  personal  rule  had  not  yet  taken  clear  shape  in  men's 
minds.  The  Parliamentary  Republic  had  not  yet  found  its 
level;  for  the  Government,  direction  and  action;  for  Parlia- 
ment, deliberation  and  control.  The  body  politic  had  not  yet 
recovered  from  the  recent  ordeals  of  despotism  and  oppression. 
The  mentality  of  its  leading  men  was  still  littered  with 
wreckage. 

General  de  Miribel,  who  on  May  i6  had  been  instructed, 
with  Ducrot,  to  prepare  for  a  mobilisation  of  the  Army  in  the 
event  of  a  second  dissolution,  was  appointed  Chief  of  the 
General  Staff;  Marshal  Canrobert,  then  a  Bonapartist  Senator 
for  the  Dordogne  Department,  and  General  Gallifet,  who  had 
suppressed  the  Commune,  were  placed  upon  the  Army  Coun- 
cil;  J.-J.  Weiss,  an  Alsatian  in  origin  and  in  spirit,  who  had 
been  Broglie's  Councillor  of  State,  was  appointed,  in  default 
of  Albert  Sorel,  Director  of  Political  Affairs  at  the  Foreign 
Office,  in  succession  to  Baron  de  Courcel,  who  became  ambas- 
sador in  Berlin;  Floquet  went  to  the  prefecture  of  the  Seine 
Department,  Magnin  to  the  Banque  de  France,  and  so  on.  In 
technical  matters,  Gambetta  ranked  competence  as  more 
important  than  political  views.  "  For  government,  you  want 
a  party,"  he  used  to  say;  "for  administration,  capable  men, 
irrespective  of  party."  The  same  course  had  been  pursued  by 
Danton,  when  he  entrusted  the  War  Ministry  and  that  of 
Foreign  Affairs  to  men  who  had  served  under  the  Monarchy. 

301 


GAMBETTA 

It  was  difficult,  however,  even  on  these  grounds,  to  accept 
Weiss  and  Miribel ;  and  many  RepubHcans  felt  qualms  at  the 
selection  of  such  inveterate  foes  ere  the  noise  of  battle  had  yet 
died  down,  and  thought  that  it  boded  ill  for  the  maintenance 
of  existing  institutions. 

A  question  was  put  to  the  Minister  of  War  concerning  the 
appointment  of  General  de  Miribel  :  "  You  place  the  Repub- 
lic," exclaimed  Clovis  Hugues,  "at  the  mercy  of  those  who 
have  always  tried  to  deal  it  its  death-blow  I  '  General  Cam- 
penon  had  already  spoken  once,  and  was  about  to  return  to 
the  charge ;  the  Prime  Minister  pointed  out  that,  where  a  ques- 
tion was  concerned,  the  rules  of  procedure  would  not  permit 
of  this  reply.  "  Don't  speak,"  cried  Henri  Marot  to  the 
General.  "  Cassar  forbids  !  "  Gambetta  :  "  Why  don't  you 
talk  French!  "  Maret :  "Very  well,  I  won't  say  'Caesar,' 
I'll  say  '  Vitellius!  '" 

All  the  time,  too,  the  agony  raged  within.  The  cruel  exer- 
tions of  public  life  were  telling  upon  him  more  than  ever.  He 
wrote  to  his  beloved  :  "  I  had  a  bad  night,  and  all  the  solace 
that  you  brought  me,  the  moral  balm  that  you  applied  to  my 
.soul,  the  hope  that  you  had  roused  in  me  had  not  worked 
enough  reaction  to  banish  the  wretched  fever!"  (Novem- 
ber 29.)  "  Believe  me,  my  dear  child,  you  can  save  us  both; 
yes,  save  us,  for  without  you  my  life  is  empty  and  desolate, 
has  no  more  value  or  charm."  (December  7.)  "A  new  year 
will  soon  dawn  for  us;  we  are  still  at  liberty  to  change  our 
lot.  .  .  .  You  have  drained  the  cup  of  sorrow  to  the  dregs; 
and  I,  without  losing  my  calm  or  balance,  have  known  the 
dizziest  heights  of  happiness,  all  that  is  conventionally  called 
the  sweets  of  power  and  fame.  Yet  I  count  this  as  nothing 
without  you,  without  your  love,  your  presence,  your  requital 
for  an  unkind  destiny.  Let  us  open  a  new  stage  of 
life  together;  come  to  my  heart  and  stay  there.  .  .  ." 
(December  g.) 

Nevertheless,  he  did  not  turn  aside  from  the  path  of  duty 
He  confirmed  the  Treaty  of  Bardo,  thus  crowning  Jules 
Ferry's  work  in  Tunisia.  In  the  Senate,  the  Due  de  Broglie 
picked  holes  in  the  treaty,  asked  for  "  more  effective  territorial 

302 


THE   GRAND   MINISTRY 

guarantees,"  and  professed  to  see  certain  dangers  tor  France 
in  having  Turkey  as  a  neighbour.  Gambettas  reply  was 
marked  by  restraint  and  good  humour,  and  showed  perfect 
deference  towards  the  Senate;  he  obtained  his  rredits  by  a 
unanimous  vote.     (December  lo.) 

At  St.  Petersburg  Alexander  III.  had  succeeded  his  father, 
Alexander  II.,  who  had  been  assassinated  on  March  13,  1881. 
Increasing  symptoms  of  a  desire  for  a  Franco-Russian  under- 
standing were  noted.  KatkofT  was  the  trusted  adviser  of  the 
new  Tsar.  Skobeleflf,  who  made  no  concealment  of  his  hatred 
for  German  supremacy,  was  preparing  to  visit  Paris.  Gam- 
betta  appointed  as  Ambassador  in  Russia  his  favourite  agent 
Chaudordy.  He  had  ideas  of  sending  the  Due  d'Aumale,  as 
Envoy  Extraordinary  of  the  Repubhc,  to  Alexander  III.'s 
coronation.  He  has  often  been  credited  with  the  phrase  : 
"  Leaning  on  London  and  on  St.  Petersburg,  we  shall  be 
invincible."  If  he  never  said  it,  at  any  rate  he  thought  it, 
and  he  put  the  maxim  into  practice. 

The  Egyptian  question,  however,  was  to  give  a  new  trend 
to  the  policy  of  France  and  of  Europe. 

F'rance  and  the  Nile  share  the  honour  of  having     made 
Egypt.     Our  scholars,  our  soldiers,  our  engineers,  our  manu- 
facturers, our  traders,  our  jurists  had  wrought  the  prosperity 
of  the  country.     It  was  France  that  had  set  up  courts  of  justice 
and  an  educational  system.     There  were  then  in  Egypt  18.000 
Frenchmen,  among  them  being  representatives  of  our  leading 
industries.       All   the  Government  departments  were  run  by 
French  agents.     The  Suez  Canal  was  the  achievement  of  a 
Frenchman.     Egypt  was  France's  adopted  daughter.     F'ng- 
land,    however,    had    bought  the    Khedive's   holding   in    the 
Canal.     In  December,    1875,  Gambetta  had  vainly  besought 
the  Due  Decazes,  Minister  for  Foreign   Affairs,   to  purchase 
the  176,000  shares  which  the  Khedive  offered  us  for  sale.     He 
promised  that  the  entire  Left  would  support   the  operation. 
There  had  then  been  introduced,  in  i87(),  the  dual  control  by 
England  and  France.     It  bound  England  as  it  bound  us;  it 
ensured  us  a  share  of  control  strictly  on  a  par  with  that  of 
England,     Thanks  to  this  system,  the  national  debt  had  been 

303 


GAMBETTA 

reduced,  taxation  lightened,  and  usury  put  down.  In  Gam- 
betta's  eyes,  the  condominium  in  the  Nile  Valley  was  the 
cornerstone  of  the  Anglo-French  entente.  Thiers  had  warned 
him  :  "  Whatever  you  do,  never  let  go  of  Egypt !  "' 

An  anti-foreign  agitation  had  recently  broken  out  among 
the  officers  in  Cairo.  On  September  lo,  1881,  Colonel  Arabi 
had  invested  the  Khedive's  palace,  demanding  that  the 
notables  should  be  convened,  a  Constitution  drawn  up,  and 
the  Army  effectives  (which  had  been  reduced  to  4,000)  should 
be  raised  to  18,000.  The  Khedive  had  been  forced  to  submit. 
The  Dual  Control  was  badly  shaken.  Turkey  took  advantage 
of  this,  and  made  an  attempt  to  recover  her  ancient  heritage ; 
the  Sultan  sent  Turkish  emissaries  to  Cairo.  The  Paris  and 
London  Cabinet  agreed  to  have  them  watched  by  two  battle- 
ships, one  French  and  the  other  British,  detached  to 
Alexandria. 

On  December  14  Gambetta,  in  his  first  conversation  with 
Lord  Lyons,  the  British  Ambassador,  revealed  himself  as  a 
.staunch  advocate  of  the  entente  :  "  Would  it  be  wise  for 
France  and  England  to  let  themselves  be  caught  unawares  by 
some  catastrophe  ?  The  two  Governments  should  come  to 
an  agreement  as  regards  the  most  suitable  means,  either  of 
averting  a  crisis,  if  the  explosion  can  be  prevented,  or  of 
applying  remedies,  if  it  is  unavoidable." 

The  British  Government,  however,  had  no  wish  to  see 
France  taking  control  in  the  affair.  This  was  amply  proved 
by  the  remarks  passed  at  the  Congress  of  Berlin,  and  by  a 
note  from  Lord  Granville  to  Sir  Edward  Malet,  Consul- 
General  at  Cairo,  on  November  4,  1881,  the  contents  of  \vhich 
were  communicated  to  the  Cabinet  in  Paris.  It  was  couched 
in  guarded  terms.  On  December  23  Lord  Lyons  replied  to 
Gambetta  :  "  Her  Majesty's  Government  is  of  opinion  that 
the  cordial  understanding  that  exists  on  the  subject  of  Egvpt 
must  assuredly  be  made  manifest,  but  that  there  is  room  for 
mature  consideration  to  determine  the  conduct  to  be  adopted 
in  the  event  of  a  fresh  outbreak  of  the  disturbances." 

Gambetta,  seizing  hold  of  Lord  Granville's  statement  that 
"  the   cordial    understanding    that   exists  on  the  subject   of 

304 


THE   GRAND   MINISTRY 

Egypt  must  be  made  manifest,"  insisted  that  "  the  attachment 
between  the  two  Powers  should  not  remain  merely  at  the 
Platonic  stage."  Anxious  that  "a  clear-cut  and  definite 
object  should  be  pursued  by  both  in  common,"  he  proposed 
that  the  two  Governments  should  instruct  their  representatives 
to  give  Tewfik  Pasha  positive  assurance  of  the  sympathy  and 
support  of  France  and  England,  and  to  encourage  His 
Highness  to  maintain  and  strengthen  his  own  authority." 

On  January  6  Lord  Lyons  wrote  to  Gambetta :  "  Her 
Majesty's  Government  concurs  in  the  recommendations  set 
forth  in  your  Note  of  December  30,  on  the  strict  understand- 
ing that  it  must  not  be  regarded  as  thereby  committing  itself 
to  any  particular  mode  of  action,  should  action  prove 
necessary." 

The  plan  of  a  joint  note  was  thus  accepted,  but  the  questions 
of  "action  "  and  "mode  of  action  "  were  held  over.  Lord 
Granville  remarked  to  our  Ambassador,  Challemel-Lacour  : 
"  The  most  important  thing  is,  not  that  France  and  England 
should  really  work  in  harmony,  but  that  they  should  appear 
to  do  so."  Challemel-Lacour  left  no  doubt  as  to  the  half- 
hearted attitude  shown  by  Lord  Granville.  He  wrote  on 
January  17  that  "  if  the  London  Cabinet  had  considered  the 
possibility  of  effective  action,  it  was  only  to  reject  the  idea." 

The  initiative  taken  by  the  two  Western  Powers  had  given 
umbrage  to  the  Porte  and  the  other  Cabinets.  They  saw  or 
professed  to  see  in  it  an  encroachment  upon  their  rights  and 
a  breach  of  the  statute  which  had  been  granted  to  Egypt 
under  their  guarantee.  Gambetta,  in  order  to  learn  their 
intentions,  made  inquiries  of  our  charge  d'affaires  in  Berlin, 
the  Comte  d'Aubigny.  The  latter  replied  on  January  10  that 
if  fresh  troubles  should  arise,  Germany,  Russia,  Austria  and 
Italy  would  not  sanction  the  landing  of  Anglo-French  forces 
on  the  banks  of  the  Nile;  the  only  way  to  cut  the  knot,  in  their 
opinion,  would  be  "the  despatch  of  Turkish  regiments  after 
a  previous  understanding  between  the  Porte  and  the  Cabinets 
of  London  and  Paris,  supplemented,  if  need  were,  by  a  naval 
demonstration  on  the  part  of  those  two  Powers.''  Further, 
on  the  17th  :    "  According  to  information  which   reaches  us 

305  X 


GAMBETTA 

from  a  trustworthy  source,  England  has  consulted  Prince 
von  Bismarck ;  the  Chancellor,  in  his  answer,  expressed  the 
fear  that  Russia,  Italy  and  Austria  could  not  look  on  unmoved 
at  the  intervention  of  France  and  England.  The  Prince's 
view  was  that  a  concerted  military  action  by  England  and 
France  in  Egypt  should  be  avoided  at  all  costs."  (On  the 
31st  he  wrote  again,  to  the  same  effect.)  On  the  24th, 
Challemel  wrote  to  Gambetta  :  *'  I  am  afraid  that  Lord  Gran- 
ville is  not  disposed  to  accept  the  intervention  of  any  other 
Power."  The  British  Ambassador  in  Berlin,  with  the  object 
of  getting  us  evicted,  was  exerting  all  his  influence  both  upon 
Bismarck  and  upon  our  representative.  Bismarck,  for  his 
part,  was  trying  at  one  and  the  same  time  to  consolidate 
Germany's  position  at  Constantinople  and  to  cause  a  rift 
between  France  and  England.  We  shall  see  how  he 
succeeded. 

At  home,  Gambetta  had  left  nothing  out  of  the  reckoning. 
In  this  Chamber,  the  forces  against  him  were  too  strong ;  he 
came  to  office  too  late  or  too  soon ;  why  wear  himself  out,  why 
row  laboriously  in  the  teeth  of  adverse  winds  ?  No,  his  hour 
had  not  struck,  and  he  knew  it.  And  he,  he  who  had  said  to 
wise  Normandy  that  it  would  be  "  childish  "  to  ask  the  Cham- 
ber to  change  the  method  of  ballot  that  had  brought  it  into 
being,  now  drew  his  sword  once  more  from  the  scabbard  and 
held  it  to  Parliament's  throat.  He  or  the  Chamber  :  did  he 
think  that  it  would  offer  no  resistance  ? 

On  January  12,  1881,  he  writes  :  "  The  storm  is  gathering, 
the  clouds  are  massing;  there  is  little  reason  to  doubt  that  the 
deluge  will  burst  upon  my  head  in  a  few  days'  time.  I  shall 
put  the  question  fairly  and  squarely,  I  shall  lay  all  my  cards 
on  the  table  :  double  or  quits  !  Either  they  will  pass  under  the 
Caudine  Forks,^  or  I  shall  let  them  wallow  in  their  hopeless 
impotence.  I  feel,  not  only  free,  but  more  determined.  Fate 
will  decide."  "Double  or  quits!  "  Yes,  that  summed  up 
the  position.  He  would  either  triumph  or  perish,  but  perish 
only  to  rise  again,  in  full  strength,  at  a  later  day. 

^  A  pass  through  which  the  defeated  Roman  army  was  forced  by  the  Samnites  to 
march  under  the  yoke,  321  B.C. — Translator's  note. 

306 


THE   GRAND   MINISTRY 

On  the  14th  he  brought  forward  his  scheme  for  constitu- 
tional revision.  His  idea  was  that  the  Constitution  should 
lay  down  the  system  of  ballot  for  the  Chamber,  as  it  already 
did  for  the  Senate.  For  the  election  of  Senators,  he  wished 
to  make  the  number  of  delegates  from  the  boroughs  propor- 
tional to  the  number  of  their  inhabitants;  for  the  irremovable 
Senators  elected  by  the  Senate,  he  substituted  Senators  elected 
for  a  term  of  nine  years  by  both  Assemblies;  finally,  in 
matters  of  finance,  he  was  for  giving  the  first  and  the  last 
word  to  the  Chamber. 

The  committee  charged  with  examining  the  scheme  was 
almost  entirely  hostile.  "  Gambetta  wants  to  reign  supreme  in 
the  Chamber,"  said  one  Deputy;  "  we  must  choose  between 
the  Chamber  and  him."  "The  President  of  the  Republic," 
said  Wilson,  the  moving  spirit  of  the  coalition,  "  is  opposed  to 
the  project." 

On  January  19,  Gambetta  writes  :  "  Soat  last  the  clouds  are 
dispersing  and  I  am  face  to  face  with  my  opponents  of  every 
stamp.  We  shall  fight  in  broad  daylight.  What  a  splendid 
battlefield  they  have  just  provided  for  me  !  It  is  no  longer 
political  methods,  texts  and  constitutional  law,  public  rights 
and  electoral  rights  that  are  at  stake,  but  a  higher  issue  : 
Shall  there,  or  shall  there  not,  be  a  Government  worthy  of  the 
name  ?  I  owe  them  a  debt  of  gratitude  for  having  opened  the 
debate,  and  having  assured  it,  at  this  critical  hour,  all  the 
prestige,  all  the  importance  it  deserves.  I  am  glad  to  think 
I  can  throw  myself  into  a  final  and  glorious  struggle,  and, 
come  what  may,  can  once  more  find  an  opportunity  of  telling 
the  truth  to  the  country.  And  then,  then  I  shall  cry,  like  the 
Prophet,  Liberavi  aniviam  meam,  I  have  set  free,  I  have 
delivered  my  soul  !  I  shall  rush  into  the  fray  with  a  light 
heart ;  for  if  I  win,  I  have  them  in  the  hollow  of  my  hand ;  if 
I  lose,  I  am  once  more  my  own  master  !  " 

On  January  24,  M.  Louis  Andrieux,  ex-Prefect  of  Police, 
witty,  mordant,  with  an  "  indefinable  something  "  in  his 
intellect,  like  the  Cardinal  de  Retz,  read  out  his  report  to  the 
Chamber:  "  To  embody  the  scrutin  de  liste  in  the  Constitu- 
tion," he  said,  "  is  to  condemn  our  origin  and  our  principles, 

307  .  X  2 


GAMBETTA 

to  endanger  at  once  the  credit  and  the  moral  authority  essen- 
tial to  every  Chamber;  it  would  reveal  the  campaign  for 
a  dissolution,  naked  and  unashamed,  and  bring  it  to  a 
head." 

The  matter  was  brought  up  in  the  House  on  January  26. 
F'rom  the  very  first  crossing  of  the  foils  Gambetta  lunges  out 
and  uncovers  his  guard.  "This  is  what  they  say:  *  We 
recognise  the  full  jurisdiction  of  the  Congress;  we  recognise 
the  absolute  .ompetence  of  each  member  of  the  Senate  and 
the  Chamber  10  raise  any  question  whatsoever ;  but  there  is  a 
band  of  political  outcasts  in  whom  we  acknowledge  neither  a 
right  nor  a  capacity  to  broach  any  question — that  is,  the 
Ministers." 

He  attacks  the  Extreme  Left:  "I  know  that  a  single 
Chamber,  with  no  counterpoise  or  brake,  with  nothing  to 
restrict  its  movements,  is  an  ideal  that  still  finds  favour  in  the 
ranks  of  the  democracy.  What  I  also  know  is  that  this  theory 
is  becoming  more  and  more  discredited  in  the  light  of 
events,  by  the  experience  of  every  day.  The  experience  of 
the  past  fortnight,  for  instance,  proves  how  useful,  how 
vitally  important  it  is  for  a  democracy  to  have  an  Upper 
Chamber,  if  only  because  it  gives  everyone  time  to  think 
things  over,," 

Always  j>ut  on  his  defence,  forced  to  explain  himself,  to 
interpret  his  meaning,  he  keeps  nothing  back,  he  bares  his 
tortured  soul:  "Of  all  the  afflictions  that  can  befall  one  in 
political  lile — and  God  knows  that  I  have  had  my  share  ! — 
there  is  one  that  I  cannot  endure  in  silence  :  namely,  to  be  held 
up  to  the  Republican  party  as  one  who  is  trying  to  break 
away  from  it,  to  forswear  his  allegiance.  Will  anyone  dare 
to  stand  up  in  this  House  and  say  that  I  am  animated  by 
some  vile  ambition,  graced  with  the  name  of  '  dictatorship,' 
which  would  make  me  the  laughing-stock  of  the  world  if  I 
ever  sank  so  low  as  to  cherish  so  paltry  an  aim  ?  .  .  ."  The 
phrases  clash  and  jostle  against  one  another  and  are  lost  in 
the  swirling  flood.  He  reminds  them  of  the  perils  he  and 
they  have  faced  together  and  shows  them  the  danger  of 
irreparable  fissures.     "You  know  me;  you  know  my  faults, 

308 


THE   GRAND   MINISTRY 

and,  I  make  bold  to  say,  my  passionate  devotion  to  the  service 
of  the  Republic.  What  have  I  done?  Side  by  side  with 
you,  I  fought  in  the  open  against  the  enemies  of  the  Republic. 
We  have  got  rid  of  our  foes;  what  is  left  to  us  now  is  to 
govern  ourselves,  to  combat  the  endless  discords  that  beset 
us,  to  overcome  our  obsession  with  personalities  and  keep  our 
eyes  riveted  on  the  country.  Finally,  a  sweeping  survey  of 
the  whole  present  and  the  whole  future— the  future,  safe  and 
assured,  the  clear  road  to  the  mountain-tops;  later  on,  at 
any  rate,  if  they  do  not  wish  to  open  the  track  now.  The 
advice  has  been  given  me  :  '  Change  your  hidden  power  into 
a  real  authority.'  My  answer  was  :  '  Change  the  electoral 
laws,  and  I  am  ready.  I  am  convinced  that,  in  resisting  vou, 
I  am  acting  in  the  essential  interests  of  State  policv.  All 
that  I  can  bring  forward,  to  counteract  your  fears,  is  mv 
loyalty,  the  plans  we  have  prepared  together,  in  a  word  mv 
whole  past  career,  and  I  appeal  to  your  sense  of  right  and 
wrong.  At  any  rate,  it  will  be  without  bitterness,  without 
feeling  a  vestige  of  wounded  self-esteem,  that  I  shall  bow  to 
your  verdict;  for  there  is  something  that  I  rank  above  all 
ambitions,  and  that  is  my  trust  in  the  Republicans,  without 
which  I  can  never  accomplish  what  is — I  surely  have  some 
right  to  say  so — my  task  in  public  life,  the  rehabilitation  of 
our  country!  "  He  was  loudly  cheered.  The  Chamber  was 
still  dominated  by  the  spell  of  his  oratory,  it  was  still  proud 
of  him.  Naturally,  however,  it  thought  of  its  own  safety 
first. 

M.  Andrieux  replied.  Confidence  must  be  mutual  :  unless 
the  Government  had  confidence  in  the  Chamber,  it  could  not 
ask  members  for  a  token  of  their  confidence.  No  Government 
could  assume  office  in  face  of  an  Assemblv  with  w^hich  it 
thought  that  it  could  not  work  hand  in  hand.  He  recalled  the 
recent  pronouncements  of  Gambetta  at  Le  Neubourg.  A 
Chamber  which,  at  its  very  outset,  condemns  the  source  from 
which  it  sprang,  is  stricken  with  decay  and  doomed  to  an 
early  dissolution. 

Gambetta  was  defeated  by  26S  votes  to  218.  The  Ministers 
at  once  trooped  out  of  the  Chamber.     Early  on  the  following 

309 


GAMBETTA 

day  he  wrote  to  Les  Jardies :  "So  my  forecast  has  come  true 
to  the  very  day — the  blessed  day  of  deHverance  !  I  was 
already  hailing  it  with  delight  at  heart,  that  dawn  of  freedom. 
Everything  that  happens  must  serve  as  an  object-lesson  for 
the  future.  I  don't  complain,  for  I  feel  instinctively  that  the 
country  will  know  better  where  it  stands,  and,  in  a  few  years' 
time,  will  be  able  to  do  me  justice  and  return  to  its  genuine 
traditions.  Yesterday  evening  I  tasted  the  first-fruits  of 
vengeance,  although  that  appetising  dish  has  to  be  eaten 
cold.  The  vict  jrs  looked  very  glum ;  I  leave  you  to  imagine 
whether  I  showed  my  mirth  too  openly  !  " 

The  Gambetta  Ministry  had  lasted  sixty-three  days.  It 
fell  under  the  blows  of  a  coalition  in  which  the  Extreme  Left, 
the  Right,  and  the  friends  of  thefilys^e  joined  hands.  Yet 
its  chief  remained  the  loftiest  embodiment  of  the  Republic, 
and,  for  a  large  number  of  Frenchmen,  the  man  of  the  future. 

The  Extreme  Left  were  indignant  at  the  abandonment  of 
the  old  Republican  programme,  the  programme  of  1869,  a 
single  Chamber,  disestablishment  of  the  Church,  and  so  forth. 
They  did  not  want  any  colonial  expeditions,  and  Gambetta's 
imperious  manner  made  them  restive.  The  Right  was  pursu- 
ing the  course  which  it  was  to  maintain  for  thirty  years.  As 
for  President  Grevy,  apart  from  the  fact  that  Gambetta's  popu- 
larity was  not  altogether  to  his  liking,  and  that  the  journey 
to  Cherbourg  still  rankled  with  him,  he  did  not  favour 
revanche  ideas.  Neither  the  home  nor  the  foreign  policy  of 
Gambetta  was  calculated  to  please  him,  and  he  now  felt  easier 
in  mind. 

Gambetta  went  off  to  Nice  and  from  there  to  Italy.  He 
took  up  his  quarters  in  Genoa,  enjoying  its  pure,  health-giving 
air,  its  expanse  of  silver  sea.  The  blood  of  his  forbears 
thrilled  in  his  veins.  We  may  give  a  typical  extract  from 
his  letters:  "  I  have  a  sense  of  excessive  loneliness  in  this 
great  city  of  marble,  where  I  am  always  reminded  that  it  was 
my  cradle.  I  breathe  more  freely  here  than  anywhere  else, 
and  so  far  from  feeling  that  I  am  in  a  strange  country,  its 
whole  history  comes  back  to  me  like  a  family  tradition.  I 
abandon   myself  to  dreams  of  the   past,  I   forget   my  own 

310 


THE    GRAND   MINISTRY 

troubles  in  musing  over  that  wonderful  venture  of  Columbus, 
those  daring  maritime  raids  of  Doria,  Spinola's  great  sword- 
strokes,  the  gilded  fantasies  of  the  Doges;  though  a  good 
Frenchman,  I  am  conscious  of  a  sort  of  ancestral  yearning 
when  I  look  once  more  upon  these  mighty  emblems  of  the 
proud  Republic  of  Genoa  in  its  palmy  days,  a  Republic  where 
strength  and  dignity  walked  hand  in  hand  with  popular 
liberty."     (February  13,  1882.) 


311 


CHAPTER    XIX 

DEATH 

The  Second  Freycinet  Cabinet  (January  30,  1882) — Bombardment  of  Alexandria — 
Gambetta's  Last_Speech  (July  18)— Resignation  of  the  Freycinet  Cabinet— Death 
of  Gambetta. 

On  January  30  the  new  Cabinet  was  installed,  with  M. 
de  Freycinet,  its  head,  at  the  Foreign  Office,  L6on  Say  at  the 
Treasury,  Jules  Ferry  as  Minister  of  Public  Instruction, 
Admiral  Jaur^guiberry  as  Minister  of  Marine. 

It  has  been  seen  how,  before  the  fall  of  the  Gambetta  Minis- 
try, the  Powers  had  rejected  the  scheme  of  exclusive  action 
by  England  and  France  in  the  Egyptian  affair.  Even  if 
Gambetta  had  remained  in  office,  he  could  not  have  pursued 
the  policy  outlined  in  his  note  of  January  7,  namely,  joint 
action ;  England  was  backing  out.  A  week  after  the  crisis, 
on  February  2,  Germany,  Austria,  Russia  and  Italy  assured 
the  Ottoman  Government  that  the  status  quo  in  Egypt,  in  the 
form  established  by  the  Firmans  of  the  Sultans  and  by  various 
European  settlements,  could  not  be  modified  without  a 
previous  understanding  between  the  Powers  and  the  suzerain 
State.  England  having  come  round  to  this  view,  the  Frey- 
cinet Ministry  was  of  one  mind  in  thinking  that  we  should 
have  to  make  approaches  to  the  other  Governments.  On 
February  7,  the  British  Cabinet  discussed  the  prospect  of  a 
mandate  given  to  England  and  France  in  the  name  of  the 
European  Concert.  Bismarck  approved  of  this  course.  He 
said  to  our  ambassador,  Baron  de  Courcel :  "  Should  the  two 
maritime  Powers  feel  inclined  to  take  action,  and  should  the 
other  Powers  give  them  a  mandate  to  do  so,  this  solution  is 
one    that    I    might    countenance."       A    few    days    later,    on 

312 


DEATH 

March  I,  Busch,  the  Under-Secretary  of  State,  repeated  the 
Chancellor's  suggestion  in  more  explicit  terms:  "The 
German  Chancellery,"  he  observed  to  M.  de  Courcel,  "  would 
be  ready  to  admit  the  two  Powers  as  Europe's  mandatories  for 
restoring  order  in  the  valley  of  the  Nile."  As  for  the  Russian 
Government,  it  not  only  accepted  this  mode  of  action,  but 
spoke  warmly  in  its  favour,  as  having  proved  its  value  in  i860. 
On  May  11  M.  de  Freycinet  announced  in  the  Chamber  that 
he  would  act  in  harmony  with  the  Powers,  that  the  "  pre- 
dominant and  privileged  status  of  France  and  England  was 
recognised  by  them  and  regarded  as  beyond  dispute."  This 
was  the  right  plan  :  joint  action,  in  virtue  of  a  European  man- 
date. It  was  in  strict  accordance  with  the  Treaty,  and  a 
reasonable  compromise  between  France's  interests  and 
Europe's  claims.  Here  was  solid  ground,  where  we  ought  to 
have  been  able  to  keep  our  feet.  Why  did  we  fail  to  do  so? 
Why,  in  the  space  of  a  few  days,  did  we  completely  lose  grip 
of  the  situation  ? 

On  the  day  after  making  this  announcement  in  the  Cham- 
ber M.  de  Freycinet  sent  our  new  ambassador  in  London, 
Tissot,  a  telegram  which  was  to  be  communicated  to  Lord 
Granville  :  "  France  and  England  would  each  send  six  men- 
of-war  light  enough  to  enter  Alexandria  Harbour.  In  the 
event  of  a  landing,  we  should  have  recourse  to  Turkish  troops, 
under  the  control  of  the  two  Powers."  Why  this  calling  in 
of  Turkish  troops,  which,  despite  their  control  by  the  two 
Powers,  entirely  altered  the  aspect  of  affairs?  The  following 
explanation  is  given  by  M.  de  Freycinet  in  his  book,  La 
Question  d'Egypte  (1915)  :  "  Bismarck,  without  positively 
refusing  his  adherence  to  the  mandate,  laid  great  stress  on  the 
advantages  of  using  Turkish  troops,"  and  England,  "  fear- 
ing, perhaps,  that  our  force  would  be  superior  in  numbers, 
had  made  representations  to  the  same  effect."  Bismarck  was 
anxious  to  please  the  Sultan,  in  order  to  promote  German 
influence  at  Constantinople.  He  had  expressed  this  latest 
view  in  conversations ;  it  was  not  recorded  in  any  written  note. 
The  change  of  policy  was  a  serious  blow  lo  France's 
privileged  position. 

313 


GAMBETTA 

Since  the  Khedive's  security  was  still  threatened,  M. 
de  Freycinet  on  May  23  gave  notice  of  his  intention  to  propose 
a  Conference,  and  in  agreement  with  the  London  Cabinet 
actually  did  so  on  June  2.  A  lively  scene  ensued  in  the 
Chamber.  M.  de  Freycinet,  being  plied  with  questions,  dis- 
claimed any  idea  of  adventures,  of  a  French  expeditionary 
force.  To  calm  the  apprehensions  of  the  Chamber,  he  dis- 
creetly hinted  at  the  possibility  that  troops  other  than  French, 
in  other  words  Turkish,  would  be  employed. 

Gambetta  interposed.  "  When  I  heard  it  stated  that,  not 
content  with  having  thrown  away  the  special  and  peculiar 
position  allotted  to  France  and  England  in  Egypt  by  tradition 
and  by  Firmans  of  the  Porte ;  not  content  with  entrusting  the 
Concert  of  Europe  (in  other  words,  the  opponents  of  this  state 
of  things)  with  the  adjudication  and  settlement  of  a  dispute 
in  which  the  question  is  not  one  of  dismembering  the  Ottoman 
Empire,  but  merely  one  of  upholding  the  status  quo  regulated 
by  treaties — when  I  heard  it  had  been  determined  beforehand, 
once  and  for  all,  that  under  no  circumstances  whatsoever 
would  France  embark  upon  military  intervention,  then  I 
remembered  how  one  day  Berryer  had  taken  his  stand  at  this 
rostrum  on  a  similar  occasion  and  exclaimed  :  '  You  must  not 
speak  like  that !  We  don't  speak  like  that  of  France  !  '  " 
M.  de  Freycinet  protested:  "What  I  said  and  what  I  still 
say  is  that  we  shall  not  rely  on  our  isolated  judgment  in  the 
Egyptian  question.  We  shall  go  to  the  Concert  of  Europe 
and  settle  the  question  by  common  agreement." — Gambetta: 
"  You  have  just  betrayed  to  Europe  the  secret  of  your  weak- 
ness. All  they  need  do  is  to  bully  you,  and  they  will  get  your 
consent  to  anything." — The  Cabinet,  and  France  as  well, 
emerged  from  this  debate  with  distinct  loss  of  strength. 

The  affair  dragged  on.  The  Conference  did  not  meet  in 
Constantinople  until  June  23.  The  French  Government 
opened  the  ball  by  proposing  and  securing  the  acceptance  of  a 
protocol  which  declared  that  "while  the  Conference  lasted, 
the  Powers  would  abstain  from  any  isolated  action  in  Egypt." 
England  at  once  had  these  words  added  :  "  Except  in  a  case 
of  force  majeure,  such  as  the  necessity  of  protecting  the  lives 

314 


DEATH 

of  their  nationals."  The  Conference  then  decided  upon 
Turkish  intervention.     (July  6.) 

On  June  ii,  however,  a  riot  had  broken  out  in  .Alexandria. 
More  than  forty  Europeans  had  been  killed  and  sixty-six 
wounded.  Towards  the  end  of  June  the  Eg^yptians  reinforced 
the  batteries  commanding  the  entrance  to  Alexandria  harbour. 
England  had  not  waited  for  the  murders  nor  even  for  the 
opening  of  the  Conference  before  arming  herself  for  action. 
She  had  already  mustered  considerable  naval  forces  between 
Malta  and  Alexandria.  On  June  15,  Salisbury  said  in  the 
House  of  Lords:  "  Some  suggest  that  Europe  may  take  it 
amiss;  England  knows  that  she  is  free  to  attain  her  political 
ends  by  herself,  if  she  cannot  do  so  in  company  with  tlu-  other 
Powers." 

A  rumour  got  abroad  that  the  passes  of  the  harbour  were 
going  to  be  blocked.  Admiral  Seymour,  afraid  for  his  ships, 
warned  the  Egyptians  that  at  the  slightest  sign  of  anything 
untoward  he  would  proceed  to  a  bombardment.  At  the  same 
time  he  invited  the  French  admiral  who  had  been  sent  into 
Alexandrian  water  in  concert  with  the  British  division  to  take 
such  measures  as  were  needed  for  the  security  of  both  detach- 
ments. On  July  4  Lord  Lyons  communicated  to  ^L 
de  Freycinet  the  orders  given  to  Admiral  Seymour  and  asked 
him  whether  we  were  going  to  issue  similar  instructions  to 
Admiral  Conrad.  M.  de  Freycinet  declared  to  Lord  Lyons 
that  **  if  Admiral  Seymour  ventured  on  a  bombardment,  we 
could  not  join  him  in  that  enterprise."  Our  squadron 
received  orders  to  weigh  anchor  and  proceed  to  Port  Said. 
On  the  nth,  the  British  ships  opened  fire,  and  Lord  Gran- 
ville telegraphed  to  Lord  Dufferin,  ambassador  in  Constan- 
tinople, that,  so  far  as  Her  Majesty's  Government  could  see, 
a  resort  to  force  was  the  only  means  of  putting  an  end  to  a 
state  of  things  that  had  become  deplorable."  On  the  15th 
the  British  landed  troops  and  seized  the  reins  of  government. 

The  French  Cabinet  then  proposed  an  occupation  of  the 
Suez  Canal,  in  concert  with  the  English,  and  on  July  18 
asked  for  a  credit  of  8,000,000  francs  on  behalf  of  the  Ministry 
of  Marine.     Gambetta  mounted  the  rostrum  for  the  last  time  : 

315 


GAMBETTA 

*'  Let  not  France  be  shorn  of  her  heritage !  The  more 
ancient  it  is,  the  more  sacred!  "  "A  Bismarckian  trap!  " 
someone  interrupted.  "  One  must  give  that  statesman  his  due — 
he  who  is  as  firm  and  self-restrained  as  he  is  daring  at  certain 
moments;  he  never  troubles  his  head  about  anything  that  is 
not  closely  bound  up  with  German  interests.  It  is  absurd 
to  see  Prince  Bismarck's  finger  in  every  plan  and  every  action. 
Do  nothing  without  mature  consideration  of  your  own 
interests. 

"  Some  have  spoken  of  the  *  national  Egyptian  party,'  of 
'  Egyptian  nationality  ' ;  they  have  found  out  that  this  people, 
which  has  been  in  bondage  for  forty  centuries,  is  on  the  eve 
of  creating  or  re-discovering  the  principles  of  1789  in  the  sub- 
terranean vaults  of  the  Pyramids  !  ...  It  is  not  for  the  sake 
of  Egyptian  nationality  or  the  Egyptian  national  party  that 
we  ought  to  go  to  Egypt;  it  is  for  the  French  nation.  Unfor- 
tunately there  are  people  who  have  come  to  the  conclusion 
that  Arabi  Pacha  is  a  very  formidable  power,  and  that  the 
Egyptian  army  needs  at  least  50,000  Frenchmen  to  disperse 
it!  " 

The  Anglo-French  entente  must  be  preserved  at  all  costs,  to 
meet  any  situation  that  may  arise  :  "I  know  no  other  policy 
that  would  be  any  help  to  us  in  the  most  terrible  crisis  that 
we  might  have  to  face.  What  I  say  to  you  to-day,  I  say  with 
a  deep  sense  of  insight  into  the  future  :  never  break  off  the 
alliance  with  England.  I  am  a  sincere  friend  of  the  English, 
but  not  to  such  an  extent  that  I  would  sacrifice  French 
interests  on  their  behalf.  Besides,  you  may  rest  assured 
that  the  English,  like  the  good  statesmen  they  are,  will  think 
well  only  of  allies  who  can  make  themselves  respected,  who 
do  not  lose  sight  of  their  own  interests.  What  I  dread  more 
than  anything  is  that  you  may  hand  over  to  England,  for 
good  and  all,  territories,  rivers  and  rights  of  way  where  your 
title  to  live  and  to  trade  is  no  less  valid  than  theirs.  That 
is  the  spirit  in  which  I  shall  vote  for  the  credits.  I  give  you 
the  money;  I  think  the  sum  is  inadequate;  but  I  shall  give  it 
you  with  the  assurance  that  what  the  Chamber  is  ratifying 
to-day  is  not  a  matter  of  credits,  but  a  matter  of  future  policy  : 

316 


DEA'IIl 

the  Mediterranean  remaining  a  theatre  for  French  activities, 
and  Egypt  being  torn  from  the  grasp  of  Moslem  fanaticism, 
sheltered  from  these  raids  of  a  barrack-room  soldiery,  to  come 
once  more  within  the  ambit  of  European  politics.  That  is 
why  I  give  you  the  money,  and  that  is  why  my  friends  can 
associate  their  vote  with  mine." 

I  witnessed  this  sitting  from  the  Strangers'  Gallery,  i  can 
picture  the  scene  as  if  it  were  yesterday.  The  great  orator 
began  slowly,  in  a  low,  solemn  tone;  such  was  Mirabeau's 
way.  The  mighty  engine,  just  as  it  was  getting  rt-ady  to 
start,  seemed  to  be  straining  itself,  to  be  summoning  from  its 
innermost  vitals  the  forces  it  was  about  to  unchain.  Little 
by  little,  the  movement  grew  faster;  at  last  he  burst  forth  into 
flame,  a  flame  that  seared  and  devoured  all  that  lay  in  its 
path.  The  speaker  had  to  face  that  coalition  of  extremist 
sections  which  was  to  become  a  stock  feature  of  the  parlia- 
mentary game  for  more  than  thirty  years;  and  at  the  same 
time  he  had  against  him  the  friends  of  the  Elysee.  Under 
the  pitiless  light  of  that  glass-roofed  hall,  I  saw  that  hostile 
throng,  their  eyes  glaring  distrust,  waiting  to  pounce.  At 
times,  his  words  swept  over  the  shuddering  Assembly  like  a 
gale,  and  their  heads  bowed  beneath  the  blast  like  ears  of 
corn.  It  was  a  natural  force,  a  cyclone.  Every  note  was 
struck,  from  mournful  irony  and  savage  indignation  to  the 
swelling  organ-roll  of  glorious  memories  and  the  magic 
clarion-call  of  hope.  When  he  spoke  of  "  the  doctors  of  the 
law  around  the  mosque  of  El-Ahzar,"  it  was  as  if  one  were 
looking  at  a  picture  by  Delacroix.  And  all  through  the  inci- 
sive reasoning  of  the  man  who  had  lately  held  office  and  knew 
to  a  nicety  how  far  we  had  to  reckon  with  the  factor  of  military 
revolt  and  Arabi's  power  of  resistance,  one  was  conscious  of  a 
scorn  that  he  did  not  trouble  to  disguise  for  the  blind  infatua- 
tion of  ignorance  and  frivolity  which,  from  age  to  age,  fly 
in  the  face  of  experience  and  wisdom.  A  young  hothead,  on 
the  Extreme  Left,  had  ventured  on  a  misguided  interruption  : 
"  Don't  jeer  at  the  dawn  of  the  Egyptian  1789  !  "  (just  as,  in 
after  days,  others  believed  in  the  "  Liberalism  "  of  the  Young 
Turks,  etc.).     Gambetta  nailed  him  to  his  seat  with  an  Olym- 

317 


GAMBETTA 

plan  retort.  Obviously,  he  took  a  malicious  delight  in  play- 
ing with  the  difficulty;  with  something  of  an  artist's  joy  in 
his  craft  did  he  use  his  power  to  infuriate  his  opponents.  In 
speaking  of  the  English,  after  remarking  that  he  wanted  to 
be  their  friend,  not  their  dupe,  and  that  they  only  respect 
those  who  can  hold  their  own  with  them,  he  pointed  out  the 
differences  in  their  colonising  methods,  according  as  they  have 
to  govern  peoples  of  their  own  race  and  standard  of  civilisa- 
tion, or  peoples  who  for  centuries  have  lived  "  under  the 
lash."  "  Under  the  lash!  "  At  these  words,  as  at  a  blow 
from  a  whip,  more  than  one  generous  and  humane  soul 
winced. 

Throughout  this  great  fighting  speech  there  ran  as  a  refrain 
the  cries  of  the  patriot,  the  moving  accents  of  the  Republican 
deeply  wounded  by  unjust  suspicions,  the  appeal  to  painful 
memories:  "I  have  the  right  to  say  that  both  before  and 
after  1870  my  chief  and  most  abiding  care  has  been  for  the 
security  of  France ;  that  I  should  loathe  myself,  should  deny 
myself  the  honour  of  ever  addressing  my  country  again,  if  I 
could  bring  myself  to  throw  anything  in  the  scale  against  her 
future  and  her  glory  !  "  When  he  exclaimed,  in  a  peroration 
that  still  rings  in  our  ears:  "  I  give  you  the  money,  but  on 
one  condition  :  the  Mediterranean  remaining  the  theatre  of 
French  action,"  the  style  was  certainly  a  little  slipshod:  a 
"sea"  that  remains  a  "theatre"  o£  "activities"  would 
hardly  commend  itself  to  one  who  chooses  his  words  carefully ; 
but  we  saw  the  blue  sea,  crowded  with  sails,  the  great  French 
lake  conquered  for  civilisation  by  our  fathers,  all  France's 
achievements  in  the  East,  her  glory,  her  prestige  for  centuries 
past,  since  the  Crusades.  There  was  in  this  picture  a 
wizardry  of  vivid  presentation,  a  colour  that  could  never  fade 
from  our  minds.  In  the  ardour  of  our  twenty  years  we  were 
fairly  carried  away.  This  man,  still  so  young  and  so  fascinat- 
ing, who  embodied  a  tragic  page  in  our  history,  also  incar- 
nated in  our  eyes  that  which  is  dearest  to  every  heart — hope. 

While  he  was  speaking,  his  mother  lay  dying  at  St.  Mand^. 
As  he  stepped  down  from  the  rostrum,  his  friends  hurried 
him  away.     While  bending  over  his  mother  on  her  deathbed, 

318 


DEATH 

he  heard  the  newsboys  sliouiing  "  Gambetta's  Speech  !  " — 
the  speech  that  left  him  still  aglow  with  passion.  He  had  his 
dead  mother  taken  to  Nice:  "  All  alone,  I  am  escorting  my 
poor  mother  to  her  last  resting-place,  down  there,  facing  iht- 
sea,  beneath  the  sun  and  the  flowers,  near  her  beloved  sister." 
Alas,  how  soon  he  was  to  join  her  I 

Meanwhile,  in  London,  the  Cabinet  voted  a  credit  of 
;{^2, 280,000.  In  Paris  the  Senate,  by  205  votes  to  5,  granted 
the  8,000,000  francs  demanded  for  the  protection  of  the  Suez 
Canal ;  almost  the  entire  Right  abstained  from  voting 
(July  25).  In  the  Chamber,  on  the  29th,  M.  Clemenceau 
opposed  intervention  in  any  shape  or  form  :  "  Europe  is 
swarming  with  soldiers,  everyone  is  waiting.  The  Powers 
reserve  their  liberty  for  the  future;  let  us  reserve  that  of 
France."  M.  de  Freycinet  advocated  intervention  on  a 
limited  scale,  the  eventual  protection  of  the  Canal.  He  got 
no  more  than  75  votes.  Gambetta's  friends  voted  against  the 
proposal.  M.  de  Freycinet's  supporters  took  him  to  task, 
maintaining  that  a  half-hearted  intervention  was  worse  than 
none  at  all.  It  was,  indeed,  not  a  little  strange  to  censure  the 
Government  for  not  doing  its  utmost,  and  at  the  same  time 
not  even  allow  it  to  do  the  least  that  could  be  done.  But 
after  all,  even  if  Gambetta's  friends  had  backed  the  Cabinet, 
it  would  not  have  had  a  majority.  France's  day  was  over  in 
that  land  which  her  genius  had  fertilised..  After  being  all  in 
all  there  for  fifty  years,  she  was  in  one  hour  reduced  to  a 
cipher.  Our  refusal  to  occupy  the  Suez  Canal  shut  us  out 
from  Egypt  for  ever.  The  Freycinet  Ministry  resigned 
(July  30).  On  September  13,  at  Tel-el-Kebir,  the  Egyptian 
army  was  put  to  rout  by  General  Wolseley  in  the  space  of 
twenty  minutes. 

The  Mediterranean,  together  with  the  Rhine,  has  always 
been  the  great  object  of  France's  aspirations.  For  centuries 
it  was  a  Prankish  sea.  At  every  period  of  political  turmoil 
and  religious  disputes  our  influence  in  the  East  has  undergone 
a  crisis.  Our  greatest  kings,  our  greatest  Ministers, 
Henri  IV.  and  Richelieu,  for  instance,  managed  to  promote, 
side  by  side,  our  forward  drive  on  the  Eastern  marches  and 

319 


GAMBETTA 

in  the  Southern  sea.  Could  we,  after  1870,  remain  both  on 
the  Vosges  and  in  the  Mediterranean?  Jules  Ferry  and 
Gambetta  thought  we  could,  and  the  present  w  riter,  who  was 
then  just  entering  upon  the  stage  of  public  life,  shared  their 
view.  To-day,  history  has  given  her  verdict.  In  the  most 
terrible  war  of  all,  the  possession  of  a  vast  colonial  empire, 
very  much  larger  than  the  one  that  was  then  in  question — for, 
besides  Tunisia,  it  includes  the  Soudan,  the  Congo,  Madagas- 
car, Indo-China  and  Morocco — so  far  from  proving  a  source 
of  weakness  to  France,  has  turned  out  to  be  a  tower  of 
strength,  notably  increasing  her  resources  both  in  men  and 
material.  We  can  all  see  this  now,  after  the  event.  At  that 
time,  however,  the  country  had  barely  emerged  from  ill-fated 
ventures  and  military  disasters.  The  difficulties  of  the 
Algerian  conquest,  the  Mexican  fiasco  and  memories  of  the 
invasion  still  weighed  on  our  souls  like  an  incubus.  Every- 
where we  expected  to  find  obstacles  in  our  path,  to  be  thrown 
off  our  track,  to  be  enmeshed  in  snares.  Men,  gold,  perhaps 
blood,  would  be  needed;  we  were  inclined  to  hoard  what  we 
had  left.  Many  Frenchmen  felt  that  it  was  foolhardy  to 
divert  French  troops  and  French  money  to  remote  enterprises, 
while  her  flank  was  exposed  to  the  enemy.  We  did  not  care 
to  dismantle  the  frontier;  we  still  dreaded  some  Bismarckian 
thrust;  we  asked  ourselves  apprehensively  whether,  in  going 
so  far  afield,  we  should  not  be  playing  into  Germany's  hands. 
France,  though  already  on  the  upward  path,  lacked  self- 
confidence;  she  still  bore  the  burden  of  the  vanquished  and 
the  weak. 

There  were  some  who  held  that  in  continuing  to  act  in  con- 
cert with  England  in  Egypt  we  ran  the  risk  of  falling  out 
with  her.  Even  if  the  worst  had  come  to  the  worst,  there  is 
one  thing  that  the  French  forget  too  often  and  the  English 
never  lose  sight  of — the  value  of  guarantees.  Once  they  have 
seized  hold,  they  never  let  go.  On  any  assumption,  to  aban- 
don our  rights,  our  position  in  Egypt,  without  getting  any- 
thing in  return  was  unutterable  folly.  We  ought  to  have 
been  on  the  spot. 

Throughout  all  this  period  of  our  history,  France  seems  to 

320 


DKATJI 

live  under  ihc  brocjdm^  biiadtju  <»l  ilic  l«jrei^ner'.s  nmII. 
Always  Bismarck  lias  a  finger  in  uur  (luarreis,  always  he 
inflames  and  exploits  our  dissensions.  Prussia  had  been  the 
cancer  of  Germany;  Bismarrk  was  the  evil  genius  of  Europe 
and  the  scourge  of  France.  AccursM  be  defeat,  not  only  for 
piling  ruin  upon  ruin,  but  for  leaving  so  mans-  faint  hearts 
and  feel.>le  hands  in  its  trail  !  A  contiucrcd  nation  is  never  a 
nation  of  the  free.  Our  children,  at  anv  rate,  will  n(jt  have  to 
endure  tlu;  agonies  that  we  went  through  long  after  the  date 
at  which  our  present  story  ends  down  lo  the  eve  of  the  war  (jf 
1914! 

At  the  time  when  these  events  were  unfolding,  public 
opinion,  for  the  most  part,  as  always  happens  in  such  cases, 
had  no  inkling  of  their  significance.  We  were  not  told  the 
details,  we  did  not  know  what  was  going  on  behind  the 
scenes.  Gambetta  had  been  under  a  delusion  as  to  the  atti- 
tude of  the  British  Government.  He  had  wanted  to  bind  it 
irrevocably,  and  had  thought  that  it  was  already  amenable  to 
his  wishes.  The  British  Ministers,  knowing  that  his  position 
was  somewhat  shaky,  had  refused  to  commit  themselves  very 
far.  liven  before  the  fall  of  his  Ministry,  luiro|)e  had  wished 
to  have  a  voice  in  the  matter,  and  as  soon  as  he  was  over- 
thrown the  London  Cabinet  came  round  to  the  views  of  the 
other  Powers.  Bismarck,  who  in  l'"ebruary  and  even  at  the 
beginning  of  March  had  acquiesced  in  the  intervention  of 
England  and  France  in  the  name  ot  the  European  concert, 
some  days  later  advanced  the  claims  of  Turkey.  The  Frey- 
cinet  Ministry,  compelled  to  rely  on  the  elements  that  had 
brought  about  Gambetta's  downfall,  was  set  the  dilTicult  task 
of  satisfving  l^lngland,  Germany  and  the  Chamber.  The 
whole  peritid  of  French  history  that  we  are  studying  is  domi- 
nated by  the  German  terror.  We  cannot  really  understand 
the  conflicts  of  the  National  .Assembly,  the  crisis  of  1S77  and 
the  Tunisian  and  Egyptian  alTairs,  unless  we  bear  in  mind 
the  perpetual  menace  of  Bismarck.  The  disaster  of  1882  in 
the  Mediterranean  was  tiie  direct  outcome  of  our  defeats  in 
1870  on  the  Continent. 

W^e  mav  now  form  an  estimate  of  Gambetta  as  an  orator. 

r.2i  V 


GAMBETTA 

He  ranks  with  Mirabeau,  Vergniaud  and  Danton  as  among 
the  greatest  speakers  of  France  since  the  Revolution.  Like 
Berryer,  however,  he  will  hardly  bear  reading,  he  had  to  be 
seen  and  heard. 

His  style  is  as  a  rule  unwieldy,  copious,  loose-knit.  He 
can  write  well  when  he  lays  himself  out  to  do  so;  witness  the 
portrait  of  Lachaud,  sketched  when  he  was  twenty-four.  His 
speech  on  the  plebiscite  in  1869  is  a  more  compact  piece  of 
work  than  his  popular  harangues  of  1873  and  1874,  which 
he  delivered  off-hand,  heedless  of  form ;  and  naturally  his 
fighting  speeches  were  less  elaborate  than  those  in  which  he 
expounded  his  doctrines.  At  first  he  writes  them  out  in  full, 
but  it  is  not  long  before  he  contents  himself  with  making  out 
a  skeleton — exordium,  middle  and  peroration — and  this  he 
submits  to  a  friend  for  approval.  If  ever  he  wanders  from 
the  track  thus  marked  out,  his  friendly  critic  sets  him  right. 
In  a  later  phase  he  tests  his  arguments  beforehand  in  private 
conversations,  in  gatherings  of  intimates.  As  he  goes  on,  he 
prepares  and  revises  less  and  less.  He  almost  invariably 
uses  too  many  words ;  he  has  not  or  will  not  take  the  time  to 
he  brief.  Like  Bismarck  and  Cavour,  he  recked  nothing  of 
literary  polish;  all  he  cared  about  was  the  result;  all  he  aimed 
at  was  to  grip  his  audience,  to  convince  it,  to  lead  it  whither 
he  would.  It  is  true  that  a  political  sp>eech  is  primarily  a 
weapon,  not  a  work  of  art,  but  there  is  no  reason  why  it 
should  not  be  both.  In  order  to  be  great  in  action,  a  man 
need  not  be  a  poor  speaker;  Demosthenes  is  a  case  in  point. 
Oratory  should  not  smell  of  the  lamp,  but  on  the  other  hand 
it  should  not  fall  outside  the  province  of  literary  criticism. 
We  may  grant,  indeed,  that  a  superabundance  of  words, 
which  enables  the  improviser  to  see  his  sentences  coming,  is 
often  very  attractive  to  the  ear,  though  it  repels  the  reader. 
In  writing,  reiteration  is  a  weakness,  in  speaking  it  is  a  source 
of  strength.  But  the  effect  thus  produced  is  evanescent; 
nothing  remains  except  a  few*  memorable  phrases,  a  few 
bright  coins  from  the  speaker's  mint,  the  rest  dies  with  him. 
There  is  no  law  that  forbids  us  to  address  posterity  as  well, 
and  only  injudicious  admirers  will  hold  up  as  a  merit  what 

322 


DEATH 

is  certainly  a  defect.  Style  counts  for  little  in  a  man's  politi- 
cal achievements,  but  without  it  his  reputation  tor  eloquence 
cannot  live.  Nor  are  we  here  girding  at  commonplaces  or 
irregularities.  Commonplaces  are  the  orator's  daily  bread; 
political  audiences  are  soon  nettled  by  a  speaker  who  sees 
further  than  they;  if  his  ideas  are  in  advance  of  theirs,  they 
are  baffled  and  disconcerted ;  hence  the  lack  of  harmony 
between  (he  spirit  of  the  Assemblies  and  the  intuitive  genius 
of  a  poet  like  Lamartine,  or  the  profound  calculations  of  a 
political  philosopher  like  Tocqueville.  As  for  irregularities, 
they  may  sotnetimes  invest  a  speech  with  singular  charm. 
No,  we  are  thinking  of  the  vagueness  of  language  which 
arises  from  looseness  of  thought,  illogical  constructions, 
mixed  metaphors,  nay,  even  solecisms  which  the  Tribune — 
great  lover  of  letters  though  he  was — helped  to  introduce  into 
the  currency  of  the  language,  but  which  would  not  be  found 
in  any  writer  of  the  seventeenth  or  eighteenth  century;  yet 
for  all  that,  with  his  impetuous  outbursts,  his  flashes  of  fire 
and  enthusiasm,  his  sweeping  eagle-ilights,  the  cries  that 
spurt  forth  from  the  very  depths  of  his  being,  his  gestures 
that  bespoke  now  the  wrath  of  the  insurgent  democracy,  now 
the  anguish  of  invaded  France,  that  blend  of  suppleness  and 
strength,  of  audacity  and  gentleness,  of  familiarity  and 
vehemence,  he  must  be  reckoned  as  one  of  the  most  amazing 
oratorical  forces  of  our  time.  He  was  a  volcano  that  belched 
forth  slag  and  turbid  smoke  together  with  burning  lava. 

On  August  13  Freycinet  had  been  succeeded  by  Duclerc. 
When  the  Chambers  reassembled,  Gambetta  resumed  his  old 
position  as  Chairman  of  the  Committee  for  Army  Affairs. 
He  now  went  on  working  at  his  plan  and  pulling  his  various 
strings  in  Europe.  Skobeleff,  the  very  day  after  he  set 
foot  in  France,  secured  an  introduction  to  him.  It  was 
arranged  that  the  general  and  the  statesman  should  dine 
together  in  private,  in  order  that  they  might  chat  at  their 
leisure.  "  We  met  at  six  o'clock  in  the  evening,"  said 
Skobeleff,  "  and  did  not  part  company  till  two  in  the  morning. 
His  bright,  sparkling  eyes  had  in  them  a  humorous,  kindly 
twinkle  which  lent  a  peculiar  charm   to  his  talk.     When   he 

323  V  2 


GAMBETTA 

grew  excited,  his  nostrils  would  dilate,  his  lips  wore  a  disdain- 
ful curve,  his  eyes  flashed  superbly  and  his  whole  cast  of 
features  assumed  an  air  of  majesty.  He  had  a  wonderful 
instinct  for  military  matters,  and  adored  the  army.  The  army, 
strangely  enough,  seeing  that  he  was  not  a  member  of  its 
caste,  had  claimed  him  for  its  own;  it  relied  upon  him,  if  not 
to  lead  it,  at  any  rate  to  shape  its  future." 

His  friends  had  just  founded,  under  his  patronage,  the 
"  Patriots'  League,"  with  Alfred  Mezieres,  Felix  Faure,  Paul 
D^roulede,  Ferdinand  Buisson,  fidouard  D^taille,  Antonin 
Merci(^%  Alphonse  de  Neuville,  Jules  Massenet,  Joseph 
Reinach,  Sansboeuf  and  others.  The  League  had  for  its 
object  "  the  revision  of  the  Treaty  of  Frankfort  and  the 
restoration  of  Alsace-Lorraine  to  France,  and  for  its  task  the 
fostering  of  military  and  patriotic  education  and  propaganda. 
Henri  Martin  was  its  president.  "To  accept  a  first  mutila- 
tion," said  the  venerable  historian,  "  is  to  court  a  second 
dismemberment." 

Gambetta's  health,  however,  was  more  seriously  under- 
mined than  ever,  and  his  fits  of  despondency  were  growing 
more  and  more  frequent.  On  July  6,  after  upholding  before 
the  Committee  his  ideas  regarding  the  army,  he  exclaimed  : 
"  It  seems  to  me  a  paltry  proceeding  to  deny  myself  my  true 
happiness  merely  in  order  to  follow  the  unsatisfying  mirage 
of  political  renown.  Two  days  ago,  however,  1  was  able  to 
achieve  something  fairly  useful ;  I  had  my  scheme  for  military 
reconstruction  approved  by  the  committee.  By  this  last  shred 
I  still  cling  to  the  interests  of  our  country;  I  shall  enter  upon 
this  final  conflict,  and  if  I  fail  I  can  face  with  equanimity  the 
prospect  of  no  longer  wearying  my  purblind  contemporaries 
with  my  designs  for  a  national  revival." 

As  if  with  a  presentiment  that  the  end  is  near,  he  opens  his 
heart  to  his  friends  and  already,  in  some  way,  to  posterity  : 
"  I  regret  nothing,  for  1  have  never  acted  but  in  the  higher 
interests  of  my  party.  Sooner  or  later,  the  day  will  dawn 
when  men  will  do  me  justice.  Even  if  it  does  not  come  till 
after  my  death,  I  shall  not  grieve.  I  pin  my  faith  upon  his- 
tory.    If  we  can  abide  the  supreme  verdict  of  history,  the 

324 


DEATH 

arrows  of  slander  and  calumny  fly  past  us  without  even 
grazing  our  skin."  Yet  they  did  wound  him,  for  all  these 
brave  words.  To  bo  hated  is  always  depressinf^.  He  had  to 
taste,  until  the  bitter  end,  the  dregs  of  base  creduhtv  and  the 
gall  of  ignoble  souls.  If  he  did  not  answer  his  traducers,  if 
he  begged  his  friends  not  to  answer  them,  he  could  not  bring 
himself  to  ignore  any  of  their  accusations.  In  fact,  they 
seemed  to  afford  him  a  sort  of  grim  and  poignant  pleasure. 
Just  before  his  death  he  had  read  to  him  the  articles  which 
made  mock  of  his  approaching  end.  (Ranc,  Souvenirs.)  He 
consoled  himself  by  calling  to  mind  the  famous  scene  of 
Richelieu's  farewell  to  Father  Joseph  :  the  Capuchin  monk 
with  the  shadow  of  death  already  upon  him,  and  the  Cardinal 
bending  over  his  old  confessor  and  announcing  to  him — the 
traveller  to  that  unknown  country  where  no  news  of  this 
world  ever  penetrates — the  latest  victory  of  his  army  in 
Alsace  :  "  Father  Joseph  !  Father  Joseph  !  Brisach  is  ours  !  " 
.'Xnd  now  at  last  he  is  to  realise  his  fondest  dream,  the 
marriage  that  he  had  been  planning  for  so  long  :  **  .As  soon 
as  you  wish  it,  my  dear  Leonie,  we  will  take  advantage  of  the 
dispensations  of  our  civil  code,  here  or  beyond  the  frontier, 
whichever  you  choose.  I  shall  not  be  satisfied  at  heart  until 
the  day  when  you  become  in  name,  as  you  already  are  in  fact, 
my  inseparable  and  eternal  partner."  His  mother  was  dead, 
he  had  fallen  from  power,  and  she  who  loved  him  now  con- 
sented to  become  his  wife.  On  Septemljer  21  he  writes  from 
I.es  Fretes  :  "  I  feel  sure  that  you  are  already  settled  at  Ville 
d'Avray  and  that,  as  is  only  right,  you  will  act  as  mistress  of 
the  house,  thus  preparing  yourself,  as  quickly  as  possible,  for 
the  part  you  are  destined  to  play."  In  this  happiness,  so 
eagerly  craved,  he  is  to  find  balm  for  his  stricken  soul  :  "  I 
feel  more  and  more  assured  that  I  am  going  to  be  happy.  I 
am  glad  to  have  hit  upon  so  ideal  a  companion,  and  I  shall 
very  soon  be  joining  her  who  alone  can  now  bring  sunshine 
into  my  life,  soothe  my  troubles  and  give  me  the  infinite  joy 
of  owning  a  pearl  beyond  price.  It  is  this  perfect  conct)rd  of 
our  SfMils  that  links  us  so  divinely  in  a  union  such  as  few  can 
ever  know." 

325 


GAMBETTA 

At  the  beginning  of  October  he  returned  to  Les  Jardies. 
The  announcement  of  his  marriage  was  communicated  to  his 
father  and  to  a  few  intimate  friends.  He  lengthened  his  stay 
in  the  country,  and  was  still  there  when  winter  came  on.  On 
November  27,  about  eleven  o'clock  in  the  morning,  he  was 
wounded  in  his  right  hand  by  a  bullet  from  a  revolver  which 
he  was  incautiously  handling.  In  a  few  days'  time  he  seemed 
to  have  recovered.  "  In  January,"  he  said,  "  I  shall  make 
my  reappearance  with  a  good-humoured  speech,  a  speech  of 
reconciliation."  Towards  the  middle  of  December,  however, 
he  began  to  feel  acute  pain  in  his  right  side.  Appendicitis, 
followed  by  perityphlitis,  set  in.  An  operation  might  perhaps 
have  saved  him,  but  the  doctors  did  not  care  to  risk  it.  Intes- 
tinal perforation  brought  on  death  on  December  31,  a  few 
minutes  before  midnight.  He  was  then  aged  forty-four  years, 
eight  months  and  nineteen  days.  A  woman  kissed  him  on 
the  forehead  and  he  vanished  into  the  darkness,  for  ever. 

Paris  and  France  honoured  Gambetta  with  a  splendid 
funeral,  a  national  and  intensely  human  ceremony.  In  that 
tomb  France  was  interring  a  part  of  her  own  life.  The  body 
was  taken  to  Paris  and  placed  in  the  Palais  Bourbon.  For 
three  days  deputations  from  all  over  the  country  came  to  pay 
their  respects  to  the  dead.  Among  the  visitors  was  Victor 
Hugo,  with  his  grandchildren.  An  innumerable  throng  filed 
through  the  room,  day  and  night.  The  funeral  took  place  on 
January  7,  1883.  The  hearse  bore  on  its  pall  the  heraldic 
crown  of  the  city  of  Thann.  Behind  his  coffin  marched  a 
representative  gathering  from  the  length  and  breadth  of 
France,  not  the  France  of  the  Treaty  of  Frankfort,  stripped  by 
fraud  and  violence,  but  the  real  France,  France  in  her  entirety, 
Alsace  and  Lorraine  at  the  head.  Strasburg,  Metz  and 
Colmar  were  among  the  leaders ;  the  procession  was  headed 
by  men  from  the  captured  cities.  Gambetta  in  death  passed 
by  the  statue  of  Strasburg  in  mourning.  Was  not  this  a 
triumph  in  the  grave,  a  harbinger  of  victories  to  come  ? 

The  P^re-Lachaise  cemetery  was  not  reached  till  nightfall. 
Brisson,  Peyrat  and  Billot,  the  War  Minister,  made  speeches. 
Henri  Martin  lamented  "  the  Fate  that  had  cut  short,  after 

326 


DEATH 

toLirleen  r.rowded  years,  a  career  of  three  phases,  each  of  them 
alone  enough  to  win  a  man  imperishable  glory."    Me  repealed 
what  a  famous  royalist  had  said  of  a  famous  revolutionary  : 
"  He   was  magnanimous."      Darkness  was  now  coming  on 
apace.     Paul  Bert  had  no  lime  to  express  all  the  warm  and 
passionate  devotion  that  a  noble  heart  iiad  inspired  in  other 
noble  hearts:    "They  have  celebrated  your  fame,  they  have 
extolled    your    patriotism,    your    matchless    eloquence,    your 
ardent  spirit  and  your  ever-active  brain,  your  genius  that  has 
saved  the  life  of  the  Republic  and  the  honour  of  our  country. 
They  have  told  us  of  your  dreams  for  the  future,  your  uncon- 
querable hope,  of  the  open  wound  of  France  that  was  an  oprn 
wound  in  your  own  heart.     But  for  us  all  this  is  not  enough. 
We  must  tell  the  world  what  you  were  f(jr  vour  friends  dav 
by  day,  we  must  speak  of  your  wondrous,  unrivalled  charitv, 
your  kindliness  and  seductive  grace,  your  never-varying  good 
humour,  your  infectious  outbursts  of  friendly  or  joyous  emo- 
tion, all  that  full-blooded  vitality  that  Death,  as  if  grudging 
it,  has  so  cruelly  quenched.     Where  are  now  your  winning 
smile,  your  firm,  affectionate  clasp  of  the  hand,  your  gentle 
look,  your  frank,   hearty   laugh?     How  you  gripped  us  all, 
how  happy  we  all  were  to  be  yours  !     What  words  of  ours 
can  convey  the  brightness  of  your  intellect,   the   warmth  of 
your  heart?     For  it  is  that  heart  we  loved  above  all  things; 
it  was  by  your  heart  that  you  held  us  in  thrall.     I'or  us,  it 
always  stood  wide  open,  a  fountain  at  which  we  drank  with- 
out stint.     It  was  open  even  to  your  enemies,  for  you  never 
knew  how  to  hate;  it  was  open  even  to  those  whose  treason 
broke  it  in  the  end  !     Let  all  men  know,  at  least,  hcnv  dearly 
vou  were  loved,  how  dearly  you  loved  in  your  turn  !      It  is  no 
detraction  from  your  glory  to  .say  that  you  were  not  merely 
great !  " 

Yes,  it  is  with  the  heart  that  great  things  are  done.  Tiie 
older  we  get,  the  more  inclined  we  are  to  put  goodness  first, 
then  common  sense,  then  talent  and  intellect  last  of  all. 

"  The  crowd  went  down  the  hill  again  and  scattered  into 
(he  night,  bearing  with  it  the  .sorrow  and,  as  it  were,  the 
remorse  for  this  career  so  soon  lopped  off."     (Hanotaux.)     Il 

327 


GAMBETTA 

did  not  know  that  this  stormy  and  splendid  life,  wholly  given 
up  to  the  loftiest  causes — patriotism,  freedom  and  justice — 
had  also  been  a  great  life  of  love.  For  France,  this  death  was 
a  defeat ;  for  Germany,  a  deliverance. 

His  ashes  were  conveyed  to  Nice,  to  join  those  of  his 
humble  forefathers,  near  the  azure  sea  and  the  mountains  of 
snow  and  golden  sunshine  whose  radiance  and  harmony  had 
entered  into  his  soul.  In  the  evening,  as  day  faded,  SpuUer, 
distraught  with  grief,  bade  him  the  last  farewell. 

The  death  of  Gambetta  closes  the  first  period  of  the  Third 
Republic.  Throughout  those  thirteen  years  he  had  been 
among  the  leading  actors,  at  times  the  protagonist,  in  the 
most  momentous  events  :  the  fall  of  the  Second  Empire,  the 
war  with  Germany,  the  1875  Constitution  and  the  fall  of  the 
Parliamentary  Republic,  the  Sixteenth  of  May,  the  Tunisian 
and  Egyptian  affairs.  His  part  in  these  epoch-making  crises 
had  been  now  important,  now  decisive.  He  had  been 
glorious  in  war  and  glorious  in  peace. 

His  work,  which  some  of  his  contemporaries  thought 
ephemeral,  has  endured.  If  France,  after  the  disasters  of 
1870  and  the  suicide  of  the  Monarchy,  has  succeeded  in 
founding  a  system  of  government  that  can  live,  if,  after  so 
many  revolutions  and  ill-fated  experiments,  the  Republic  has 
won  its  battles  both  within  and  without,  it  is  to  him,  more 
than  anyone,  that  the  credit  is  due. 

The  question  has  often  been  raised,  what  his  part  would 
have  been  if  he  had  lived.  In  these  rather  artificial  attempts 
at  conjectural  history,  the  various  sections  of  the  Republican 
party  have  contrived  to  claim  his  policy  for  their  own,  because 
his  aim  was  to  uphold  the  unity  of  the  party  by  means  of 
compromises  and  mutual  concessions,  and  to  flit  from  one 
wing  to  another  of  his  army  in  order  to  lead  it,  as  a  compact 
force,  to  the  conquest  of  power  and  then,  when  the  victory  was 
won,  to  consolidate  the  conquest.  This  explains  why,  on 
certain  paramount  questions,  he  put  forward  different  views 
at  different  times,  always  pursuing,  though  by  divergent 
paths,  the  same  grand  design  :  at  home,  the  triumph  of  the 
Republic,  abroad,  the  regeneration  of  France.     And  just  as 

328 


DEATH 

in   1877  he  did  not  follow  the  samr  policy  as  in   i86(;,  so  in 
1881  he  did  not  follow  the  same  policy  as  in  1877  : 

"  Each  shares  in  him,  all  have  him  as  a  whole.'* 

A  sort  of  cult,  a  fervent  and  passionate  cult,  has  sprunp 
up  around  his  memory.  Hvery  year  a  stnam  of  faithful 
pilgrims  wends  its  way  to  the  little  house  <»f  I.es  Jardies,  the 
resting-place  of  his  heart,  adorned  with  the  < oal-of-arms  of 
every  town  in  Alsace  and  Lorraine,  with  these  two  mottoes: 
In  clade  decus;  spes  in  luctu  ("  Honour  in  defeat,  hope  in 
mourning  ") :  and  the  following  inscription  carved  hv  Alsace- 
Lorrainers  :  "  Our  hopes  are  still  bound  up  with  his  m<'mory, 
as  they  were  linked  with  his  life."  Others  have  come,  in  a 
never-ending  throng,  to  kindle  their  souls  at  this  flame.  Hven 
during  the  great  war,  on  April  6,  i()i6,  we  were  at  T.es  fardies 
with  M.  de  F'reycinet — who,  once  more  a  Minister  (jf  the 
Republic  and  of  the  new  national  defence,  still  hale  and 
upright  in  his  green  old  age,  recalled  that  other  war — and 
with  those  who  have  distinguished  themselves  by  an  unswer\- 
ing  loyalty,  Antonin  Dubost,  Gaston  Thomson,  Joseph 
Reinach,  P^phau,  Etiennc — Etienne  who  every  year,  for 
thirty-eight  years  past,  has  gone  to  Nice  and  placed  a  wreath 
upon  his  tomb. 

Gambetta  was  dearly  loved  in  his  lifetime,  and  is  still  loved 
no  less  dearly.  His  name  is  a  part  of  France's  religion  : 
what  more  glorious  dream  could  a  groat  soul  cherish?  In 
the  blaze  of  that  sunlight,  his  faults,  his  mistakes,  his  incon- 
sistencies disappear  from  view^  France  no  longer  sees  aught 
but  this — that  when  everything  had  crashed  into  ruin,  wh<'n 
all  seemed  lost,  there  artise  one  man  who  bore  up  the  flag, 
with  indomitable  faith,  to  the  end.  She  loves  him  vanquished 
no  less  than  if  he  had  been  victorious.  Vanquished,  do  1 
say?  Nay,  he  is  victorious.  Yes,  he  is  victorious  to-day  by 
our  side.  It  is  because  he  held  out  in  1870  that  France  did 
not  lose  the  world's  esteem  or  her  own  self-respect,  that  she 
kept  her  rank  in  the  human  family,  that  she  raised  hers<'lf 
and  fulfilled  the  destiny  that  he  had  planned.  There  can  be 
no  great  nation  or  great  man  without  a  great  idea.  .\  nation 
like  France  does  not  own  itself  finally  beaten  because  of  three 

329 


AMBETTA 

defeats  :  that  is  what  he  felt,  that  is  what  he  proclaimed  with 
irresistible  force,  with  deathless  eloquence.  From  1914  to 
1918  his  soul  fought  in  company  with  our  heroes.  His  ideal, 
the  union  of  all  Frenchmen  in  a  victorious  Republic,  has 
proved  a  reality.  In  the  hour  when  France  signed  the  peace 
of  Right  he  was  present  in  our  midst  and  took  part  in  the 
ceremony. 

On  December  9,  1918,  when  we  entered  Strasburg,  we  read, 
on  a  house  in  the  Grand-Rue,  the  following  scrawl,  an  artless 
and  touching  effusion  of  popular  feeling:  "Sleep  in  peace, 
Gambetta  !  At  last  the  glorious  dawn  of  the  day  you  dreamed 
of  has  arisen  for  us  !  " 

France,  Alsace  and  Lorraine  have  always  given  themselves 
freely  to  those  who  loved  them  well  and  never  doubted  that 
they  were  sound. 


330 


BIBLIOGRAPHY 

I  believe  I  have  consulted  all  ilial  has  been  published  with 
regard  to  Gambelta.  I  have  chiefly  made  use  of  thr 
following- :  — 

Parliamentary  papers,  the  National  Assembly's  In<|uirv 
into  the  War  of  1870-71  and  the  French  and  (icrman  works 
on  that  campaign  and  on  the  National  Defence  (icjvernmrnt. 

M.  Joseph  Reinach's  Discours  ct  plaidoyers  politiqitcs  dc 
Gavibetta;  le  Minisierc  (lambctla;  la  Vic  politique  dc 
Gambctta. 

M.  de  Freycinet's  La  Guerre  en  Province;  Souvenirs;  Lc 
Question  d'Egypte. 

M.  Gabriel  Hanotaux's  Ilistoire  dc  la  France  cuniem- 
poraine;  the  Vicomte  de  .Meaux's  Souvenirs;  M.  Henri 
Galli's  Gambetta  et  V Alsace-Lorraine ;  M.  \\-[\.  Cihensi's 
Gambelta  per  Gambetta. 

My  warmest  thanks  are  due  to  Colonel  V.  Dupuis,  chief  of 
the  historical  section  of  the  General  Staflf,  for  plans,  etc.. 
of  military  operations;  to  M.  Georges  Delahache,  for  papers 
relating  to  the  negotiations  of  187 1  ;  to  Mme.  Arthur  Ranc, 
who  has  kindly  entrusted  me  with  a  number  of  unpublished 
letters  from  Gambetta  to  her  husband;  to  Mme.  Marti, 
daughter  of  Jules  Grosjean,  who  has  forwarded  to  mr  the 
original  text  of  the  protest  from  the  Alsace-f.orraine  Deputies, 
read  by  her  father  to  the  National  Assembly;  to  MM.  Ilmile 
Boutroux  and  Alfred  R^bellian,  for  the  unpublished  speech 
delivered  by  Gambetta  at  Marseilles,  in  th«-  Mu.s.set  Theatre,  in 
1869,  and  for  the  unpublished  letters  written  to  Rartlulemy. 
from  St.  Sebastian,  in  1871;  and  to  M.  P.-H.  (ihensi.  for 
unpublished  letters  from  (iambetta  to  Ruiz. 


331 


INDEX 


About,  Edmond,  334. 

Adam,  Edmond,  139,  143. 

Adam,  Mme.,  57,  219,  214. 

Albert,  Prince  Consort,  35. 

Alcmbert,  D',  9. 

Alexander  II.,  Tsar,  41,  303. 

Alexander  III.,  Tsar,  303. 

Allain-Targ^,  114,  152,  214,  200. 

Alton-SWe,  Comte  d",  185. 

Andrieux,  M.  Louis,  307,  309. 

Arabi,  Colon?!,  304,  316,  317. 

.Arago,  Emmanui'l,  14,  109,  140. 

Ariige,  Arnaud  de  1',  152. 

Arnault.  M.,  4. 

Arndt,  131. 

Amim,  Graf  von,  181,  183,  253. 

Aubigny,  Comte  d",  305. 

Audififret-Pasquier,  Due  d',  75,   157,   150,   I75, 

178,  186,  192,  216,  218,  233,  241. 
Augereau,  77. 
Aumale,  Due  d',  143  155, 175, 176,  233,  241,  253, 

303. 
Aurelle  des  Paladines,  General  d",  71,  78-80,  83 

85-88,  90,  91,  93-95,  97,  98. 

Bainville,  M.  Jacques,  250  254. 

Balzac,  261. 

Bamberger,  140. 

Bapst,  234. 

Baragnon,  214. 

Barbte,  25. 

Barodet,  175,  299. 

Barri^re,  CamiUe,  152. 

Barri^re,  Pallu  de  la,  122. 

Barry,  Genera    80. 

BartWlemy,  143,  152. 

Baudin,  18,  20-22,  25,  31. 

Baza-jie,  59.  79   122,  123. 

Beaconsfield,  Lord  ,256,  291 

Becker,  131. 

Bedeau,  23. 

Benedett',  40,  41-43,  49 

B^renger,  Rene,  236. 

Bernstein,  259. 

Berryer,  10,  17   19  21,  23,  25,  314.  322. 

Bert,  Paul,  114   152   299,  327. 

Berthelot,  152. 

Bessidres,  4. 

Bessol,  Du,  122. 

Bibesco,  Prince  Nicholas,  19. 

Billot,  72,  86,  92,  122,  326. 

Bismarck,  Grat  Herbert  von,  247,  248,  250. 

Bismarck,  Prince  von,  34,  37-40,  42,  63,  66,  75, 
91,  98,  103-105,  107,  108,  115-117,  123, 
129-131,  139,  140,  158,  159,  182,  183, 
216,  218,  221,  224,  231,  246  247-249, 
251-253.  256,  258,  267,  268,  279,  .'84, 
286,  287,  290,  291,  293,  306,  312,  313,  316, 
320-322. 

Bismarck-Bohlen,  129. 

Blanc,  Louis,  21,  139,  140,  142,  156,  186,  187, 
190,  192,  237. 

Blanqui,  52,  58,  284. 

Blowitz,  251. 

Boisguillebert,  165. 

Bonnet,  General,  73. 

Borel,  General,  75,  79,  83,  84,  93,  122. 

Bossack,  General,  73. 

Bossuet,  8,  30. 

Bo«ill4,  98,  122. 

Boulanger,  200. 

Bouras,  73. 

Bourbaki,  71,  76,  99-102,  105,  122 

Bourges,  Michel  de,  23. 

GAMBEITA 


lirim   General,  294. 

HriMon,  ileiui,  139,  191,  lU,  297,  ji6. 

Hrocj,  15  J. 

HroKlie,  Due  Albert  de,  121,  1J9,  166,  167,  I7»- 
176,  178-180,  i8j.  114-196,  190,  19J, 
I9i.  »95.  19V  i«4.  H7,  2«8  »W.  »JJ. 
240,     241,   301,   302. 

MroKlie,  Due  Victor  de,  20J. 

Bruat,  7j. 

Brun,  Lucien,  175. 

Hrunrt.  140. 

Hurtte.  Lou^f.  1 1,  14,  49. 

Buflct,  47,  140,  174,  192.  193,  I9<,  2l'j.  jn.  Jt , 

Buisfon,  Ferdiuaod   324. 

Burgoyne,  Sir  John   52. 

Hu*ch,  313. 

Onar,  Julius,  22. 

Cairoli,  29}. 

Cambon,  Jules,  31. 

CamescasK,  114. 

Campenon,  299,  302. 

Canrobert,  Marshal,  275,  301 

Carayon-Latour,  73,  214. 

Camot,  76. 

Camot,  Hippolyte,  25. 

Carnot,  Sadi,  114,  139,  278 

Casenove  de  Pradine,  214. 

Casimir-Perier,  186,  192,  206   214. 

Catalina,  22. 

Cathelineau,  63,  73,  122. 

Cato,  22. 

Cavaignac,  4,  21,  23. 

Cavour,  9,  322. 

Cazot,  Jules,  64,  299. 

Cendre,  15. 

Challemel-Lacour,  19,  21,  114,  152,  l}6,  171,  171, 

305,  306. 
CbamborJ,  Comte  de,  63,   112,   143,   146,   147 

151.  155.  178,  180,  184,  253. 
Changarnier,  General,  23,  140,  139,  166,  170. 
Channing,  146. 
Chaniy.  71,  80,  84,  91.  93-^5.  9*-«o«    "4,  107. 

121,  122,  132,  133,  291,  292. 
Charette,  63,  9>i,  122. 
Charles  V.,  Emperor,  7. 
Charles  X.,  227,  260. 
Charmetant,  Father,  292. 
Charras,  23. 
Cbartres,  Due  de,  63. 
Chateaubriand,  165. 
Chitelier,  M.  le,  14. 
Chaudey,  Gustave,  29. 

Chaudordy,  3,  9,  04,  115-118,  130,  225.  303. 
Choiseul.  220. 
Christophle,  Albert,  173. 
Cialdini,  General,  293. 
Cicero,  22. 

Clssey,  General  dr.  187,  191. 
Climenceau,  Georges,  139,  Hi,  214.  2**,  JI9. 
Clery,  14. 

Clinchant,  102,  105,  122. 
Cochin,  M.  Deny*,  254. 
Colbert,  165. 
Colomb,  De,  122. 
Columbus.  4,  31 1' 

Comte,  Auguste,  13,  32,  50,  27S,  279. 
Cond(^,  90. 
Constans,  214. 
Conti,  140. 
Comeille,  22. 
Corot,  6.  269. 

Courcel.  Baron  de,  292,  293,  30'.  5«*.  J' J- 
Crem-a^,  Geucr.il,  73,  122. 


333 


rXDEX 

,  t,  It.  U.  IT.  JLS.  S*  ••-•«.  «*.  *». 


Pkin^  »a  ••-fL  9*.  ««.  99k 


Okfi.  mv,  af.  9*.  «a«,  m«.  nv 

GtiMUt.  Si^  SI,  •»>  91.  9C.  R*a«T.  Dm—umOm  fc.  *»- 


•7-%. »», »-».  WMiM,  «♦,  n^  !»«. 
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334 


INDEX 


Joly,  Albert,  214. 
Inseph,  Father,  3:5 
jourde,  234. 
Jouy,  M.  de,  9. 
Ju1iu«  II.,  4. 
Jitssrlaiii,  71. 

KatkofI,  30]. 

Keller,  73,  133,  140,  148. 

Kliber,  63. 

Kiiss,  140. 

Laboulayp,  Gdouard,  188,  iqo,  191,  ao<>,  1^^^. 

Lacbaud,  12,  332. 

La  Fayette,  Etlmond  de,  234. 

Lacuerre,  Georges,  288. 

Lalance,  Auguste,  181. 

Lamarline,  ibi.  237,  267,  J82,  323. 

Lambrecht,  139. 

Lamorici^re,  23. 

Lamy,  Etienne,  31. 

l.anglois,  140,  142. 

Laonelongue,  152. 

Ljrabit,  129. 

Larcy,  De,  139. 

Lasteyrie,  2,54- 

Laurier,  Clement,  5,  12,  14,  17-19.  ^i.  aO,  64,  6<). 

Lavertujon,  50,  51,  58,  :5:. 

Lavii^erie,  Cardinal,  292. 

Le  Uoeuf,  28,  74- 

Lecesne,  Jules,  04,  70. 

Lecoiiite,  122. 

Lccomte,  General,  142. 

Ledru,  23. 

Ledru-KoUin,  186,  ig^. 

Leiorl,  General,  64,  65,  69,  70. 

Lemoine,  239. 

Leo  XIII.,  242,  243. 

Lioa,  L^onie,  243,  262,  263,  26S,  325. 

Lesseps,  25,  234. 

Lbouys,  Drouyn  de,  36,  38,  39.  115. 

Lionville,  8,  214. 

Lipowski,  73,  81. 

Littri,  278. 

Lockroy,  E.,  139,  142. 

Loubct,  F.mile,  214. 

Louis  XIV.,  39,  165,  179,  220. 

LouU  XVIII.,  201. 

Lou  5- Philippe,  138,  201,  227. 

Lou  'ois,  90. 

Lo>  tl,  72. 

Luc  Comte  de,  220. 

Luxembourg,  90. 

Lyons,  Lord,  52,  116  304,  305,  315 

Maccio,  291. 

MacMahon,  Marshal,  53,  59,  175-1/7,  188,  191, 

212,     217.     2t8,     229-232,     234       236-2JS, 

240,  251,  253.  259,  262. 
Madison,  188. 
Magne,  38. 
Magnin,  jf,  301. 
Malet,  Sir  Edward,  304. 
Manteufiel,  102,  105,  177. 
Marcel,  Etienne,  5. 
Marcdre,  De,  234. 
Marck,  Comte  de  la,  13. 
Marcou,  90. 
Marot,  Henri,  302. 
M.irtin,  Henri,  142,  304. 
Marx    Karl,  259. 
Massabie,  Jenny,  9. 
Massabic,  Marie-MagdiMfioc,  ;, 
Massenet,  Jules,  324. 
Mass.icau't,  T14. 
Mastai  (Pius  IX.),  3. 
Maurras  M.  Charles,  277. 


Maxiuiiliao,  Bmparor,  4* 

■1  .  -iiu,  «7. 

■ .  4  • 

•    Vicomtede,  14B    I7J.  i»o.  llj 
ibum  Gnuid  Dukt  ct,  8j.  •4.  M,  94 

JI4. 

fJ4 

.  AUred,  314. 
^'.  50.  194- 
Millciand,  Alexandre,  iM 
Millet,  6. 
Milli«re,  }8    140. 
Mirabeau,  8.  13,  50.  «5«.  i8S  »o«.  »j7,  j6t,  t*7. 

3>7.   W2 
Miribel,  General  de,  301,  502. 
Moll*rc,  28}. 

.Moltke,  42,  4^,  82.  90,  101,  119,  1*4,  151    1*3 
M'  ium>'-ii,  III. 
"•!  •     148,  f6j. 

:ntc  de,  159. 
^'  '..cr  dc,  190,  I9.V  jw 

Mult  .41,   .y. 

Momy,  Due  de,  17. 
Motterouge,  78. 
Mullcr,  216. 
Mun,  Albcn  de,  122. 
Murat,  4. 
Mibset,  De.  267. 

Napoleon  I.,  4,  6,  34,  39,  77,  91,  »oj,  223,  142. 

261. 
Napoleon  III.,  Louis  Bonaparte,  11,  ]S-4l,  )i, 

53.  5<>.  <>\.  «40,  201.  282. 
.\aqnet    214. 

Ncuville,  Alpbonse  de,  324. 
Niel,  Marshal,  41,  50. 
Noaillcs,  Marquis  de,  291. 
.Noir,  Victor,  28. 

Ochsenbem,  General,  73. 

O'Coiinell,  144. 

Ollivier,  F.mile,  10,  17,  27,  18.  41.  49.  51. 

Ordinaire,  Dionyi,  152. 

OrWans,  Due  d',  243. 

Orsini,  8,  32. 

Paiva,  246. 

Palikao,  52.  jj,  74.  75- 

Palliires,  Martin  des,  79,  81,  83,  87.  S9,  91,  fj. 

PalmerttoD,  3}. 

Paris,  Comtc  de,  18,  15s.  179.  184.  10:.  hi    :*i, 

253- 
Payrn,  73. 

Pelissier,  General,  73. 
Pellet,  Marcellin,  152,  214. 
Pelletan,  Camillc,  31,  57,  288. 
Pelletan,  Eugene,  109. 
Penhoat,  73,  122. 
Pephau,  IS,  329. 
Persiguy,  38. 

Peyrat,  21,  1 39,  190,  327,  316. 
Peytavin,  80. 

Picard,  Ernest,  10,  17.  «>.  57.  J8.  «1»- 
PichoD,  Stephen,  288. 
Piron,  9. 

Pius  IX.,  182,  226,  228,  229,  242. 
Polignac,  Due  de,  232. 
Polignac,  General  de,  73. 
Potlui.iii    A>lmiral,  139. 
P 
P  1.  139. 

Pre.  I,  10,  21,  165,  20J,  loti. 

Pr>juJiiuu,  i.i. 

Proust,  Aatonln,  214,  199. 

Prou>t,  Gabriel,  15a. 


335 


INDEX 


Quinet,  Edgar,  21,  26,  139,  140,  142,  186,  190, 
192,  194- 

Rabelais,  5,  12,  267. 

Ranc,  Arthur,  114,  139,  142,  152,  i75.  187,  193, 

216,  217,  220-»24,  248,  254,  325- 
Randon,  Marshal,  38. 
Kapbacl,  5. 
Raspail,  214. 
Kaynal,  299. 
Rebillard,  122. 
Reffye,  Colonel  de,  71. 
Reinach,  Joseph,  152,  262,  324,  329. 
Remusat,  Charles  de,  23,  148,  173, '75- 
Renan,  124,  269. 
Renault,  Uon,  14. 
Retz,  Cardinal  de,  307. 
Reyau,  General,  81. 
Reyuolds,  6. 
Ribot,  300. 

Ricard,  Xavier  de,  18,  114. 
Richelieu,  13,  124,  319,  325. 
Rivet,  149,  150. 
Rivieres,  Sere  de,  122. 
Robespierre,  13,  76. 
Rochebouet,  General  de,  241. 
Rochefort,  Henri,  28,  58,  60. 
Roon,  42. 
Rothan,  41. 
Rouher,  27,  157,  iSf>. 
Rousseau,  g,  13. 
Roussy,  64. 
Roustan,  291,  293. 
Rouvier,  299. 
Royer,  Le,  174. 
Royer-Collard,  165. 
Rubattino,  292. 
Ruiz,  224,  232,  236. 

Saint-Hilaire,  Barth61emy,  278,  279. 

Saint-Simon,  Due  de,  165. 

Saint-Vallier,  Comte  de,  171,  253,  "5^,  287,  293. 

Saisset,  Admiral,  142. 

Sal,  M.  de,  14. 

Salisbury,  Lord,  256,  315. 

Sallust,  22. 

Sand,  George,  270. 

SansbcBuf,  324. 

Saussier,  General,  122,  294,  295. 

Sauzet,  265. 

Say,  Leon,  190,  211,  262,  297,  298,  312. 

Schaelcher,  Victor,  139,  142. 

Scheurer-Kestner,  152,  268. 

Schiller,  121. 

Schmidt,  Adolph,  131. 

Schneider,  55,  120. 

Schurz,  Karl,  39. 

Serre,  De,  100,  loi,  165,  266. 

Seymour,  Admiral,  315. 

Silvy,  64. 

Simon,  Jules,  50,  58,  Oi,  67,  107-109,  139,  i74. 

218,  226,  228-230,  273. 
Sixtus  IV.,  4. 

Skobeleff,  General,  287,  303,  323. 
Socrates,  22. 

Sonis,  De,  72,  86,  95,  98,  102. 
Sorel,  \lbert.  115,  301. 
Spinola,  311. 
Spuller,  9,  14,  15,  144,  145,  152,  214.  232,  248, 

252.  254,  299- 
Stael,  Mme.  de  166. 
Steenackers,  64,  71. 


Stiehle,  General  von,  82,  iiq. 
Stoffel,  Colonel,  41,  175. 

Tacitus,  160. 

Taine,  63,  233. 

Talhouet,  47. 

Tann,  Von  der,  78-81,  84. 

Target,  214. 

Temple,  Du,  122,  183. 

T^not,  Eugene,  21. 

Testelin,  262. 

Tcutsch,  181. 

Tewfik  Pasha,  305. 

Thiers,  16,  17,  19,  23,  25,  28,  37,  5a,  54,  115,  116, 

130-132,  138-142,  144-151,  154,  158,  159. 

164-166,  169,  170-176,  178,  181,  186,  191, 

206,  218,  225,  235,  237,  238,  272,  278,  282 

285,  304. 
Thomas,  142. 

Thomson,  Gaston,  152,  329. 
Thoumas,  64,  71,  95,  109. 
Thrasea,  22. 
Tirman,  114. 
Tissot,  73,  313. 
Titian,  6. 

Tocqueville,  35,165,  205,  323. 
Trinquet,  273,  274. 
Trochu,  General,  52,  58,  62,  76,  79,  84,  87,  92, 

106,  n6. 
Turenne,  90. 
Turner,  6. 

Uhrich,  63. 

Vacherot,  140. 

Vacquerie,  Auguste,  234. 

Vaga,  Perino  del,  5. 

Valentin,  Edmond,  114. 

Valette,  La,  38,  40. 

Vannsay,  Comte  de,  179. 

Varus,  153. 

Vasili,  Comte  Paul,  272. 

Vatimesnil,  M.  de,  237. 

Vauban,  165. 

Vecker,  Dr.,  ig. 

Vergniaud,  8,  322. 

Verlaine,  9. 

Veronique,  General,  71. 

Victor  Emmanuel,  King,  41,  231. 

Vigny,  De,  267. 

Villemain,  5,  14. 

Vinols,  M.  de,  191. 

Vinoy,  59- 

Vitellius,  302. 

Vivieu,  23. 

Voltaire,  9,  255. 

Waddington,  248,  25G,  257,  262,  270,  277,  282, 

287,  291- 
Wagner,  Adolph,  131. 
Waldeck-Rousseau,  203,  299,  300. 
Wales,  Prince  of  (Edward  VIL),  222,  269. 
Walewski,  36. 
Wallon,  190,  191,  192,  206. 
Washington,  204. 
Weiss,  J. -J.,  283,  301,  302. 
VVerder,  xo2. 

William  L,  Emperor,  38,  39,  41,  42,  82,  158,  219. 
William  II.,  Emperor,  131,  251,  252. 
Wilson,  Daniel,  297,  307. 
Wolseley,  General,  319. 


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